Boyce v. Ashcroft, 268 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 2001). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Boyce v. Ashcroft, 268 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 2001).
Court of Appeals for the Tenth CircuitPublished opinionNo. 98-1280Oct 1, 2001

Boyce v. Ashcroft

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42 citation events (42 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 2002 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2002 2014 2026
Cited for
At page 955Jurisdictional hierarchy and subject matter jurisdiction rules8 citing casesrelying on Ruhrg-as to hold that this court was entitled to dismiss case on Article III mootness grounds instead of determining whether district court had statutory authority to entertain 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition1 citing court put it this way
  • Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Env't v. United States Off. of Surface Mining Reclamation & Enf't, 643 F. App'x 799 (10th Cir. 2016).unpublished
    Cf. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578 , 119 S.Ct. 1563 , 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999); Boyce v. Ashcroft, 268 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir.2001) (“Although the court may have discretion to decide subject matter jurisdiction before rea…
  • Rollins v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 279 F. App'x 730 (10th Cir. 2008).unpublished 2 cites
    Boyce v. Ashcroft, 268 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir. 2001); Kaw Nation v. Norton, 405 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed.
  • United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004).published 2 cites
    (relying on Ruhrg-as to hold that this court was entitled to dismiss case on Article III mootness grounds instead of determining whether district court had statutory authority to entertain 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition)
  • Wach v. State of Utah, No. 23-4123 (10th Cir. Dec. 5, 2024).unpublished
    See Boyce v. Ashcroft, 268 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir. 2001).
  • City Ctr. West, LP v. Am. Modern Home Ins., 749 F.3d 912 (10th Cir. 2014).published
    ([W]e are not sure what [a request to depublish] means in practical effect” and “[o]ur decision to vacate the judgment and direct the district court to vacate its judgment removes the preclusive effect (if any) of the v…)
  • Clark v. Payne, 341 F. App'x 355 (10th Cir. 2009).unpublished
    See Boyce v. Ashcroft, 268 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir.2001).
  • Miller v. Glanz, 331 F. App'x 608 (10th Cir. 2009).unpublished
    (noting procedure is duty of appellate court)
  • Ortiz v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, No. 24-4097 (10th Cir. Jan. 29, 2025).unpublished
    (concluding habeas proceeding was moot and ordering district court to vacate its judgment)
At page 954Mootness of habeas petition after petitioner's transfer2 citing casesagreeing habeas petition seeking transfer to a different prison was moot following petitioner’s transfer1 citing court put it this way
  • King v. Ciolli, No. 23-1201, 2024 WL 1179908 (10th Cir. Mar. 19, 2024).unpublished
    See Boyce v. Ashcroft, 268 F.3d 953, 954 (10th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“Boyce states that the Bureau of Prisons transferred him from ADX Florence, Colorado to FCI Sheridan, Oregon on May 31, 2001.
  • Acevedo v. True, No. 1:20-cv-00723 (D. Colo. Aug. 18, 2020).
    (agreeing habeas petition seeking transfer to a different prison was moot following petitioner’s transfer)
Other citing cases8 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Christopher John BOYCE
v.
John ASHCROFT, Attorney General of the United States John Hurley, Warden, U.S. Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum Security, Florence, Colorado
No. 98-1280.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Oct 1, 2001.
Published opinion
268 F.3d 953
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 21262
2001 WL 1154994
Ebel, Lucero, Vratil.
Cited by 8 opinions  |  Published
Citer courts: E.D. California (4)

ORDER ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

On June 4, 2001, in a published opinion, this panel held that Boyce’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus sought relief which was not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and that the district court had not erred in dismissing that petition. This matter comes before the court on Boyce’s petition for rehearing filed June 20, 2001. Boyce states that the Bureau of Prisons transferred him from ADX Florence, Colorado to FCI Sheridan, Oregon on May 31, 2001. He points out that the transfer is precisely the relief which his petition requested, and he contends that the published opinion is therefore moot. Petitioner asks the court to vacate and “depublish” the opinion and allow him to voluntarily dismiss his appeal nunc pro tunc as of the date of his transfer, May 31, 2001.

The court agrees that the case became moot when the BOP transferred petitioner to FCI Sheridan. See, e.g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 403, 95 S.Ct. 2330, 45 L.Ed.2d 272 (1975) (claim that transfer was unconstitutional moot upon re-transfer); Kearns v. Turner, 837 F.2d 336, 338 (8th Cir.1988) (aspect of habeas petition seeking to enjoin transfer for final disposition of state law charge became moot when petitioner transferred and sentenced); Burrus v. Turnbo, 743 F.2d 693 (9th Cir.1984) (Ninth Circuit affirmed district court injunction against transfer of prisoner;[*955] prisoner released while case pending before Supreme Court, which then vacated judgment and remanded to district court with instructions to vacate injunction and dismiss case as moot), vacated as moot sub nom, Hijar v. Burrus, 474 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 562, 88 L.Ed.2d 548 (1985); see also Kenney v. State of Colorado, 185 F.3d 874, 1999 WL 476014 (10th Cir. July 9, 1999) (citing Kearns and Bums in ruling that habeas petition was moot).

The government asserts that the panel opinion rested upon a finding that the district court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and not a holding that Boyce had failed to state an actionable claim under that statute. If this position is correct, we need not address the question of mootness because the court has discretion to first reach the jurisdictional issue. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999) (court may decide personal jurisdiction before subject matter jurisdiction); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (court must address issues of jurisdiction before reaching merits). Although the court may have discretion to decide subject matter jurisdiction before reaching the issue of mootness, however, we find no reason to do so in this case. The matter is unquestionably moot. The court therefore vacates its judgment and remands to the district court with directions to vacate its judgment as moot. See Great W. Sugar Co. v. Nelson, 442 U.S. 92, 99 S.Ct. 2149, 60 L.Ed.2d 735 (1979) (per curiam) (“[w]here it appears upon appeal that the controversy has become entirely moot, it is the duty of the appellate court to set aside the decree below and to remand the cause with directions to dismiss.”).

Regarding Boyce’s request to “depublish,” we are not sure what such a request means in practical effect. See Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir.1986) (denying request to vacate published opinions, noting that “the opinions may be useful to someone in the future simply as a description of the course of this case”). Our decision to vacate the judgment and direct the district court to vacate its judgment removes the preclusive effect (if any) of the vacated judgments. See id.

The judgment of this court affirming the district court’s dismissal of Boyce’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is hereby vacated. The district court is ordered to vacate its judgment and dismiss the case as moot.