William G. Horton v. Michael O'dea, Warden, 94 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 1996). · Go Syfert
William G. Horton v. Michael O'dea, Warden, 94 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
41 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Geier v. Sundquist (ca6, 2004-06-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see" Geier v. Sundquist
6th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Geier v. Sundquist, 94 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.1996); Geier v. Richardson, 871 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir.1989); Geier v. Alexander, 801 F.2d 799 (6th Cir.1986); Geier v. Alexander, 593 F.Supp. 1263 (M.D.Tenn.1984); Geier v. University of Tennessee, 597 F.2d 1056 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886 , 100 S.Ct. 180 , 62 L.Ed.2d 117 (1979); Geier v. Blanton, 427 F.Supp. 644 (M.D.Tenn.1977); Geier v. Dunn, 337 F.Supp. 573 (M.D.Tenn.1972); and Sanders v. Ellington, 288 F.Supp. 937 (M.D.Tenn.1968).
discussed Cited "see" Geier v. Sundquist (2×)
6th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Geier v. Sundquist, 94 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.1996); Geier v. Richardson, 871 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir.1989); Geier v. Alexander, 801 F.2d 799 (6th Cir.1986); Geier v. Alexander, 593 F.Supp. 1263 (M.D.Tenn.1984); Geier v. University of Tennessee, 597 F.2d 1056 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886 , 100 S.Ct. 180 , 62 L.Ed.2d 117 (1979); Geier v. Blanton, 427 F.Supp. 644 (M.D.Tenn.1977); Geier v. Dunn, 337 F.Supp. 573 (M.D.Tenn.1972); and Sanders v. Ellington, 288 F.Supp. 937 (M.D.Tenn.1968).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Oakland County v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n
E.D. Mich. · 2011 · signal: see also · confidence low
Triax Co. v. TRW, Inc., 724 F.2d 1224, 1228 (6th Cir.1984) (“These three factors, however, cannot be said to be a comprehensive list of the circumstances where intervention of right ought to be granted.”); see also Geier v. Sundquist, 94 F.3d 644 (Table), 1996 WL 464979, at *2 (6th Cir.1996) (“Factors to be considered in determining the adequacy of representation are: (1) if there is collusion between the representative and an opposing party ____” (emphasis added)); Purnell v. City of Akron, 925 F.2d 941, 949 (6th Cir.1991) (“Some of the factors to be considered in determining whethe…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Doss, Charles v. First Franklin Finan
7th Cir. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Hayes v. General Motors Corp., 94 F.3d 644 , *4 (6th Cir. 1996) (unpublished) (citing Tennessee law).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Doss v. Clearwater Title Co.
7th Cir. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir.2002); see also Hayes v. General Motors Corp., 94 F.3d 644 , 1996 WL 452916, *4 (6th Cir.1996) (unpublished) (citing Tennessee law).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jack McLaurin v. Russ Cole (2×)
6th Cir. · 1997 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Birdo v. Smith, 94 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.1996) (unpublished) (“[T]he gravamen of Birdo’s complaint is his assertion of retaliation....
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
William G. Horton
v.
Michael O'dea, Warden
95-6358.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Aug 8, 1996.
94 F.3d 644
Unpublished

94 F.3d 644

NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit.
William G. HORTON, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Michael O'DEA, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 95-6358.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Aug. 8, 1996.

Before: KEITH, SILER, and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

1

William G. Horton, a former Kentucky state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 9(a), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed.R.App.P. 34(a).

2

Horton was convicted following a 1990 jury trial of second degree arson and was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. He filed a post-conviction motion pursuant to Ky.R.Cr. 11.42 in the trial court, which was denied on the ground that the direct appeal was still pending. On direct appeal, his conviction was affirmed. Horton then filed for federal habeas corpus relief, raising a number of claims. The district court dismissed the petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state court remedies. Horton returned to the state courts and filed a second 11.42 motion. The trial court denied the motion without opinion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, addressing the merits of the claims raised. Appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court was dismissed.

3

Horton then moved to reinstate his federal habeas corpus petition. The district court granted this motion, and then denied the petition. The district court concluded that Horton's claims were procedurally barred because he had not raised these claims on direct appeal, had prematurely filed his first 11.42 motion, and had not established cause to excuse these defaults. On appeal, Horton argues that his claims are not procedurally barred because his second 11.42 motion was considered on the merits by the state courts. Counsel for the respondent has informed the court that she will not be filing a brief.

4

Upon review, we conclude that the district court erred in applying the doctrine of procedural default in this case. In determining whether a procedural default has occurred, the court must first find that the state courts enforced a procedural sanction against the petitioner. See Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir.1986). In this case, the last state court to give a reasoned opinion on Horton's claims did not rely on a procedural bar, but addressed the claims on the merits.

5

Accordingly, we find that this case must be remanded to the district court so that the respondent can brief the merits of the claims and submit the necessary state court records to allow a determination of the claims on the merits. The district court's order denying this petition on the basis of procedural default is therefore vacated and this matter is remanded for further proceedings. Rule 9(b)(3), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.