United States v. One 18th Century Colombian Monstrance, 802 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1986). · Go Syfert
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United States v. One 18th Century Colombian Monstrance, 802 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
37 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 18 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Rosga, 864 F. Supp. 2d 439 (E.D. Va. 2012)
Treatment trajectory · 1987 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1987 2006 2026
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At page 838 Establishing standing to contest property forfeiture14 citing cases“facially colorable ownership interest”3 citing courts quote it
  • United States v. Rosga, 864 F. Supp. 2d 439 (E.D. Va. 2012).published
    Although the claimant need not prove the merits of his underlying claim, he must establish at least a “facially colorable ownership interest” in the property in ques- tion. 9 United States v. One 18th Century Colombian Monstrance, 802 F.2d…
  • United States v. $11,320.00 in United States Currency, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2012).published
    Article III Standing “It is well established that in order to contest a forfeiture, a claimant first must demonstrate a sufficient interest in the property to give him Article III standing; otherwise, there is no ‘case or controversy,’ in…
  • Kadonsky v. United States, 216 F.3d 499 (5th Cir. 2000).published
    ([M]ere physical possession is not sufficient to confer standing to contest forfeiture.)
  • No. 98-1467 (ca-96-1633-a), 213 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 2000).published
    See 28 U.S.C. § 2461 (1994); United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 991 F. Supp. 222, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. One 18th Century Colombian Monstrance, 802 F.2d 837, 838 (5th Cir. 1986).
  • United States v. Ahmad, 213 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 2000).published
    See 28 U.S.C. § 2461 (1994); United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 991 F.Supp. 222, 230 (S.D.N.Y.1997), aff'd, 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir.1999); United States v. One 18th Century Colombian Monstrance, 802 F.2d 837, 838 (5th Cir.1986).
  • United States v. One Cashier's Check, 162 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 1998).published
    This latter holding was emphatically confirmed upon petition for rehearing, when the en banc court stated that to hold otherwise would put the “cart before the horse.” United States v. One 18th Century Colombian Monstrance, 802 F.2d 837, 8…
  • United States v. Electrodyne Sys. Corp., 28 F. Supp. 2d 213 (D.N.J. 1998).published
    In support of this contention, the Individual Defendants cite: United States v. Gardner, 894 F.2d 708, 709-710 (5th Cir.1990) (automobiles, to circumvent environmental standards); United States v. Felsen, 648 F.2d 681, 682 (10th Cir.1981)…
  • United States v. Real Prop. Located at 5201 Woodlake Drive, 895 F. Supp. 791 (M.D.N.C. 1995).published 2 cites
    As the Fifth Circuit has succinctly pointed out in One 18th Century Colombian Monstrance, 802 F.2d at 838, there is “no case or controversy, in the constitutional sense, absent a dispute between parties who have a real interest in its reso…
  • Commonwealth v. One 1986 Volkswagen GTI Auto., 630 N.E.2d 270 (Mass. 1994).published
    See United States v. $38,000 in U.S. Currency, 816 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. One 18th Century Colombian Monstrance, 802 F.2d 837, 838 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom.
  • United States v. $24,000 in U.S. Currency, 722 F. Supp. 1386 (N.D. Miss. 1989).published
    (claimant “must show at least a facially colorable claim to an ownership interest” to establish a case or controversy in the constitutional sense)
Show 4 more citing cases
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United States
v.
ONE 18TH CENTURY COLOMBIAN MONSTRANCE Known as the Keeper of the Host of Santa Clara 11.3 Troy Pounds of Gold with Approximately 1,500 Precious and Semi-Precious Stones and Pearls, James W. Newton, Claimant-Appellant
No. 85-2643.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Oct 22, 1986.
Published opinion
802 F.2d 837
1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 33051
Seagal V. Wheatley, Oppenheimer, Rosenberg, Kelleher & Wheatley, Leo O. Bacher, Jr., San Antonio, Tex., for claimant-appellant., James F. Fitzpatrick, Arnold & Porter, Edward L. Wolf, Washington, D.C., for amieus-Amer. Ass’n of Dealers in Ancient, Oriental and Primitive Art., Pamela Ann Mathy, Asst. U.S. Atty., Helen M. Eversberg, U.S. Atty., John F. Paniszczyn, Asst. U.S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., for USA., Robert E. Goodfriend, Dallas, Tex., William T. McCue, New York City, A. Lauren Carpenter, Donald R. Taylor, San Antonio, Tex., for Republic of Columbia.
Cited by 8 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

In Newton’s petition for rehearing, he takes the position that he is entitled to require, or that the district court must sua sponte require, the Government to demonstrate probable cause for the forfeiture before examining his standing to raise that question. This puts the cart before the horse. In order to contest the forfeiture of the Monstrance to the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 545, Newton must first establish that he has standing. There is no ease or controversy, in the constitutional sense, absent a dispute between parties who have a real interest in its resolution.[1] Even assuming, as the panel did, that Newton made his contract concerning the Monstrance innocently and in complete good faith, to establish standing, Newton must show at least a facially colorable claim to an ownership interest in the work.

Newton continues to insist that he possesses either a legal or an equitable ownership interest in the Monstrance or some sort of right arising out of physical possession that accords him standing. As we held in our previous decision, however, Newton has been unable to establish a facially colorable ownership interest of either a legal or equitable nature, and mere physical possession is not sufficient to confer standing to contest forfeiture. Any presumption of ownership he enjoyed due to the fact that the Monstrance was seized from his possession was overcome by the clear meaning of the contracts he and Uhart signed. Newton’s own representations about his dealings with Uhart and his efforts to locate a buyer, and the evidence and explanation proffered by the Government as the basis of its decision to seize the work. The face of the relevant legal documents and the versions of the facts offered by every interested party show that Newton was acting solely as Uhart’s broker. Only Newton’s bald assertion of ownership, which is unaccompanied by factual allegations sufficient to raise serious question about the intent expressed on the face of the contracts, suggests otherwise. No reasonable person could conclude on the basis of the undisputed facts and Newton’s representation of the disputed, objective facts that a sale of the Monstrance to Newton was consummated or intended. Finally, because we found that Newton did not possess even an equitable ownership inter[*839]est in the Monstrance, we refrained in our earlier opinion, as we do now, from deciding whether such an interest would, if established, confer standing.

The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED, and no member of this panel nor Judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc, (Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Local Rule 35) the Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED.

1

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324-25, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984); Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 226, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 2934-35, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).