At page 1264 Defining the appropriate official for title ix liability22 citing cases“high enough up the chain-of-command that his acts constitute an official decision by the school district itself not to remedy the misconduct.”
- Rachael DeMarcus v. Univ. of South Alabama, 133 F.4th 1305 (11th Cir. 2025).published First, it “reinstate[d its] prior decision and opinion.” Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir. 1999) (Floyd II) (emphasis added).
- Doe v. New Coll. of Florida, No. 8:21-cv-01245 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2023). “high enough up the chain-of-command that his acts constitute an official decision by the school district itself not to remedy the misconduct”
- Doe v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 1:20-cv-00975 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2021).The Eleventh Circuit has described an “appropriate person,” as a “school official … high enough up the chain-of-command that his acts constitute an official decision by the school district itself not to remedy the misconduct.” Hill v. Cund…
- Lauren Kesterson v. Kent State Univ., 967 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2020).publishedIn considering whether a teacher’s aide was an “appropriate person,” the Eleventh Circuit examined the aide’s position and authority to discipline students, and found that an aide “had to answer to a teacher, the assistant principals, and…
- Jane Doe v. Edgewood Indep Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2020).published(concluding that an “appropriate person” for purposes of Title IX liability is a “supervisor with authority to take corrective action” who is “a school official high enough up the chain-of-command that his acts constitut…)
- Walker v. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 7:17-cv-00381 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 18, 2019).Bd. of Broward Cty, Fla., 604 F.3d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 2010). “[T]he official with notice . . . must be ‘high enough up the chain-of-command that his [or her] acts constitute an official decision by the school district itself not to reme…
- J.S. ex rel. J.S. v. Houston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 877 F.3d 979 (11th Cir. 2017).unpublished“An ‘appropriate person’ ... is, at a minimum, an official of the recipient entity with authority to take corrective action to end the discrimination.” Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290, 118 , S.Ct. 1989. “[T]he official with notice .., must be ‘hig…
- James Hill v. Jeanne Dunaway, No. 13-15444 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2015).publishedIn Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir. 1999), this Court elaborated on the “appropriate person” requirement, stating the school official must be “high enough up the chain-of- command that his acts constitute an official decisi…
- James Hill v. Madison Cnty. Sch. Bd., 797 F.3d 948 (11th Cir. 2015).publishedIn Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir.1999), this Court elaborated on the “appropriate person” requirement, stating the school official must be “high enough up the chain-of-command that his acts constitute an official decision…
- Susan Liese v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334 (11th Cir. 2012).published “high enough up the chain-of-command that his acts constitute an official decision . . . not to remedy the misconduct”
Show 11 more citing cases
- Ross v. Corp. of Mercer Univ., 506 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (M.D. Ga. 2007).published“school official high enough up the chain-of-command that his acts constitute an official decision”
- Theriault v. Univ. of S. Maine, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D. Me. 2004).published“that [their] acts constitute an official decision by the school ... itself not to remedy the misconduct”
- Baynard v. Lawson, 112 F. Supp. 2d 524 (E.D. Va. 2000).published (post-Gebser decision endorsing two-part test to establish Title IX liability against a school district: (1) some supervisor with authority to take corrective action was placed on notice of bad conduct, and (2)
- Colbert v. Univ. of South Alabama, No. 1:22-cv-00184 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 6, 2024). See Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (llth Circuit. 1999).
- DeMarcus v. Univ. of South Alabama, No. 1:21-cv-00380 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 27, 2023). See Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (llth Circuit. 1999).
- Weis v. Bd. of Trs. of Florida Gulf Coast Univ., No. 2:19-cv-00503 (M.D. Fla. May 7, 2020).See Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir. 1999).
- K.B. v. Daleville City Bd. of Educ., 536 F. App'x 959 (11th Cir. 2013).unpublishedSee Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir.1999).
- L.N. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 141 So. 3d 466 (Ala. 2013).published See Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir.1999).
- Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., Fla., 604 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2010).publishedSee Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir.1999).
- Litman v. George Mason Univ., 131 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Va. 2001).publishedSee Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir.1999).
- Doe v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 329 F. Supp. 3d 543 (E.D. Tenn. 2018).published
Other citing cases
- Samedi v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2001).published
- Danvers v. Loudoun Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 1:21-cv-01028, 2022 WL 4585524 (E.D. Va. Sept. 29, 2022).
- Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2007).published
- Hartley ex rel. Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 1999).published
v.
Iris WAITERS, Security Chief, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, William Decker Booker, Security Guard, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, Kenneth Bronson, Security Guard, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, John Nicholson, Head of Operations, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, Stephen Massey, President, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, Thomas Hagler, Superintendent, Board of Public Education and Orphanage for Bibb County, Harry Tinker
We earlier decided this case in Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786 (11th Cir.1998). The Supreme Court vacated our judgment and instructed us to reconsider the case in the light of its decision in Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998). We have done so. We reinstate our prior decision and opinion.
Briefly stated, in Floyd, we wrote that a Title IX plaintiff must establish two things to survive summary judgment in a cause of action against a school district like Bibb County’s for the discriminatory acts of its employees. First, some supervisor with authority to take corrective action was placed on notice of the bad conduct. See id. at 792 & n. 13. Second, the supervisor possessing this authority was a school official high enough up the chain-of-command that his acts constitute an official decision by the school district itself not to remedy the misconduct. See id. at 790-792. Given the circumstances of this case, we held that there could be no Title IX liability.
In Gebser, the Supreme Court faced a sexual-harassment-by-a-teacher case under Title IX. The Court pointed out the contractual nature of Title IX and rejected school district liability based on either re-spondeat superior or constructive notice. See Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 1997. Then the Court tied school district liability to an official decision by the school district not[*1265] to remedy a known act of misconduct. For school district liability, the Court stressed that some “appropriate person” in the school district must have actual notice of the misconduct. See id. at 1999.
The Court did not go into detail about who would be an appropriate person; it did not need to do so to decide Gebser: in Gebser no one in the pertinent school district other than the offending teacher himself knew of his misconduct. See id. at 1993. The Court did say, however, that the appropriate person must necessarily be an “official” of the school district and must have the authority to end the discrimination. See id. at 1999. But these preconditions were set out in the context of “at a minimum” — a minimum which was not met in Gebser — and not set out as a fully developed, complete standard.*
In our view, our decision in this case is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision (and reasoning) in Gebser. The judgment of the district court is again AFFIRMED.
By the way we, given the record before us, also conclude as a matter of law that Mr. Waiters and Mr. Tinker (the two district employees who have been especially singled-out by plaintiffs) were not school district officials and that they also lacked authority to end the pertinent discrimination.