Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altrigestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1990)
A question of law is controlling under 28 U.{U}.C. § 1292(b) if reversal of the district court order would terminate the action.
The PLO seeks leave to appeal a district court order denying its motion to dismiss claims arising from the seizure of the Achille Lauro. The central question is whether a controlling question of law under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) requires the issue to have precedential value for a wide range of pending cases. The court holds that a question of law is controlling if reversal of the district court's order would terminate the action, and that the statute does not require the issue to affect other pending suits. The court further finds that substantial grounds for difference of opinion exist and that immediate appeal would materially advance the litigation. Consequently, the court grants the petition for leave to appeal.
At page 24Determining when a question of law is controlling70 citing cases“it is clear that a question of law is 'controlling' if reversal of the district court's order would terminate the action.”
- Buehlman v. IDE Pontiac, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 3d 437 (W.D.N.Y. 2017).published([The] plaintiffs argue that a question of law must be ‘controlling’ in a wider sense, that is, the resolution of the question must also have precedential value for a number of pending cases. We disagree.)
- Iron Workers Local Union No.17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 825 (S.D. Ohio 1998).published (The legislative history of section 1292(b) clearly shows that this discretion encompasses denial of a properly certified appeal — which by definition includes a “controlling question of law” — for any reason, including…)
- Aboah v. Fairfield Healthcare Servs., Inc., No. 3:20-cv-00763 (D. Conn. Dec. 18, 2024). Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21 , 24–25 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he power to grant an interlocutory appeal must be strictly limited to the precise conditions stated in the law…
- People of the State of New York v. Arm or Ally, LLC, No. 1:22-cv-06124 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2024).([T]he resolution of an issue need not necessarily terminate an action in order to be ‘controlling.’)
- James v. Venture Home Solar, LLC, 715 F. Supp. 3d 203 (D. Conn. 2024).published Achille Lauro, 921 F.2d 21 , 25 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he power [to grant an interlocutory appeal] must be strictly limited to the precise conditions stated in the law.”) (citation omitted).
- Davarci v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. 1:20-cv-09224 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2021).(the resolution of an issue need not necessarily terminate an action in order to be “controlling)
- Petersen Energía Inversora S.A.U. v. Argentine Repub. & YPF S.A., 895 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2018).published([I]t is clear that a question of law is 'controlling' if reversal of the district court's order would terminate the action.)
- Jackson v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 3d 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).published(In determining whether a controlling question of law exists, the district court should consider whether: reversal of the district court’s opinion could result in dismissal of the action; reversal of the district court’…)
- First Owners' Ass'n of Forty Six Hundred v. Gordon Props., LLC, 470 B.R. 364 (E.D. Va. 2012).published(Although the resolution of an issue need not necessarily terminate an action in order to be ‘controlling,’ ... it is clear that a question of law is ‘controlling’ if reversal of the district court’s order would termina…)
- McGreevy, No. 3:23-cv-00082 (D. Conn. July 2, 2026).Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro In Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1990).
Show 60 more citing cases
- Medina, No. 7:21-cv-07492 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2025). This threshold is easily met “[w]here reversal of the district court’s order ‘would terminate the action,’” Quartararo, 521 F. Supp. 3d at 276 (quoting Klinghoffer, 921 F.2d at 24), but the potential termination of litigation upon interloc…
- Stevens & Co. v. Espat, No. 1:24-cv-05223 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2025).“Even when all three criteria are met, a district court retains ‘unfettered discretion’ to deny leave to appeal for ‘any reason,’ including judicial economy.” In re Lehman Bros., 2019 WL 2023723 , at *3 (quoting Klinghoffer, 921 F.2d at 24…
- In re Mosdos Chofetz Chaim Inc., No. 7:21-cv-08691 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2022). Second, for there to be “substantial grounds for difference of opinion,” the issue “must involve more than strong disagreement between the parties,” although this prong will be satisfied if the issue is “‘difficult and of first impression.…
- Lanzillotta v. GEICO Employees Ins. Co., No. 1:19-cv-01465, 2021 WL 2381905 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2021).Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro In Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1990).
- Whyte v. WeWork Companies, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-01800, 2020 WL 4383506 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2020).Achille Lauro, 921 F.3d 21, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1990)).
- In re Residential Capital, LLC, No. 1:20-cv-01645 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2020).“Even when all three criteria are met, a district court retains ‘unfettered discretion’ to deny leave to appeal for ‘any reason,’ including judicial economy.” In re Lehman Holdings, 2019 WL 2023723 , at *3 (quoting Klinghoffer, 921 F.2d at…
- In re Willis Towers Watson plc Proxy Litig., No. 1:17-cv-01338 (E.D. Va. Feb. 26, 2020).(observing that precedential value is not a decisive factor)
- In re Actos Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 1:15-cv-03278 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2020).“reversal of the district court’s order would terminate the action”
- In re ACTOS Antitrust Litig., No. 1:13-cv-09244 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2020).“reversal of the district court’s order would terminate the action”
- Buckskin Realty Inc. v. Greenberg, 552 B.R. 40 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).publishedAchille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir.1990)); see also Picard v. Estate of Madoff, 464 B.R. 578, 582 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (“controlling question of law” is one in which “…
- Credit One Fin. v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 550 B.R. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).published Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir.1990) (citing Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194, 196 (2d Cir.1959)).
- Graham v. Hubbs Mach. & Mfg., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 3d 600 (E.D. Mo. 2014).publishedAchille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir.1990)).
- Persaud v. Caribbean Airlines Ltd., 33 F. Supp. 3d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).publishedAchille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978)).
- In re Facebook, Inc., IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).published The impact an appeal will have on other cases need not be large, but it “is a factor that [the court] may take into account.” Klinghoffer, 921 F.2d at 24.
- In re Facebook, Inc., IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).published(observing that precedential value is factor to be taken into account but is not requirement)
- Gulino v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist., 907 F. Supp. 2d 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).publishedAc-Mile Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 23-24 (2d Cir.1990) (“Although the resolution need not necessarily terminate an action in order to be ‘controlling,’ ... it is clear that…
- Tesco Corp. v. Weatherford Int'l, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 2d 755 (S.D. Tex. 2010).publishedAchille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir.1990) (citing cases); see also Johnson v. Burken, 930 F.2d 1202, 1206 (7th Cir.1991) (finding that a question of law can be co…
- Kuzinski v. Schering Corp., 614 F. Supp. 2d 247 (D. Conn. 2009).publishedAchille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir.1990).
- Monaco v. Hogan, 576 F. Supp. 2d 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).published"In determining whether a controlling question of law exists the district court should consider whether: reversal of the district court's opinion could result in dismissal of the action; reversal of the district court's opinion, even thoug…
- Century Pac., Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 574 F. Supp. 2d 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).published Controlling Question of Law A question of law is “controlling” if “reversal of the district court’s order would terminate the action.” SPL Shipping Ltd., 2007 WL 1119753 , at *2 (quoting Klinghoffer, 921 F.2d at 24); see also S.E.C. v. Cre…
- City of Charleston, SC v. Hotels. Com, LP, 586 F. Supp. 2d 538 (D.S.C. 2008).publishedKlinghoffer v. SNC Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir.1990).
- Fox v. Bank Mandiri (In re Perry H. Koplik & Sons, Inc.), 377 B.R. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).published “justify a departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment”
- Morris v. Flaig, 511 F. Supp. 2d 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).publishedAchille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro In Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir.1990)); see also S.E.C. v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 103 F.Supp.2d 223, 227 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (“In determining whether a controlling…
- Transp. Workers Union of Am., Local 100 v. New York City Transit Auth., 358 F. Supp. 2d 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).publishedKlinghoffer, 921 F.2d at 24. 20 .
- Justus v. Toyo Kensetsu Kohki Co., 228 F. Supp. 2d 215 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).published
- Skylon Corp. v. Guilford Mills, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).published
- In re Del-Val Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 874 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).published
- North Fork Bank v. Abelson, 207 B.R. 382 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).published
- McNeil v. Aguilos, 820 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).published
- Idylwoods Assocs. v. Mader Capital, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 421 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).published
- IBI Sec. Serv., Inc. v. Nat'l Westminster Bank USA (In re IBI Sec. Serv., Inc.), 174 B.R. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).published
- In re Payroll Exp. Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).published
- Dynegy Mktg. & Trade v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp.), 316 B.R. 767 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).published
- Kam Shing Chan v. City of New York, 803 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).published
- Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 907 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).published
- APCC Servs., Inc. v. Sprint Commc'ns Co., LP, 297 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D.D.C. 2003).published
- APCC Servs., Inc. v. AT & T CORP., 297 F. Supp. 2d 101 (D.D.C. 2003).published
- In re Air Crash Off Long Island, Ny, 27 F. Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).published
- Garg v. Winterthur Life, 573 F. Supp. 2d 763 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).published
- Primavera Familienstifung v. Askin, 139 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).published
- Ryan, Beck & Co. v. Fakih, 275 F. Supp. 2d 393 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).published
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 103 F. Supp. 2d 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).published
- Moore U.S.A. Inc. v. Stand. Register Co., 180 F. Supp. 2d 411 (W.D.N.Y. 2001).published
- Klein v. Vision Lab Telecomm., Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).published
- Wausau Bus. Ins. v. Turner Constr. Co., 151 F. Supp. 2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).published
- Pineiro v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 22 F. App'x 47 (2d Cir. 2001).unpublished
- Pereira v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 921 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).published
- Franzon v. Massena Mem'l Hosp., 189 F.R.D. 220 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).published
- Kahle v. Cargill, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-08532 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2023).
- Young v. Paramount Commc'ns Inc. (In re Wingspread Corp.), 186 B.R. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).published
- Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger, 957 F. Supp. 327 (D. Mass. 1997).published
- Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).published
- Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).published
- In re Buspirone Pat. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).published
- In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 182 F.R.D. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).published
- Knauf Insulation, LLC v. Johns Manville Corp., No. 1:15-cv-00111 (S.D. Ind. July 24, 2020).
- Hall v. Trivest Partners L.P., No. 4:22-cv-12743 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 16, 2024).
- United States v. I-44 Truck Ctr. & Wrecker Serv., LLC, No. 4:23-cv-00001 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 24, 2023).
- Gentile v. Touro Law Ctr., No. 2:21-cv-01345 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2024).
- Pen Am. Ctr., Inc. v. Trump, No. 1:18-cv-09433, 2020 WL 5836419 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020).
At page 25Interlocutory appeal under statute 1292(b) requirements45 citing cases“the power to grant an interlocutory appeal must be strictly limited to the precise conditions stated in the law.”
- Iron Workers Local Union No.17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 825 (S.D. Ohio 1998).published Klinghoffer, 921 F.2d at 24 (“The legislative history of section 1292(b) clearly shows that this discretion encompasses denial of a properly certified appeal — which by definition includes a “controlling question of law” — for any reason,…
- Aboah v. Fairfield Healthcare Servs., Inc., No. 3:20-cv-00763 (D. Conn. Dec. 18, 2024). ([T]he power to grant an interlocutory appeal must be strictly limited to the precise conditions stated in the law.)
- James v. Venture Home Solar, LLC, 715 F. Supp. 3d 203 (D. Conn. 2024).published ([T]he power [to grant an interlocutory appeal] must be strictly limited to the precise conditions stated in the law.)
- Medina, No. 7:21-cv-07492 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2025). This threshold is easily met “[w]here reversal of the district court’s order ‘would terminate the action,’” Quartararo, 521 F. Supp. 3d at 276 (quoting Klinghoffer, 921 F.2d at 24), but the potential termination of litigation upon interloc…
- Monk v. United States, No. 3:22-cv-01503 (D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2025).Achille Lauro, 921 F.2d 21 , 25 (2d Cir. 1990)). “[O]nly exceptional circumstances will justify a departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment.” Klinghoffer, 921 F.2d at 25 (clean…
- In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., No. 1:21-cv-10316 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2022).Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro In Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1990)), the Court finds that in light of its prior order remanding this case for considerations on international comity, this…
- In re Mosdos Chofetz Chaim Inc., No. 7:21-cv-08691 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2022). Second, for there to be “substantial grounds for difference of opinion,” the issue “must involve more than strong disagreement between the parties,” although this prong will be satisfied if the issue is “‘difficult and of first impression.…
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Rio Tinto PLC, No. 1:17-cv-07994 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2021). Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro In Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1990) (alteration in original) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978)).
- Lisa Locurto v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, No. 1:13-cv-04303 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2019).Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro In Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1990) (alteration in original) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978)).
- Credit One Fin. v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 550 B.R. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).published Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir.1990) (citing Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194, 196 (2d Cir.1959)).
Show 35 more citing cases
- Hart v. Rick's Cabaret Int'l, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 3d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).published([I]t continues to be true that only ‘exceptional circumstances will justify a departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment.’ ” (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. L…)
- Persaud v. Caribbean Airlines Ltd., 33 F. Supp. 3d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).publishedAchille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978)).
- Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 987 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).publishedAchille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro In Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978)) (internal brackets omi…
- Picard v. Katz, 466 B.R. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).published Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978)). *210 The Trustee neve…
- Yerushalmi v. Shibolelth, 405 B.R. 44 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).published (stating that “only ‘exceptional circumstances [will] justify a departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment’)
- Century Pac., Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 574 F. Supp. 2d 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).published Controlling Question of Law A question of law is “controlling” if “reversal of the district court’s order would terminate the action.” SPL Shipping Ltd., 2007 WL 1119753 , at *2 (quoting Klinghoffer, 921 F.2d at 24); see also S.E.C. v. Cre…
- Marriott v. Cnty. of Montgomery, 426 F. Supp. 2d 1 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).publishedAchille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 , 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2461 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978)).
- Williston v. Eggleston, 410 F. Supp. 2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).publishedAchille Lauro, 921 F.2d at 25 (2d Cir.1990).
- Marlin v. United States Tr., 333 B.R. 14 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).publishedIn order to merit certification, “[an issue] must involve more than a strong disagreement between adversary parties ... [f]or example, there are substantial grounds ... when the issue ‘is difficult and of first impression.’ ” North Fork Ba…
- In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (\MTBE\") Prods. Liab. Litig.", 399 F. Supp. 2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).publishedKlinghoffer, 921 F.2d at 25. 8 . 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b). 9 .
- In re Del-Val Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 874 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).published
- North Fork Bank v. Abelson, 207 B.R. 382 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).published
- McNeil v. Aguilos, 820 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).published
- IBI Sec. Serv., Inc. v. Nat'l Westminster Bank USA (In re IBI Sec. Serv., Inc.), 174 B.R. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).published
- Kam Shing Chan v. City of New York, 803 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).published
- Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 907 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).published
- Wausau Bus. Ins. v. Turner Constr. Co., 151 F. Supp. 2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).published
- Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs., 808 F. Supp. 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).published
- Fleet Data Processing Corp. v. Branch (In re Bank of New England Corp.), 218 B.R. 643 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998).published
- Maestri v. Westlake Excavating Co., 894 F. Supp. 573 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).published
- Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).published
- DGM Investments, Inc. v. New York Futures Exch., Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).published
- Hampton Bays Connections, Inc. v. Duffy, 188 F. Supp. 2d 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).published
- Youngers v. Virtus Inv. Partners Inc., 228 F. Supp. 3d 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).published
- Capri Sun GmbH v. Am. Beverage Corp., No. 1:19-cv-01422 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2022).
- Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger, 957 F. Supp. 327 (D. Mass. 1997).published
- In re Buspirone Pat. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).published
- Enron Corp. v. Citigroup, Inc. (In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp.), 410 B.R. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).published
- Bilello v. JPMorgan Chase Ret. Plan, 603 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).published
- Aristocrat Leisure Ltd. v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, 426 F. Supp. 2d 125 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).published
- Carpenter v. City of New York, 984 F. Supp. 2d 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).published
- Davarci v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. 1:20-cv-09224 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2021).
- Chechele v. Stand. Gen. Master Fund L.P., No. 1:20-cv-03177 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2022).
- Tavarez v. Moo Organic Chocolates, LLC, 641 F. Supp. 3d 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).published
- Flores v. Nat'l Football League, No. 1:22-cv-00871 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2024).
At page 23Assessing subject matter and personal jurisdiction over political entities7 citing casesAlthough the resolution need not necessarily terminate an action in order to be ‘controlling,’ ... it is clear that a question of law is ‘controlling’ if reversal of the district court’s order would terminate the action.
- Gulino v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist., 907 F. Supp. 2d 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).published(Although the resolution need not necessarily terminate an action in order to be ‘controlling,’ ... it is clear that a question of law is ‘controlling’ if reversal of the district court’s order would terminate the actio…)
- NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Cent. De La República Argentina, 652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011).published(discussing the criteria for accepting jurisdiction in an appeal pursuant to § 1292(b))
- Decora Inc. v. DW Wallcovering, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).published
- German by German v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 896 F. Supp. 1385 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).published
- Justus v. Toyo Kensetsu Kohki Co., 228 F. Supp. 2d 215 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).published
- Skylon Corp. v. Guilford Mills, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).published
- Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).published
At page 22“our review of the statute and relevant authorities convinces us that a 'controlling question of law' under section 1292(b) need not affect a wide range of pending cases, and we so hold.”1 citing case
- Drazen v. Godaddy.com, LLC, No. 1:19-cv-00563 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 9, 2025).“our review of the statute and relevant authorities convinces us that a 'controlling question of law' under section 1292(b) need not affect a wide range of pending cases, and we so hold.”
Other citing cases
- Meta Platforms Inc. v. Namecheap Inc., No. 2:20-cv-00470 (D. Ariz. Mar. 15, 2021).
- Malka L. Fishman v. Subway Franchisee Advert. Fund Trust, Ltd., No. 2:19-cv-02444 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2020).
v.
S.N.C. ACHILLE LAURO ED ALTRIGESTIONE MOTONAVE ACHILLE LAURO IN AMMINISTRAZIONE STRAORDINARIA, Defendants Sophie CHASSER, Plaintiffs-Respondents v. ACHILLE LAURO LINES, Defendants Viola MESKIN, Plaintiffs-Respondents v. ACHILLE LAURO LINES, Defendants Donald SAIRE, Plaintiffs-Respondents v. ACHILLE LAURO ED ALTRI-GESTIONE M/N ACHILLE LAURO S.N.C., Defendants Frank R. HODES and Mildred Hodes, Plaintiffs-Respondents v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, An Unincorporated Association, John Doe, President, PLO, and Richard Roe, Treasurer, PLO, Defendants-Petitioners Donald E. SAIRE and Anna G. Saire, Plaintiffs-Respondents v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, and John Doe as President and Don Roe as Treasurer of The Palestine Liberation Organization, Defendants-Petitioners
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) seeks leave to appeal an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Louis L. Stanton, J., denying the PLO’s motion to dismiss the complaints and third-party complaints against it. The district court subsequently granted the PLO’s motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) for certification of the order for interlocutory appeal, and the PLO now seeks leave from this court to pursue the appeal. For reasons given below, we grant the PLO’s petition for leave to appeal. We issue an opinion, however, in order to clarify that a “controlling question of law” under section 1292(b) need not affect a wide range of pending cases.
Background
This consolidated action arises from the forcible seizure of the Italian passenger liner Aehille Lauro in the Mediterranean Sea in October 1985. During the course of the seizure, one of the passengers, Leon[*23] Klinghoffer, was shot and his body thrown overboard. Plaintiffs, passengers or executors of the estates of persons who were passengers, assert that the seizure and murder were done by members of the PLO. The PLO denies responsibility for those acts and claims that they were done by its opponents in an effort to discredit it.
Several passengers brought suit in the district court, alleging that the owner and charterer of the Achille Lauro, travel agencies and various other entities failed to take sufficient steps to prevent, or warn of the risk of, the piracy. The Klinghoffer action asserts claims under state law, general maritime law and the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.App. §§ 761-68.
Two of the defendants then impleaded the PLO, seeking indemnification or contribution for any damages awarded against them on plaintiffs’ claims and compensatory and punitive damages against the PLO for tortious interference with their businesses. Other Achille Lauro passengers later filed two actions directly against the PLO.
The PLO then moved pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(b)(1), (2), (5), (6) and 17(b) to dismiss the complaints and third-party complaints against it on the grounds that the district court had no subject matter jurisdiction because the case presents a nonjus-ticiable political question, that the PLO is immune from suit because it is a sovereign state and a Permanent Observer at the United Nations, that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over it, that the PLO, assuming it is an unincorporated association, lacks the capacity to be sued and that the service of process on Zuhdi Labib Terzi, the PLO’s Permanent Observer at the United Nations, was insufficient.
In June 1990, Judge Stanton denied the PLO’s motion to dismiss. The PLO then moved for reargument or for certification of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). In July 1990, the district court in a memorandum opinion denied the motion for reargument, but granted the PLO’s request under section 1292(b) and certified the order for review by this court. The PLO then petitioned this court for permission to pursue its appeal from the district court’s June 1990 order denying the PLO’s motion to dismiss.
Discussion
Section 1292(b) provides a means of appealing from interlocutory orders that are otherwise non-appealable, upon consent of both the district court and the court of appeals:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals ... may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order....
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
Before deciding whether we should exercise our discretion under the statute to accept the appeal, we must first determine whether the district court properly found that the requisites for section 1292(b) certification have been met. See Red Bull Assocs. v. Best Western Int’l, Inc., 862 F.2d 963, 965 & n. 5 (2d Cir.1988). Plaintiffs argue that the appeal does not involve a “controlling question of law” because it does not involve issues that affect a wide range of pending cases, and plaintiffs cite a number of district court opinions in this circuit that have imposed this condition for certification. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., No. 84-CV-413, 1988 WL 128618 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1988); Department of Economic Development v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 683 F.Supp. 1463, 1486-87 (S.D.N.Y.1988); Herold v. Braun, 671 F.Supp. 936, 938 (E.D.N.Y.1987); Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515, 525 (S.D.N.Y.1973), appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir.1974).
[*24] The district courts have apparently derived this requirement from Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir.1961) (in banc), in which the in banc court noted that leave to appeal was granted in that case in part because “such a determination was likely to have precedential value for a large number of other suits ... now pending in the Southern District [of New York].” Id. at 417. We do not, however, interpret Brown v. Bullock as holding that certification is proper only if the certified issue has precedential value for a large number of pending suits. The court in that case did not expressly address the “controlling question of law” requirement, and we do not regard its reference to the precedential value of the issues before it as a restrictive interpretation of that statutory term. Rather, the reference was only one of the reasons provided as justification for acceptance of the appeal, see id., and was an explanation of why the court was so exercising its discretion. Thus, Brown v. Bullock did not decide the issue plaintiffs pose for us, and we must still decide whether their position is correct.
Although the resolution of an issue need not necessarily terminate an action in order to be “controlling,” cf. In re The Duplan Corp., 591 F.2d 139, 148 n. 11 (2d Cir.1978); Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 312 F.2d 236, 238 (2d Cir.1962) (in banc), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 909, 83 S.Ct. 1298, 10 L.Ed.2d 411 (1963), it is clear that a question of law is “controlling” if reversal of the district court’s order would terminate the action. See J. Moore & B. Ward, 9 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 110.22[2], at 268 (1990) (collecting cases). For example, we have granted certification when the order involved issues of in per-sonam and subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1330 (2d Cir.1972). The order being appealed from in this case denied the PLO’s motion to dismiss the complaints and third-party complaints against it. If we reverse the district court’s order and dismiss the actions against the PLO, those actions would be terminated, and thus our resolution of the issues involved in the certified order would be “controlling” in that sense.
As already indicated, however, plaintiffs argue that a question of law must be “controlling” in a wider sense, that is, the resolution of the question must also have precedential value for a number of pending cases. We disagree. Section 1292(b) expressly states that the court of appeals may “in its discretion” permit the appeal “to be taken." The legislative history of section 1292(b) clearly shows that this discretion encompasses denial of a properly certified appeal—which by definition includes a “controlling question of law”—for any reason, including docket congestion. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2461, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978). Therefore, in exercising our discretion under the statute, we may properly consider the system-wide costs and benefits of allowing the appeal. In other words, the impact that an appeal will have on other cases is a factor that we may take into account in deciding whether to accept an appeal that has been properly certified by the district court. But that is not the same as defining a “controlling question of law” in terms of its precedential value. We have not found any circuit court decisions that squarely support plaintiffs’ position, and we regard In re Cement Antitrust Litigation, 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir.1982), aff’d for absence of quorum sub. nom. Arizona v. Ash Grove Cement Co., 459 U.S. 1190, 103 S.Ct. 1173, 75 L.Ed.2d 425 (1983), as contrary to their view. Moreover, distinguished commentators have concluded that “[t]he suggestion ... that the question must be important to a large number of other suits ... is not supported by any statutory purpose.” C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper & E. Gressman, 16 Federal Practice and Procedure § 3930, at 159 (1977). Our review of the statute and relevant authorities convinces us that a “controlling question of law” under section 1292(b) need not affect a wide range of pending cases, and we so hold.
In reaching this result, we do not imply that section 1292(b) should be liberally con[*25]strued, since “the power [to grant an interlocutory appeal] must be strictly limited to the precise conditions stated in the law.” Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194, 196 (2d Cir.1959). Rather, we think that the construction of “controlling question of law” pressed upon us by plaintiffs is an overly restrictive interpretation of the “precise conditions” imposed by section 1292(b). Thus, our holding does not extend the statute beyond its intended limits, and it continues to be true that only “exceptional circumstances [will] justify a departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 475, 98 S.Ct. at 2461.
In light of the above, it is apparent that the present appeal does involve a “controlling question of law.” Our inquiry, however, does not end there. Plaintiffs also argue that the appeal does not satisfy the remaining statutory requirements because there are no “substantial grounds for difference of opinion” regarding the controlling legal questions nor will their resolution “materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” We disagree. In his July 1990 memorandum opinion, Judge Stanton pointed out that the issues are difficult and of first impression. For example, the judge observed that
[t]he undefined juristic nature of the PLO [which the district court held may be treated in this litigation as an unincorporated association], the PLO’s argument that it is entitled to “functional” immunity since its presence in New York is principally connected with its status as an Observer at the United Nations, and the special attention given to the PLO by Congress in the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201-03 (1988), argue that this is an exceptional case in which section 1292(b) certification is appropriate.
The district court also stated that if we find that there is no jurisdiction over the PLO, that finding will greatly assist the ultimate termination of the litigation. We see no persuasive reason for rejecting the reasoning of Judge Stanton on these matters.
The PLO’s petition for permission to appeal is granted.