green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
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“under the , this court may not grant the instant petition unless we find that the state court unreasonably applied the principles underlying the jackson standard when reviewing petitioner's claim.”
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Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Copeland v. Walker
under the , this court may not grant the instant petition unless we find that the state court unreasonably applied the principles underlying the jackson standard when reviewing petitioner's claim.
discussed
Cited "see"
Hargrave-Thomas v. Yukins
(2×)
See Welch, 49 F.Supp.2d at 1000 & n. 2 (discussing Gomez v. Acevedo, 106 F.3d 192, 193-94 (7th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 522 U.S. 801 , 118 S.Ct. 37 , 139 L.Ed.2d 6 (1997)).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States Ex Rel. Jones v. Chrans
See Gomez v. Acevedo, 106 F.3d 192, 196 (7th Cir.1997) (citing People v. Coleman, 168 Ill.2d 509 , 214 Ill.Dec. 212 , 660 N.E.2d 919, 927 (1995), vacated on other grounds, 522 U.S. 801 , 118 S.Ct. 37 , 139 L.Ed.2d 6 (1998)).
cited
Cited "see"
Piaskowski v. Casperson
See Gomez v. Acevedo, 106 F.3d 192, 200 (7th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 522 U.S. 801 , 118 S.Ct. 37 , 139 L.Ed.2d 6 (1997).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States ex rel. Smith v. Washington
See Pitsonbarger v. Gramley, 103 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that petitioner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Section 2254(e)(2) on whether his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a fitness hearing), judgment vacated ,—U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 37 , 139 L.Ed.2d 6 (1997) (vacating judgment because the court retroactively applied the amended statute); Burris, 116 F.3d at 258 .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Donald L. Jackson v. Al C. Parke
See also Pitsonbarger v. Gramley, 103 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.1996), vacated on other grounds, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 37 , 139 L.Ed.2d 6 (1997) (district court's refusal to strike a juror for cause, causing defendant to use a peremptory challenge, did not violate the Sixth Amendment). 11 In this case, Jackson does not contend that the jury that convicted him was biased and partial.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Smith v. Sullivan
Carter, 110 F.3d at 1108 (characterizing this standard of review as “akin to the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard”); see also Pitsonbarger v. Gramley, 103 F.3d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir.1996) (federal habeas court’s review of mixed questions of law and fact is “[i]n a sense” de novo, but *212 the question the court must answer is “whether the state court ‘unreasonably’ applied clearly established federal law as the Supreme Court has determined it”), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 37 , 139 L.Ed.2d 6 (1997).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Dwight B.
v.
Jerry Lynn C.
v.
Jerry Lynn C.
No. A-185 (97-5685).
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 6, 1997.
Published
Citer courts: E.D. New York (1)
Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Application for stay, addressed to Justice Ginsburg and referred to the Court, denied.