M.B. 11072-054 v. Reish, 119 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1997). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite M.B. 11072-054 v. Reish, 119 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1997).
Court of Appeals for the Second CircuitPublished opinionNo. 1814, Docket 96-2347Jul 30, 1997

M.B. 11072-054 v. Reish, 119 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1997)

Quick Summary

A pro se litigant who responded substantively to summary judgment and understood the need to show a genuine factual dispute needs no express warning of its consequences.

A federal prisoner, proceeding pro se, sued Bureau of Prisons employees under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments over disciplinary actions taken while he was incarcerated. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and stayed the prisoner's discovery requests. On appeal, the question is whether the court must affirmatively advise a pro se litigant of the consequences of an insufficient summary judgment response and whether the discovery stay was an abuse of discretion. The court holds that no such advisement is required where the litigant responded substantively and understood the consequences, and that the discovery ruling was within the court's discretion. The judgment is affirmed.

71 citation events (60 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997 2011 2026
Cited for
At page 232Pro se litigant's understanding of summary judgment consequences33 citing cases“the need to set forth all available evidence demonstrating a genuine dispute over material facts,”3 citing courts quote it · 28 listed here
  • Tatum, No. 2:23-cv-01550 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2025).
    In the Second Circuit, a district court cannot grant a motion for summary judgment in a case involving a pro se litigant unless: (1) the court apprises the pro se litigant of the consequences of failing to respond to the motion, see Ruotol…
  • Hicks, No. 7:23-cv-08088 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2025).
    “the need to set forth all available evidence demonstrating a genuine dispute over material facts”
  • Lifchits v. Key 4U Transporation Corp. Bus, No. 1:20-cv-03749 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2023).
    However, “the Second Circuit has recognized exceptions to this obligation when the moving party has provided the pro se litigant with the requisite notice through other means, or when the pro se litigant responds to the summary judgment mo…
  • Etere v. Nassau Cnty., No. 1:17-cv-03113, 2023 WL 5881186 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2023).
    In the Second Circuit, a district court cannot grant a motion for summary judgment in a case involving a pro se litigant unless (1) the court apprises the pro se litigant of the consequences of failing to respond to the motion, see Ruotolo…
  • Vidal v. State of New York, No. 7:18-cv-06184 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2023).
    Local Rule 56.2 Requirements In the Second Circuit, a district court cannot grant a motion for summary judgment in a case involving a pro se litigant unless (1) the court apprises the pro se litigant of the consequences of failing to respo…
  • Reynolds v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 7:21-cv-04763 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2023).
    Prior to filing their motion for summary judgment, Defendants served Plaintiff a “Notice to Pro Se Litigant Pursuant to Local Civil Rules 12.1 and 56.2.” 1 (ECF Nos. 56, 71.) In support 1 In the Second Circuit, a district court cannot gran…
  • Gil-Cabrera v. Dep't of Corr., No. 1:20-cv-09493 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2023).
    Separately, a district court may not grant summary judgment in a case involving a pro se litigant unless (1) the court apprises the pro se litigant of failing to respond to the motion, (2) an opposing party has already provided the pro se…
  • Johnson v. Reed, No. 7:17-cv-08620-NSR-AEK (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2023).
    (Id.) Defendant Reed reported that Ms. Bartholomew “showed redness, swelling and a small amount of blood to her mouth/nose area” and that A.B. “showed swelling and redness to the area she was struck and . . . complained of discomfort.” (Re…
  • Carzoglio v. Paul, No. 7:17-cv-03651-NSR (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2022).
    In the Second Circuit, a district court cannot grant a motion for summary judgment in a case involving a pro se litigant unless (1) the court apprises the pro se litigant of the consequences of failing to respond to the motion, see Ruotolo…
  • Phipps v. Experian, No. 7:20-cv-03368 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2022).
    In the Second Circuit, a district court cannot grant a motion for summary judgment in a case involving a pro se litigant unless (1) the court apprises the pro se litigant of the consequences of failing to respond to the motion, see Ruotolo…
Show 18 more citing cases
  • Graves v. Corr. Med. Serv., 667 F. App'x 18 (2d Cir. 2016).unpublished
    However, where "a pro se litigant has demonstrated a clear understanding of the nature and consequences of a summary judgment motion and ‘the need to set forth all available evidence demonstrating a genuine dispute over material facts,' fa…
  • Davila v. Uconn Med. Ctr., 353 F. App'x 490 (2d Cir. 2009).unpublished 4 cites
    Taking into account “the nature of the papers submitted by the litigant and the assertions made therein as well as the litigant’s participation in proceedings before the District Court,” Vital, 168 F.3d at 621 , we conclude that Davila kne…
  • Jova v. Smith, 582 F.3d 410 (2d Cir. 2009).published 2 cites
    Taking into account “the nature of the papers submitted by the litigant and the assertions made therein as well as the litigant’s participation in proceedings before the District Court,” Vital, 168 F.3d at 621 , we, therefore, find that th…
  • Hynard v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 50 F. App'x 48 (2d Cir. 2002).unpublished
    “understood the consequences of a sum mary judgment motion and the requirements of a successful response”
  • Johnson v. Buffalo Police Dep't, 46 F. App'x 11 (2d Cir. 2002).unpublished
    (no reversal required where the pro se litigant’s submissions included a 27-page declaration of facts with 104 pages of exhibits, a 40-page memorandum of law, a counterstatement of disputed facts, a cross-motion for summ…)
  • Bourdon v. Loughren, 7 F. App'x 116 (2d Cir. 2001).unpublished
    In M.B. # 11072-054 v. Reish, 119 F.3d 230, 232 (2d Cir.1997) (per curiam), we held that a pro se litigant had adequate notice of the consequences of summary judgment where the litigant: (1) filed a 27 page declaration of facts with 104 pa…
  • Richard Dean Sawyer, III v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 180 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 1999).published 2 cites
    “the need to set forth all available evidence demonstrating a genuine dispute over material facts”
  • Coleman Vital v. Interfaith Med. Ctr. & Local 1199, 168 F.3d 615 (2d Cir. 1999).published 3 cites
    At the same time, we have recognized that a District Court need not advise a pro se litigant as to the nature of summary judgment where an opposing party has already provided the litigant with the requisite notice, see Champion v. Artuz, 7…
  • Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1998).published
    (district court's discovery rulings "reversed only upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.)
  • Abdiel Echeverria v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 523 F. App'x 675 (11th Cir. 2013).unpublished
    (failure to provide pro se litigant with Rule 56 notice is not reversible error when the litigant “responds to the summary judgment motion with factual and legal submissions indicating that he understood the nature and c…)
  • Liggins v. Griffo, 356 F. App'x 537 (2d Cir. 2009).unpublished
    See M.B. #11072-054 v. Reish, 119 F.3d 230, 232 (2d Cir.1997) (per curiam).
  • Wali v. Chelsea Plastics, 351 F. App'x 547 (2d Cir. 2009).unpublished 2 cites
    See M.B. #11072-054 v. Reish, 119 F.3d 230, 232 (2d Cir.1997) (per curiam) (finding that a pro se litigant who filed a 27-page declaration of facts with 104 pages of exhibits, a 40-page memorandum of law, a cross-motion for summary judgmen…
  • Keesh v. Smith, No. 08-2816-pr (2d Cir. Sept. 28, 2009).published
    (finding that a pro se litigant who filed a 27-page declaration of facts with 104 pages of 9 exhibits, a 40-page memorandum of law, and a cross-motion for summary judgment understood 10 the nature and consequences of sum…)
  • Thomsen v. Cnty. of Erie New York, 203 F. App'x 381 (2d Cir. 2006).unpublished
    See M.B. # 11072-054 v. Reish, 119 F.3d 230, 232 (2d Cir.1997); see also Sawyer v. Am.
  • Trammell v. Keane, 338 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2003).published 2 cites
    (where prisoner's Section 1983 claims are insufficient as a matter of law and the record before the district court sufficient, denial of discovery is not a basis for vacatur)
  • Schafler v. Summer, 63 F. App'x 581 (2d Cir. 2003).unpublished 2 cites
    See M.B. #11072-054, v. Reish, 119 F.3d 230, 232 (2d Cir.1997).
  • Oudekerk, No. 5:23-cv-00288 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2025).
    See, e.g., M.B. v. Reish, 119 F.3d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1997).
  • Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2005).published 2 cites
    See, e.g., M.B. # 11072-054 v. Reish, 119 F.3d 230, 232 (2d Cir.1997) (per curiam); Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir.1983).
At page 231Understanding the nature of summary judgment motions1 citing casePER CURIAM. M.B., a prisoner in the United States Witness Protection Program, appeals from Judge Knapp’s adverse grant of summary judgment. M.B. alleges…opening of page *231 (no citing court says what it cites this page for)
  • Elastic Wonder, Inc. v. Posey, 179 F. Supp. 3d 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).published
    Corp., No. 15-679, 2016 WL 1055780 , at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 17, 2016) (summary order) (finding the record made clear that the pro se party understood the nature of a summary judgment motion because the party submitted an opposition that cited…
Other citing cases8 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
M.B. 11072-054
v.
R.M. REISH, Warden, M.C.C. N.Y. Waliyd A. Muhammed, Unit Manager Doug Reed, Health Services Administration Frank E. Harper, Discipline Hearing Officer Robert Parrish, Special Investigative Agent caren 1. gibson Emelio Ortiz, Correction Counselor Patrick Flynn, Education Department F. Briggs, Lieutenant John (1-5) Doe
No. 1814, Docket 96-2347.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Jul 30, 1997.
Published opinion
119 F.3d 230
1997 WL 423065
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 19302
Omid Zareh, Coudert Brothers, New York City (Douglas F. Broder, of counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellant., Marianne T. O’Toole, Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, New York City (Mary Jo White, United States Attorney, Gideon A. Schor, Assistant United States Attorney, of counsel), for Defendants-Appellees.
Jacobs, Leval, Winter.
Cited by 30 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

M.B., a prisoner in the United States Witness Protection Program, appeals from Judge Knapp’s adverse grant of summary judgment. M.B. alleges violations of his rights under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in connection with prison disciplinary actions taken by appellees, all present or former employees of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The claims arise out of incidents that occurred in 1994 and 1995 while M.B. was incarcerated at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in Manhattan.

We have already rejected a number of M.B.’s claims in a previous decision rendered by summary order. M.B. # 11072-051, v. R.M. Reish, et al., No. 96-2347 (2d Cir. Dec.27, 1996). In the instant appeal, M.B. argues that Judge Knapp’s grant of summary judgment should be reversed on the grounds that the district court erred in not giving M.B., then a pro se litigant, adequate notice of the consequences of an insufficient response to a motion for summary judgment and in staying M.B.’s discovery requests. We disagree.

Appellant claims that Ruotolo v. IRS, 28 F.3d 6 (2d Cir.1994), in which we reversed a grant of summary judgment that had been entered against pro se plaintiffs for failure to[*232] respond to the motion, mandates reversal in the instant case. We reversed a grant of summary judgment in Ruotolo on the ground that the trial court had not advised the pro se plaintiffs that their case would be dismissed if they did not respond to the summary judgment motion. 28 F.3d at 8. See also Champion v. Artuz, 76 F.3d 483 (2d Cir.1996). Ruotolo and Champion do not, however, mandate reversal in the instant case where appellant did in fact respond to the opposing motion for summary judgment and where the record is clear that he understood the need to set forth all available evidence demonstrating a genuine dispute over material facts.

There is no requirement that the district court affirmatively advise the pro se litigant of the nature and consequences of a summary judgment motion if the pro se litigant has otherwise been adequately notified or is already aware of such consequences. In Champion we held that an “easily comprehensible notice from the party moving for summary judgment would suffice,” Champion, 76 F.3d at 486, and in Ruotolo we explicitly grounded our reversal of summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs “did not understand the district court’s procedure with respect to summary judgment motions,” Ruotolo, 28 F.3d at 9.

Unlike the plaintiffs in both Ruotolo and Champion, M.B. responded to the motion for summary judgment with a 27-page declaration of facts with 104 pages of exhibits, a 40-page memorandum of law, a cross-motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs favor, a counter “3(g) statement” of facts pursuant to the local rales of the Southern District, and a request for further discovery. Furthermore, in his papers M.B. made it clear that he understood the consequences of a summary judgment motion and the requirements of a successful response. M.B. states that his papers were intended to show “clear factual disputes preventing summary judgement,” that he was addressing appellees’ assertions and “providing documentary support” for his counter-assertions “whenever and where ever [sic] possible,” and that “there seems to exist a material issue of fact which presents a genuine issue to be tried, which precludes summary judgment.” We therefore hold that M.B. had adequate notice of the requirements of a summary judgment motion and of the failure to sufficiently respond to such a motion.

We similarly reject M.B.’s contention that he was improperly denied discovery by the district court pending resolution of the summary judgment motion. We have held that a “trial court enjoys wide discretion in its handling of pre-trial discovery, and its rulings with regard to discovery are reversed only upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.” Cruden v. Bank of New York, 957 F.2d 961, 972 (2d Cir.1992). For the most part, M.B.’s claims were insufficient as a matter of law or could not have been aided by discovery. For example, his Eighth Amendment claims required a showing of deliberate indifference by prison officials, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991), and the record before the district court was sufficient for it to conclude that no amount of discovery would breathe life into them. The only claim that might arguably have benefited from discovery was the claim asserted against Caren Gibson that she had retaliated against M.B. by instructing an inmate — with whom she was allegedly having an affair — to assault M.B. However, M.B. offered no evidence in support of this claim other than his own statements, which he conceded were not based on personal knowledge. Further, he told Judge Knapp that the inmate would not give sworn evidence of the alleged instructions in the instant matter. Judge Knapp’s denial of discovery was therefore within his discretion because M.B. failed to present any credible basis to suggest that discovery would produce favorable evidence relating to this claim. Indeed, M.B.’s requests for discovery seem not to have been directed to the retaliation claim.

We therefore affirm.