green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
25.6 score
“on a large parcel of land, a pond 300 feet away from a dwelling may be as intimately connected to the residence as is the backyard grill of the bloke next door.”
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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2026
Top citers, strongest first. 31 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
State of Missouri v. Leland Dwayne Daggett
on a large parcel of land, a pond 300 feet away from a dwelling may be as intimately connected to the residence as is the backyard grill of the bloke next door.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Decker v. United States
United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 331, 335 (2d Cir. 1996).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Buckley
Defendant also alleged specific deficiencies in counsel's performance, namely, that counsel failed to investigate whether the Special Prosecutor's withdrawal of the 2016 cooperation agreement was impermissibly "premised on bad faith, invidiousness, . . . dishonesty" or unconstitutional considerations and, moreover, failed to discuss the possibility of demanding a hearing on that issue with defendant ( United States v Pollack , 91 F3d 331, 335 [2d Cir 1996]; see United States v Khan , 920 F2d 1100, 1105 [2d Cir 1990], cert denied 499 US 969 [1991]; People v Brewer , 118 AD3d 1409, 1411 [2014], …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. La Luz-Jimenez
“It is well-settled that proffer and plea agreements are construed according to principles of contract law.” United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 331, 334 (2d Cir. 1996). “[O]nce a defendant’s good-faith compliance with the terms of the agreement is established, the state must perform on its side and any attempt by the state to breach the agreement is per se a bad faith prosecution,” Rowe v. Griffin, 676 F.2d 524, 528 (11th Cir. 1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Simmons
However, it is well-settled that “plea agreements are contractual in nature” and “are construed according to contract law principles.” United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 331, 334-35 (2d Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Houghton v. Culver
The Second Circuit has "assumed, without deciding, that Ornelas requires us to review the district court's finding of curtilage de novo, and specifically to give plenary reconsideration to whether the facts of [the] case satisfy the relevant legal standard.” United States v. Reilly, 91 F.3d 331, 331 (2d Cir.1996) (per curiam).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Dionisio
See, e.g., In re Altro, 180 F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir.1999); United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 331, 334 (2d Cir.1996).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Murphy
E.g., United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 331, 334-35 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Gil-Christ, 130 F.3d 1131, 1134 (3d Cir.1997); United States v. McQueen, 108 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir.1997).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Rafael Burgos Lnu1-00cr0744-003, Alan Dyckman
Some apply a clear error standard, see, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876, 893 (2d Cir.1992) (“The court’s determination as to the defendant’s role is a question of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard.”); others review the adjustment de novo, see, e.g., United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 331, 336 (2d Cir.1996) (“We review the district court’s conclusion that a defendant was a ‘manager’ or ‘supervisor’ under U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(b) de novo, as it involves a legal interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines.”). 2 *92 Here, the Government agrees with Dyckman…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Doe
See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 127 F.3d 277, 286 (2d Cir.1997)(where a cooperation agreement required the defendant to be truthful, his subsequent lying to the government constitutes a breach of the agreement, allowing the government to refrain from making a § 5K1.1 motion); United States v. Brechner, 99 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir.1996) (same); United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 331, 336 (2d Cir.1996) (same); United States v. Resto, 74 F.3d 22, 27 (2d Cir.1996) (same).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Diehl
The Second Circuit in United States v. Reilly, 91 F.3d 331, 331 (2d Cir.1996) (per curiam), assumed but did not decide that Ornelas requires de novo review.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Michael Johnson
(6×)
also: Cited "see"
United States v. Reilly, 91 F.3d 331, 331 (2d Cir. 1996).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Alonzo T. Gregory
The Government’s determination that Gregory had committed a crime and thus breached the cooperation agreement was not “premised on bad faith, invidiousness, ... dishonesty, [or] unconstitutional considerations.” United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 331, 335 (2d Cir.1996) (citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Casso
The Second Circuit has held that a district court may review the government’s determination not to file a § 5K1.1 motion “for misconduct, bad faith, or an unconstitutional motive, such as the defendant’s race or religion.” United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 260 (2d Cir.1998); see also Brechner, 99 F.3d at 99 ; United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 331, 335 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 714 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Harpaul, 4 F.Supp.2d 137, 139-40 (E.D.N.Y.1998).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Harpaul
(3×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
The defendants seek specific performance by the Government of their cooperation agreements, requiring the Government to make motions for downward departure pursuant to Guidelines § 5K1.1, see United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 331, 334 (2d Cir.1996) (plea agreements are construed according to contract law); United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 1483, 1486 (2d Cir.1992) (“specific performance may also be available when the government breaches a plea agreement containing a cooperation clause”); United States v. Khan, 920 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir.1990) (“cooperation agreements, like plea bargai…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Carmine Avellino
(2×)
See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 127 F.3d at 286 ; United States v. Brechner, 99 F.3d at 99-100 ; United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 331, 334-35 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Resto, 74 F.3d at 26 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Santos Escotto
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
A district court’s factual findings are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, e.g., United States v. Leonard, 37 F.3d 32, 37-38 (2d Cir.1994), but the determination that those findings support a sentencing enhancement is a legal conclusion that we review de novo, because it involves an interpretation of the Guidelines, e.g., United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 331, 336 (2d Cir.1996). (a) Leadership Role.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cady v. United States
Although the government may have wished to preclude plaintiff from filing motions challenging the sentence imposed pursuant to the charges he pleaded guilty to, in addition to the other restrictions in his plea agreement, the Court must “construe the present plea agreement strictly according to its terms and [ ] not read into it requirements that, while in accord with its ‘spirit,’ were not specifically set forth by the parties.” See United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 331, 335 (2d Cir.1996).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. John Frank Rodgers
United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 331, 334 (2d Cir.1996).
discussed
Cited "see"
Conroy v. Caron
See United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1280 (2d Cir.) (good faith exception not applicable where officer included facts in warrant affidavit that were “almost calculated to mislead” such that “the issuing judge could not possibly make a valid assessment of the legality of the warrant that he was asked to issue”), aff'd and amended, 91 F.3d 331 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Robertson
See United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1280 (2d Cir.) (good faith exception not applicable where officer included facts in warrant affidavit that were “almost calculated to mislead” such that "the issuing judge could not possibly make a valid assessment of the legality of the warrant that he was asked to issue”), aff'd and amended, 91 F.3d 331 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam). .
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Ganias
(2×)
See United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1280 (2d Cir.) (“The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not protect searches by officers who fail to provide all potentially adverse information to the issuing judge . . . .”), aff’d and amended, 91 F.3d 331 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam); see also United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1368 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding good faith reliance on a warrant, under Leon, where officers, first, committed a constitutional violation they did not reasonably know, at the time, was unconstitutional — a warrantless canine sniff — and second, in …
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Doe
See United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 331, 336 (2d Cir.1996) (noting that the defendant “would soon be indicted” for a further crime); United States v. Resto, 74 F.3d 22, 27 (2d Cir.1996) (holding that defendant’s “flight from the courthouse and failure to appear for sentencing, although never prosecuted, constituted” a further crime).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Anthony Santa
(2×)
See United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1276 (2d Cir.1996), aff'd on reh’g, 91 F.3d 331 (2d Cir.1996) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Trent
A defendant’s failure to be truthful “provide[s] good faith grounds for refusing to move for a downward departure.” United States v. Brechner, 99 F.3d 3 96 , 99–100 (2d Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 331, 336 (2d Cir. 1996).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Fisher
(2×)
See United States v. Breza, 308 F.3d 430, 435 (4th Cir.2002); United States v. Diehl, 276 F.3d 32, 37 (1st Cir.2002); United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 898, 911-13 (9th Cir. 2001); State v. Martwick, 231 Wis.2d 801, 811-14 , 604 N.W.2d 552 (2000); see also United States v. Reilly, 91 F.3d 331, 331 (2d Cir.1996) (assumed, without deciding, that Ornelas requires appellate court to review the district court's finding of curtilage de novo.) As the First Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Diehl : "As in those inquiries, the question of curtilage requires a court to make a legal judgment about…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Johnson
See, e.g., United States v. Alegria, 192 F.3d 179, 187 (1st Cir.1999), United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir.1998), United States v. Vest, 125 F.3d 676, 680 (8th Cir.1997), United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 331, 335 (2d Cir.1996), United States v. Jones, 58 F.3d 688, 692 (D.C.Cir.1995), United States v. Lee, 989 F.2d 377, 380 (10th Cir.1993); cf. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 , 92 S.Ct. 495 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) (binding prosecution to promise not to testify as to sentencing under executory plea agreement). 8 .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Martwick
See, e.g., United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1275 , aff’d on reh'g, 91 F.3d 331 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Friend, 50 F.3d 548, 552 (8th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 517 U.S. 1152 (1996); United States v. Benish, 5 F.3d 20, 24 (3rd Cir. 1993); United States v. Knapp; 1 F.3d 1026, 1029 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Traynor, 990 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hatch, 931 F.2d 1478, 1480 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 883 (1991); United States ex rel.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Noel C. Jenkins (96-5338) Linda L. Jenkins (96-5346)
Id. at 302 , 107 S.Ct. at 1140 ; see also United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1277-78 (2d Cir.) (finding of curtilage where defendant’s property was enclosed by three-sided wire fence and woods), aff'd. on reh’g, 91 F.3d 331 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Swepston, 987 F.2d 1510, 1515 (10th Cir.1993) (finding of curtilage where “chicken shed” and defendant’s house were partially enclosed by wire fence).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States of America, Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Leonard Wisniewski, Jr., Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, Stuart Solomon Ern-Len Corporation
The district court’s conclusion that Wisniewski was not a manager, supervisor, organizer, or leader, for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, however, “involves a legal interpre *58 tation of the Guidelines and is reviewed de novo.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 331, 336 (2d Cir.1996).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellant,
v.
Kevin C. REILLY, Defendant-Appellee
v.
Kevin C. REILLY, Defendant-Appellee
1787, Docket 95-1024.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Jul 31, 1996.
Winter, Leval, Calabresi.
Cited by 12 opinions | Published
Citer courts: Missouri Court of Appeals (1)
PER CURIAM:
On February 12, 1996, we filed an opinion in this case affirming the judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Howard G. Munson, Senior District Judge), which granted defendant Kevin C. Reilly’s motion to suppress evidence. 76 F.3d 1271, affirming 875 F.Supp. 108 (N.D.N.Y.1994). The government sought a petition for rehearing, which was denied. Subsequent to the denial of that petition, the United States Supreme Court decided Ornelas v. United States, — U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). Believing that this decision justified a rehearing, the government sought permission to submit a second petition. We granted that permission, and a second petition for rehearing was submitted on July 3, 1996.
We have now reviewed the issues in this case in the light of Ornelas. For purposes of that reconsideration, we have assumed, without deciding, that Ornelas requires us to review the district court’s finding of curtilage de novo, and specifically to give plenary reconsideration to “whether the facts of [the] case satisfy the relevant legal standard.” (Government brief in second petition for rehearing at 5.) We conclude that the outcome in the case before us is not altered by de novo review.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.