Union Fed. Bank v. Minyard, 919 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1990). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Union Fed. Bank v. Minyard, 919 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1990).
Court of Appeals for the Fifth CircuitPublished opinionNo. 90-2341Dec 18, 1990

Union Fed. Bank v. Minyard, 919 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1990)

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29 citation events across 11 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1991 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Cited for
At page 336Allowing late assertion of defense on appeal10 citing cases“as the fdic had neither opportunity nor occasion to assert the d'oench doctrine in the trial court, we will entertain its assertion here.”2 citing courts quote it · 8 listed here
  • Resolution Trust Corp. v. Tarrant Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 926 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996).published
    See *801 Larsen, 835 S.W.2d at 74 (holding that section 1821 does not give FDIC absolute new substantive right to assert D'Oench, Duhme-type federal defenses for first time on appeal); see also Baumann v. Savers Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n,…
  • Metro North State Bank v. Gaskin, 34 F.3d 589 (1st Cir. 1994).published
    Bank of Indianapolis v. Minyard, 919 F.2d 335, 336 (5th Cir.1990) 15 Metro North's action against Robert H.
  • Metro North State Bank v. Gaskin, 34 F.3d 589 (8th Cir. 1994).published
    Bank of Indianapolis v. Minyard, 919 F.2d 335, 336 (5th Cir.1990). .
  • Harry Lemaire v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 20 F.3d 654 (5th Cir. 1994).published
    Bank of Indianapolis v. Minyard, 919 F.2d 335, 336 (5th Cir.1990). 9 We have held that the D'Oench Duhme doctrine may be raised for the first time on appeal "in circumstances where the FDIC succeeds to the bank's interest in a judgment in…
  • Lemaire v. Fed. Deposit Ins., 20 F.3d 654 (5th Cir. 1994).published
    Bank of Indianapolis v. Minyard, 919 F.2d 335, 336 (5th Cir.1990).
  • Resolution Trust Corp. v. Charles McCrory Defendants-Counter-Plaintiffs-Appellants, 951 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1992).published
    In Minyard, we emphasized that the federal regulator had no opportunity to raise its special defense in the trial court, and implied that it should not be penalized on appeal for that lack of opportunity. 919 F.2d at 336; accord Baumann, 9…
  • Baumann v. Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 934 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1991).published 2 cites
    “[a]s the FDIC had neither opportunity nor occasion to assert the D’Oench doctrine in the trial court, we will entertain its assertion here”
  • Fed. Deposit Ins. v. Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1992).published 3 cites
    (FDIC allowed to raise special defense for first time on appeal because, as the Corporation was not a party in the trial court, it had neither the occasion nor opportunity to raise it below)
At page 335Federal regulator's opportunity to raise special defense1 citing case
  • Larsen v. FDIC/Manager Fund, 835 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1992).published 3 cites
    In Minyard, we emphasized that the federal regulator had no opportunity to raise its special defense in the trial court, and implied that it should not be penalized on appeal for that lack of opportunity. 919 F.2d at 335; accord Baumann, 9…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Union Federal Bank of Indianapolis
v.
William A. Minyard, III v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as Receiver for Arsenal Savings Association, F.A., Counter
No. 90-2341.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Dec 18, 1990.
Published opinion
919 F.2d 335
1990 WL 187053
Bill Boyd, Boyd, Veigel & Hance, McKinney, Tex., for defendants-appellants., Christopher Lyle Daines, Kevin H. George, Eikenburg & Stiles, Houston, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee., Scott Douglas Cunningham, Brown & Fowler, Houston, Tex., for counter defendant-appellant.
Gee, Smith, Wiener.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM: [*~335–337]

Today’s appeal arises from the foreclosure of property on which a Texas joint venture had, in palmier times, proposed to erect a shopping center. The venturers had guaranteed payment of the purchase money note in various individual percentages, and the transferee holder of the note recovered judgments against them in a state court trial. In that trial, the ventur-ers contended unsuccessfully that the holder was seeking to recover interest of them at usurious rates, though not that the loan documents themselves specified such rates.

Subsequent to the entry of judgment, the holder was declared insolvent; and first the FSLIC, and later the FDIC, was appointed receiver and substituted as counter-defendant in this case. FSLIC had removed the case after judgment but while the ventur-ers’ motion for new trial was pending. The federal court overruled that motion and, in essence, re-entered the state judgment as its own.

As the FDIC had neither opportunity nor occasion to assert the D’Oench doctrine [1] in the trial court, we will entertain its assertion here. See FDIC v. Castle, 781 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir.1986). Under it, and because the venturers’ attempt to base a usury claim on pleading contentions is perforce not one reflected in the lender’s records, it is therefore of no use — offensive or defensive — against the FDIC. Beighley v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 776 (5th Cir.1989).

[*~336–337]

As for the claim against Union Federal Savings Bank, the assignee of the note, no serious attempt is made by the appellants to assert that, as takers from one which held “at least holder in due course status,” [2] its rights were less than those of its assignor. Various other reasons support the judgments of the trial court; but, as those recited suffice to do so, we write no further.

AFFIRMED.

1

D’Oench, Duhme v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 62 S.Ct. 676, 86 L.Ed. 956 (1942).

2

FSLIC v. Murray, 853 F.2d 1251, 1256 (5th Cir.1988).