Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Colello
The SEC may name a non-party depository as a nominal defendant to effect full relief in the marshalling of assets that are the fruit of an underlying fraud.
The Securities and Exchange Commission sued a non-party to a fraud scheme, naming him as a nominal defendant to recover investor funds in his possession. The defendant argued the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the summary judgment was improper because he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. The court held that the SEC may name a non-party depository as a nominal defendant to effect full relief in the marshalling of assets that are the fruit of the underlying fraud. Because the defendant's silence, combined with evidence of his receipt of funds, allowed the court to draw adverse inferences regarding his lack of a legitimate claim, the summary judgment was proper.
At page 677Invoking the fifth amendment in civil cases and drawing adverse inferences47 citing cases“parties are free to invoke the fifth amendment in civil cases, but the court is equally free to draw adverse inferences from their failure of proof.”
- Thao v. Cnty. of Siskiyou, No. 2:23-cv-02563 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2025).(Parties are free to invoke the Fifth Amendment in civil cases, but [in civil proceedings] the court is equally free 28 to draw adverse inferences from their failure of proof.)
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Sripetch, No. 3:20-cv-01864 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2024). (Parties 1 are free to invoke the Fifth Amendment in civil cases, but the court is equally free to 2 draw adverse inferences from their failure of proof.)
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Zachary J. Horwitz, No. 2:21-cv-02927 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2021).(Parties are free to invoke the Fifth Amendment in civil cases, but the court is equally free to draw adverse inferences from their failure of proof.)
- Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Fin. Tree, No. 2:20-cv-01184 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2021).(a district 12 court has discretion in its response to a party’s invocation of the Fifth.)
- United States v. Harding, No. 2:19-cv-00871 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2020).(Parties 13 are free to invoke the Fifth Amendment in civil cases, but the court is equally free to draw 14 adverse inferences from their failure of proof.)
- Braswell v. McCamman, 256 F. Supp. 3d 719 (W.D. Mich. 2017).published (Parties are free to invoke the Fifth Amendment in civil cases, but the court is equally free to draw adverse inferences from their failure of proof.)
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. World Capital Mkt., Inc., 864 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2017).published ([T]he lack of a legitimate claim to the funds is the defining element of a nominal defendant.)
- SEC v. Vincent Messina, No. 15-55325 (9th Cir. Mar. 21, 2017).published ([T]he lack of a legitimate claim to the funds is the defining element of a nominal defendant.)
- Verbena Health, Res. v. Michelle L. Malkin, No. 68179-6 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2013).unpublished(Parties are free to invoke the Fifth Amendment in civil cases, but the court is equally free to draw adverse inferences from their failure of proof.)
- Steiner v. Minnesota Life Ins. Co., 85 P.3d 135 (Colo. 2004).published (Parties are free to invoke the Fifth Amendment in civil cases, but the court is equally free to draw adverse inferences from their failure of proof.)
Show 36 more citing cases
- Nat'l Ass'n of State Vets. Homes v. Donor, No. 8:23-cv-02787 (D. Md. Apr. 24, 2025).“the district court exercised its discretion by shifting the burden to defendant ....”
- Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Tate's Auto Ctr. of Winslow Incorporation, No. 3:18-cv-08176 (D. Ariz. Feb. 5, 2021). “plaintiff must show that 3 the nominal defendant has received ill gotten funds and that he does not have a legitimate 4 claim to those funds.”
- Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Burke, 699 F. App'x 669 (9th Cir. 2017).unpublished (Parties are free to invoke the Fifth Amendment in civil cases, but the court is equally free to draw adverse inferences from- their failure of proof.)
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. McGee, 895 F. Supp. 2d 669 (E.D. Pa. 2012).published“the creditor plaintiff must show that the nominal defendant has received ill gotten funds and that he does not have a legitimate claim to those funds.”
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Gemstar-Tv Guide Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2005).published(Parties are free to invoke the Fifth Amendment in civil cases, but the court is equally free to draw adverse inferences from their failure of proof.)
- United States Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Crypto Traders Mgmt., LLC, No. 2:21-cv-00103 (D. Idaho Mar. 4, 2024). The Ninth Circuit has explained that to obtain an order of disgorgement from a relief defendant, the SEC must show that the defendant “received ill-gotten funds and that he does not have a legitimate claim to those funds.” Id. at 677 (emph…
- Wynne v. Arteaga, No. 4:23-cv-02365 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2024). (explaining courts are free to fashion whatever remedy is required to prevent unfairness)
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Yin, No. 1:17-cv-00972 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2023).Importantly, the SEC does not have a “cause of action” against a relief defendant; rather, it names a party as a relief defendant solely to “effect full relief in the marshalling of assets that are the fruit of the underlying fraud.” S.E.C…
- United States Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Crypto Traders Mgmt., LLC, No. 2:21-cv-00103 (D. Idaho Sept. 28, 2022). “Parties are free to invoke the Fifth Amendment in civil cases, but the court is equally free to draw adverse inferences from their failure of proof.” S.E.C. v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U…
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Complete Bus. Solutions Grp., Inc., No. 9:20-cv-81205 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2022).The Court can order such relief where the relief defendant (1) has received ill-gotten funds, and (2) does not have a legitimate claim to those funds.” Janvey v. Adams, 588 F.3d 831, 834 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing S.E.C. v. Colello, 139 F.3d…
- Ussec v. Berkeley Healthcare Dynamics, No. 20-16754 (9th Cir. Jan. 5, 2022).unpublished Under Ninth Circuit precedent, to obtain disgorgement against a relief defendant, a “plaintiff must show that the nominal defendant has received ill gotten funds and that he does not have a legitimate claim to those funds.” Id. at 677.
- Donald Hugh Nichols & Jane Ann Nichols, No. 4:18-bk-09638 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Feb. 21, 2020).S.E.C. v. Colello, 27 139 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1998); Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 326 (9th 28 Cir. 1995); see also In re Martinez, 500 B.R. 608, 615 (Bankr.
- Fed. Trade Comm'n v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2016).published Colello, 139 F.3d at 677. Á relief defendant has no ownership interest in the property, but “may be joined to aid the recovery of relief.” SEC v. Cavanagh (Cavanagh 11), 445 F.3d 105 , 109 n.7 (2d Cir. 2006).
- Siu v. Martinez (In re Martinez), 500 B.R. 608 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2013).publishedCo. v. Richards, 541 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir.2008); S.E.C. v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir.1998).
- Kyung Cho v. UCBH Holdings, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2012).published(this Court has discretion to draw a negative inference regarding the defendants’ burden of proof)
- U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Wecorp, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (D. Haw. 2012).published Further, “[g]iven the general similarity between the role of the [CFTC] and the role of the SEC in remedying wrongs within their respective spheres, it is entirely appropriate to allow the [CFTC] to proceed against nominal defendants under…
- Sherman v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (In re Sherman), 658 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2011).published A nominal defendant is "not a real party in interest because `he has no legitimate claim to the disputed property.'" SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting Colello, 139 F.3d at 676). [7] We found that Sherman "was effecti…
- Sherman v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 658 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2011).published A nominal defendant is “not a real party in interest because ‘he has no legitimate claim to the disputed property.’ ” SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting Colello, 139 F.3d at 676). 7 We found that Sherman “was effectiv…
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Monterosso, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (S.D. Fla. 2010).publishedS.E.C. v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir.1998) (citing Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir.1979) 7 ).
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2007).published
- SEC v. Ross, No. 05-35541 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 2007).published
- Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Kimberlynn Creek Ranch, Inc., 276 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2002).published
- Sherman v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (In re Sherman), 441 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2006).published
- Nationwide Life Ins. v. Richards, 541 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2008).published
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Brown, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (D. Minn. 2008).published
- Leonard v. Coolidge (In re Nat'l Audit Def. Network), 367 B.R. 207 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2007).published
- Englebrick v. Worthington Indus., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2009).published
- Weddell v. Landis, 551 B.R. 74 (D. Nev. 2016).published
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Presto Telecomm., Inc., 237 F. App'x 198 (9th Cir. 2007).unpublished
- United States v. Crisp, 190 F.R.D. 546 (E.D. Cal. 1999).published
- Fanaro v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, No. 3:19-cv-03247 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2021).
- Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Medicor, LLC, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2002).published
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Whittemore, 691 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D.D.C. 2010).published
- KLA-Tencor Corp. v. Murphy, 717 F. Supp. 2d 895 (N.D. Cal. 2010).published
- People in re L.K, 2016 COA 112, 410 P.3d 664.published
- Jackson v. Microsoft Corp., 211 F.R.D. 423 (W.D. Wash. 2002).published
At page 676Defining nominal defendants and jurisdiction in securities actions25 citing cases“the paradigmatic nominal defendant is 'a trustee, agent, or depositary,”
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. World Capital Mkt., Inc., 864 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2017).published See Colello, 139 F.3d at 677 (“[T]he lack of a legitimate claim to the funds is the defining element of a nominal defendant.”).
- SEC v. Vincent Messina, No. 15-55325 (9th Cir. Mar. 21, 2017).published See Colello, 139 F.3d at 677 (“[T]he lack of a legitimate claim to the funds is the defining element of a nominal defendant.”).
- Head, No. 4:26-cv-01254 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2026).“The paradigmatic nominal defendant is a trustee, agent, or depositary . . . [who is] joined 8 purely as a means of facilitating collection in an action to recover fraud proceeds.” S.E.C. v. 9 Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1998) (qu…
- Blankenship, No. 3:26-cv-03500 (S.D. Cal. July 9, 2026).Ass’n of Am., 300 F.3d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002), and that 10 “[t]he paradigmatic nominal defendant is a trustee, agent of depositary . . . [who is] joined 11 purely as a means of facilitating collection.” S.E.C. v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674,…
- United States v. United States Territory of Guam, No. 1:21-cv-00022 (D. Guam Sept. 4, 2025).Comm’n, 139 F.3d at 676 (internal citations omitted). 22 In this case, GovGuam is attempting to characterize the unnamed claimant Guzman as a 23 nominal defendant.
- Canzoni v. Bank of Am. NA, No. 3:23-cv-05489 (W.D. Wash. June 5, 2023).“The paradigmatic nominal defendant is a trustee, agent, or depositary who is 26 joined purely as a means of facilitating collection.” S.E.C. v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 676 (9th 27 Cir. 1998) (internal punctuation and citation omitted).
- Golden Creek Holdings, Inc. v. Quality Loan Servicing Corp., No. 2:22-cv-00166 (D. Nev. Aug. 3, 2022). Accordingly, “there is no claim against him and it is unnecessary to obtain subject matter over him once 15 jurisdiction of the defendant is established.” 16 S.E.C. v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing S.E.C. v. Cherif, 93…
- Umouyo v. Bank of Am. NA, No. 2:22-cv-00704 (W.D. Wash. July 14, 2022).As a trustee under a deed of 14 trust, and where no independent claims are asserted against it, it is the ‘paradigmatic nominal 15 defendant,’ . . . and so its citizenship should not be considered for determining jurisdiction.” 16 (quoting…
- Lara Shapiro v. Citibank, N.A., No. 20-55934 (9th Cir. May 17, 2021).unpublishedThis includes a party against whom no claims are brought, S.E.C. v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1998), and whose role is limited to “that of a stakeholder” in the underlying action, Hewitt v. City of Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230, 1233 (…
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. San Francisco Reg'l Ctr. LLC, No. 3:17-cv-00223, 2020 WL 4569844 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2020). To order disgorgement against a relief defendant, the “court need find only that [the relief 24 defendant] has no right to retain the funds illegally taken from the victims.” Id. at 679.
Show 14 more citing cases
- John v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp of Washington, No. 4:20-cv-05008 (E.D. Wash. May 4, 2020).Courts have defined a nominal defendant as one who 2 “holds the subject matter of the litigation in a subordinate or possessory capacity 3 and to which there is no dispute.” S.E.C. v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 4 1998).
- Boruta v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 3:19-cv-07257 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2020).S.E.C. v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1998) 25 26 3 In addition to challenging diversity of citizenship, the Borutas’ motion to remand also mentions that “the amount of controversy is not met.” Remand Mot. 5.
- In re W.Y.L.Y., 526 B.R. 194 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2015).published She also points out that “[t]he paradigmatic nominal defendant is a trustee, agent, or depositary.” S.E.C. v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 676 (9th Cir.1998), quoted in Supplement 2. 9 If she is before the District Court merely to help the SEC c…
- Perez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 929 F. Supp. 2d 988 (N.D. Cal. 2013).published“The paradigmatic nominal defendant is a trustee, agent, or depository who is joined merely as a means of facilitating collection.” Colello, 139 F.3d at 676 (internal quotations omitted); see also Hafiz v. Greenpoint Mortg.
- U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Wecorp, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (D. Haw. 2012).published Further, “[g]iven the general similarity between the role of the [CFTC] and the role of the SEC in remedying wrongs within their respective spheres, it is entirely appropriate to allow the [CFTC] to proceed against nominal defendants under…
- Sherman v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (In re Sherman), 658 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2011).published A nominal defendant is "not a real party in interest because `he has no legitimate claim to the disputed property.'" SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting Colello, 139 F.3d at 676). [7] We found that Sherman "was effecti…
- Sherman v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 658 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2011).published A nominal defendant is “not a real party in interest because ‘he has no legitimate claim to the disputed property.’ ” SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting Colello, 139 F.3d at 676). 7 We found that Sherman “was effectiv…
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2007).published
- SEC v. Ross, No. 05-35541 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 2007).published
- Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Kimberlynn Creek Ranch, Inc., 276 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2002).published
- Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Transnet Wireless Corp., 506 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (S.D. Fla. 2007).published
- S. Union Co. v. Sw. Gas Corp., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D. Ariz. 2002).published
- Sherman v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (In re Sherman), 441 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2006).published
- Thompson v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 5:20-cv-02107 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2020).
At page 675Defining relief defendant's lack of property interest7 citing casesGOODWIN, Circuit Judge: This appeal challenges the right of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) to recover, from a non-party to a fraud,…
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. World Capital Mkt., Inc., 864 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2017).published See Colello, 139 F.3d at 677 (“[T]he lack of a legitimate claim to the funds is the defining element of a nominal defendant.”).
- SEC v. Vincent Messina, No. 15-55325 (9th Cir. Mar. 21, 2017).published See Colello, 139 F.3d at 677 (“[T]he lack of a legitimate claim to the funds is the defining element of a nominal defendant.”).
- Life Partners, Inc. v. Arnold, 464 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2015).published“Relief Defendants” Finally, we address the arguments of Advance Trust & Life Escrow Services, L.T.A., and Purchase Escrow Services, ' LLC, two Petitioners in State v. Life Part ners, Inc. The State sued these Petitioners as “relief defend…
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2007).published
- Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Hanover Trading Corp., 34 F. Supp. 2d 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).published
- SEC v. Ross, No. 05-35541 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 2007).published
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. All. Leasing Corp., 28 F. App'x 648 (9th Cir. 2002).unpublished
At page 678Combining adverse inferences with evidence to defeat summary judgment7 citing cases[S]ummary judgment may seem 21 harsh, but [the defendant] refused to give information necessary to determine [liability] . . . .
- Klein v. Kim, No. 2:20-cv-01628 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 10, 2022).([S]ummary judgment may seem 21 harsh, but [the defendant] refused to give information necessary to determine [liability] . . . .)
- Trevor Lee Watts v. Thomas Dale Watts, 366 So. 3d 863 (Miss. Ct. App. 2022).published(allowing adverse inferences to be combined with evidence to defeat summary judgment)
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Loomis, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (E.D. Cal. 2013).publishedId. at 678.
- Unum Grp. v. Benefit P'ship, Inc., 938 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D. Mass. 2013).publishedSee LaSalle Bank Lake View v. Seguban, 54 F.3d 387, 389-394 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that an adverse inference is permissible from nonmoving party’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment right in reply to a summary judgment motion, but only whe…
- Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Hanover Trading Corp., 34 F. Supp. 2d 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).published
- Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Medicor, LLC, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2002).published
- KLA-Tencor Corp. v. Murphy, 717 F. Supp. 2d 895 (N.D. Cal. 2010).published
To 22 order disgorgement, the district court … need find only that [the defendant] has no right to retain 23 the funds illegally taken from the victims.
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Catledge, No. 2:12-cv-00887 (D. Nev. Dec. 16, 2019).(To 22 order disgorgement, the district court … need find only that [the defendant] has no right to retain 23 the funds illegally taken from the victims.)
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Catledge, No. 2:12-cv-00887 (D. Nev. Sept. 18, 2019).(To 7 order disgorgement, the district court … need find only that [the defendant] has no right to retain 8 the funds illegally taken from the victims.)
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Liu, 262 F. Supp. 3d 957 (C.D. Cal. 2017).published(To order disgorgement, the district court ... need find only that [the defendant] has no right to retain the funds illegally taken from the victims.)
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Jt Wallenbrock & Assocs. Citadel Capital Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 440 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2006).published (To order disgorgement, the district court . . . . need find only that [the defendant] has no right to retain the funds illegally taken from the victims.)
At page 679“to order disgorgement, the district court ... need find only that the defendant has no right to retain the funds illegally taken from the victims.”4 citing cases
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Liu, 262 F. Supp. 3d 957 (C.D. Cal. 2017).published“to order disgorgement, the district court ... need find only that the defendant has no right to retain the funds illegally taken from the victims.”
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Jt Wallenbrock & Assocs. Citadel Capital Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 440 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2006).published “to order disgorgement, the district court . . . . need find only that the defendant has no right to retain the funds illegally taken from the victims.”
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. San Francisco Reg'l Ctr. LLC, No. 3:17-cv-00223, 2020 WL 4569844 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2020). To order disgorgement against a relief defendant, the “court need find only that [the relief 24 defendant] has no right to retain the funds illegally taken from the victims.” Id. at 679.
- Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Kimberlynn Creek Ranch, Inc., 276 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2002).published
“to 22 order disgorgement, the district court ... need find only that the defendant has no right to retain 23 the funds illegally taken from the victims.”
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Catledge, No. 2:12-cv-00887 (D. Nev. Dec. 16, 2019).“to 22 order disgorgement, the district court ... need find only that the defendant has no right to retain 23 the funds illegally taken from the victims.”
- Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Catledge, No. 2:12-cv-00887 (D. Nev. Sept. 18, 2019).“to 7 order disgorgement, the district court ... need find only that the defendant has no right to retain 8 the funds illegally taken from the victims.”
v.
Michael J. COLELLO, Cross Financial Svc., Inc. Owen R. Fox Carroll E. Siemens Bruce Franklin Douglas S. Cross
This appeal challenges the right of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) to recover, from a non-party to a fraud, investor funds traced to the “nominal defendant” in an action in personam. In the district court proceedings against a number of defendants, the SEC named Michael Co-lello as a nominal defendant after he had been dismissed as a party to the fraud. Upon a motion for summary judgment, the district' court ordered Colello to disgorge over $2.6 million. On appeal, Colello argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that, in any event, summary judgment was in error. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.
Facts and Procedural Background
This ease arises from a scheme whereby a company called Cross Financial Services, Inc. (“CFS”) and a. number of individuals defrauded more than 700 public investors out of more than $21 million. The SEC claims that Colello received approximately $2.9 million of the $21 million. Colello claims that the money he received was to obtain letters of credit for CFS, that he did not keep most of it, and that what he did retain was payment for services rendered.
The SEC sued the perpetrators, initially naming Colello as a participant in the scheme to defraud. After losing on a motion for a preliminary injunction against Colello, the SEC amended its complaint to name Colello as a defendant “solely for the purpose of obtaining full relief.” The SEC and Colello then cross-filed motions for summary judgment. The district court granted the SEC’s motion for summary judgment and ordered Colello to disgorge $2,620,598.00 and pay $276,954.68 in interest. Judgments were also entered against the other defendants, who are not involved in this appeal. Colello failed to pay the judgment against him on the order to disgorge. In a post-judgment proceeding, the district court found Colello in contempt for noncompliance. The district court ordered Colello to pay the judgment or surrender himself for arrest. It then stayed the arrest warrant pending Colello’s submission of supplemental evidence that he is unable to comply with the district court’s order.
Standard of Review
This court reviews de novo both the grant of the SEC’s summary judgment motion and the denial of Colello’s. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Lowe, 109 F.3d 521, 526 (9th Cir.1997). We likewise review the district court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction and its denial of Colello’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm. v. Eu, 826 F.2d 814, 818 n. 3 (9th Cir.1987). This court reviews the disgorgement order for abuse of discretion. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 453 (9th Cir.1990).
Discussion
I
Two district courts have allowed the SEC to sue a “nominal defendant” to recover[*676] fraud proceeds, SEC v. Egan, 856 F.Supp. 401 (N.D.Ill.1993); SEC v. Antar, 831 F.Supp. 380 (D.N.J.1993), and the Seventh Circuit has endorsed such actions in SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir.1991). This circuit has not yet spoken on the subject.
A nominal defendant is a person who “holds the subject matter of the litigation in a subordinate or possessory capacity as to which there is no dispute.” Cherif 933 F.2d at 414 (internal quotations and citation omitted). The paradigmatic nominal defendant is “a trustee, agent, or depositary ... [who is] joined purely as a means of facilitating collection.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). As the nominal defendant has no legitimate claim to the disputed property, he is not a real party in interest. Id. Accordingly, “there is no claim against him and it is unnecessary to obtain subject matter jurisdiction over him once jurisdiction of the defendant is established.”[1] Id.
Colello asks this court to reject per se the use of nominal defendants. He relies upon such cases as Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 1455, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994) (The text of the securities laws does not provide for aider and abettor liability.) and Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 650, 108 S.Ct. 2063, 2079-80, 100 L.Ed.2d 658 (1988) (refusing to expand the term “seller” because such expansion is not supported by the text). Each of these cases stands for the proposition that causes of action under the securities laws must have a basis in the text of the statute. Colello correctly notes that the text of the securities laws does not mention the use of nominal defendants.
Nevertheless, there is law to support the use of nominal defendants in securities’ actions to collect the proceeds of fraud. While no precedent speaks directly to this point, ample authority supports the proposition that the broad equitable powers of the federal courts can be employed to recover ill gotten gains for the benefit of the victims of wrongdoing, whether held by the original wrongdoer or by one who has received the proceeds after the wrong. For example, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff who has a cause of action under the securities laws can enforce those rights “by such legal or equitable actions or procedures as would normally be available to him.” Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 287-88, 61 S.Ct. 229, 232-33, 85 L.Ed. 189 (1940).[2] This court has declared that “federal courts have inherent equitable authority to issue a variety of ‘ancillary relief measures in actions brought by the SEC to enforce the federal securities laws.” SEC v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir.1980) (“Wencke II”). This broad power extends over third parties to the action. Wencke II, 622 F.2d at 1369 (District court has power to enjoin non-parties from suing a receivership in securities’ action.).
The Supreme Court’s hostility to causes of action without textual support and precedent supporting broad equitable powers can be reconciled by distinguishing between causes of action and forms of relief, a distinction drawn by the Supreme Court. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 2273-74, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979) (“[T]he question whether a litigant has a ‘cause of action’ is analytically distinct and prior to the question of what relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled to receive.”). See also SEC v. Sands, 902 F.Supp. 1149, 1158 (C.D.Cal.1995) (“The Central Bank decision does not renounce the once predominant view that courts may invoke whatever rights and remedies they deem appropriate to effectuate the purposes of the securities laws.”) (internal quotations and alteration omitted). Accord[*677]ingly, we conclude that the SEC may name a non-party depository as a nominal defendant to effect full relief in the marshalling of assets that are the fruit of the underlying fraud.
II
Colello also argues that even if the SEC is allowed to name a nominal defendant, in this case he is not one. As noted above, the standard nominal defendant is a bank or trustee, which has only a custodial claim to the property. Colello contends that his relationship with the principal defendants in this ease is very different. He claims that he provided services to CFS by securing letters of credit. He asserts that he paid over to others most of the money in doing so, and the amount that he retained was his fee for services. Colello contends that the district court improperly placed the burden on him to show that he had a legitimate claim to the funds. Moreover, he contends that he produced evidence below raising genuine issues of material fact as to the validity of his claims.
A
Colello’s claims are not without substance. Indeed, we emphasize that in the typical case, the creditor plaintiff must show that the nominal defendant has received ill gotten funds and that he does not have a legitimate claim to those funds.[3] The SEC attempts to counter Colello’s argument by characterizing Colello’s claim that he has a legitimate interest in the funds as an affirmative defense. We disagree with the SEC because the lack of a legitimate claim to the funds is the defining element of a nominal defendant.
This case, however, is atypical because Colello has consistently invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify. The district court expressly based its summary judgment for the SEC on Colello’s failure to go forward with evidence, as well as his resort to the Fifth Amendment. SEC v. Cross Financial Services, 908 F.Supp. 718, 732 (C.D.Cal.1995) (“Colello’s receipt of investor monies for an alleged purpose that was never disclosed to the investors, together with his assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to questions about his ownership claims, demonstrate the absence of any legitimate call on the funds.”).
B
Parties are free to invoke the Fifth Amendment in civil cases, but the court is equally free to draw adverse inferences from their failure of proof. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 1557-58, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976); United States v. Solano-Godines, 120 F.3d 957, 962 (9th Cir.1997) (“In civil proceedings, however, the Fifth Amendment does not forbid fact finders from drawing adverse inferences against a party who refuses to testify.”). Moreover, a district court has discretion in its response to a party’s invocation of the Fifth. See Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 608 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir.1979) (If invocation of privilege prejudiced the other party, the district court “would be free to fashion whatever remedy is required to prevent unfairness.”); United States v. $506,641.00 in U.S. Currency, 1996 WL 78364, *3 (N.D.Ill.1996) (“[A] court has discretion in determining the appropriate means of dealing with a claimant’s invocation of the privilege.”). In this case, the district court exercised its discretion by shifting the burden to Colello to show a legitimate claim to the funds and granted the SEC summary judgment.
Courts have imposed fairly severe penalties in cases procedurally similar to Colello’s. See United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 780 F.Supp. 715, 722 (D.Or.1991) (striking counterclaim and affirmative defense in their entirety because of defendant’s use of the privilege); SEC v. Benson, 657[*678] F.Supp. 1122, 1129 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (granting summary judgment against the silent party). See also Robert Heidt, The Conjurer’s Circle—The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 Yale L.J. 1062, 1126-32 (1982) (recommending burden-shifting and barring testimony as appropriate responses to invocation of the Fifth Amendment). In Benson, the defendant invoked his Fifth Amendment right and tried to introduce evidence precluding summary judgment against him. Benson, 657 F.Supp. at 1129. The court, however, barred him from introducing any such evidence. It held that “[b]y his initial obstruction of discovery and his subsequent assertion of the privilege, defendant has forfeited the right to offer evidence disputing the plaintiffs evidence or supporting his own denials.” Id.
C
The Seventh Circuit has held that a “direct inference of guilt from silence is forbidden.”[4] LaSalle Bank Lake View v. Seguban, 54 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir.1995). It based its holding on passages from two Supreme. Court opinions. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham 431 U.S. 801, 808 n. 5, 97 S.Ct. 2132, 2137 n. 5, 53 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977). (The Fifth Amendment is violated when “refusal to waive the Fifth Amendment privilege leads automatically and without more to imposition of sanctions.”); Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318, 96 S.Ct. at 1558 (adverse inference allowed when defendant “remained silent at the hearing in the face of evidence that incriminated him; and, as far as th[e] record reveals, his silence was given no more evidentiary value than was warranted by the facts”). Lefkowitz and Baxter require that there be evidence in addition to the adverse inference to support a court’s ruling. Thus, whether the district court committed reversible error turns on whether the SEC presented additional evidence against Colello.
As noted above, the district court based its ruling on the SEC’s proof of Colello’s receipt of the funds of the victims combined with an adverse inference drawn from Colello’s silence. Cross Financial Services, 908 F.Supp. at 732 (“Colello’s receipt of investor monies for an alleged purpose that was never disclosed to the investors, together with his assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to questions about his ownership claims, demonstrate the absence of any legitimate call on the funds.”). The district court also considered the evidence presented by Colello and found nothing in it to support Colello’s claims to the funds. Id. at 721 n. 3. Thus, the district court’s ruling did not turn on Colello’s silence alone and the court did not err.
The summary judgment may seem harsh, but Colello refused to give information necessary to determine whether he still possessed any of the funds or whether he had a legitimate claim to them. The principal defendants did not know how Colello had spent the money, nor did they know what his fees were. See Colello’s Excerpts of Record at 1167-70 (Principal defendant Carroll Siemens testifying that certain transfers to Co-lello were “probably” consulting fees); Colello’s Excerpts of Record at 1187-88 (Siemen’s accountant testifying that he was unsure whether the dollar amount he entered on a 1099 Form for Colello was $447,650 or $3,447,650). It also should be noted that the district court continues to give Colello an opportunity to show where the money went. Despite finding Colello in contempt for noncompliance with its disgorgement order, the district court has stayed the arrest of Colello to permit him to file supplemental materials explaining why he cannot comply.
Ill
Finally, Colello argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to disgorge the illegal funds. He reasons that disgorgement is a form of injunctive remedy and this circuit requires that the SEC must establish the likelihood of future violations of the securities laws by the defendant to obtain an injunction. See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d at 453 (Disgorgement is a form of injunctive relief); SEC v. Murphy, [*679] 626 F.2d 633, 655 (9th Cir.1980) (To obtain a permanent injunction, the SEC must show a likelihood of future violations.).
This argument has no merit. The need to show a likelihood of future violations is limited to cases involving a permanent injunction. See, e.g., SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1295 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 59, 139 L.Ed.2d 22 (1997); SEC v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 695 (D.C.Cir.1994); SEC v. The Electronics Warehouse, Inc., 689 F.Supp. 53, 68 (D.Conn.1988). To order disgorgement, the district court need not have found that Colello was likely to violate securities laws in the future. The court need find only that Colello has no right to retain the funds illegally taken from the victims. It was not error to order disgorgement in this case.
Affirmed.
The SEC correctly notes that "there is no such concept as ‘subject matter jurisdiction over the person.’ ” Brief for SEC at 17 n. 9. When the Seventh Circuit uses this phrase, we assume that it means subject matter jurisdiction over a claim to the property in the nominal defendant’s possession.
Colello argues that Deckert "has been eroded to the vanishing point by subsequent [Supreme] Court precedent." Reply Brief for Colello at 5. This argument has no merit. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the relevant portion of Deckert as recently as 1992. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 68, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 1033-34, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992) (quoting Deckert for the proposition that if there is a statutory violation, courts can fashion appropriate equitable relief).
Unfortunately, the cases discussing the use of nominal defendants are not explicit on this question. See Cherif, 933 F.2d at 414 n. 11 (stating that the court below must determine whether the nominal defendant has a legitimate claim, but not explaining who bears the burden); Picard Chemical Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Perrigo Co., 940 F.Supp. 1101, 1137 (W.D.Mich.1996) (Plaintiffs cannot name parties as nominal defendants "without a showing that they possess illegally obtained profits without a legitimate claim to ' them.”).
As a nominal defendant, Colello is theoretically not “guilty” of anything. A finding that he has no legitimate claim to the funds, however, is a ruling against him as a custodian and subjects him to a disgorgement order.