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“technical errors . . . require suppression only if: (1) the defendants were 6 prejudiced by the error, or (2) there is evidence of deliberate disregard of the rule.”
Treatment trajectory · 1992 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1992
2009
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
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discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Benshoof v. Admon
technical errors . . . require suppression only if: (1) the defendants were 6 prejudiced by the error, or (2) there is evidence of deliberate disregard of the rule.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Grant Manaku
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
prejudice in this context means the search would otherwise not have occurred or would have been less intrusive absent the error.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Pennings CA4/1
(2×)
Based on her refusal to name her source, the [trial] court granted the government’s motion to strike her entire testimony.” (Negrete-Gonzales, supra, 966 F.2d at p. 1280.) On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the identity of the source was “only peripherally related to Medina’s direct testimony” and, on this 9 We note also that, although the motive of the defendant in refusing to answer and the materiality of the withheld answers in the present case are similar to those in Reynolds, the measure challenged in the present case (i.e., the striking of only relevant portions of Pen…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Watson
IV “We review de novo motions to suppress, and any factual findings made at the suppression hearing for clear error.” United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir. 1992).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Rodriguez v. Attorney General for the State of New Mexico
NN) (citing State v. Malloy, 2001- NMCA-067, ¶ 11, 34 P.3d 611, 614 , which in turn relied on United States v. Negrete–Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 1992)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Clausen
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
It has been stated: “The key question is whether the defend ant’s right to present witnesses can be protected without frustrat- ing the government’s interest in effective cross-examination.” U.S. v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1992).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Bryan Henderson
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
To determine whether suppression is justified, we must first decide whether the Rule 41(b) violation is a “fundamental error[]” or a “mere technical error[].” United States v. Negrete- Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 1992).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Kevin Peterson
A. Motion to Suppress “We review de novo motions to suppress, and any factual findings made at the suppression hearing for clear error.” United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir. 1992). “[I]nevitable discovery rulings are mixed questions [of law and fact] that . . . should be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.” United States v. Lang, 149 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Hammond
U.S. v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 1992) (dividing Rule 41 violations into two categories, fundamental and technical, and explaining that “[fundamental errors are those that result in clear constitutional violations”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Gabriel Viramontes
“If the government’s case is based on more than just a defendant’s presence, and the jury is properly instructed on all elements of 'the crime, then a ‘mere presence’ instruction is unnecessary.” United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Tucker
(3×)
also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
“A district court may properly refuse to give a ‘mere presence’ instruction when the government’s case rests on ‘more than just a defendant’s presence, and the jury is properly instructed on all elements of the crime..." United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 925 (9th Cir.2009) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Basher
A. “ ‘We review de novo motions to suppress, and any factual findings made at the suppression hearing for clear error.’ ” United States v. Ruckes, 586 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Maddox
(2×)
United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir.2007); United States v. Bynum, 362 F.3d 574, 578 (9th Cir.2004); United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Sanders
We utilize independent review in analyzing the issue. ( People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901-902 [ 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23 , 15 P.3d 243 ] [independent review, not abuse of discretion, standard applicable to whether witness was legally unavailable].) (2) The choice of remedy depends chiefly on the motive of the witness and the materiality of the questions the witness refuses to answer. ( Reynolds, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at p. 47 .) The critical question is whether the inquiry goes to a material issue from the witness's direct testimony, or a collateral issue that bears only on the witness's c…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Ruckes
II "We review de novo motions to suppress, and any factual findings made at the suppression hearing for clear error." United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992). "[I]nevitable discovery rulings are mixed questions [of law and fact] that . . . should be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard." United States v. Lang, 149 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir.1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Adrick Ruckes
II “We review de novo motions to suppress, and any factual findings made at the suppression hearing for clear error.” United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992). “[I]nevitable discovery rulings are mixed questions [of law and fact] that ... should be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.” United States v. Lang, 149 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir.1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Contreras
“We review de novo motions to suppress, and any factual findings made at the suppression hearing for clear error.” United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992). “[IJnevitable discovery rulings are mixed questions [of law and fact] that ... should be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.” United States v. Lang, 149 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir.1998).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Weyne
“We review de novo motions to suppress, and any factual findings made at the suppression hearing for clear error.” United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Weyne
“We review de novo motions to suppress, and any factual findings made at the suppression hearing for clear error.” United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Contreras
“We review de novo motions to suppress, and any factual findings made at the suppression hearing for clear error.” United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992). “[IJnevitable discovery rulings are mixed questions [of law and fact] that ... should be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.” United States v. Lang, 149 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir.1998).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Reed
A district court may properly refuse to give a “mere presence” instruction when the government’s case rests on “more than just a defendant’s presence, and the jury is properly instructed on all elements of the crime.... ” Id. at 629 (quoting United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Reed
A district court may properly refuse to give a “mere pres- ence” instruction when the government’s case rests on “more than just a defendant’s presence, and the jury is properly instructed on all elements of the crime . . . .” Id. at 629 (quot- ing United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir. 1992).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. King
The district court did not err because “the government’s case [was] based on more than just a defendant’s presence, and the jury [was] properly instructed on all elements of the crime[.]” United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. King
The district court did not err because “the government’s case [was] based on more than just a defendant’s presence, and the jury [was] properly instructed on all elements of the crime[.]” United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Norris
However, “[i]f the government’s case is based on more than just a defendant’s presence, and the jury is properly instructed on all elements of the crime, then a ‘mere presence’ instruction is unnecessary.” United States v. Negrete- Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992) (citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Norris
However, “[i]f the government’s case is based on more than just a defendant’s presence, and the jury is properly instructed on all elements of the crime, then a ‘mere presence’ instruction is unnecessary.” United States v. Negrete- Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992) (citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. McCreary
The district court may refuse a “mere presence” instruction “when the government’s case rests on ‘more than just a defendant’s presence, and the jury is properly instructed on all elements of the crime.’ ” United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 629 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. McCreary
The district court may refuse a “mere presence” instruction “when the government’s case rests on ‘more than just a defendant’s presence, and the jury is properly instructed on all elements of the crime.’ ” United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 629 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Ravandi
“If the government’s case is based on more than just a defendant’s presence, and the jury is properly instructed on all elements of the crime, then a ‘mere presence’ instruction is unnecessary.” United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992), quoting United States v. Chambers, 918 F.2d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir.1990).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Espinoza-Durazo
The commentary to the pattern instruction says: “A ‘mere presence’ instruction is unnecessary if the government’s case is not solely based on the defendant’s presence and the jury has been instructed on the elements of the crime.” This comment is based on a statement in United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992), the case on which Espinoza principally relies.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Gooch
United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir. 1992).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Gooch
United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Latu
A “technical” violation of the Rule requires suppression only if there was a “deliberate disregard of the rule,” Gantt, 194 F.3d at 1005 , citing United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir.1992), “or if the defendant was prejudiced.” Id.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Jones
“Prejudice in this context means the search would otherwise not have occurred or would have been less intrusive absent the error.” United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir.1992).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Loren Samuel Williamson
United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir.1992) (citing Johnson, 660 F.2d at 753 ); see also United States v. Ridgway, 300 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir.2002). 2 Williamson concedes that there was no prejudice here.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Williamson
United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Johnson, 660 F.2d at 753 ); see also United States v. Ridgway, 300 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2002). 2 [5] Williamson concedes that there was no prejudice here.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Aase
Suppression is justified here because the violation was deliberate.” Gantt, 194 F.3d at 994 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 1992)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Aase
Suppression is justified here because the violation was deliberate." Gantt, 194 F.3d at 994 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir.1992)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Colon-Valdez
Id. at 994 ; United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir.1992).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Schnelle v. State
The Ninth Circuit has set forth a well-established rule that a court may only apply the extreme sanction of striking a witness’s entire testimony “when the question asked pertains to matters directly affecting the witness’s testimony; the judge may not use the sanction when the privileged answer pertains to a collateral matter.” United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir.1992); see also United States v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461, 1469 (10th Cir.1991).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. William Bushyhead, Sr.
“Due process requires that defendants be able to exercise their constitutional right to remain silent and not be penalized at trial for doing so.” United States v. Baker, 999 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1280-81 (9th Cir.1992)); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 468 n. 37, 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (The “prosecution may not ... use at trial the fact that [defendant] stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.”).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Malloy
United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir.1992).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Sean Howell
A district court may properly refuse to give a “mere presence” instruction when the government’s case rests on “more than just a defendant’s presence, and the jury is properly instructed on all elements of the crime.... ” United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Ramon Velarde-Gomez
A mere presence instruction is unnecessary if “the government’s case is based on more than just a defendant’s presence, and the jury is properly instructed on all elements of the crime.” United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992); see also United States v. Medrano, 5 F.3d 1214, 1218-19 (9th Cir.1993).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Simons
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
See Simons, 206 F.3d at 403 ; Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d at 1283.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Jose Lombera-Camorlinga
(2×)
See United States v. Doe, 170 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir.1999) (violation of the Juvenile Delinquency Act’s parental notification provision); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 288 (9th Cir.1996) (violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5); United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir.1992) (violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 41); United States v. Soto-Soto, 598 F.2d 545, 550 (9th Cir.1979) (violation of 19 U.S.C. § 482 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Simons
Regardless of whether there is any evidence that Mesisca made this statement deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the truth, there is no reason to suspect that the statement affected the probable cause determi- nation. 14 137 F.3d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Gerber, 994 F.2d 1556, 1560 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 386-87 (2d Cir. 1975).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Mark L. Simons
See United States v. Chaar, 137 F.3d 359, 362 (6th Cir.1998); United States v. Gerber, 994 F.2d 1556, 1560 (11th Cir.1993); United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir.1992); United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 386-87 (2d Cir.1975).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Turner v. Kaiser
His sister’s proferred testimony was “merely cumulative of that of other witnesses.” United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1992) (granting habeas relief because the non-testifying witness was the defendant’s key witness and no other witness could duplicate that testimony); see also Bennett v. Scroggy, 793 F.2d 772, 776-77 (6th Cir. 1986) (granting habeas relief because defendant was the only person to testify about his victim’s reputation for violence and holding that the testimony of others about the victim’s reputation for violence would have been criti…
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Theo Ervin Williams v. Robert Borg, Warden
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
In my view, the striking of all of Williams’ testimony was disproportionate to the purposes the sanction was .designed to serve. “[SJtriking a witness’s entire testimony is an extreme sanction, not to be lightly imposed.” United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir.1992).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
United States
v.
Daniel Proa-Tovar
v.
Daniel Proa-Tovar
90-50373.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
May 13, 1992.
966 F.2d 1277
Published
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Daniel PROA-TOVAR, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 90-50373.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
May 13, 1992.
Prior Report: 945 F.2d 1450
Before: WALLACE, Chief Judge, BROWNING, HUG, TANG, SCHROEDER, FLETCHER, FARRIS, PREGERSON, ALARCON, POOLE, D.W. NELSON, CANBY, NORRIS, REINHARDT, BEEZER, HALL, WIGGINS, BRUNETTI, KOZINSKI, NOONAN, THOMPSON, O'SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, TROTT, FERNANDEZ, RYMER, T.G. NELSON, and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
1
Upon the vote of a majority of nonrecused regular active judges of this court, it is ordered that this case be reheard by the en banc court pursuant to Circuit Rule 35-3.