green
Positive treatment
9.2 score
Treatment trajectory · 1991 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1991
2008
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 31 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "but see"
United States v. Conner
(2×)
But cf. United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc) (when an agent knocked on defendant’s door for several minutes as he shouted in English and in Spanish, “I’m a police officer, I would like to talk to you, I need for you to come here,” the court concluded that the agent’s words were “in the form of a request,” and thus the defendant’s decision to open the door was voluntary), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Rosemond
(2×)
See United States v. Tobin[, 923 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir.1991), certiorari denied 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991), citing United States v. Young, 909 F.2d 442, 446 (11th Cir.1990).] The test for whether exigent circumstances exist is an objective one.
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Martin, Unpublished Decision (12-3-2004)
See United States v. Tobin (C.A.11, 1991), 923 F.2d 1506 , 1509 , certiorari denied (1991), 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , citing United States v. Young (C.A.11, 1990), 909 F.2d 442 , 446 . {¶ 24} The test for whether exigent circumstances exist is an objective one.
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Martin, Unpublished Decision (12-3-2004)
See United States v. Tobin (C.A.11, 1991), 923 F.2d 1506 , 1509 , certiorari denied (1991), 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , citing United States v. Young (C.A.11, 1990), 909 F.2d 442 , 446 . {¶ 24} The test for whether exigent circumstances exist is an objective one.
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Ponce Munoz
(2×)
See United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir.) (“Reasonable suspicion cannot justify the warrantless search of a house, but it can justify the agents’ approaching the house to question the occupants.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991); United States v. Hardeman, 36 F.Supp.2d 770, 777 (E.D.Mich.1999) (discussing the “knock and talk” procedure to obtain a suspect’s consent to search).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Jones
(2×)
See United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir.) (“Reasonable suspicion cannot justify the warrantless search of a house, but it can justify the agents’ approaching the house to question the occupants.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991); United States v. Hardeman, 36 F.Supp.2d 770, 777 (E.D.Mich.1999) (discussing the “knock and talk” procedure to obtain a suspects consent to search).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Olbres
The Third Circuit viewed the Commission’s policy statement on “vocational skills” as being based on an underlying “principle ... that a sentencing judge may grant a departure based on a defendant’s ability to make a work-related contribution to society only in extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 785; see also United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1424 (3d Cir.1994); United States v. Mogel, 956 F.2d 1555, 1564 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 857 , 113 S.Ct. 167 , 121 L.Ed.2d 115 (1992); accord United States v. Rutana, 932 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir.) (“[E]ven assuming that [defendan…
discussed
Cited "see"
Janus Petroleum Co., Inc. v. United States
See Brookhurst, Inc. v. United States, 931 F.2d 554 , 556-57 (9th Cir.), cert. denied., 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 242 (1991); Tucker v. United States, No. 87 Civ. 3349, 1989 WL 58012 , at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y.
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. German Villabona-Garnica, Jorge Enrique Munoz
(2×)
See United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir.) (en banc) (warrantless search requires probable cause and exigent circumstances), cer t. denied, 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Paul Edward Hromada
(2×)
See United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1513 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991) (a reasonable belief that someone else could be inside the house permits a protective sweep).
discussed
Cited "see"
Raymond E. And Dorothy J. O'Bryant v. United States
See Brookhurst, Inc. v. United States, 931 F.2d 554 , 556-57 (9th Cir.) (government may use methods other than specific erroneous refund suit provision (§ 7405) to recover erroneous refunds), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 242 (1991). 5 .
discussed
Cited "see"
Hopkins v. State
(2×)
See United States v. Tobin, 890 F.2d 319, 327 (11th Cir.1989), vacated, 902 F.2d 821 (11th Cir.), on rehearing, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir.1990) (en banc) ("[r]easonable suspicion cannot justify the warrantless search of a house"), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991); State v. Davis, 295 Or. 227 , 666 P.2d 802, 812 (1983); State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 17 (Utah App.1993).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Aguilar
See United States v. Rutana, 932 F.2d 1155, 1158-59 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 300 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Robert P. Aguilar, United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Robert P. Aguilar, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee
See United States v. Rutana, 932 F.2d 1155, 1158-59 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 300 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991). 63 "A long course of adversarial proceedings" awaits many a defendant following criminal conviction--be they forfeiture proceedings, civil suits seeking tort damages, or administrative proceedings to revoke professional licenses.
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Villegas
See United States v. Rutana, 932 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 300 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Phillips
(2×)
Id., ¶ 18; see also United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991) (holding the agents could reasonably conclude from the defendants' hurried actions and furtive looks that the defendants were either aware or afraid that someone was watching them such that the destruction or removal of some portion of the narcotics was therefore a possibility that justified the warrantless entry into the home based on exigent circumstances). ¶ 15 Because they had probable cause and because exigent circumstances existe…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Knutson v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.
See, e.g., Littlefield v. U.S., 927 F.2d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 242 (1991) (implying that a distinction might be present where the employer was in a better position than the contractor to anticipate dangers and implement precautions, or where there was a question as to the competency or solvency of the independent contractor); Karadanis v. Newcomb, 698 P.2d 872, 874 , 101 Nev. 196, 199 (1985) (holding that a landowner may be liable for injuries to an independent contractor’s employee if the hazard *995 ous condition was not “open…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Moore
Compare Axselle, 604 F.2d at 1338 (citing Bonanno and . addressing knowledge) with United States v. Antoon, 933 F.2d 200, 203-04 (3rd Cir.) (applying Kelly and focusing on issue of coercion), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 300 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991). 6 While consent in some cases may be shown solely with evidence that the party knows a call is to be recorded, in other cases the circumstances surrounding the call may give rise to the issue of whether the consent was voluntary, and evidence of coercion may negate the consent implied by the party knowingly agreeing to the recording.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Sunkett
(2×)
See, e.g., U.S. v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1513 (11th Cir.1991) (fact that three vehicles were parked in front of house and that defendant had lied about codefendant being in house gave rise to reasonable belief that additional people could be hiding in house), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Hardeman
(2×)
See id.; see also United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir.1991), reh’g denied, 935 F.2d 1297 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Miller
(2×)
Id. at 543 ; see also United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir.1991), reh’g denied, 935 F.2d 1297 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991) (same).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Johnson v. United States
See, e.g., Brookhurst, Inc. v. United States, 931 F.2d 554 , 555-57 (9th Cir.1991) (government entitled to collect erroneous refund by supplemental assessment under section 6204(a)), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 242 (1991); Estate of Wilbanks v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Isabel YANEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee
(2×)
Id. ; see also Littlefield v. United States, 927 F.2d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir.) (duty under section 413 is limited to requiring a contractor to take appropriate safety measures in its contract), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 242 (1991); Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 469, 477 (9th Cir.1980) ("The essence of the duty ... imposed by Section 413 [is] to provide contractually for the contractor's observance of detailed and specific safety precautions.").
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Clark v. United States
No. 960, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1928); see also Brookhurst, Inc. v. United States, 931 *87 F.2d 554, 557 (9th Cir.) (IRS not limited to § 7405 because imperfect assessment may be reassessed within three years from date tax return was filed), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L,Ed.2d 242 (1991). 7 .
examined
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Pedro Ernesto McGregor
(8×)
See, e.g., United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Denise Moffitt, Individually and as Guardian Prochein Ami for Brian Craig Moffitt and Dayton Christopher Moffitt, Minors, and as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Clayton E. Moffitt v. United States of America and Utility Body Company, Denise Moffitt, Individually and as Guardian Prochein Ami for Brian Craig Moffitt and Dayton Christopher Moffitt, Minors, and as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Clayton E. Moffitt v. United States of America, and Utility Body Company
See, e.g., Littlefield v. United States, 927 F.2d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 299 (1991); Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 625 F.2d 1095, 1103-04 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Denise Moffitt, Individually and as Guardian Prochein Ami for Brian Craig Moffitt and Dayton Christopher Moffitt, Minors, and as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Clayton E. Moffitt v. United States of America and Utility Body Company, Denise Moffitt, Individually and as Guardian Prochein Ami for Brian Craig Moffitt and Dayton Christopher Moffitt, Minors, and as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Clayton E. Moffitt v. United States of America, and Utility Body Company
See, e.g., Littlefield v. United States, 927 F.2d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 299 (1991); Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 625 F.2d 1095, 1103-04 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Susan Haines v. Liggett Group Inc.
See, e.g., United States v. Antoon, 933 F.2d 200, 204 (3d Cir.1991), American Home Prod. v. Barr Lab., 834 F.2d 368, 371 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 300 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991). 67 Although there is a distinction between the sanctity of jury fact-finding protected by the Seventh Amendment and the extremely limited review of facts found by a judge permitted under the clearly erroneous rule, in neither event does common law tradition permit a reviewing court to consider evidence which was not before the tribunal of the first instance.
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Haines v. Liggett Group Inc.
See, e.g., United States v. Antoon, 933 F.2d 200, 204 (3d Cir.1991), American Home Prod. v. Barr Lab., 834 F.2d 368, 371 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 300 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Daniel B. Nickeson and Enid C. Nickeson Norman E. Kuhl and Nancy J. Kuhl v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Supply, 781 F.2d at 726 (quoting Hirsch v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 731, 736 (9th Cir.1963)); see also Agro Science Co. v. Commissioner, 934 F.2d 573, 576 (5th Cir.) (deductions under § 174 allowable only if “the taxpayer made them primarily in furtherance of a bona fide profit objective independent of tax consequences” (emphasis added)), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 300 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Mayo
(2×)
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); see also United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991); United States v. Burgos, 720 F.2d 1520, 1525 (11th Cir.1983).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Fruhwirth
v.
Baltimore City Police Department
v.
Baltimore City Police Department
No. 91-152.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 15, 1991.
Published
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.