Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240 (Fed. Cir. 1989). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Court of Appeals for the Federal CircuitPublished opinionNo. 88-1491Jan 4, 1989

Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240 (Fed. Cir. 1989)

Quick Summary

The International Trade Commission is not required to exclude sales at more than fair value from its injury determination when assessing a class or kind of merchandise.

The International Trade Commission determined that dumped steel products injured the domestic industry, refusing to consider data distinguishing sales at less than fair value from those at more than fair value. The appellant argued the Commission committed legal error by failing to exclude the latter sales from its injury analysis. The court applies the statutory text, which focuses on a class or kind of merchandise, and holds that the Commission is not required to exclude sales at more than fair value per se. The court further notes that inter-agency data disputes are for the agencies to resolve. The court affirms the decision, finding the Commission’s methodology was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.

81 citation events (43 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989 2007 2026
Cited for
At page 243Distinguishing binding authority among trial court judges17 citing casesamong trial courts [e.g., CIT] it is unusual for one judge to be bound by the decision of another and, if it is to occur, such a rule should be stated somewhere. That is not done here.3 citing courts put it this way · 16 listed here
  • Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Frank LaRose, No. 18-4258 (6th Cir. Jan. 18, 2019).unpublished
    ([A]mong trial courts it is unusual for one judge to be bound by the decisions of another[.])
  • SSK Indus., Inc. v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 2d 825 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000).published 2 cites
    (among trial courts [e.g., CIT] it is unusual for one judge to be bound by the decision of another and, if it is to occur, such a rule should be stated somewhere. That is not done here.)
  • Hyundai Steel Co. v. United States, 659 F. Supp. 3d 1327 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2023).published
    While the BGH I court sustained Commerce’s financial contribution determination with respect to the EU ETS, 600 F. Supp. at 1262-63, Hyundai Steel raises different arguments grounded in statutory interpretation that the BGH I court did not…
  • Shenzhen Xinboda Indus. Co. v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 3d 1272 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2020).published
    Further, as Defendant-Intervenors observe, “one judge of the United States Court of International Trade [(“CIT”)] is not bound by the decision of another judge of the [CIT].” See Def.-Intervenor’s Br. at 3 (citing Algoma Steel Corp. v. Uni…
  • Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 2d 977 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000).published 2 cites
    Although this Court is not bound by the decisions in American Permac I, American Permac II and Rheem, see Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240, 243 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919 , 109 S.Ct. 3244 , 106 L.Ed.2d 590 (198…
  • United States v. Complex Mach. Works Co., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999).published
    Algoma Steel Corporation v. U.S., 865 F.2d 240, 243 (Fed.Cir.1989). 9 .
  • United States v. Tri-State Hosp. Supply Corp., 74 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999).published
    Although this Court is not bound by Rockwell and its progeny, Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240, 243 (Fed.Cir.1989), they are persuasive authority on the issue of whether materiality is, in the first instance, a question fo…
  • United States v. Hitachi Am., Ltd., 21 Ct. Int'l Trade 373 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997).published
    Cir. (T) 154, 156, 865 F.2d 240, 243 (1989) (“among trial courts it is unusual for one judge to be bound by the decisions of another and, if it is to occur, such a rule should be stated somewhere.
  • Krupp Stahl A.G. v. United States, 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 169 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1991).published
    “[AJmong trial courts it is unusual for one judge to be bound by the decisions of another* * *”
  • Keirton USA, Inc. v. United States, 2023 CIT 47 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2023).published
    (trial court decisions do not bind other trial courts)
Show 6 more citing cases
At page 242Refusing to consider sales breakdown is not arbitrary6 citing cases[I]t is not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law for the ITC to refuse to consider a computer printout showing the breakdown of [specific] sales during a six-month period between LTFV and [more than fair value] sales [‘MTFV’].1 citing court put it this way
  • Papierfabrik August Koehler Ag v. United States, 675 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009).published 3 cites
    ([I]t is not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law for the ITC to refuse to consider a computer printout showing the breakdown of [specific] sales during a six-month period between LTFV and [more than fair value] sa…)
  • United Tech. Corp. v. United States, 25 Ct. Int'l Trade 1366 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001).published
    Although, as UTC observes, the Civil Aircraft Agreement and HTSUS conflict with the ATCA to the extent they are narrower in scope, this court has previously held that “[e]ven if U.S. law contradicts the agreement, U.S. law must be followed…
  • Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1998).published
    Cir. (T) 154, 156, 865 F.2d 240, 242 (1989).
  • Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 17 Ct. Int'l Trade 1040 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993).published
    See Id. at 667 ; see also Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240, 242 (Fed.
  • Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 17 Ct. Int'l Trade 474 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993).published
    See id. at 667 ; see also Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240, 242 (Fed.
  • Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 810 F. Supp. 1287 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993).published
    See Id. at 667 ; see also Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240, 242 (Fed.Cir.1989).
At page 241Determining dumping margin as a weighted average5 citing cases“should be one for the agencies to resolve between themselves, and not for the courts.”2 citing courts quote it · 4 listed here
  • Papierfabrik August Koehler Ag v. United States, 675 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009).published 3 cites
    Accord Algoma Steel, 865 F.2d at 242 (“[I]t is not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law for the ITC to refuse to consider a computer printout showing the breakdown of [specific] sales during a six-month period between LTFV and [more t…
  • Papierfabrik August Koehler Ag v. United States, 646 F.3d 904 (Fed. Cir. 2011).published 2 cites
    Departure from Precedent The panel primarily relies on a single authority to support its holding that the Commission “must” use the dumping margins calculated by Commerce, Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240, 241 (Fed.Cir.198…
  • Hosiden Corp. v. Advanced Display Mfrs. of Am., 85 F.3d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1996).published 2 cites
    “should be one for the agencies to resolve between themselves, and not for the courts”
  • United Eng'g & Forging v. United States, 779 F. Supp. 1375 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1991).published
    In Algoma Steel Corporation v. United States, 865 F.2d 240, 241 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919 , 109 S.Ct. 3244 , 106 L.Ed.2d 590 (1989), the court of appeals described this division of responsibilities as follows: In the intricate…
Other citing cases4 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The ALGOMA STEEL CORPORATION, LIMITED, Christianson Pipe, Ltd., Ipsco, Inc. and Ipsco Steel, Inc.
v.
The UNITED STATES and U.S. International Trade Commission, Lone Star Steel Company, Maverick Tube Corporation, Sawhill Tube Division and Cyclops Corporation
No. 88-1491.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Jan 4, 1989.
Published opinion
865 F.2d 240
1989 WL 178
1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 36
William Silverman, Dow, Lohnes & Al-bertson, Washington, D.C., argued for plaintiffs-appellants. With him on the brief was Michael P. House. Rufus E. Jarman, Barnes, Richardson & Colburn, New York City, represented the plaintiffs., George Thompson, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Intern. Trade Com’n, Washington, D.C., argued for defendant-appel-lee. With him on the brief were Lyn M. Schlitt, General Counsel and James A. Tou-pin, Asst. General Counsel. Michael H. Stein, Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, Washington, D.C., argued for defendants.
Mayer, Michel, Nichols.
Cited by 32 opinions  |  Published
NICHOLS, Senior Circuit Judge.

This is a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) to review a decision of the United States Court of International Trade, 688 F.Supp. 639, 22 Cust.B. & Dec. 13 (1988), which affirms a determination of the International Trade Commission (ITC) which holds that the sales at less than fair value (LTFV or “dumping”) of certain steel products, oil country tubular goods (OCTG) from Canada, injure or threaten injury to an industry in the United States. In the case of appellant Algoma Steel Corporation, a Canadian producer, the Department of Commerce had previously determined that, over a six-month period studied, such sales occurred, but it is undisputed that they were slightly under 50 percent of all United States sales Algoma made. Algo-ma had a printout made of the data establishing this, but the ITC refused to receive or consider it, holding that for purposes of its injury determination, sales at more than fair value (MTFV) were not to be excluded. The Court of International Trade rejected Algoma’s assertion that this was legal error, as do we. That is the sole issue in the appeal, and our view of it requires that we affirm.

I

In the intricate administrative machinery Congress has erected over the years for dumping and countervailing duty cases, one unique feature is the allocation of responsibility to two agencies otherwise independent of one another, the Commerce Department and the ITC, the requisite injury determination for the latter, and everything else for the former. Naturally the specifics as to who does what is for dispute and discussion. Commerce, determining that sales at LTFV have occurred, normally makes no finding as to what percentage of all sales they are, but rather and in lieu thereof, states a “dumping margin” which is a weighted average adjusting appropriately for the MTFV sales. The ITC says it is not told how many or which the MTFV sales were and the raw data that was before the Commerce Department is of no use to it because its injury determination covers a different time frame. This kind of issue should be one for the agencies to resolve between themselves, and not for the courts. We think we should confine our consideration to the ultimate product: is an injury determination, not confined to the LTFV sales alone, arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary to the law? We hold it is not.

As Clausewitz, the sapient Prussian general, once wrote, “the object of war is peace.” Likewise, the object of sales at LTFV is other sales at MTFV. Many such sales might be the best evidence possible that the LTFV sales had served their purpose and the United States competitor was in full retreat. It is, therefore, not at all[*242] obvious that the MTFV sales are per se legally irrelevant. They might be irrelevant as a practical matter in some instances, but that would have to be shown, and no such showing has even been attempted here. The whole issue is presented as one of per se legality or illegality.

The statute seems to us to speak in plain language and to be unambiguous. Section 731, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 says:

If—
(1) the administering authority determines that a class or kind [emphasis supplied] of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair value, and
(2) the Commission determines that—
(A) an industry in the United States—
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded,
by reason of imports of that merchandise, or by reason of sales (or the likelihood of sales) of that merchandise for importation,
then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise an antidumping duty,

If a “class or kind” of that merchandise is sometimes sold at LTFV, the terms of any individual sale do not matter. Here Commerce told the ITC that a class or kind of goods, namely OCTG, was being so sold. It seems quite apparent that any one sale by the foreign producer, Algoma, or any other foreign producer, is one less for the domestic industry, and to that extent whether it is over or under fair value is immaterial but, of course legal injury, unlike economic, is a concept requiring some admixture of wrong doing. Some LTFV sales must be found, but if they occurred, the ITC is not required to pursue details as to the chain of causation of every instance where the foreign supplier supplanted the domestic one.

Appellant cites some legislative history and we have considered the citations, but the instances given probably do not stem from as careful consideration as does the statutory language itself, nor is it obvious the writers adverted to, and intended to discuss, instances of sales at LTFV and MTFV by the same foreign supplier in the same period of six months. On the other hand, appellee refers to its own administrative practice, unbroken since the enactment of the present law, as consistent with its position in this case. This would require more detailed consideration if the statutory language were not so plain but, at any rate, there is nothing there to undermine our position.

We have also considered the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Congress no doubt meant to conform the statutory language to the GATT, but we are not persuaded it embodies any clear position contrary to ours. Should there be a conflict, the United States legislation must prevail. 19 U.S.C. § 2504(a).

Thus, it is not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law for the ITC to refuse to consider a computer printout showing the breakdown of Algoma’s sales during a six-month period between LTFV and MTFV sales. The period, incidentally, is one as to which entries will normally have been liquidated, so any assessment of dumping duties that ensues will not have any significant impact on the parties’ businesses in that period.

This is not to say that a similar printout might not justify consideration if the raw data were supported by reasons specific to the particular case, why sales at MTFV were not relevant to the injury determination. It is only the appellant’s per se rule that we reject. We are also of course not saying that the sales of the class or kind at MTFV and at LTFV are per se of equal probative value, so any distinction between them would be unwarranted however supported by the facts.

II

Appellant seeks to discredit the opinion of the trial court by citation and discussion of a decision by Judge Newman of that court, Sprague Electric Co. v. United [*243] States, 488 F.Supp. 910, 84 Cust.Ct. 243 (1980), twice revisited by that Judge, 84 CustCt. 260 (1980), and 529 F.Supp. 676, 2 CIT 302 (1981). This was a challenge by an American producer to a negative injury determination, the converse to the case we have here. One issue was the correctness of the ITC in that case having confined its consideration to sales at LTFV, excluding all others. Naturally, the American producer wanted all of them considered. Judge Newman, rejecting this point, seems to say the ITC would be guilty of legal error if it refused to exclude the LTFV sales. His result would perhaps be consistent with ours, as we are inclined to think there is no per se rule either way, but reluctantly we acknowledge his language does conflict with our view. We could stop with the obvious, that an appellate court is not bound by what a trial court says the law is, even in the same case, still less another one. The parties and the trial court, in this case, lay so much stress on their discussion of Sprague Electric, however, perhaps we should say more than the obvious.

In the first place, then, it is asserted the second and third Sprague Electric decisions overturned sub silentio the conclusion we have found stated in the first, since Judge Newman ended up affirming later determinations of the ITC that he could not but have known (it is said) were based on all the sales of the class or kind involved, not just the LTFV sales. When, however, it is as here a matter of stare decisis, not res judicata or collateral estoppel, any legal conclusion not expressed in words is of small precedential authority, if any.

In the second place, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, which reenacted as 19 U.S.C. § 1673 the 1921 provision originally codified as 19 U.S.C. § 160, did so before the first Newman decision and therefore cannot possibly be presented as reenacting a provision which has received a judicial construction. The dates are wrong. The administrative constructions seem to have been conflicting.

In the third place, we do not think the decisions of the Customs Court are relegated to being, as precedents, decisions of a predecessor court to the Court of International Trade, in the same way decisions of the old Court of Claims and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are to us. They are decisions of the same court. Judge Restani, in the decision under review, rightly calls the Customs Court “This court.” It is nowhere spelled out in the Custom Courts Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-417, but is implicit in section 703(a) that the status of individuals serving as Customs Court judges is not affected, and section 704 that actions pending under the old law shall continue to be processed.

However, among trial courts it is unusual for one judge to be bound by the decisions of another and, if it is to occur, such a rule should be stated somewhere. That is not done here; with all the criticism directed by appellants towards Judge Restani for not following Judge Newman, nowhere is anything pointed out saying she must. She, herself, accepts an analysis of Judge Newman’s decisions as precedents which we deem in part mistaken, but she is right in making her own decision nevertheless.

Conclusion

The decision of the Court of International Trade which is appealed from is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.