Emmanuel G. Knight v. John Jabe, Deputy Pogats, Robert Brown, Jr., Sgt. Letts, 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1991). · Go Syfert
Emmanuel G. Knight v. John Jabe, Deputy Pogats, Robert Brown, Jr., Sgt. Letts, 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1991). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
60 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: F.L. Thorpe & Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (ca8, 1995-12-01)
Treatment trajectory · 1991 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1991 2008 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) F.L. Thorpe & Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (2×) also: Cited "see"
8th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
In Chicago Beef Co., 298 NLRB 1039 , 1990 WL 122480 (1990), enforced, 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir.1991), the NLRB held that an economic strike had been converted into an unfair labor practice strike as a result of the employer’s unlawful conduct; in support of its decision, the NLRB relied upon subjective evidence (i.e. strikers’ testimony) that the employer’s unlawful conduct “caused consternation among the striking employees.” Id. at 1040.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) F.L. Thorpe & Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, United Steelworkers of America, Afl-Cio/clc, Intervenors. F.L. Thorpe & Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, United Steelworkers of America, Afl-Cio/clc, Intervenors (2×) also: Cited "see"
8th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Significantly, in reaching this conclusion, the Board inferred a change in the strikers' subjective motivations based upon its conclusion that the ULP's "caused consternation among the employees so as to prolong the strike." Id. 25 In Chicago Beef Co., 298 NLRB 1039 , 1990 WL 122480 (1990), enforced, 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir.1991), the NLRB held that an economic strike had been converted into an unfair labor practice strike as a result of the employer's unlawful conduct; in support of its decision, the NLRB relied upon subjective evidence (i.e. strikers' testimony) that the employer's unlawful co…
discussed Cited "see" Wilkie Co. v. National Labor Relations Board
6th Cir. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Chicago Beef Co., 298 NLRB 1039 , 1055-56, 1990 WL 122480 (1990), enforced, 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir.1991); see also Kinney Drugs, Inc. v. NLRB, 74 F.3d 1419, 1430 (2d Cir.1996) (“[T]he NLRB has acknowledged that an employer can effectively repudiate unlawful conduct if the repudiation is ‘timely, unambiguous, specific in nature to the coercive conduct and free from other proscribed illegal conduct.’ ”) (quoting Passavant Mem’l Area Hosp. v. Health Care Local Union No. 1401, 237 NLRB 138 , 1978 WL 7798 (1978)).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." WEINER v. CITY OF DURHAM
M.D.N.C. · 2025 · signal: see also · confidence low
Aug. 23, 2005) (unpublished); see also Morris v. DeHaan, No. 90-2190, 944 F.2d 905 (table), 1991 WL 177995, at *4 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 1991) (unpublished) (“[The defendant-housing complex] is privately owned, and [the] complaint is devoid of any hint that [] the State . . . was involved in [its] day-to-day operation.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." WEINER v. VAN ALLEN APARTMENTS
M.D.N.C. · 2025 · signal: see also · confidence low
Aug. 23, 2005) (unpublished); see also Morris v. DeHaan, No. 90-2190, 944 F.2d 905 (table), 1991 WL 177995, at *4 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 1991) (unpublished) (“[The defendant-housing complex] is privately owned, and [the] complaint is devoid of any hint that [] the State . . . was involved in [its] day-to-day operation.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Tranchmontagne v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
E.D. Mich. · 2021 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Morris v. Dehaan, 944 F.2d 905 , 1991 WL 177995, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 1991) (table case) (holding that “nothing in the Fair Housing Act ... can be construed as a congressional abrogation” of sovereign immunity); Kelly v. Wilson, 426 F. App’x 629, 632 (10th Cir. 2011) (“The United States has not waived its sovereign immunity from suits for money damages under the Fair Housing Act . . .”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hadad v. Gonzales
6th Cir. · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Cytacki v. INS, 996 F.2d 1214 , 1993 WL 216490 , at *4 *803 (6th Cir. June 18, 1993) (unpublished); see also Ulloa v. INS, 944 F.2d 905 , 1991 WL 181745, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 1991) (unpublished).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Emmanuel G. Knight
v.
John Jabe, Deputy Pogats, Robert Brown, Jr., Sgt. Letts
91-1565.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Sep 19, 1991.
944 F.2d 905
Unpublished

944 F.2d 905

NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit.
Emmanuel G. KNIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
John JABE, Deputy Pogats, Robert Brown, Jr., Sgt. Letts,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 91-1565.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Sept. 19, 1991.

1

Before KEITH and ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judges, and JOHNSTONE, District Judge.[*]

ORDER

2

Emmanuel Knight appeals the judgment of the district court that dismisses his civil rights complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and requests the appointment of counsel on appeal. This case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 9(a), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed.R.App.P. 34(a).

3

Knight alleged in his complaint that the defendants acting in their individual and official capacities violated his eighth amendment right to personal safety when they failed to prevent him from being sexually assaulted at the reception center of the State Prison of Southern Michigan. He sought $500,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages from each defendant. The defendant prison officials moved to dismiss Knight's complaint on grounds that Knight failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted and that the eleventh amendment barred recovery of monetary damages against them. The defendants supported their motion with affidavits and copies of various prison incident reports related to the assault.

4

Following consideration of the defendants' motion and Knight's answer, the magistrate recommended dismissing Knight's complaint for his failure to establish any facts demonstrating deliberate indifference to his personal safety or a pervasive risk of harm. The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. Knight now appeals arguing that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to appoint counsel, extend time for discovery or conduct an evidentiary hearing.

5

Initially, we note that we review the district court's judgment as one for summary judgment because the court considered matters other than the pleadings in entering the judgment. Rogers v. Stratton Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir.1986). Reviewed as such, we conclude that the suit was properly dismissed because there is no genuine issue of material fact and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 312, 318 (1986). The undisputed facts clearly establish that Knight can not demonstrate the deliberate indifference needed to support his eighth amendment claims. Stewart v. Love, 696 F.2d 43, 44 (6th Cir.1982). The defendants did not deliberately disregard a serious threat to his safety after actually becoming aware of that threat. Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449 (6th Cir.1990). Neither appointment of counsel nor the additional discovery requested by Knight would alter the undisputed material facts that preclude his recovery under the eighth amendment. Mere negligence is not enough. Stewart, 696 F.2d at 44.

6

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed and Knight's motion for appointment of counsel is denied. Rule 9(b)(3), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.

*

The Honorable Edward H. Johnstone, U.S. District Judge for the Western District of Kentucky, sitting by designation