United States v. Bell, 137 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 1998). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Bell, 137 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 1998). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
23 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Stephanie Dasinger (ca11, 2016-05-24)
Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1999 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 20 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Stephanie Dasinger
11th Cir. · 2016 · confidence medium
United States v. Bell, 137 F.3d 1274, 1275 (11th Cir.1998); see also Isnadin, 742 F.3d at 1307 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Esnel Isnadin
11th Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
“The [G]ov-ernment must also establish some nexus between the firearm and the drug trafficking offense to show possession was in furtherance of the crime.” United States v. Gunn, 369 F.3d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir.2004) (citing United States v. Timmons, 283 F.3d 1246, 1252-53 (11th Cir.2002)). “[Ujnder § 924(c), a defendant may be liable for a coconspirator’s possession if possession was reasonably foreseeable.” Id. at 1234 (citing United States v. Bell, 137 F.3d 1274, 1274-75 (11th Cir.1998)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Esnel Isnadin
11th Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
“The [G]overnment must also establish some nexus between the firearm and the drug trafficking offense to show possession was in furtherance of the crime.” United States v. Gunn, 369 F.3d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Timmons, 283 F.3d 1246, 1252-53 (11th Cir. 2002)). “[U]nder § 924(c), a defendant may be liable for a co- conspirator’s possession if possession was reasonably foreseeable.” Id. at 1234 (citing United States v. Bell, 137 F.3d 1274, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 1998)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Shaheed Rashard Thompson
11th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1099-100 (11th Cir.2001); United States v. Bell, 137 F.3d 1274, 1274-75 (11th Cir.1998) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Mark Anthony Myrie
11th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
United States v. Bell, 137 F.3d 1274, 1274-75 (11th Cir.1998). “[A]n absent conspirator may be found guilty of violating § 924(c) if the carrying or using of a firearm by a coconspirator is a reasonably foreseeable action of the conspiracy.” United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1100 (11th Cir.2001).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ramon Blanco
11th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
United States v. Bell, 137 F.3d 1274, 1275 (11th Cir.1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Banan Mahmoud Qasim
11th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
United States v. Bell, 137 F.3d 1274, 1274-75 (11th Cir.1998) (referring to this rule as “Pinkerton liability”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Bryan Timothyleenard Smith
11th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
United States v. Bell, 137 F.3d 1274, 1275 (11th Cir.1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Tanisha Crissy Taylor
11th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
United States v. Pringle, 350 F.3d 1172, 1175-76 (11th Cir.2003); United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1099 (11th Cir.2001) (citing United States v. Bell, 137 F.3d 1274, 1275 (11th Cir.1998)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Manuel Gunn
11th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
United States v. Bell, 137 F.3d 1274, 1274-75 (11th Cir.1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jerry Pringle
11th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Diaz, 248 F.3d at 1099 (citing United States v. Bell, 137 F.3d 1274, 1275 (11th Cir.1998)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Diaz (2×)
11th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
As the majority points out, every conspirator is liable for every co-conspirator's reasonably foreseeable actions. 17 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 , 66 S.Ct. 1180 , 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946); United States v. Bell, 137 F.3d 1274, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Diaz
11th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
As the majority points out, every conspirator is liable for every co-conspirator's 13 R.1-1 at 1. 14 R.59-6 at 310-11. 15 R.59-6 at 318-20. 16 R.59-6 at 319-20. 34 reasonably foreseeable actions.17 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 460, 466-67 (1946); United States v. Bell, 137 F.3d 1274, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 1998).
cited Cited "see" Joseph W. Bullard v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
M.D. Fla. · 2026 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Jones, 137 F.3d at 1274 (quotation marks omitted).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Diaz
11th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See U.S. v. Bell, 137 F.3d 1274 , 1275 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that coconspirator liability for a § 924(c) offense may be established under Pinkerton liability).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Diaz
11th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See U.S. v. Bell, 137 F.3d 1274 , 1275 (11th Cir.1998) (holding that coconspirator liability for a § 924(c) offense may be established under Pinkerton liability).
discussed Cited "see" Castillo v. United States
11th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Bell, 137 F.3d 1274, 1275 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that liability under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946), continues to apply to ' 924(c) offenses subsequent to Bailey).
discussed Cited "see" Castillo v. United States
11th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Bell, 137 F.3d 1274, 1275 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that liability under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 , 66 S.Ct. 1180 , 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946), continues to apply to § 924(c) offenses subsequent to Bailey ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Quinton Bannister
11th Cir. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence medium
This Circuit has extended so-called Pinkerton liability to § 924(c) offenses: “[Cjriminal *626 defendants remain liable for the reasonably foreseeable actions of their coconspirators—including the using or carrying of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence.” Diaz, 248 F.3d at 1099 ; see also United States v. Bell, 137 F.3d 1274, 1275 (11th Cir.1998) (holding co-conspirator liability for a § 924(c) offense may be established under Pinkerton).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. McIntosh
10th Cir. · 1999 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g. , United States v. Bell , 137 F.3d 1274, 1275 (11th Cir. 1998) (and cases cited therein).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff-Appellee.
v.
Yvette BELL, Defendant-Appellant
96-2626.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Mar 23, 1998.
137 F.3d 1274
James H. McCarty, Gainesville, FL, for Defendant-Appellant., R. Jerome Sanford, Asst. U.S. Atty., Gainesville, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Cox, Carnes, Roney.
Cited by 18 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

This case requires us to decide if Pinkerton co-conspirator liability continues to apply to section 924(e) cases after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995). We conclude that it does and therefore affirm the district court’s refusal to permit Bell to withdraw her guilty plea.

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) punishes individuals who use or carry a firearm in connection with drug trafficking or a crime of violence. In Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 1184-85, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946), the Supreme Court held that criminal[*1275] defendants are liable for the reasonably foreseeable actions of their co-conspirators. Pinkerton liability is well established in this Circuit, see, e.g. United States v. Broadwell, 870 F.2d 594, 603-04 (11th Cir.1989), and although we have apparently never directly confronted the issue, the general rule among the circuits has been that the Pinkerton doctrine is applicable in section 924(c) eases, see, e.g. United States v. McManus, 23 F.3d 878, 883 (4th Cir.1994), United States v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761, 765 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1041, 114 S.Ct. 1564, 128 L.Ed.2d 210 (1994); United States v. Davis, 1 F.3d 1014, 1017 (10th Cir.1993).

The district court correctly held that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bailey did not preclude the application of Pinkerton liability in Bell’s case. In Bailey, the Court held that a conviction for “using” a firearm required proof of active employment of a weapon, and that proof of mere possession was insufficient. See Bailey, 516 U.S. at 142, 116 S.Ct. at 506. Bailey interpreted the meaning of the word “use.” Every appellate court opinion we have found on this issue has squarely held that Pinkerton liability continues to apply to section 924(c) offenses subsequent to Bailey. See e.g. Woodruff v. United States, 131 F.3d 1238, 1243 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Fonseca-Caro, 114 F.3d 906, 907 (9th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 895, 139 L.Ed.2d 880 (1998); United States v. Wilson, 105 F.3d 219, 221 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 133, 139 L.Ed.2d 82 (1997); United States v. Myers, 102 F.3d 227, 237-38 (6th Cir. 1996), — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1720, 137 L.Ed.2d 843 (1997); United States v. Rodger, 100 F.3d 90, 91 (8th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 145, 139 L.Ed.2d 92 (1997); United States v. Pimentel, 83 F.3d 55, 58 (2d Cir.1996).

We agree with the reasoning of our sister circuits and now expressly hold that the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey did not eliminate Pinkerton liability.

The sole issue on this appeal is whether the district court should have allowed plaintiff to withdraw her pre-Bailey guilty plea because without Pinkerton, the government’s proffer was insufficient to constitute a crime. Since the government’s proffer was sufficient factually to provide the basis for Pinkerton liability, the court properly denied the motion to withdraw.

AFFIRMED.