green
Positive treatment
2.3 score
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994
2010
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
cited
Cited "see"
General Acc. Ins. Co. v. State
See Morton International, Inc. v. General Accident Insurance Company of America, 134 N.J. 1, 27 , 629 A. 2d 831 (1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2764 , 129 L.Ed. 2d 878 (1994).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Muralo Co. v. EMPLOYERS INS. WAUSAU
See, e.g., Morton Int'l v. General Acc. Ins., 266 N.J.Super. 300, 340-341 , 629 A. 2d 895 (App.Div. 1991), aff'd, 134 N.J. 1 , 629 A. 2d 831 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1245 , 114 S.Ct. 2764 , 129 L.Ed. 2d 878 (1994); Universal-Rundle v. Commercial Ins., 319 N.J.Super. 223, 242 , 725 A. 2d 76 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 161 N.J. 149 , 735 A. 2d 574 (1999); Trustees of Princeton Univ. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 293 N.J.Super. 296, 301-305 , 680 A. 2d 783 (App.Div.1996), leave to appeal granted, 147 N.J. 574 , 688 A. 2d 1050 (1997); Rutgers v. Liberty Mut.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Carlos Pacheco
The rule of lenity provides that “ambiguous laws which impose penal sanctions are to be strictly construed against the Government.” United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 120 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 , 103 S.Ct. 1891 , 77 L.Ed.2d 282 (1983); see also Dauray, 215 F.3d at 264 (suggesting that rule of lenity has constitutional underpinnings rooted in due process notions of “fair warning”). “[Bjefore a man can be punished as a criminal under the Federal law his case must be ‘plainly and unmistakably’ within the provisions of some statute.” United States v. Plaza…
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. American Insurance
See also Morton Int’l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins., 134 N.J. 1, 75 , 629 A.2d 831 , cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1245 , 114 S.Ct. 2764 , 129 L.Ed.2d 878 (1994).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Marbley v. Bane
Such a reading would be contrary to the “presumption against construing a statute as containing superfluous or meaningless words or giving it a construction that would render it ineffective.” United States v. Blasius, 397 F.2d 203 , 207 n. 9 (2d Cir.1968), cert. granted, 393 U.S. 950 , 89 S.Ct. 375 , 21 L.Ed.2d 361 (1968), and cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 1008 , 89 S.Ct. 615 , 21 L.Ed.2d 557 (1969); see also United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 646 (2d Cir.1993) (“It is elemental that congress does not add unnecessary words to statutes.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Marbley v. Bane
Such a reading would be contrary to the "presumption against construing a statute as containing superfluous or meaningless words or giving it a construction that would render it ineffective." United States v. Blasius, 397 F.2d 203 , 207 n. 9 (2d Cir.1968), cert. granted, 393 U.S. 950 , 89 S.Ct. 375 , 21 L.Ed.2d 361 (1968), and cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 1008 , 89 S.Ct. 615 , 21 L.Ed.2d 557 (1969); see also United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 646 (2d Cir.1993) ("It is elemental that congress does not add unnecessary words to statutes."), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
NCR Corp.
v.
South Carolina Department of Revenue and Taxation
v.
South Carolina Department of Revenue and Taxation
No. 93-1416.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jun 27, 1994.
Published
Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.