Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 1986)
The mere exposure of a decision-maker to evidence in nonadversary investigative procedures does not violate due process unless the risk of unfairness is intolerably high.
Two firefighters filed a Section 1983 action alleging that their termination violated procedural due process because a civil service commission was biased by prior exposure to an investigative report. They also claimed that the public release of the report violated their constitutional right to privacy. The court held that the mere exposure of a tribunal to evidence from nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient to establish bias unless the risk of unfairness is intolerably high. Furthermore, the disclosure of information regarding unlawful drug use does not implicate a constitutionally protected interest in privacy. Because the complaint failed to state a claim for relief, the court affirmed the dismissal.
At page 839Determining legitimate expectation of privacy in personal information74 citing cases“rights of substantive due process are founded not upon state provisions but upon deeply rooted notions of fundamental personal interests derived from the constitution.”
- Dr. Rosario C. Pesce v. J. Sterling Morton High Sch., Dist. 201, Cook Cnty., Il, 830 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1987).published (public disclosure of certain information held by state is permissible only for compelling state interest served in least intrusive manner)
- Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1987).published (compelling interest analysis for all privacy violations)
- Wilkerson v. Phelps-Powers, No. 3:24-cv-00114 (S.D. Ohio June 24, 2025).(Information is constitutionally protected when a legitimate expectation exists that it will remain confidential while in the state’s possession.)
- Obispo de la Iglesia Católica v. Secretario de Justicia, 191 P.R. 292 (2014).published(Information is constitutionally protected when a legitimate expectation exists that it will remain confidential)
- Tapia v. City of Albuquerque, 10 F. Supp. 3d 1323 (D.N.M. 2014).published See Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d at 889 (“The legitimacy of an individual’s expectations depends, at least in part, upon the intimate or otherwise personal nature of the material.... ”).
- Tapia v. City of Albuquerque, 10 F. Supp. 3d 1207 (D.N.M. 2014).published (The legitimacy of an individual’s expectations depends, at least in part, upon the intimate or otherwise personal nature of the material....)
- United States v. Yazzie, 998 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (D.N.M. 2014).published (The legitimacy of an individual’s expectations depends, at least in part, upon the intimate or otherwise personal nature of the material....)
- Kerns v. Bd. of Com'rs of Bernalillo Cnty., 707 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D.N.M. 2010).published (The legitimacy of an individual’s expectations depends, at least in part, upon the intimate or otherwise personal nature of the material....)
- Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 2006).published (Validly enacted drug laws put citizens on notice that this realm is not a private one. Accurate information concerning such unlawful activity is not encompassed by any right of confidentiality . . . .)
- Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2000).published (Due process thus implies an assurance of confidentiality with respect to certain forms of personal information possessed by the state.)
Show 55 more citing cases
- Lockridge, No. 5:25-cv-03013 (D. Kan. Sept. 25, 2026).Kan. Oct. 2, 2025). 32 Sheets v. Salt Lake Cnty., 45 F.3d 1383 , 1387 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986). 33 Id. (further citation omitted). 34 Id. 35 Stidham v. Peace Officer Standards & Training…
- Nondoc Media & William W. Savage III v. State ex rel. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Of Oklahoma, 2026 OK 2.published The Reports are not protected by a constitutional right to privacy. ¶29 According to the ORA, the privacy interests of persons who disclose information to public bodies are "adequately protected in the specific exceptions to the Oklahoma O…
- Zesiger v. Leavenworth Cnty., No. 2:25-cv-02323 (D. Kan. Oct. 2, 2025).Kan. 2019). 25 Sheets v. Salt Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986)). 26 Id. (quoting Mangels, 789 F.2d at 839 ). 27 Id. (quoting Mangels, 789 F.2d at 839 ) (further ci…
- Hinkel v. Colling, No. 1:20-cv-00166 (D. Wyo. June 30, 2021).Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986).
- Trejo v. Deming Pub. Schs., No. 2:19-cv-00561 (D.N.M. Apr. 6, 2021).“Information is constitutionally protected when a legitimate expectation exists that it will remain confidential while in the state's possession”
- Stewart v. Oklahoma City City of, No. 5:18-cv-00420 (W.D. Okla. July 29, 2020).(Dkt. 98) at 7. 40 Id. 41 Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986). 42 Stidham v. Peace Officer Standards And Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1155 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted). intimate.”43 Thus, “[i]nformation readily…
- Todd v. Hause, 2015 COA 105, 371 P.3d 705.publishedT42 Accordingly, we reverse that part of the summary judgment order allowing redaction of the test takers' personal information and remand for further proceedings. 5 If the same issue arises on remand, the district *713 court must evaluate…
- Klaassen v. Univ. of Kansas Sch. of Med., 84 F. Supp. 3d 1228 (D. Kan. 2015).publishedSubstantive due process claims are not based on violations of state law; instead, they are founded upon “deeply rooted notions of fundamental personal interests derived from the Constitution.” Hennigh v. City of Shawnee, 155 F.3d 1249, 125…
- Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011).published See, e.g., A.L.A. v. West Valley City, 26 F.3d 989, 990 (10th Cir.1994) (considering claims arising from "disclosure of [] confidential medical information”) (emphasis added); Stidham v. Peace Officer Standards & Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1…
- Cross Continent Dev., LLC v. Town of Akron, 742 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (D. Colo. 2010).published“but upon deeply rooted notions of fundamental personal interests derived from the Constitution”
- Nunez v. Pachman, 578 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2009).published Second, even if we accept Nunez’s assertions that the expungement statute accomplishes a complete removal of a criminal record from the public domain, and that New Jersey law thus creates a reasonable expectation of privacy in this informa…
- Nelson v. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 568 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2009).published (finding that disclosure of drug use cannot violate constitu- tional right to informational privacy)
- Nelson v. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 530 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2008).published Validly enacted drug laws put citizens on notice that this realm is not a private one.” Id. at 839 (internal citations omitted).
- Silver v. Primero Reorganized Sch. Dist. No. 2, 619 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (D. Colo. 2007).published Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 , 97 S.Ct. 869 , 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977); Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir.1986).
- Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910 (10th Cir. 2006).published In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 , 97 S.Ct. 869 , 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977), the Supreme Court held that the constitutional right to privacy includes an “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.... ” Relying on Whalen…
- Thomas B. Hennigh v. City of Shawnee, 155 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1998).published
- Stidham v. Peace Officer Standards & Training, 265 F.3d 1144 (10th Cir. 2001).published
- Ortlieb v. Howery, 74 F. App'x 853 (10th Cir. 2003).unpublished
- Donohue v. Hoey, 109 F. App'x 340 (10th Cir. 2004).unpublished
- Robert A. Borucki v. W. Michael Ryan, 827 F.2d 836 (1st Cir. 1987).published
- Kauth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Illinois, 852 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1988).published
- Samuel J. Reich v. Patricia Beharry, 883 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1989).published
- Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1989).published
- No. 89-3082, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir. 1991).published
- Ramonita Santiago De Castro v. Victor Morales Medina, 943 F.2d 129 (1st Cir. 1991).published
- Holland v. City Of Broken Arrow, 972 F.2d 356 (10th Cir. 1992).published
- Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477 (10th Cir. 1994).published
- Demar Nilson v. Layton City & Rex Brimhall, 45 F.3d 369 (10th Cir. 1995).published
- Sheets v. Salt Lake Cnty., 45 F.3d 1383 (10th Cir. 1995).published
- Cynthia Bloch v. Sheriff L. John Ribar, 156 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 1998).published
- Bock Assocs. v. Chronister, 951 F. Supp. 969 (D. Kan. 1997).published
- Mason v. Stock, 869 F. Supp. 828 (D. Kan. 1994).published
- Jacobs v. Dujmovic, 752 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Colo. 1990).published
- Harris v. Bd. of Pub. Utils. of Kansas City, 757 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Kan. 1991).published
- Burns v. Brinkley, 933 F. Supp. 528 (E.D.N.C. 1996).published
- Austin v. Neal, 933 F. Supp. 444 (E.D. Pa. 1996).published
- Jones v. Temmer, 829 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Colo. 1993).published
- Houck v. City of Prairie Vill., 978 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Kan. 1997).published
- Patrick v. City of Overland Park, Kan., 937 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Kan. 1996).published
- Armstrong v. City of Arnett, 708 F. Supp. 320 (W.D. Okla. 1989).published
- Rice v. Vigil, 642 F. Supp. 212 (D.N.M. 1986).published
- Babbar v. Ebadi, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D. Kan. 1998).published
- Jones v. Wildgen, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (D. Kan. 2004).published
- Aid for Women v. Foulston, 427 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (D. Kan. 2006).published
- Travis v. Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921 (W.D. Wis. 1998).published
- Falvo v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-011, 233 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir. 2000).published
- Migneault v. Peck, 973 F. Supp. 1295 (D.N.M. 1997).published
- Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir. 1991).published
- Jane Doe v. Rob Bonta, 101 F.4th 633 (9th Cir. 2024).published
- DeVargas v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners for Santa Fe Cnty., No. 1:21-cv-00271 (D.N.M. May 12, 2022).
- Mecklenburg v. Kingfisher Indep. Sch. Dist. No 7, No. 5:22-cv-00089 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 2023).
- Univ. of Mississippi Med. Ctr. v. Christopher W. Hughes, No. 1999-CA-01126-SCT (Miss. June 2, 1999).published
- Univ. Of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Hughes, 765 So. 2d 528 (Miss. 2000).published
- Pike v. Gallagher, 829 F. Supp. 1254 (D.N.M. 1993).published
- Univ. of Mississippi Med. Ctr. v. Hughes, 765 So. 2d 528 (Miss. 2000).published
At page 838Presumption of honesty and integrity of decisionmakers43 citing cases“there must be some substantial countervailing reason to conclude that a decisionmaker is actually biased with respect to factual issues being adjudicated.”
- Downs v. Thompson, No. 2:17-cv-00330 (D. Utah Aug. 24, 2020). ([H]onesty and integrity are presumed on the part of a tribunal.)
- Smith v. City of Atlanta, 759 S.E.2d 63 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).published“a failure to comply with 5 state or local procedural requirements does not necessarily constitute a denial of due process; the alleged violation must result in a procedure which itself falls short of standards derived f…”
- Rodriguez-Ortega v. Rich, No. 1:21-cv-01129 (D.N.M. Aug. 20, 2024).“A failure to comply with state or local procedural requirements does not necessarily constitute a denial of due process; the alleged violation must result in a procedure which itself falls short of standards derived fro…”
- Lavine v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 4:22-cv-00570 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 29, 2024).See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007). “[A]n administrative law judge enjoys a presumption of honesty and integrity . . . which is only rebutted by a showing of ‘some substantial countervailing reason to conclude tha…
- Nicholson v. Carter, No. 1:23-cv-00380 (D. Md. Feb. 29, 2024).“[T]here must be some substantial countervailing reason to conclude that a decisionmaker is actually biased with respect to factual issues being adjudicated”
- Bruce v. Ogden City Corp., No. 22-4114, 2023 WL 8300363 (10th Cir. Dec. 1, 2023).unpublished“[d]ue process is violated only when ‘the risk of unfairness is intolerably high’ under the circumstances of a particular case”
- In the Interest of D.S., S.S, R.H., J.S., & S.S., Minors, 2023 Guam 13 (Guam 2023).publishedAs such, we decline to address these arguments. short of standards derived from the Due Process Clause.” Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 838-39 (10th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted); see also Nozzi v. Hous.
- Bley v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No I-041 of Oklahoma Cnty., No. 5:21-cv-01026 (W.D. Okla. May 9, 2023).“because honesty and integrity are presumed on the part of a tribunal, there must be some substantial countervailing reason to conclude that a decisionmaker is actually biased with respect to factual issues being adjudic…”
- Rhodes v. Regents of the Univ. of New Mexico, No. 1:21-cv-01128 (D.N.M. Oct. 20, 2022). “[a]n impartial tribunal is an essential element of a due process hearing”
- Cardona v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-00061 (D. Utah Sept. 22, 2021).An ALJ “enjoys a presumption of honesty and integrity, which is only rebutted by a showing of ‘some substantial countervailing reason to conclude that a decisionmaker is actually biased with respect to factual issues being adjudicated.’” H…
Show 30 more citing cases
- Smith v. Coyle Pub. Schs., No. 5:18-cv-00808 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 10, 2021).Because honesty and integrity are presumed on the part of a tribunal…there must be some substantial countervailing reason to conclude that a decisionmaker is actually biased with respect to factual issues being adjudicated[.] Mangels v. Pe…
- Morales-Aguilar v. Grant, No. 5:20-cv-00212 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 30, 2020).“some substantial countervailing reason to conclude that a decisionmaker is actually biased with respect to factual issues being adjudicated”
- Rodriguez v. Barnhart, No. 6:19-cv-00146 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 17, 2020).Moreover, “[b]ecause honesty and integrity are presumed on the part of a tribunal, there must be some substantial countervailing reason to conclude that a decision maker is actually biased with respect to factual issues being adjudicated.”…
- Messeri v. Univ. of Colorado, Boulder, No. 1:18-cv-02658, 2019 WL 4597875 (D. Colo. Sept. 23, 2019).Honesty and integrity are presumed, so there must also be “some substantial countervailing reason to conclude that a decisionmaker is actually biased with respect to the factual issues being adjudicated.” Id. (citing Mangels v. Pena, 789 F…
- Farrakhan-Muhammad v. Oliver, 688 F. App'x 560 (10th Cir. 2017).unpublishedBd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504 , 518 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir. 1986)).
- Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien Lp, 812 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2016).published (finding that adjudicator's pre-hearing exposure to an investigative report did not violate due process)
- Moore v. City of Tulsa, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1337 (N.D. Okla. 2014).published“The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution entitles each citizen to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation of a fundamental right.” Id. at 1256 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 5…
- Hanken v. Colvin, 68 F. Supp. 3d 1342 (D. Colo. 2014).published“some substantial countervailing reason to conclude that [the ALJ] is actually biased with respect to factual issues being adjudicated”
- Bjorklund v. Miller, 779 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (N.D. Okla. 2011).publishedMangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir.1986).
- Riggins v. Goodman, 572 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 2009).published Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482, 493 , 96 S.Ct. 2308 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976); Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir.1986).
- Highland Dev., Inc. v. Duchesne Cnty., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Utah 2007).publishedMangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir.1986).
- Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2004).published
- Cacy v. City of Chickasha, 124 F.3d 216 (10th Cir. 1997).published
- Harline v. Drug Enf't Admin., 148 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 1998).published
- Thomas B. Hennigh v. City of Shawnee, 155 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1998).published
- Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504 (10th Cir. 1998).published
- Harjo v. Varnum Pub. Sch., 166 F.3d 347 (10th Cir. 1998).unpublished
- Lovingier v. City of Black Hawk, No. 98-1133, 1999 WL 1029125 (10th Cir. Nov. 12, 1999).unpublished
- Williamson v. City of Edmond, No. 98-6462 (10th Cir. Dec. 16, 1999).unpublished
- Messina v. Fed. Heights, CO, No. 99-1380 (10th Cir. Aug. 14, 2000).unpublished
- United States v. Zalazar-Torres, 25 F. App'x 707 (10th Cir. 2001).unpublished
- Tanuwidjaja v. Holder, Jr., 352 F. App'x 281 (10th Cir. 2009).unpublished
- Larry & Karen Spielman v. Sara C. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1377 (10th Cir. 1989).published
- Hicks v. City of Watonga, 942 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1991).published
- Tommy G. Jones v. Jack Cowley, 948 F.2d 1294 (10th Cir. 1991).published
- Emil A. Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. Of Regents, 159 F.3d 504 (10th Cir. 1998).published
- Clark v. Town of Kersey, 973 F. Supp. 1217 (D. Colo. 1997).published
- Brown v. Youth Ctr. at Topeka, 883 F. Supp. 572 (D. Kan. 1995).published
- Johnson v. City of Wichita, 687 F. Supp. 1501 (D. Kan. 1988).published
- L.C. v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (D. Utah 2002).published
At page 837Insufficiency of exposure to evidence to establish bias17 citing casesobserving that an administrative adjudicator’s mere exposure to evidence presented in nonad-versary investigative procedures is insufficient” to establish bias
- Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2004).published
- Skeet v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 760 F. Supp. 872 (D. Kan. 1991).published
- Smith v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 755 F. Supp. 354 (D. Kan. 1990).published
- Fed. Deposit Ins. v. Thayer Ins. Agency, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 745 (D. Kan. 1991).published
- First Nat'l Bancshares of Beloit, Inc. v. Geisel, 853 F. Supp. 1337 (D. Kan. 1994).published
- Oltremari ex rel. McDaniel v. Kansas Soc. & Rehabilitative Serv., 871 F. Supp. 1331 (D. Kan. 1994).published
- Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. City of Lawrence, 715 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Kan. 1989).published
- Gray v. Univ. of Kansas Med. Ctr., 715 F. Supp. 1041 (D. Kan. 1989).published
- Tersiner v. Union Pac. R.R., 740 F. Supp. 1519 (D. Kan. 1990).published
- State of Kan. ex rel. Hayden v. United States, 748 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1990).published
Show 7 more citing cases
- Nal II, Ltd. v. Tonkin, 705 F. Supp. 522 (D. Kan. 1989).published
- Mason v. Twenty-Sixth Jud. Dist. of Kansas, 670 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Kan. 1987).published
- Freeman v. Medevac Midamerica of Kansas, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Kan. 1989).published
- Kjorlie v. Lundin, 765 F. Supp. 671 (D. Kan. 1991).published
- Kansas Hosp. Ass'n v. Whiteman, 851 F. Supp. 401 (D. Kan. 1994).published
- Wessinger v. Vetter Corp., 716 F. Supp. 537 (D. Kan. 1989).published
- Taylor v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 128 F.R.D. 118 (D. Kan. 1989).published
At page 889Determining legitimacy of individual expectations based on material nature1 citing caseThe legitimacy of an individual’s expectations depends, at least in part, upon the intimate or otherwise personal nature of the material....
- Tapia v. City of Albuquerque, 10 F. Supp. 3d 1323 (D.N.M. 2014).published (The legitimacy of an individual’s expectations depends, at least in part, upon the intimate or otherwise personal nature of the material....)
v.
Federico PENA, Mayor of the City and County of Denver John Simonet, Manager of Safety of the City and County of Denver Myrle K. Wise, Chief of the Denver Fire Department The Civil Service Commission of the City and County of Denver, a municipal corporation
Douglas C. Mangels and Randal K. Man-gels brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), alleging due process deprivations arising from the termination of their employment with the Denver Fire Department. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the Mangels appealed. We affirm on the alternative ground that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Wright v. Lane County District Court, 647 F.2d 940, 941 (9th Cir.1981) (per curiam).
I.
A complaint may not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief. Shoultz v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 754 F.2d 318, 321 (10th Cir.1985) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The pleadings must be liberally construed on appeal and all well-pleaded allegations accepted as true. Id.; Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir.1984). Viewed in this light, the facts appear as follows.
Douglas and Randal Mangels are firefighters within the civil service of the City and County of Denver.[1] In late 1983, an investigation conducted by the Internal Investigations and Inspection Bureau of the Denver Police Department (I.I.I.B.) indicated that both men had used contraband drugs. Myrle K. Wise, Chief of the Fire Department, informed the Mangels of impending disciplinary action and required each to make a personal statement. Chief Wise subsequently recommended dismissal to John Simonet, Manager of Safety, who approved this recommendation the same day. Along with eight other firefighters, the Mangels filed timely complaints with the Denver Civil Service Commission (Commission) requesting review of their termination orders.
Simonet transmitted to the Commission five complete copies of the original I.I.I.B. report, and each Commission member received a copy prior to the hearing. In addition, Simonet released the report to the news media. The report included statements by the firefighters and witnesses, polygraph examination results, and various supporting documents. There is no indication that the report contained personal information unrelated to the alleged drug use.
The Mangels filed this action for injunc-tive and monetary relief, naming as defendants Wise, Simonet, the Commission, the mayor of Denver, and the City itself. The Mangels claim (1) that they were denied procedural due process because the Commission’s advance exposure to the I.I.I.B. report improperly combined investigatory and adjudicative functibns to produce a biased tribunal, (2) that release of the report to the news media violated their constitutional right to privacy, and (3) that defendants violated state tort law.
The district court held a preliminary hearing and declined to enjoin either the Commission from proceeding with the appeals or the Manager of Safety from disseminating information about the Mangels’ employment. The court thereafter directed the parties to address whether its jurisdiction had properly been invoked. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted. The court ruled that Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975), forecloses the Mangels’ procedural due process[*838] claim, and that the right to privacy does not encompass the kind of information allegedly released to the media. The court further elected to dismiss the pendent state law claims.
II.
The complaint alleges that the Man-gels held a property interest in their jobs as firefighters as well as a liberty interest in their reputations and ability to find other employment. These interests are protected by the constitutional requirements of procedural due process. See generally Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). The Mangels do not dispute that they were granted notice and a hearing, at which they were represented by counsel and entitled to present and cross-examine witnesses. Rather, they contend that the Commission members’ prehearing exposure to the I.I. I.B. report biased the tribunal and that the hearing before the Commission therefore did not provide due process.
“An impartial tribunal is an essential element of a due process hearing.... A tribunal is not impartial if it is biased with respect to the factual issues to be decided at the hearing.” Miller v. City of Mission, 705 F.2d 368, 372 (10th Cir.1983) (citations omitted); see also Withrow, 421 U.S. at 46-47. However, “[t]he mere exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness” of a later adversary hearing. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 55, 95 S.Ct. at 1468. Due process is violated only when “the risk of unfairness is intolerably high” under the circumstances of a particular case. See id. at 58, 95 S.Ct. at 1470. Because honesty and integrity are presumed on the part of a tribunal, id. at 47, 95 S.Ct. at 1464, there must be some substantial countervailing reason to conclude that a decisionmaker is actually biased with respect to factual issues being adjudicated, see, e.g., Roberts v. Morton, 549 F.2d 158, 164 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834, 98 S.Ct. 121, 54 L.Ed.2d 95 (1977).
Under these principles, the complaint in this case does not state a claim for relief. It alleges that the Civil Service Commission was biased both by its advance exposure to the I.I.I.B. report and by the fact that the report was made public. Withrow forecloses precisely this argument as the basis for a procedural due process claim. The allegation of improper exposure to hearsay statements and polygraph examination results is insufficient to overcome Withrow’s presumption of administrative regularity. Hearsay is often admissible in administrative hearings, see, e.g., Hoska v. United States Department of the Army, 677 F.2d 131, 138-39 (D.C.Cir.1982), and the Man-gels have not argued otherwise in this case. More generally, such exposure is likely to occur whenever investigatory and administrative functions are combined, yet With-row unequivocally approves such combinations. The presumption stands that deci-sionmakers will decide cases in accordance with the proper substantive and procedural rules.
Nor does the publication of the I.I.I.B. report support the Mangels’ claim of bias. Although inflammatory publicity could bias a tribunal and thereby result in a denial of due process, see, e.g., Roberts, 549 F.2d at 164, the complaint here alleges only the fact of publication, not that media coverage was hostile or otherwise inflammatory. The likelihood of bias from the report being made public could thus be no greater than that due to the Commission’s direct, and constitutionally permissible, familiarity with the report.
Even assuming that Denver’s city charter would not authorize the Commission’s receipt of the report, as the Mangels argue, there has been no constitutional deprivation. A failure to comply with state or local procedural requirements does not necessarily constitute a denial of due process; the alleged violation must result in a procedure which itself falls short of standards derived from the Due Process Clause. See Atencio v. Board of Education, 658 F.2d 774, 779 & n. 11 (10th Cir.1981); accord Bowens v. North Carolina Department of Human Resources, 710 F.2d 1015, 1019[*839] (4th Cir.1983); Bates v. Sponberg, 547 F.2d 325, 329-30 (6th Cir.1976). Withrow provides the constitutional standard in this case, and that standard is not violated by the alleged conduct.
III.
The Due Process Clause directly protects fundamental aspects of personal privacy against intrusion by the State. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152, 93 S.Ct. 705, 726, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n. 23, 97 S.Ct. 869, 876 n. 23, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977). One aspect of this substantive due process arises from “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.” Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 & n. 25, 97 S.Ct. at 876 & n. 25; see also Denver Policemen’s Protective Association v. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 432, 435 (10th Cir.1981). Due process thus implies an assurance of confidentiality with respect to certain forms of personal information possessed by the state. Disclosure of such information must advance a compelling state interest which, in addition, must be accomplished in the least intrusive manner. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d at 435.
Information is constitutionally protected when a legitimate expectation exists that it will remain confidential while in the state’s possession. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 457-58, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2797-80, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511-12, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)); Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d at 435. The legitimacy of an individual’s expectations depends, at least in part, upon the intimate or otherwise personal nature of the material which the state possesses. Id.; see also United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (medical records protected).
The possession of contraband drugs does not implicate any aspect of personal identity which, under prevailing precedent, is entitled to constitutional protection. See Leary v. United States, 544 F.2d 1266, 1270 (5th Cir.1977) (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 n. 11, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1249-50 n. 11, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969)). Validly enacted drug laws put citizens on notice that this realm is not a private one. Accurate information concerning such unlawful activity is not encompassed by any right of confidentiality, and therefore it may be communicated to the news media.[2] See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1166, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976).
Any limited assurances of confidentiality offered by Denver officials to the Mangels do not make a difference in this case.[3] Rights of substantive due process are founded not upon state provisions but upon deeply rooted notions of fundamental personal interests derived from the Constitution. See Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 507, 515-16, 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring). The legitimacy of individual expectations of confidentiality must arise from the personal quality of any materials which the state possesses. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 457, 97 S.Ct. at 2797; Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d at 435. Allegations of a failure on the part of government officials to abide by their own assurances of confidentiality will not suffice to state a[*840] claim. Any. disclosed information must itself warrant protection under constitutional standards. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. at 1166.
IV.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the Mangels’ complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint is affirmed.
Although this information is not part of the record, the Mangels agreed at oral argument that they were reinstated following the district court’s order of dismissal.
An employee who is publicly stigmatized by inaccurate information in the course of termination proceedings is entitled to a name-clearing hearing. See McGhee v. Draper, 639 F.2d 639 (10th Cir.1981). In this case, the Mangels’ only procedural due process challenge concerns the alleged bias of the Commission, a challenge we have rejected in part II, supra. They do not assert a McGhee-type injury.
Before making statements to police investigators, the Mangels each signed a form which reads in pertinent part:
"This statement and answers to questions are given for departmental administrative purposes only, and shall be limited in use to the Department of Safety, the Civil Service Commission, or subsequent hearings relating to any disciplinary action of the Fire Chief or Manager of Safety."
Rec., vol. V, at B48, B64. The Mangels also seek to rely upon certain provisions of the Colorado Public Records Act, Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 24-72-101 et seq. (1973).