James Kozohorsky v. Greg Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141 (8th Cir. 2003). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite James Kozohorsky v. Greg Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141 (8th Cir. 2003).
Court of Appeals for the Eighth CircuitPublished opinionNo. 02-1903Jun 19, 2003

James Kozohorsky v. Greg Harmon

Quick Summary

A district court abuses its discretion by dismissing an entire action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when the plaintiff moves to amend the complaint to strike unexhausted claims.

A prisoner sued prison officials for constitutional violations. The district court dismissed the entire complaint without prejudice because the prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies for claims against the warden. The prisoner moved to amend the complaint to strike the claims against the warden, but the district court implicitly denied the motion. The Eighth Circuit reviews the denial of a motion to amend for abuse of discretion. The court holds that when a prisoner fails to exhaust remedies for some claims, the district court must allow the prisoner to amend the complaint to remove the unexhausted claims rather than dismissing the entire action. Because the amendment would cure the defect and no grounds for denial existed, the district court abused its discretion by implicitly denying the motion.

76 citation events (76 in the last 25 years) across 17 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 2003 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2003 2014 2026
Cited for
At page 1144Abuse of discretion denying motion to amend complaint14 citing casesholding that § 1997e(a) requires dismissal of only the defective, mixed complaint rather than the entire action2 citing courts put it this way · 13 listed here · 1 cautionary
  • Blackmon v. Crawford, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (D. Nev. 2004).published Cited "but see" · 3 cites
    Graves v. Norris, 218 F.3d 884, 886 (8th Cir.2000); but see Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141 , 1144 (8th Cir.2003) (district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow petitioner to amend his complaint to dismiss unexhaust-ed clai…
  • Whisman, No. 6:25-cv-06063 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 17, 2026).
    Servs., 512 F .3d 488, 497 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141, 1144 (8th Cir. 2003)).
  • Murry, No. 4:24-cv-00816 (E.D. Ark. July 23, 2026).
    Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141, 1144 (8th Cir. 2003)).
  • Hill, No. 3:26-cv-00003 (E.D. Ark. July 20, 2026).
    Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141, 1144 (8th Cir. 2003)). 2 CCDC was not named as a defendant in Hill’s operative second amended complaint (Doc.
  • Prestby v. A&A Servs., LLC, No. 8:24-cv-00204 (D. Neb. Apr. 29, 2025).
    Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141, 1144 (8th Cir.2003).
  • Richardson v. Payne, No. 4:22-cv-00160 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 8, 2025).
    Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141, 1144 (8th Cir. 2003)). (arguing that the December 8, 2019 claim should be dismissed because it describes a claim about internal prison policies).
  • Webb v. Franken, No. 4:21-cv-03031 (D. Neb. Oct. 11, 2022).
    Civ. P. 15(a). “[A]bsent a good reason for denial—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the non-moving party, or futility of amendment—…
  • Craig Frentzel v. Glenn Boyer, 297 F. App'x 576 (8th Cir. 2008).unpublished
    (it is proper to deny motion to amend if, inter alia, amendment would be futile)
  • McAninch ex rel. Est. of Sinclair v. Wintermute, 478 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2007).published
    Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141, 1144 (8th Cir.2003).
  • Johnson v. Sadzewicz, 426 F. Supp. 2d 635 (E.D. Mich. 2006).published
    In Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141, 1144 (8th Cir.2003), the Eighth Circuit, which also applies a total exhaustion rule in § 1983 cases, 9 permitted the plaintiff, who had filed a mixed complaint, to amend the complaint to dismiss the…
Show 3 more citing cases
  • Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2005).published 2 cites
    (holding that § 1997e(a) requires dismissal of only the defective, mixed complaint rather than the entire action)
  • Lamar William Jones Bey v. Kelly Johnson, 407 F.3d 801 (6th Cir. 2005).published 8 cites
    Kozohorsky, 332 F.3d at 1143.
  • Beltran v. O'MARA, 405 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D.N.H. 2005).published
    See Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141, 1144 (8th Cir.2003).
At page 1143Reviewing district court's findings of fact and law12 citing cases[W]hen multiple prison condition claims have been joined . . . the plain language of § 1997e(a) requires that all available prison grievance remedies must be exhausted as to all of the claims5 citing courts put it this way
  • Bigelow v. Van Buren Cnty., No. 4:23-cv-00540 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 7, 2023).
    ([W]hen multiple prison condition claims have been joined . . . the plain language of § 1997e(a) requires that all available prison grievance remedies must be exhausted as to all of the claims)
  • Samuel v. Goacher, No. 4:23-cv-00678 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 11, 2023).
    “when multiple prison condition claims have been joined . . . the plain language of 1997e(a) requires that all available prison grievance remedies must be exhausted as to all of the claims.”
  • Everett v. Martin, No. 1:19-cv-00113 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 13, 2021).
    “when multiple prison condition claims have been joined . . . the plain language of 1997e(a) requires that all available prison grievance remedies must be exhausted as to all of the claims”
  • Glenn-El v. Hanecock, No. 1:21-cv-00058 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 14, 2023).
    Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141, 1143 (8th Cir. 2003).
  • Word v. Missouri Dep't of Corr., 542 F. App'x 540 (8th Cir. 2013).unpublished
    (court abused its discretion by denying amendment that would have cured pleading defect in otherwise valid § 1983 complaint)
  • Jimmy G. Nixon, Sr. v. Linda Sanders, 243 F. App'x 197 (8th Cir. 2007).unpublished
    We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, see Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141, 1143 (8th Cir.2003), but because Nixon did not object to the magistrate judge’s report, any error…
  • Lamar William Jones Bey v. Kelly Johnson, 407 F.3d 801 (6th Cir. 2005).published 8 cites
    Kozohorsky, 332 F.3d at 1143.
  • Joseph Stafford v. Gwen Brown, 114 F. App'x 769 (8th Cir. 2004).unpublished 2 cites
    (district court abused its discretion by implicitly denying motion to amend where requested amendment would have cured defect necessitating dismissal and not required additional discovery)
  • David Wayne Boyles v. T. Park, 111 F. App'x 861 (8th Cir. 2004).unpublished
    (when multiple prison-conditions claims have been joined, section 1997e(a)’s plain language requires that available administrative remedies be exhausted as to all claims)
  • James McAlphin v. R. Toney, 375 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 2004).published 3 cites
    After reviewing the District Court’s factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, see Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141, 1143 (8th Cir.2003), we reverse.
Show 2 more citing cases
  • Mark Anthony Harris v. Mike Kemna, 155 F. App'x 941 (8th Cir. 2005).unpublished
    (when multiple prison-condition claims have been joined, § 1997e(a) requires that all available prison grievance remedies be exhausted as to all claims)
  • Grady Newingham v. David Westbrook, 140 F. App'x 634 (8th Cir. 2005).unpublished
    See Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141, 1143 (8th Cir.2003).
[W]hen multiple prison condition claims have been joined . . . the plain language of § 1997e(a) requires that all available prison grievance remedies must be exhausted as to all of the claims.no pin page on record · 2 citing cases listed
  • Samuel v. Goacher, No. 4:23-cv-00678 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 11, 2023).
    ([W]hen multiple prison condition claims have been joined . . . the plain language of § 1997e(a) requires that all available prison grievance remedies must be exhausted as to all of the claims.)
  • Everett v. Martin, No. 1:19-cv-00113 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 13, 2021).
    ([W]hen multiple prison condition claims have been joined . . . the plain language of § 1997e(a) requires that all available prison grievance remedies must be exhausted as to all of the claims)
A court may properly deny a motion to amend a pleading if the amendment would be futile.no pin page on record · 2 citing cases listed
  • Johnson v. Clark, No. 4:21-cv-00039 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 22, 2021).
    (A court may properly deny a motion to amend a pleading if the amendment would be futile.)
  • Johnson v. Clark, No. 4:21-cv-00039 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 21, 2021).
    (A court may properly deny a motion to amend a pleading if the amendment would be futile.)
Quoted next to this citation, but not language from this opinion
“a court may properly deny a motion to amend a pleading if the amendment would be futile.”quoted beside the cite; not in this opinion · 2 citing cases listed
  • Johnson v. Clark, No. 4:21-cv-00039 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 22, 2021).
    “a court may properly deny a motion to amend a pleading if the amendment would be futile.”
  • Johnson v. Clark, No. 4:21-cv-00039 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 21, 2021).
    “a court may properly deny a motion to amend a pleading if the amendment would be futile.”
Other citing cases5 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
James Daniel KOZOHORSKY, J.D., Also Situated and as Applies, Appellant,
v.
Greg HARMON, Warden at the Tucker Maximum Security Unit at the ADC, Arkansas Department of Correction; Kay Wade, CO II Mailroom Supervisor at MSU, Arkansas Department of Correction; Kenneth Frazier, Sgt. MSU, Arkansas Department of Correction, Originally Sued as Frazier, Appellees
02-1903.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Jun 19, 2003.
Published opinion
332 F.3d 1141
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 12291
William A. Waddell, Jr., Little Rock, AR, argued, for appellant., C. Joseph Cordi, Jr., Little Rock, AR, argued, for appellee.
Bowman, Arnold, Bye.
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published
BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

James Daniel Kozohorsky, an inmate at the Arkansas Department of Corrections Maximum Security Unit (Tucker), appeals the District Court’s dismissal without prejudice of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against various prison officials at Tucker for failure to exhaust prison administrative remedies. Although we agree with the District Court’s decision to dismiss Koz-ohorsky’s claims against Greg Harmon, the warden at Tucker, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, we remand the case and instruct the District Court to grant Kozohorsky’s motion to amend his complaint to strike his claims against Harmon.

I.

In January 2000, Kozohorsky alleged various constitutional violations against officials at Tucker, including Harmon; Kay Wade, a correction officer at Tucker; and Kenneth Frazier, a sergeant at Tucker. Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b) (2000), the District Court screened his complaint and recommended dismissing all but the following claims: (1) claims against Frazier for allegedly burning Kozohorsky’s arm and hand with a chemical substance and for retaliating against Kozohorsky by withholding notarization of certain affidavits and a grievance; (2) claims against Wade[*1143] for refusing to mail some of his legal letters; and (3) claims against Harmon for refusing to take any action against Frazier for burning him, for failing to adequately train and supervise Frazier, and for retaliating against Kozohorsky for filing grievances. In July 2001, Harmon, Wade, and Frazier moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that, with respect to the claims against Harmon, Kozohorsky had not exhausted his administrative remedies and therefore the court should dismiss the entire action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000). A Magistrate Judge held a hearing on the motion and recommended dismissing without prejudice Koz-ohorsky’s entire suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies for his retaliation and failure-to-supervise claims against Harmon. The Magistrate Judge found that Kozohorsky submitted only one exhausted grievance in his complaint, the grievance against Frazier.

In his objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report and in a separate motion, Kozohorsky requested that if the District Court determined Harmon was not a proper defendant, the District Court should allow him to amend the complaint and dismiss the claims against Harmon. After receiving Kozohorsky’s motion to amend, a deputy clerk for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas struck through the title of the motion to amend and renamed it “Supplement to the Objections,” and then docketed the motion under this new title. The deputy clerk made the title change to the motion at the request of one of the District Court’s law clerks. On March 5, 2002, without explicitly ruling on Kozohorsky’s motion to amend his complaint, the District Court adopted the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge and dismissed Kozohorsky’s complaint without prejudice. This appeal followed.

II.

Kozohorsky first argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to his claims against Harmon. We review the District Court’s findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. See Jones v. Norris, 310 F.3d 610, 612 (8th Cir.2002) (per curiam).

Under § 1997e(a), a prisoner cannot bring a § 1983 action with respect to prison conditions “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). We have previously held, as is the case here, that “[w]hen multiple prison condition claims have been joined ... the plain language of § 1997e(a) requires that all available prison grievance remedies must be exhausted as to all of the claims.” Graves v. Norris, 218 F.3d 884, 885 (8th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (emphasis added). Because Kozohorsky did not exhaust his administrative remedies on his failure-to-supervise claim against Harmon, he failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies as to all of his claims. [1] See id. at 885-86 (holding dismissal proper where at least some of plaintiffs claims were unexhausted when the district court ruled).

[*1144] Despite this defect in Kozohorsky’s complaint, we believe the District Court abused its discretion by implicitly denying his motion to amend the complaint. See Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir.2002) (noting abuse-of-discretion standard applies to a denial of a motion for leave to amend). Kozohorsky’s request to amend his complaint and dismiss Harmon would have cured the defect necessitating the dismissal. Our decision here is guided by Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982), which addressed the exhaustion requirements for habeas corpus petitions. In that decision, the Supreme Court adopted “a total exhaustion rule,” which required district courts to dismiss “mixed petitions” (i.e., petitions that contain both exhausted and unexhausted claims). Id. at 510, 522, 102 S.Ct. 1198. The Supreme Court stated that after a district court dismisses such a mixed petition, the plaintiff could then return to state court to exhaust his claims or file an amended petition in federal court including only exhausted claims. Id. at 510, 102 S.Ct. 1198. We think that the rule permitting a plaintiff to file an amended petition, which includes only exhausted claims, is applicable here. In fact, we have previously approved this practice in prison condition cases. See Thornton v. Phillips County, Ark., 240 F.3d 728, 729 (8th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (remanding case to the District Court for consideration of plaintiffs objections to magistrate judge’s report because the objections should have been treated as a motion for leave to amend complaint).

Moreover, we can think of no reason why Kozohorsky’s motion to amend should be denied. Based on the record before us, we must assume that the District Court was aware of Kozohorsky’s request to amend the complaint. We have previously held that “absent a good reason for denial — such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the non-moving party, or futility of amendment — -leave to amend should be granted.” Thompson-El v. Jones, 876 F.2d 66, 67 (8th Cir.1989) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962)). None of these reasons to deny an amendment is present here. First, the deletion of Harmon as defendant would not have required any additional discovery or changed any of the pretrial deadlines or trial schedule. Second, Kozohorsky was not attempting to add any claims or defendants. Third, Kozohorsky has not previously amended his complaint, and it does not appear he showed any bad faith in failing to dismiss Harmon earlier. Finally, the deletion of Harmon would have cured the defect requiring the dismissal of his complaint.

Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court’s implicit denial of Kozohor-sky’s motion to amend was an abuse of discretion, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1

. Kozohorsky makes the novel argument that by the time he came to believe he was the victim of retaliation by Harmon, he could not amend his existing grievance against Frazier to include his retaliation and failure-to-supervise claims against Harmon. Brief of the Appellant at 13, 16. This may be true of his retaliation claim, but it certainly is not true of his failure-to-supervise claim. The record is clear that Kozohorsky failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on this claim. Koz-ohorsky’s grievance against Frazier does not contain any allegation that Harmon failed to adequately train and supervise Frazier and we see no reason Kozohorsky could not have included this claim at the time he filed his grievance against Frazier.