In re Arkansas Co.
Bankruptcy courts may exercise equitable power to grant retroactive approval of professional employment only in extraordinary circumstances.
A law firm served as counsel to a Chapter 11 creditors committee for thirteen months without obtaining prior court approval, citing its own oversight as the reason for the failure. The firm sought retroactive approval to recover compensation for services rendered. The court addresses whether bankruptcy courts possess the equitable power to grant such nunc pro tunc approval. The court holds that bankruptcy courts may authorize retroactive employment of professionals under their broad equity power, but only in extraordinary circumstances. The court rejects the notion that post-application review substitutes for prior approval, emphasizing the statutory requirement for advance authorization to prevent abuse. Because the firm’s failure resulted from its own neglect rather than hardship beyond its control, the court affirms the denial of retroactive approval.
At page 649Requiring prior court approval for creditors committee counsel32 citing cases“rejected the notion that a complete and thorough post-application review may substitute for prior approval ... because tbis approach would render meaningless the structure of the bankruptcy code and rules which contain provisions requiring both prior approval of employment and after the fact approv…”
- Dimitrios George Golesis, No. 23-22015 (Bankr. D. Utah Jan. 11, 2024). July 31, 2018) (citing In re Arkansas Co., 798 F.2d 645, 648 (3d Cir. 1986)). 22 In re Wellington, 628 B.R. 19 , 29 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2021) (citations omitted); see also In re Young, 646 B.R. 779 , 783 (Bankr. W.D.
- Ronald F. Aller & Joan L. Aller, No. 18-22878 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2023).The United States Court of Appeals has held that “with the court’s approval” in section 327(a) contemplates “prior approval.” Matter of Arkansas Co. Inc., 798 F.2d 645, 649 (3d Cir. 1986).
- Bear Commc'ns, LLC, No. 21-10495 (Bankr. D. Kan. Sept. 17, 2021).Colo. Mar. 17, 2017) (citing In re Arkansas Co., 798 F.2d 645, 649-50 (8d Cir. 1986)). 44 1408.
- MRPC Christiana, LLC v. Crown Bank, No. 19-01053 (Bankr. D.N.J. Dec. 5, 2019).unpublishedEntm't Corp., 316 B.R. 141, 145 (D.Del. 2004). 99 In re G—I Holdings, Inc., 313 B.R. 612, 628 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2004) (Gambardella, J.). 100 In re Arkansas Co., Inc., 798 F.2d 645, 649 (3d Cir. 1986). 101 Brown v. Warden Canaan USP, 2019 WL 1…
- In re McCollom Interests, LLC, 551 B.R. 292 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2016).published(stating that the Code “was designed to eliminate the abuses and detrimental practices ... [such as] the cronyism of the ‘bankruptcy ring* and attorney control of bankruptcy cases.)
- In re Grasso, 490 B.R. 500 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013).published The Third Circuit has held that § 327(a) contemplates “prior approval.” Matter of Arkansas Co. Inc., 798 F.2d 645, 649 (3d Cir.1986) (emphasis added).
- Off. of the U.S. Tr. v. McQuaide (In re CNH, Inc.), 304 B.R. 177 (M.D. Pa. 2004).publishedIn re Arkansas Company, Inc., 798 F.2d 645, 649 (3d Cir.1986).
- In re First Merchants Acceptance Corp., Debtor v. J. C. Bradford & Co., 198 F.3d 394 (1st Cir. 2000).publishedIn Matter of Arkansas Co., Inc., 798 F.2d 645, 649 (3d Cir.1986), we held that a court may authorize employment of counsel nunc pro tunc only under extraordinary circumstances, explaining that the requirement of prior court approval “was d…
- In re First Merch. Accept. Corp. v. JC Bradford & Co., No. 98-5377 (3d Cir. Dec. 14, 1999).In Matter of Arkansas Co., Inc., 798 F.2d 645, 649 (3d Cir. 1986), we held that a court may 9 authorize employment of counsel nunc pro tunc only under extraordinary circumstances, explaining that the requirement of prior court approval "wa…
- In re United Companies Fin. Corp., 241 B.R. 521 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999).publishedSee, e.g., F/S Airlease II, Inc. v. Simon, 844 F.2d 99 , 105 (3d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 852 , 109 S.Ct. 137 , 102 L.Ed.2d 110 (1988); In re Arkansas Co., Inc., 798 F.2d 645, 649-50 (3d Cir.1986).
Show 20 more citing cases
- In re Gutterman, 239 B.R. 828 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1999).publishedSee In re Land, 943 F.2d 1265 (10th Cir.1991); In re Arkansas Co., 798 F.2d 645, 649 (3rd Cir.1986); In re Triangle Chemicals, Inc., 697 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir.1983).
- In re Brierwood Manor, Inc., 239 B.R. 709 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1999).publishedThe Third Circuit “reject[ed] the notion that a complete and thorough post-application review may substitute for prior approval ... [because] [t]bis approach would render meaningless the structure of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules which con…
- In re Balli, 228 B.R. 546 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1998).publishedNews 5787, 5963, 6053.” Matter of Arkansas Co., 798 F.2d 645, 649 (3rd Cir.1986).
- In re ABC Auto. Prods. Corp., 210 B.R. 437 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997).published(function of unsecured creditors’ committee is to “negotiate with the debtor in possession in the formulation of a plan)
- In re Singson, 41 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 1994).published We are not persuaded by, and do not follow, cases such as In re Land, 943 F.2d 1265 (10th Cir.1991); In re Arkansas Co., 798 F.2d 645, 649 (3d Cir.1986); and In re Kroeger Properties & Development, Inc., 57 B.R. 821 (9th Cir. BAP 1986), th…
- In re Meyers, 169 B.R. 273 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1994).publishedTo grant relief in any other than the most extraordinary circumstances would render the above Code and Rule provisions meaningless, see In re Arkansas Company, Inc., 798 F.2d 645, 649 (3d Cir.1986), and for practical purposes we feel bound…
- Gowan v. Lefkas Gen. Partners No. 1017 (In re Lefkas Gen. Partners No. 1017), 153 B.R. 804 (N.D. Ill. 1993).publishedIn re Arkansas Co., Inc., 798 F.2d 645, 649 (3d Cir.1986); Banhalmi, 84 B.R. at 127 . 3 .
- In re Luchka, 152 B.R. 18 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1993).publishedTo grant relief in any other than the most extraordinary circumstances would render the above Code and Rule provisions meaningless, see In re Arkansas Company, Inc., 798 F.2d 645, 649 (3d Cir.1986), and for practical purposes we feel bound…
- In re Sound Radio, Inc., 145 B.R. 193 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992).published Matter of Arkansas Co., Inc., 798 F.2d 645, 649 (3d Cir.1986).
- In re Rheam of Indiana, Inc., 137 B.R. 151 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992).publishedOn remand from Rheam III on this issue, 133 B.R. at 336-39 , we determine that the auctioneer belatedly appointed on behalf of the estate, William F. Comly & Son, Inc. (“Comly”), cannot recover any compensation for his services, as it has…
- In re James W. LAND & Lois L. Land, Debtors. James W. LAND, Lois L. Land & Thomas J. Kerwin, Appellants, v. FIRST Nat'l BANK OF ALAMOSA, Appellee, 943 F.2d 1265 (1st Cir. 1991).publishedIn re Arkansas Co., 798 F.2d 645, 649-50 (3d Cir.1986).
- In re Pillowtex, Inc. Patricia A. Staiano, the United States Tr., 304 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2002).published
- In re Metro. Hosp., 119 B.R. 910 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990).published
- Indian River Homes, Inc. v. Sussex Trust Co., 108 B.R. 46 (D. Del. 1989).published
- In re Banhalmi, 84 B.R. 123 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988).published
- In re Emco Enter., Inc., 94 B.R. 184 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1988).published
- Land v. First Nat'l Bank in Alamosa (In re Land), 116 B.R. 798 (D. Colo. 1990).published
- In re B.E.S. Concrete Prods., Inc., 93 B.R. 228 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1988).published
- In re Rheam of Indiana, Inc., 133 B.R. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1991).published
- In re Bechuck, 472 B.R. 371 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2012).published
At page 648Courts' power to grant retroactive attorney approval in bankruptcy24 citing cases“bankruptcy courts have the power to authorize retroactive employment of counsel and other professionals under their broad equity power . . . where equitable concerns weigh in favor of granting retroactive approval to enable deserving professionals to recover compensation for work actually done.”
- Byron David v. Donald King, 109 F.4th 653 (4th Cir. 2024).publishedWhat is more, bankruptcy courts have traditionally been guided by “equitable principles.” In re Arkansas Co., 798 F.2d 645, 648 (3d Cir. 1986).
- Dimitrios George Golesis, No. 23-22015 (Bankr. D. Utah Jan. 11, 2024). July 31, 2018) (citing In re Arkansas Co., 798 F.2d 645, 648 (3d Cir. 1986)). 22 In re Wellington, 628 B.R. 19 , 29 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2021) (citations omitted); see also In re Young, 646 B.R. 779 , 783 (Bankr. W.D.
- Matthew W. Young & Carla R. Young, No. 18-24621 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2022).Ill. 2002). 22 See In re Arkansas Co., 798 F.2d 645, 648 (3d Cir. 1986); Fairnash v. Vergos (In re Aultman Enterprises), 264 B.R. 485, 490 (E.D.
- In re Carter, 533 B.R. 632 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2015).publishedCorp.), 837 F.2d 389, 392 (9th Cir.1988); In re Arkansas Co., Inc., 798 F.2d 645, 648-50 (3rd Cir.1986); In re Triangle Chems., Inc. 697 F.2d 1280, 1284 (5th Cir.1983).
- In re McKenzie, 449 B.R. 306 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2011).publishedIn re Jarvis, 53 F.3d 416 (1st Cir.1995); In re Singson, 41 F.3d 316, 319-20 (7th Cir.1994); Land v. First Nat’l Bank of Alamosa (In re Land), 943 F.2d 1265, 1267-68 (10th Cir.1991); F/S Airlease II, Inc. v. Simon (In re F/S Airlease II, I…
- In re Motors Liquidation Co., 438 B.R. 365 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).published See In re Arkansas Co., 798 F.2d 645, 648 (3d Cir.1986) (quoted above); Triangle Chemicals, 697 F.2d at 1282 ("we prefer to adopt the rationale of those decisions, principally of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, that would permit nunc pro t…
- In re ACandS, Inc., 297 B.R. 395 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).published Indeed, the purpose of the rule is deeply embedded in bankruptcy jurisprudence, and overarches fee issues: We have previously characterized the requirement of prior approval of employment as a means of ensuring “that the court may know the…
- In re Lehigh Valley Prof'l Sports Clubs, Inc., 260 B.R. 745 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001).publishedThe issue is therefore when it is appropriate to do so. 12 .The court found support for that conclusion, as do I, in the Third Circuit's decisions in In re F/S Airlease II v. Simon, 844 F.2d 99 , 105-08 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 85…
- In re William Engel, Debtor. Ferrara & Hantman Robert J. Hantman v. Jesus Antonio Alvarez Theodore J. Liscinski, Jr., Tr. United States Tr., 124 F.3d 567 (3d Cir. 1997).published Thus, in In re Arkansas Company, Inc., 798 F.2d 645, 648-49 (3d Cir.1986), we rejected "the notion that a complete and thorough post-application review may substitute for prior approval in most cases.
- Chrysler Credit Corp. v. B.J.M., Jr., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 813 (E.D. Pa. 1993).publishedMatter of Arkansas Co., Inc., 798 F.2d 645, 648 (3rd Cir.1986).
Show 13 more citing cases
- In re Chiapetta, 159 B.R. 152 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993).publishedAs we noted at the hearing of July 27, 1993, and the Debtor does not apparently contest, the requirements of In re F/S Airlease v. Simon, 844 F.2d 99 , 105-08 (3rd Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 852 , 109 S.Ct. 137 , 102 L.Ed.2d 110 ; a…
- In re Schubert, 143 B.R. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).publishedSee, e.g., F/S Airlease II, Inc. v. Simon, 844 F.2d 99 , 105-08 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 852 , 109 S.Ct. 137 , 102 L.Ed.2d 110 (1988); In Matter of Arkansas Co., 798 F.2d 645, 648-50 (3d Cir.1986); Lavender v. Wood Law Firm, 785 F…
- In re Off. Prods. of Am., Inc., 136 B.R. 675 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992).publishedPrior approval of employment helps to advance this purpose by ensuring “ ‘that the court may know the type of individual who is engaged in the proceeding, their [sic] integrity, their [sic] experience in connection with work of this type,…
- In re Fricker, 131 B.R. 932 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991).publishedSee In re F/S Airlease II, Inc. v. Simon, 844 F.2d 99 , 105-08 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 852 , 109 S.Ct. 137 , 102 L.Ed.2d 110 (1988); In re Arkansas Co., 798 F.2d 645, 648-57 (3d Cir.1986); and St.
- In re Jarvis, 53 F.3d 416 (1st Cir. 1995).published
- In re Saint Joseph's Hosp., 102 B.R. 416 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).published
- In re City Wide Press, Inc., 102 B.R. 431 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).published
- In re 31-33 Corp., 100 B.R. 744 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).published
- F/s Airlease II, Inc. v. Simon, 84 B.R. 389 (W.D. Pa. 1986).published
- In re Rheam of Indiana, Inc., 111 B.R. 87 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990).published
- 222 Liberty Assocs. v. Prescott Forbes Real Est. Corp. (In re 222 Liberty Assocs.), 110 B.R. 196 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990).published
- In re TM Carlton House Partners, Ltd., 93 B.R. 875 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).published
- Miller v. Greenwich Capital Fin. Prods., Inc. (In re Am. Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc.), 457 B.R. 314 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).published
At page 650Granting retroactive approval for professional appointments23 citing cases[In retroactively authorizing employment,] the bankruptcy court must consider whether the particular circumstances in the case adequately excuse the failure to have sought prior approval.
- Syed Rizwan Mohiuddin, No. 15-34752 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 7, 2021).([In retroactively authorizing employment,] the bankruptcy court must consider whether the particular circumstances in the case adequately excuse the failure to have sought prior approval.)
- Judy A Cheeseman, No. 24-10107 (Bankr. D. Vt. Mar. 10, 2025).unpublished(finding no extraordinary circumstances for delay caused by debtor in obtaining approval to employ financial advisor)
- Dimitrios George Golesis, No. 23-22015 (Bankr. D. Utah Jan. 11, 2024). July 31, 2018) (citing In re Arkansas Co., 798 F.2d 645, 648 (3d Cir. 1986)). 22 In re Wellington, 628 B.R. 19 , 29 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2021) (citations omitted); see also In re Young, 646 B.R. 779 , 783 (Bankr. W.D.
- In re Mallinckrodt plc, No. 1:21-cv-00398 (D. Del. Mar. 28, 2022).The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Granting Retroactive Approval Under controlling Third Circuit law, “bankruptcy courts have the power to authorize retroactive employment of counsel and other professionals under their br…
- In re Mallinckrodt plc, No. 1:21-cv-00268 (D. Del. Mar. 28, 2022).Under controlling Third Circuit law, “bankruptcy courts have the power to authorize retroactive employment of counsel and other professionals under their broad equity power . . . [w]here equitable concerns weigh in favor of granting retroa…
- Fibercorr Mills LLC, No. 20-61029 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Apr. 20, 2021).Ohio 1997) (quoting Matter of Arkansas Co., 798 F.2d 645, 650 (3rd Cir. 1986)); In re Roberts, 618 B.R. 213 , 216-17 (Bankr. S.D.
- In re Pilgrim Med. Ctr., Inc., 574 B.R. 523 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2017).published(also noted that retroactive approval is not permitted when it results from inattention or oversight by counsel)
- In re Grasso, 490 B.R. 500 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013).published The Third Circuit has held that § 327(a) contemplates “prior approval.” Matter of Arkansas Co. Inc., 798 F.2d 645, 649 (3d Cir.1986) (emphasis added).
- In re Renaissance Residential of Countryside, LLC, 423 B.R. 848 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010).publishedLefkas, 153 B.R. at 808 n. 2 (quoting In re Arkansas Co., 798 F.2d 645, 650 (3d Cir.1986)).
- In re Wren, 315 B.R. 921 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2004).publishedThe court declined to approve the appointment of counsel nunc pro tunc because “retroactive approval of appointment of a professional may be granted by the bankruptcy court in its discretion but that it should grant such approval only unde…
Show 13 more citing cases
- In re Princeton Med. Mgmt. Inc., 249 B.R. 813 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000).publishedIn re Arkansas Co., 798 F.2d 645, 650 (3d Cir.1986).
- In re Schachter, 228 B.R. 359 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999).published Although this may not be true in the jurisdic *365 tions in which these cases were decided, the issue of when such appointment is appropriate has been set down in clear and narrow terms by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in F/S Airlease…
- In re Ewi, Inc., 208 B.R. 885 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1997).publishedThis court addressed the issue of nunc pro tunc appointments in Matter of Platinum *896 Power Co., 105 B.R. 381 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1989) and quoted, in denying the application before it, Matter of Arkansas Company, 798 F.2d 645, 650 (3d Cir.1…
- In the Matter of: Grabill Corp., Debtors-Appellees. Appeal of: Daniel M. Pelliccioni, 983 F.2d 773 (7th Cir. 1993).publishedStolkin v. Nachman, 472 F.2d 222, 226-27 (7th Cir.1973); Chicago & West Towns Rys. v. Friedman, 230 F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir.1956); In re Arkansas Co., 798 F.2d 645, 650 (3d Cir.1986); In re Cormier, 35 B.R. 424, 425 (D.Me.1983); In re Met-L…
- In re T & D Tool, Inc., 132 B.R. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1991).publishedId. at 105 (citing In re: Arkansas Co., 798 F.2d 645, 650 (3d Cir.1986)).
- Indian River Homes, Inc. v. Sussex Trust Co., 108 B.R. 46 (D. Del. 1989).published
- In re Taylor, 66 B.R. 390 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986).published
- Frank v. Pica Sys., Inc. (In re Pica Sys., Inc.), 124 B.R. 30 (E.D. Mich. 1991).published
- In re the Music Store, Inc., 241 B.R. 752 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1999).published
- In re Worldwide Direct, Inc., 316 B.R. 637 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004).published
- Matter of Timberline Prop. Dev., Inc., 115 B.R. 787 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1990).published
- In re Crescent Mfg. Co., 122 B.R. 979 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990).published
- Matter of Platinum Power Co., Inc., 105 B.R. 381 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989).published
At page 647Limiting retroactive approval of counsel employment2 citing cases“In the case relied on by the district court, In re Triangle Chemicals, Inc., 697 F.2d 1280, 1284 (5th Cir.1983), the court held that the bankruptcy court is not compelled by a per se rule to deny retroactive approval of employment of counsel by a debtor in possession.”
- In re Stroudsburg Dyeing & Finishing Co., 209 B.R. 648 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1997).publishedMatter of Arkansas Co., 798 F.2d 645, 647-648 (3rd Cir.1986).
At page 699cited at this page1 citing case
- In re Jefsaba, Inc., 172 B.R. 786 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994).publishedSee In re F/S Airlease II, Inc. v. Simon, 844 F.2d 99 , 105 (3rd Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 852 , 109 S.Ct. 137 , 102 L.Ed.2d 110 (1988); In re Arkansas Co., 798 F.2d 645, 699 (3d Cir.1986).
OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.I.
Introduction
This case raises two issues. First, does the bankruptcy court have the power to grant retroactive approval of the employment of an attorney by a creditors committee in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings? Second, if such power exists, what standard should govern the grant of retroactive approval? We hold that bankruptcy courts may, in extraordinary circumstances, grant retroactive approval of professional employment. We also hold, however, that in this case no extraordinary circumstances were alleged to justify retroactive approval.
II.
Facts
Arkansas Company, Inc. filed a petition for reorganization pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. At the first meeting of the Unsecured Creditors Committee on November 28, 1983, the Committee recommended the employment of Benenson & Scher as the Committee’s counsel.
Through Benenson & Scher’s own oversight, it apparently failed to obtain the return of an affidavit certifying its retention which it had mailed to the Committee chairman, and it failed to file an application for court approval of its employment as Committee counsel. Benenson & Scher rendered legal services to the Creditors Committee for thirteen months before discovering in January 1985 that it had failed to obtain the requisite court approval. It then promptly prepared and submitted to the court an application for approval of its employment as counsel. On January 28, 1985, Benenson & Scher’s employment by the Committee from that date forward was approved by the bankruptcy court.
Benenson & Scher subsequently moved the bankruptcy court to approve retroactively its employment from November 28, 1983. In his affidavit Elliot Scher attributed his firm’s failure to file the affidavit of the chairman of the creditors committee selecting Scher’s firm as counsel only to “inadvertance.” App. at 8. The bankruptcy court denied the motion in an order without opinion. However, during the hearing on the motion, the bankruptcy court asserted its belief that under the Bankruptcy Code and this court’s decision in In re Hydrocarbon Chemicals, Inc., 411 F.2d 203 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 823, 90 S.Ct. 66, 76, 24 L.Ed.2d 74 (1969), it was without power to grant retroactive approval of professional employment. It also expressed its disapproval of the excuse given by Benenson & Scher for its failure to obtain prior court approval.
Benenson & Scher appealed to the district court. That court stated that, although this circuit had never actually recognized the power of bankruptcy courts to exercise their discretion to grant retroactive approval, it found persuasive the decision in In re Triangle Chemicals, Inc., 697 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir.1983), that there was such discretion in rare or exceptional circumstances. The district court then considered whether retroactive approval should have been granted in this case. The district court construed the bankruptcy judge’s comments at the hearing as suggesting that even if he had had the power to grant authorization nunc pro tunc, he would not have done so if the only reason given was “I forgot.” The district court stated that bankruptcy court control over attorneys practicing before it, and over the expenditure of assets to employ those at[*647]torneys, would be significantly reduced were counsel’s own oversight allowed to justify failure to obtain prior approval. The court therefore affirmed the denial of retroactive approval, suggesting that such approvals “be limited to cases in which the party seeking approval shows that it would otherwise be subject to an extraordinary hardship not of its own making.” In re Arkansas Co., Inc., 55 B.R. 384, 386 (D.N.J.1985). Benenson & Scher appeals.
III.
Discussion
The Bankruptcy Code provides that “with the court’s approval, [a creditors] committee may select and authorize the employment by such committee of one or more attorneys.” 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (emphasis added). The United States Trustee, appearing here as the appellee, concurs with the appellant that the language of the statute does not preclude the bankruptcy court from exercising its equitable powers to grant an order authorizing retention of counsel for the creditors committee nunc pro tunc in an appropriate case. Nonetheless, we must decide if that proposition of law is correct.
In the case relied on by the district court, In re Triangle Chemicals, Inc., 697 F.2d 1280, 1284 (5th Cir.1983), the court held that the bankruptcy court is not compelled by a per se rule to deny retroactive approval of employment of counsel by a debtor in possession. Although the court construed the Bankruptcy Code and the applicable rules of bankruptcy procedure to require the debtor in possession to obtain approval of the bankruptcy court before employing an attorney, the court held that they “do not in terms or necessary implication prohibit the court in its discretion from granting its approval, nunc pro tunc, at a date subsequent to the employment and after the services are rendered, providing that the required showing is made ... warranting the approval.” Id. at 1284 (emphasis omitted). See also In re Cormier, 35 B.R. 424, 425 (D.Me.1983); In re Twinton Properties Partnership, 27 B.R. 817, 819 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1983).
The bankruptcy court in this case believed that this court’s decision in In re Hydrocarbon Chemicals, Inc., 411 F.2d 203 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 823, 90 S.Ct. 66, 76, 24 L.Ed.2d 74 (1969), precluded it from exercising discretion to give retroactive approval. It is true that in Hydrocarbon we affirmed denial of a counsel fee and we pointed out that counsel had failed to seek prior approval of the court. However, our holding denying counsel fee was based on the absence of any provision in the Bankruptcy Act authorizing employment of the petitioning counsel, who had been retained by counsel for the debtor. We stated explicitly, “there is no provision in the Bankruptcy Act for paying more than one fee to counsel for the debtor, nor is there any provision in the Act for employment of other counsel for the counsel for the debtor.” Id. at 205. Moreover, the debtor was out of possession, and the receiver who was managing the property had already appointed two law firms as well as an accountant to perform any necessary services for the estate. Thus, we stated, “there was no necessity whatsoever for counsel for the debtor employing counsel without the approval of the court.” Id. It follows that even timely approval would have been denied. Understandably, in the later discussion of the failure to seek approval, the court did not discuss the possibility of a nunc pro tunc order, since it would have been fruitless.
It is evident, therefore, as the Triangle Chemicals court noted, that even though Hydrocarbon is sometimes cited among cases indicating an inflexible per se rule precluding compensation in the absence of prior court approval, in fact it is one of those cases where some reason other than the failure to obtain prior approval controlled the disallowance of payment of attorney’s fees. See Triangle Chemicals, 697 F.2d at 1285-86.
The seemingly broad language of Hydrocarbon was further interpreted in our later opinion in In re Designaire Modular Home [*648] Corp., 517 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir.1975). By then the relevant Bankruptcy Rule had been revised, and we held that the new Rule did not preclude award of a fee out of the bankrupt’s estate to an attorney representing a debtor out of possession who had not obtained prior court approval if the attorney had performed services useful to the estate which did not duplicate the services of the receiver or his attorney. We described the majority opinion in Hydrocarbon as “somewhat ambiguous”, but remarked that the holding that an attorney for a corporate debtor has no general authority to retain co-counsel is “unexceptional.” Id. at 1019. In discussing the need to obtain prior approval for appointment of counsel, we contrasted an attorney for the receiver or debtor in possession who has a fiduciary obligation toward the creditors and who therefore needs the prior approval of the bankruptcy court with the attorney for the debtor out of possession whose obligation is only to the debtor. Id. at 1018-19. Once again, we did not discuss the possibility of a nunc pro tunc order, since we held no prior approval was needed.[1]
It is therefore an open question in this court whether the bankruptcy court has the power to grant retroactive approval of the employment of an attorney in Chapter 11 proceedings. Some of the bankruptcy courts in this circuit have postulated such power and have acted accordingly. See In re Freehold Music Center, Inc., 49 B.R. 293 (Bankr.D.N.J.1985); In re Bible Deliverance Evangelistic Church, 39 B.R. 768, 771-72 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1984). Contra In re Whitmere Development Corp., — B.R. — No. 82-05797 (Bankr.D.N.J. July 23, 1986); In re Lewis, 30 B.R. 404 (Bankr.E. D.Pa.1983). We now express our agreement with those circuits that hold that the bankruptcy courts have the power to authorize retroactive employment of counsel and other professionals under their broad equity power. See In re Triangle Chemicals, Inc., 697 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir.1983); In re Laurent Watch Co., Inc., 539 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir.1976) (per curiam); Stolkin v. Nachman, 472 F.2d 222 (7th Cir.1973). The bankruptcy courts have traditionally been governed by equitable principles rather than statutory technicalities. Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103, 87 S.Ct. 274, 277, 17 L.Ed.2d 197 (1966). Where equitable concerns weigh in favor of granting retroactive approval to enable deserving professionals to recover compensation for work actually done, we see nothing in the statute that denies the bankruptcy court the power to grant such retroactive approval.
It does not follow that such retroactive approval should be forthcoming merely because the court would have given approval if timely requested. Such a lenient rule would subvert Congress’ purpose in imposing a prior approval requirement. We have previously characterized the requirement of prior approval of employment as a means of ensuring “that the court may know the type of individual who is engaged in the proceeding, their integrity, their experience in connection with work of this type, as well as their competency concerning the same.” Hydrocarbon, 411 F.2d at 205.
It has been suggested that these concerns can be amply attended to by the bankruptcy court’s after-the-fact control over compensation, see In re Bill & Paul’s Sporthaus, Inc., 31 B.R. 345 (Bankr.W.D. Mich.1983); In re King Electric Co., 19 B.R. 660, 663 (E.D.Va.1982), and the bankruptcy court's knowledge, through observation, of the attorney’s presence and qualifications. See In re Laurent Watch Co., 539 F.2d 1231, 1232 (9th Cir.1976) (per cu[*649]riam). We reject the notion that a complete and thorough post-application review may substitute for prior approval in most cases. This approach would render meaningless the structure of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules which contain provisions requiring both prior approval of employment and after the fact approval of compensation. 11 U.S.C. §§ 327(a), 1103(a), 330; Bankruptcy Rules 2014(a), 2016, 2017.
It is significant that Congress chose to place the requirement of court approval for the employment of an attorney, accountant, or other professional by the creditors committee directly in the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a). The legislative history makes clear that the 1978 Code was designed to eliminate the abuses and detrimental practices that had been found to prevail. Among such practices was the cronyism of the “bankruptcy ring” and attorney control of bankruptcy cases. In fact, the House Report noted that “[i]n practice ... the bankruptcy system operates more for the benefit of attorneys than for the benefit of creditors.” H.R. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5787, 5963, 6053.
As detailed in the House Report, the official committee of unsecured creditors whose function was (and still is) to negotiate with the debtor in possession in the formulation of a plan was elected by the unsecured creditors, much as the trustee was elected in a liquidation case. Although the members of the committee are not compensated, the counsel to the creditors committee is paid, and, as described by the Report, “it is a lucrative position.” “Thus,” the Report continued, “creditors’ attorneys with proxies participate actively in the election of the members of the committee in order that they may be selected as counsel to the committee.” Id. at 93, 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6054. As in the case of the election of a trustee in liquidation proceedings, “those operating the system turn it to their own advantage.” Id. at 92, 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6053. The Report stated further:
Frequently, an attorney that has represented a creditor in past cases will notify him of the bankruptcy of one of the creditor’s current debtors. The attorney then obtains a proxy from the creditor to vote the creditor’s interest in the case. An attorney may obtain numerous proxies in a particular case in this manner. When the trustee is to be elected, the attorney votes all of his proxies for a colleague. The colleague thus elected then hires the attorney to serve as counsel to the trustee in the case, assuring a fee for his services. The fee for counsel is usually substantially higher than the fee for the trustee, because it is not limited to a specified percentage under the Bankruptcy Act. In a subsequent case, the colleague and the attorney will switch places.
Id. at 92, 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6053-54. The Report stated that the participation of creditors’ attorneys who seek to be selected as counsel to the committee parallels counsel’s participation in a trustee election, as described above. Id. at 93, 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6054.
The House Report did not expressly connect the new statutory requirement of pri- or approval of attorneys for the creditors committee with the practices criticized in that Report, but the connection is evident. Prior approval and court appointment of the creditors committee, see 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a), are just some of the procedural safeguards imposed by Congress during its overhaul of bankruptcy procedure. If retroactive approval were freely granted, it would subvert the prophylactic purpose underlying the statutory requirement of prior approval.
We thus hold that nunc pro tunc approval should be limited to cases where extraordinary circumstances are present. Otherwise the bankruptcy court may be overly inclined to grant such approval influenced by claims of hardship due to work already performed. In this respect we part company with those courts that have suggested that inadvertence or oversight of counsel may constitute excusable neglect sufficient to relieve the parties of the consequences of their iAaction. See In re [*650] King Electric Co., Inc., 19 B.R. 660 (E.D. Va.1982); see also In re Triangle Chemicals, Inc., 697 F.2d at 1289. We agree instead with the approach of those courts that limit the grant of. retroactive approval to cases where prior approval would have been appropriate and the delay in seeking approval was due to hardship beyond the professional’s control. See In re Brown, 40 B.R. 728, 731 (Bankr.D.Conn.1984); In re Seatrain Lines, Inc., 15 B.R. 583, 584 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1981). While this may seem to be a harsh rule, a more lenient approach would reward laxity by counsel and might encourage circumvention of the statutory requirement.
To summarize, we hold that retroactive approval of appointment of a professional may be granted by the bankruptcy court in its discretion but that it should grant such approval only under extraordinary circumstances. Such circumstances do not include the mere neglect of the professional who was in a position to file a timely application. When considering an application, the bankruptcy court may grant retroactive approval only if it finds, after a hearing, that it would have granted prior approval, which entails a determination that the applicant satisfied the statutory requirements of 11 U.S.C. §§ 327(a) and 1103(a) that the applicant be disinterested and not have an adverse interest, and that the services performed were necessary under the circumstances. Thereafter, in exercising its discretion, the bankruptcy court must consider whether the particular circumstances in the case adequately excuse the failure to have sought prior approval. This will require consideration of factors such as whether the applicant or some other person bore repsonsibility for applying for approval; whether the applicant was under time pressure to begin service without approval; the amount of delay after the applicant learned that initial approval had not been granted; the extent to which compensation to the applicant will prejudice innocent third parties; and other relevant factors.
It would obviously be unrealistic to set forth the metes and bounds of the extraordinary circumstances that would warrant exercise of the bankruptcy court’s discretion, but certain examples from recent cases are illustrative. In In re Freehold Music Center, 49 B.R. 293 (Bankr.D.N.J. 1985), accountants performed work, at the request of the debtors, that was essential to the continuation of the debtors’ business after being advised by the attorneys for the debtors that an appropriate application would be prepared and submitted to the court. After finding that the error in proceeding was not that of the applicants but of another whose failure was beyond their control, the bankruptcy court reasonably authorized the accountants’ employment nunc pro tunc. Similarly, in In re Bible Deliverance Evangelistic Church, 39 B.R. 768 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1984), counsel who was asked to represent the creditors committee was required to begin investigating the financial position of the debtor at once because the chief operating officer was already scheduled for an examination to take place in approximately two weeks. The immediate attention of counsel was required since many of the creditors believed the information given by the debtor was incorrect and that assets were being concealed. After finding that counsel acted with reasonable promptness in filing the application for employment, the court found the existence of exceptional circumstances supporting a nunc pro tunc order.
In this case, the district court found that “the equities simply do not fall in appellant’s favor.” 55 B.R. at 386. The court correctly reasoned that retroactive approval should be limited to cases where the hardship is not of counsel’s own making. Benenson & Scher is apparently a firm with experienced bankruptcy practíoners who were aware of the need to apply for prior approval. It has alleged no time pressures justifying initiation of its service before obtaining approval; in fact, as Benenson & Scher concedes, the only excuse for its failure to apply for approval was its own oversight. Despite the fact that Benenson & Scher promptly applied for approval on discovering its oversight, and despite its claim that compensation will come from funds set aside for the debtor without harm to the creditors, it did not[*651] allege any factors that would justify application of the discretion of the bankruptcy court to grant retroactive approval for their appointment. For that reason, there is no basis for this court to direct a remand for the bankruptcy court to exercise its discretion.
Therefore, although the bankruptcy court erred in holding it did not have discretion to grant retroactive approval of Benenson & Scher’s employment, we agree with the district court that denial of such approval must be affirmed. In so ruling, we do not suggest that Benenson & Scher acted from any improper motive or that it engaged in any of the practices that concerned Congress. It is simply that the prophylactic statutory rule that approval must be sought in advance of performance of services is too strong to be overcome by a mere showing of oversight.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the district court’s order affirming the order of the bankruptcy court denying retroactive approval of Benenson & Scher’s employment will be affirmed.
In In re National Tool & Mfg. Co., 209 F.2d 256 (3d Cir.1954), we denied compensation to counsel for trustees of the debtor because he was not appointed in the manner required by the then applicable General Order 44. There was no discussion of a nunc pro tunc order, but again there appears to have been another disabling factor, since notice of the application for compensation was not given to creditors as required by the statute. Id. at 257. Similarly, in In re Calpa Co., 411 F.2d 1373 (3d Cir.1969), we did not explicitly bar retroactive approval but simply denied it to an attorney who had earlier been denied prior approval.