Easton v. Crossland Mortg. Corp., 114 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1997). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Easton v. Crossland Mortg. Corp., 114 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1997).
Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitPublished opinionNo. Nos. 96-55021, 96-55023Jun 10, 1997

Easton v. Crossland Mortg. Corp.

Quick Summary

A passing reference to a federal statute does not create federal question jurisdiction where the federal law is not a necessary element of the state claim and no preemption exists.

Former employees who alleged sexual harassment and related state-law claims in state court referred to Title VII and the federal Constitution, then disclaimed any federal remedy. The defendant removed the case, and the plaintiffs moved to remand. The question is whether a complaint that references federal theories but seeks only state remedies presents a federal question. The court holds that it does not. The plaintiffs relied exclusively on state law, did not exhaust the administrative prerequisites for Title VII, and sought no federal-only remedies. The district court erred in denying remand, so the court reverses, vacates the sanctions award, and remands to state court.

95 citation events (76 in the last 25 years) across 19 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997 2011 2026
Cited for
At page 982Determining federal question jurisdiction from the complaint30 citing casesexplaining that “the mere 25 reference of a federal statute in a pleading will not convert a state law claim into a federal cause of action if the federal statute is not a necessary element of the state 26 law claim and no preemption exists.11 citing courts put it this way · 29 listed here
  • Hughes, No. 4:26-cv-00011 (D. Alaska Aug. 7, 2026).
    ([T]he mere reference of a federal statute in a pleading will not convert a state law claim into a federal cause of action if the federal statute is not a necessary element of the state law claim and no preemption exist…)
  • (PS) Peacemaker v. Mitchell, No. 2:21-cv-01715 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2024).
    ([T]he 19 mere reference of a federal statute in a pleading will not convert a state law claim into a federal 20 cause of action if the federal statute is not a necessary element of the state law claim and no 21 preempt…)
  • Jose Yoni Aldana Hernandez v. C. R. Laurence, Co., No. 2:24-cv-03904 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2024).
    ([T]he mere reference of a federal statute in a pleading will not 5 | convert a state law claim into a federal cause of action if the federal statute is not a 6 || necessary element of the state law claim and no preempt…)
  • Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc'y, FSB v. Bersadeh Bagheri, No. 2:23-cv-01210, 2023 WL 3005005 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2023).
    (plaintiff is the master of his or her complaint and may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.)
  • Melody J. Liddell v. Claiming any Legal or Equitable Rig, No. 8:22-cv-01000 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2022).
    ([T]he mere reference of a federal statute in a pleading will not convert a state law claim into a federal cause of action if the federal statute is not a necessary element of the state law claim and no preemption exist…)
  • Brigham Field v. Genova Capital Inc., No. 2:20-cv-09563 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2020).
    ([T]he mere reference of 1 a federal statute in a pleading will not convert a state law claim into a federal cause of 2 action if the federal statute is not a necessary element of the state law claim and no 3 preemption…)
  • Gov't of Guam & Douglas B. Moylan v. Lourdes A. Leon Guerrero, No. 1:24-cv-00029 (D. Guam Apr. 7, 2026).
    (explaining that “the mere 25 reference of a federal statute in a pleading will not convert a state law claim into a federal cause of action if the federal statute is not a necessary element of the state 26 law claim and…)
  • Robert Anthony Hanson v. Nest Home Lending, LLC, No. 1:25-cv-02599 (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 2025).
    In their Motion to Remand [#13], Plaintiffs cite to Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1997), and include parenthetical language which states “quiet title and foreclosure disputes arise under state law and are…
  • (PS) Peacemaker v. Mitchell, No. 2:21-cv-01715 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2024). 2 cites
    (holding that “the mere reference 6 of a federal statute in a pleading will not convert a state law claim into a federal cause of action if 7 the federal statute” is insufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction)
  • Daniel Cavic v. Repub. of Montenegro, No. 8:23-cv-01308 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2024).
    “the mere reference of a federal statute in a pleading will not convert a state law claim into a federal cause of action if the federal statute is not a necessary element of the state law claim and no preemption exists”
Show 19 more citing cases
  • Law Offices of Phillips & Bordallo, P.C. v. Leon Guerrero, No. 1:22-cv-00020 (D. Guam Aug. 9, 2023).
    (explaining that “the mere reference of a 21 federal statute in a pleading will not convert a state law claim into a federal cause of action if the 22 federal statute is not a necessary element of the state law claim and…)
  • Ing. Dipl.-lng (FH) Elhar Muminovic v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., No. 8:22-cv-01669 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2022).
    (FH) Elhar Muminovic v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. mere reference of a federal statute in a pleading will not convert a state law claim into a federal cause of action if the federal statute is not a necessary element of the state law cla…
  • Jason Alan v. Equifax Inc., No. 2:19-cv-06588 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2019).
    Easton, 114 F.3d at 982.
  • Gallo v. Unknown No. of Identity Thieves, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2017).published
    “is not a necessary element of the state law claim and no preemption exists”
  • Sabatino v. HMO Missouri, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 3d 887 (N.D. Cal. 2015).published
    “the mere reference of a federal statute in' a pleading will not convert a state law claim into a federal cause of action if the federal statute is not a necessary element of the state law claim and no preemption exists”
  • McMaster v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of California, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1107 (N.D. Cal. 2005).published 2 cites
    “is the master of ... her complaint and may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law”
  • Pressman v. Meridian Mortg. Co., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Haw. 2004).published
    “in addition to examining the literal language selected by the plaintiff, the district court must analyze whether jurisdiction would exist under a properly pleaded complaint”
  • Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (D. Ariz. 2003).published 2 cites
    “The plaintiff is the master of his or her complaint and many avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law”
  • Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 159 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1998).published 2 cites
    Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir.1997). 7 If a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a removed action, it has the duty to remand it, for "removal is permissible only where original jurisdiction…
  • Leanders v. Yassai (In re Yassai), 225 B.R. 478 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1998).published
    Federal question jurisdiction extends in those cases to which “a well pleaded complaint establishes ... ‘that federal law creates fa] cause of action....’” Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting Franc…
  • Moreno v. Health Partners Health Plan, 4 F. Supp. 2d 888 (D. Ariz. 1998).published
    See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 , 107 S.Ct. 2425 , 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987); Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir.1997).
  • L. H. v. Rice Enter., LLC, No. 2:23-cv-00613 (W.D. Pa. June 26, 2023).
    See Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir.1997); Mink v. General Motors Corp., 72 F.3d 130 , 1995 WL 723180 , 2–3 (6th Cir.1995); Ginsberg v. Paramount Comms.
  • Rutherford v. La Jolla Riviera Apt. House LLC, No. 3:19-cv-01349, 2019 WL 6125255 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2019).
    See 18 Easton, 114 F.3d at 982; ARCO Envt’l.
  • Eva Hall v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc. George Correa All City Moving & Storage, 476 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2007).published 2 cites
    See Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir.1997); see also Opera Plaza Residential Parcel Homeowners Ass’n v. Hoang, 376 F.3d 831, 840 (9th Cir.2004) (claims “for damages stemming from alleged breach of contract” or…
  • ARCO Env't Remediation, L.L.C. v. Dep't of Health & Env't Quality, 213 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2000).published 2 cites
    See Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir.1997); Rains, 80 F.3d at 343 .
  • (PC)Taylor-El v. Cisneros, No. 1:23-cv-00889 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2023).
    See, e.g., 15 Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1997). 16 III. 17 ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION 18 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall randomly 19 assign a District Judge to t…
  • Linda Mason v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 124 F.3d 212 (9th Cir. 1997).unpublished
    See, e.g., Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir.1997). 4 In this case, as opposed to the situation in Easton, Mason on removal specifically sought a federal remedy under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")…
  • Rebecca Castillo v. Lundt & Sprungli USA Inc., No. 2:19-cv-08483 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2019).
  • Rebecca Castillo v. Tamara Mellon Brand, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-10466, 2020 WL 703693 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2020).
Other citing cases2 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Patty EASTON Peggy Maarup Maria Scott, Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-Appellants, and Henry W. Bockman, Esq., Real-Party-in-Interest-Appellant
v.
CROSSLAND MORTGAGE CORPORATION, a corporation, and Betsy Lamonte Lorene Washington, Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellees Patty EASTON Peggy Maarup Maria Scott, Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-Appellees v. CROSSLAND MORTGAGE CORPORATION, a corporation, Betsy Lamonte Lorene Washington, Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellants, Henry W. Bockman, Esq., Real-Party-in-Interest-Appellee
Nos. 96-55021, 96-55023.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Jun 10, 1997.
Published opinion
Henry W. Bockman, Sherman Oaks, CA, for the plaintiffs-counter-defendants-appellants-eross-appellees and the real-party-in-interest-appellant-cross-appellee., Cynthia E. Gitt and Lester F. Aponte, Epstein Becker & Green, Los Angeles, CA, for the defendant-appellee-cross-appellant and defendants-eounter-claimants-appelleescross-appellants.
Magill, Rymer, Thomas.
Cited by 23 opinions  |  Published

[*981] OPINION

PER CURIAM.

We consider in this appeal whether the district court should have remanded a complaint which referenced federal theories, but did not seek federal remedies. Because we find that the case should have been remanded to state court, we reverse.

I.

Patty Easton, Peggy Maarup, and Maria Scott believed they had been sexually harassed by their female supervisors at Cross-land Mortgage Corporation (“Crossland”). They filed a complaint in state court alleging sexual harassment, hostile work environment, sex discrimination, wrongful termination, assault and battery, invasion of privacy, and retaliation. The counts of the complaint alleging sexual harassment claimed that the described conduct was in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940, the plaintiffs’ right of privacy under the “California and federal” constitutions, and the “common law right to be free of sexual harassment, a sexually abusive workplace, a hostile and discriminatory workplace.” For damages proximately caused by these acts, Plaintiffs sought relief under California Civil Procedure Code § 425 et seq.

Based on the references to Title VII and the right of privacy, Crossland removed the ease. In response, plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the federal action and sent a stipulation to defendants’ counsel stating that “[w]e do intend to proceed solely for remedies available under the laws of the State of California.” Defendants declined to stipulate to a dismissal, and the individual defendants filed state law counterclaims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs filed an answer to the counterclaims stating that the plaintiffs did not “intend to pursue any federal remedy.” Plaintiffs subsequently filed a second complaint in state court omitting all references to Title VII and the U.S. Constitution.

Plaintiffs then filed a motion to remand, asserting that “the complaint does not state a claim for which relief may be granted under any federal statute or under the United States Constitution” and that there was no federal question before the court. The plaintiffs argued that they referenced Title VII and the U.S. Constitution “because California courts follow similar interpretations of federal court decisions in applying state law.” Because of that, plaintiffs claimed the citations to Title VII and the U.S. Constitution were “gratuitous but not inappropriate.” Plaintiffs also noted that they had not filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, a prerequisite for initiating an action seeking remedies under Title VII. Rather, plaintiffs had exhausted state administrative remedies before the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing and obtained a right to sue letter from the Department.

The district court denied the motion to remand. Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider based on new ease authority. Defendants opposed the motion and requested sanctions because the plaintiffs had admitted that the federal claims were baseless. The district court denied the motion to reconsider and granted sanctions in the amount of $3,150 for defense counsel’s time spent opposing the motion to remand.

Following completion of discovery, the district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Scott. Plaintiffs Easton and Maarup voluntarily dismissed all claims except their claims for sexual harassment and Maarup’s wrongful termination claim. A final pre-trial order was signed superceding all previous pleadings wherein plaintiffs once again renounced any federal relief. The case proceeded to trial. However, plaintiffs’ counsel conceded he could not prove a ease based on the district court’s pre-trial evidentiary rulings. After further briefing, the district court then granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all remaining counts. Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F.Supp. 1368 (C.D.Cal.1995).

[*982] II.

We review a district court’s denial of a remand motion de novo. Eyak Native Village v. Exxon Corp., 25 F.3d 773, 777 (9th Cir.1994).

Federal question jurisdiction extends only in those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes “either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on a resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). “[I]n order for a complaint to state a claim ‘arising under’ federal law, it must be clear from the face of the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint that there is a federal question.” Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir.1996).

The plaintiff is the master of his or her complaint and may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429-30, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). Ordinarily, the existence of federal question jurisdiction is determined from the face of the complaint. Ultramar America Ltd. v. Dwelle, 900 F.2d 1412, 1414 (9th Cir.1990). However, in addition to examining the literal language selected by the plaintiff, the district court must analyze whether jurisdiction would exist under a properly pleaded complaint. A plaintiff may not avoid federal jurisdiction by omitting from the complaint federal law essential to his or her claim or by casting in state law terms a claim that can be made only under federal law. Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 344 (9th Cir.1996). Conversely, the mere reference of a federal statute in a pleading will not convert a state law claim into a federal cause of action if the federal statute is not a necessary element of the state law claim and no preemption exists. Id. at 345-47.

In this case, like Rains, the plaintiffs alleged state law claims which included incidental reference to a federal statute and the U.S. Constitution. The remedies sought were founded exclusively on state law. The plaintiffs did not seek, much less exhaust, the administrative remedies which are a necessary precondition to a Title VII action. No remedies unique to a Title VII cause of action, such as attorneys fees, were pled.

Any lingering apprehension about the plaintiffs’ intentions was resolved by plaintiffs’ immediate actions clarifying their intent upon removal. From the genesis of the case, plaintiffs have adamantly eschewed relief based on federal law.

“Jurisdiction may not be sustained on a theory that the plaintiff has not advanced.” Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809 n. 6, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 3233 n. 6, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986). Plaintiffs’ claims, if properly pleaded, did not arise under the U.S. Constitution or the laws of the United States. Taking into account all of these circumstances, the district court should have granted the motion to remand and erred in failing to do so. See Duncan, 76 F.3d at 1485. Because the district court awarded sanctions based on plaintiffs’ motion to remand, we vacate the sanction award. Baddie v. Berkeley Farms, Inc., 64 F.3d 487, 490 (9th Cir.1995).

We reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to remand the case to the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.