Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2004). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2004).
Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitPublished opinionNo. 01-57255Sep 8, 2004

Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp.

Quick Summary

A state law claim for breach of an implied-in-fact contract survives copyright preemption if it alleges an extra element qualitatively different from copyright rights, such as an implied promise to pay.

The plaintiff, a screenwriter, sued a film company for copyright infringement and breach of an implied-in-fact contract, alleging the company used his poker-themed screenplay ideas without compensation. The district court granted summary judgment on the copyright claim and dismissed the state law claim as preempted. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the copyright ruling, finding the works not substantially similar. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the contract claim, holding that a Desny claim survives preemption if it alleges an extra element, such as an implied promise to pay, that is qualitatively different from copyright rights. Because the complaint alleged the offeree accepted the disclosure knowing the conditions and value, the claim was not equivalent to copyright infringement.

107 citation events (107 in the last 25 years) across 15 distinct courts.
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At page 967Analyzing substantial similarity and contract elements23 citing casesunder California law, to establish a breach of an implied-in-fact contract for disclosure of an idea, “the plaintiff must show that the plaintiff prepared the work, disclosed the work to the offeree for sale, and did so under circumstances from which it could be concluded that the offeree voluntari…9 citing courts put it this way · 21 listed here
  • Best Carpet Values, Inc. v. Google LLC, 90 F.4th 962 (9th Cir. 2024).published 2 cites
    That case involved an implied-in-fact contract containing an added element of an explicit “agreement to pay for use of the disclosed ideas.” Montz, 649 F.3d at 980 , citing Grosso, 383 F.3d at 967-68.
  • Reilly v. Wozniak, No. 2:18-cv-03775 (D. Ariz. Mar. 2, 2021).
    “an idea is furnished by one party to another, a contract 24 sometimes may be implied even in the absence of an express promise to pay”
  • Quibi Holdings, LLC v. Interlude US, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-02250 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2020).
    “that the plaintiff [1] prepared the work, [2] disclosed the work to the offeree for sale, and [3] did so under circumstances from which it could be concluded that the offeree voluntarily accepted the disclosure knowing…”
  • JBF Interlude 2009 Ltd - Israel v. Quibi Holdings, LLC, No. 2:20-cv-02299 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2020).
    “that the plaintiff [1] prepared the work, [2] disclosed the work to the offeree for sale, and [3] did so under circumstances from which it could be concluded that the offeree voluntarily accepted the disclosure knowing…”
  • Quibi Holdings, LLC v. Interlude US, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-02250 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2020).
    “that the plaintiff [1] prepared the work, [2] disclosed the work to the offeree for sale, and [3] did so under circumstances from which it could be concluded that the offeree voluntarily accepted the disclosure knowing…”
  • JBF Interlude 2009 Ltd - Israel v. Quibi Holdings, LLC, No. 2:20-cv-02299 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2020).
    “that the plaintiff [1] prepared the work, [2] disclosed the work to the offeree for sale, and [3] did so under circumstances from which it could be concluded that the offeree voluntarily accepted the disclosure knowing…”
  • Denise Daniels v. Walt Disney Co., 958 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2020).published
    “under circumstances from which it could be concluded that the offeree voluntarily accepted the disclosure knowing the conditions on which it was tendered and the reasonable value of the work”
  • Denise Daniels v. Walt Disney Co., 952 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2020).published
    “under circumstances from which it could be concluded that the offeree voluntarily accepted the disclosure knowing the conditions on which it was tendered and the reasonable value of the work”
  • Reilly v. Wozniak, No. 2:18-cv-03775 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2020).
    “when an idea is furnished by one party to another, a contract sometimes 3 may be implied even in the absence of an express promise to pay”
  • Reed v. Nat'l Football League, 683 F. App'x 619 (9th Cir. 2017).unpublished
    (setting forth the elements of a claim under Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715 , 299 P.2d 257 (1956), for a breach of implied-in-fact contract when an idea is furnished by one party to another)
Show 11 more citing cases
  • Burns v. Erving, 810 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Nev. 2011).published
    Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965, 967-68 (9th Cir.2004).
  • Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc., 649 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2011).published 8 cites
    Id. at 967, 968; Nimmer at § 19D.03[C][2], Contract claims generally survive preemption because they require proof of such an extra element.
  • Doody v. Penguin Grp. (usa) Inc., 673 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (D. Haw. 2009).published 2 cites
    “that the plaintiff prepared the work, disclosed the work to the offeree for sale, and did so under circumstances from which it could be concluded that the offeree voluntarily accepted the disclosure knowing the conditio…”
  • Randolph v. Dimension Films, 630 F. Supp. 2d 741 (S.D. Tex. 2009).published
    See, e.g., Tabachnik v. Dorsey, 257 Fed.Appx. 409, 410 (2d Cir.2007) (Rule 12(b)(6)); Burt v. Time Warner, Inc., 213 F.3d 641 , 2000 WL 328117 , at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2000) (Rule 12(b)(6)); Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965, 96…
  • Tillman v. New Line Cinema Corp., 295 F. App'x 840 (7th Cir. 2008).unpublished 2 cites
    (holding that common setting of poker game and use of poker jargon in both works did not make the works substantially similar)
  • A Slice of Pie Prods., LLC v. Wayans Bros. Ent., 487 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D. Conn. 2007).published
    “To establish a Desny claim for breach of implied-in-fact contract, the plaintiff must show that the plaintiff prepared the work, disclosed the work to the offeree for sale, and did so under circumstances from which it c…”
  • Donna Corbello v. Frankie Valli, 974 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2020).published
    See Narell, 872 F.2d at 911 ; Grosso, 383 F.3d at 967 .
  • Julie Riggs v. Myspace, Inc., 444 F. App'x 986 (9th Cir. 2011).unpublished
    (under California law, to establish a breach of an implied-in-fact contract for disclosure of an idea, “the plaintiff must show that the plaintiff prepared the work, disclosed the work to the offeree for sale, and did so…)
  • Benay v. Warner Bros. Ent., 607 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2010).published 2 cites
    (finding no substantial similarity where “the only similarities in dialogue between the two works come from the use of common, unprotectable poker jargon)
  • San Joaquin Gen. Hosp. v. Health Care Serv. Corp., No. 2:20-cv-01582 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2021).
    See ECF No. 10 at 18-20; see also Grosso v. 14 MiraMax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Desny v. Wilder, 15 46 Cal. 2d 715, 735-36 (1956)).
  • Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television Network, Inc., 683 F.3d 424 (2d Cir. 2012).published
    (a Desny claim requires that the offeree voluntarily accepted the idea knowing that use was conditioned on payment, looking to all the circumstances attending disclosure)
At page 968Determining state law claims surviving copyright preemption19 citing casesTherefore, his claim for breach of an implied-in-faet contract is not preempted by the Copyright Act, because it alleges an extra element that transforms the action from one arising under the ambit of the federal statute to one sounding in contract.3 citing courts put it this way · 18 listed here
  • Blue Nile, Inc. v. Ice. Com, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (W.D. Wash. 2007).published 2 cites
    (Therefore, his claim for breach of an implied-in-faet contract is not preempted by the Copyright Act, because it alleges an extra element that transforms the action from one arising under the ambit of the federal statu…)
  • OEG Inc v. Korum, No. 3:24-cv-05694 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 31, 2025). 2 cites
    (implied-in-fact contract is not preempted by the Copyright Act)
  • Gordon v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., No. 3:23-cv-01507 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2023). 2 cites
    Equivalent rights analysis. 6 The second prong of the preemption analysis focuses on whether Gordon’s state- 7 law causes of action “assert rights that are qualitatively different from the rights protected 8 by copyright: whether the asser…
  • Yu v. ByteDance Inc., No. 3:23-cv-03503 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2023).
    “To 4 survive preemption, the state cause of action must protect rights that are qualitatively different from 5 the rights protected by copyright: the complaint must allege an ‘extra element’ that changes the 6 nature of…”
  • nKlosures, Inc. Architects v. Avalon Lodging, LLC, No. 8:22-cv-00459 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2022). 2 cites
    See 24 Kodadek, 152 F.3d at 1212 . 3 Next, “[t]o survive preemption, the state cause of 4] action must protect rights that are qualitatively 5 | different from the rights protected by copyright: the 6 | complaint must allege an ‘extra elem…
  • Lori Bokenfohr v. Cynthia Gladen, No. 19-35992 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2020).unpublished
    “are ‘equivalent to . . . the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright”
  • Enter. Mgmt. Ltd. Inc v. Construx Software Builders Inc, No. 2:19-cv-01458, 2020 WL 2795198 (W.D. Wash. May 29, 2020).
    Grosso v. Miramax 9 Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004).
  • Douglas Jordan-Benel v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 859 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2017).published
    “implied promise to pay the reasonable value of the material disclosed”
  • Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network LLC, 160 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (C.D. Cal. 2015).published
    Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir.2004), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 400 F.3d 658 (9th Cir.2005) (claim for breach of contract not preempted by the Copyright Act because it alleged additional element); see al…
  • Margaret Morris v. Kenneth Atchity, 544 F. App'x 760 (9th Cir. 2013).unpublished
    Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir.2004), as amended, 400 F.3d 658 (9th Cir.2005). *761 Moreover, the available remedies would have duplicated those awarded on Plaintiffs successful claim for breach of an implied cont…
Show 8 more citing cases
At page 965“that the plaintiff prepared the work, disclosed the work to the offeree for sale, and did so under circumstances from which it could be concluded that the offeree voluntarily accepted the disclosure knowing the conditions on which it was tendered and the reasonable value of the work.”0 citing cases8 citing courts quote it
    Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
    Jeff GROSSO
    v.
    MIRAMAX FILM CORP., a New York Corporation Miramax Books Spanky Pictures, a New York Corporation David Levien, an individual Brian Koppelman, an individual Ted Demme, an individual Joel Stillerman, an individual
    No. 01-57255.
    Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
    Sep 8, 2004.
    Published opinion
    383 F.3d 965
    2004 WL 1977668
    2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18909
    John A. Marder, Steven J. Renick, and Sylvia Havens, Manning & Marder, Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, Los Angeles, CA, for the plaintiff-appellant., Richard L. Charnley, Nelson, Thompson, Pegue & Thornton, Santa Monica, CA, for the defendants-appellees.
    Graber, Schroeder, Thompson.
    Cited by 24 opinions  |  Published
    SCHROEDER, Chief Judge:

    Jeff Grosso appeals the district court’s judgment in favor of the defendants, Mira-max Film Corp. and others (“Miramax”), in his action alleging breach of contract under California law and violation of his copyright in his screenplay The Shell Game. Grosso claims that Miramax stole the ideas and themes of his work when they made the movie Rounders. In this appeal we consider two separate district court orders: one granting summary judgment on Grosso’s copyright claim and one dismissing his state law claim as preempted by the Copyright Act. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Miramax on the copyright claim, but we reverse its dismissal of the state law claim.

    Summary judgment on Grosso’s copyright claim was proper. As the district court carefully and correctly explained, the two works are not substantially similar. The works do not have substantially similar genre, mood, and pace; their themes, settings, and characters are different; their plots and sequences of events are not parallel. Both works have poker settings but the only similarities in dialogue between the two works come from the use of common, unprotectable poker jargon.

    Grosso’s state law claim is for breach of implied contract. It seeks compensation not for the actual written script, but for the idea allegedly embodied in the script and shared with Miramax. See Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d at 257 (Cal.1956). We conclude that the district court erred in holding the claim preempted by the Copyright Act and in granting Miramax’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

    In Desny, 299 P.2d at 257, the California Supreme Court explained that where an idea is furnished by one party to another, a contract sometimes may be implied even in the absence of an express promise to pay. The Court held that a contract exists where “the circumstances preceding and attending disclosure, together with the conduct of the offeree acting with knowledge of the circumstances, show a promise [to pay] of the type usually referred to as ‘implied’ or ‘implied in fact.’ ” Id. at 270. The Desny rule is justified on the theory that the bargain is not for the idea itself, but for the services of conveying that idea. See Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 245 Cal.App.2d 593, 54 Cal.Rptr. 130, 140 (1966).

    To establish a Desny claim for breach of implied-in-fact contract, the plaintiff must show that the plaintiff prepared the work, disclosed the work to the offeree for sale, and did so under circumstances from which it could be concluded that the offeree voluntarily accepted the disclosure knowing the conditions on which it was tendered and the reasonable value of the work. See Faris v. Enberg, 97 Cal.App.3d 309, 158 Cal.Rptr. 704, 709 (1979). Grosso’s complaint mirrors the requirements of Desny and states that “the idea was submitted by Plaintiff to Defendants with the understanding and expectation, fully and clearly understood by Defendants that Plaintiffs would be reasonably compensated for its use by Defendants.” We conclude that the complaint stated a Desny claim.

    [*968] With respect to preemption, the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301, establishes a two-part test. Claims under state law are preempted where: (1) the work at issue comes within the subject matter of copyright, and (2) the state law rights are “equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright.” Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d 973, 976 (9th Cir.1987) (internal quotation marks omitted) overruled on other grounds by Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994); see also 17 U.S.C. § 301.

    The dispositive preemption issue in this case is whether the rights protected by a Desny claim are equivalent to the rights protected by copyright. To survive preemption, the state cause of action must protect rights that are qualitatively different from the rights protected by copyright: the complaint must allege an “extra element” that changes the nature of the action. Del Madera, 820 F.2d at 977. Our prior decision in Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 802 F.2d 1193, 1196-97 (9th Cir.1986), supports treating the implied promise to pay required by Desny as an “extra element” for preemption purposes. In Landsberg, the defendants used the plaintiffs idea for a Scrabble strategy book without paying the expected compensation, and we applied California law to affirm a judgment of liability on a Desny claim. We explained that:

    The contract claim turns not upon the existence of a [copyright] ... but upon the implied promise to pay the reasonable value of the material disclosed.

    Id. at 1196.

    In Del Madera we held that a claim for unjust enrichment was equivalent to a claim for copyright infringement, and thus preempted, because the claim lacked an extra element — the bilateral expectation of compensation. Here, Grosso has alleged that the extra element is present. Therefore, his claim for breach of an implied-in-fact contract is not preempted by the Copyright Act, because it alleges an extra element that transforms the action from one arising under the ambit of the federal statute to one sounding in contract. See Del Madera, 820 F.2d at 977. Grosso’s complaint alleged circumstances that, if true, would sustain an action under Desny that is not preempted.

    The summary judgment of the district court on the copyright claim is affirmed. The judgment of the district court dismissing the state law claim is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

    AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART. Each party will bear its own costs.