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Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
6.7 score
“evidence is not 'suppressed' if the defendant either knew or should have known of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence.”
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983
2004
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 36 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "but see"
United States v. Gordon Pennell
(2×)
But see United States v. Burns, 684 F.2d 1066, 1077 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983).
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
State v. Todden
evidence is not 'suppressed' if the defendant either knew or should have known of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Potts v. State
Hence, there is no misbehavior to be deterred, and the interest in maintaining judicial integrity is not implicated____” Id. at 1074.
discussed
Cited "see"
Carter v. United States
See id. [3] What appears to be a less stringent test is found in Smith, supra, which includes the following elements: [I]mmunity must be properly sought in the district court; the defense witness must be available to testify; the proffered testimony must be clearly exculpatory; the testimony must be essential; and there must be no strong governmental interests which countervail against a grant of immunity. 615 F.2d at 972 .
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Taylor
See United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 616 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983). 2.
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Taylor
See United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 616 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983). 2.
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Alex Simmons
See United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 617 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Simmons
See United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 617 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Anthony Indelicato
(2×)
See United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 616-17 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983); United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 53-55 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 , 101 S.Ct. 3109 , 69 L.Ed.2d 971 (1981).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Adegbite
See United States v. Bums, 684 F.2d 1066, 1075-76 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. J. Michael Robilotto, Louis D. Spagnola and Anthony v. Civitello, Defendants
See United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 617 (2d Cir.1982) (section 1962(c) “does not require that predicate acts be in furtherance of the enterprise”), cer t. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983); see also United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 , 103 S.Ct. 492 , 74 L.Ed.2d 634 (1982); cf. United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1332-33 (5th Cir.1983) (adding requirement that predicate acts had some effect on the enterprise), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 , 104 S.Ct. 996 , 79 L.Ed.2d 229 (1984).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Pietro Tussa, Rajan Patiwana, Pietro Amato, and Paolo Zummo, Defendants
However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and acknowledging that the jury was free to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, see United States v. Carson, 702 F.2d 351, 361 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1108 , 103 S.Ct. 2456 , 2457, 77 L.Ed.2d 1335 (1983), we cannot conclude that no “rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime[s] charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); see United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 616 (2d Cir.1982), cert…
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Schwimmer
See United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 618 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Ira Paul Citron
See United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 616 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Santoro
See United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 618 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. William A. McLaughlin
See United States v. Burns, 684 F.2d 1066, 1075-76 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. James Chitty
See United States v. Burns, 684 F.2d 1066, 1077 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983); United States v. Turkish, supra, 623 F.2d at 776-78 .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Mark Daniel Byerly v. The State of Wyoming
We agree. [¶40] “The essence of Brady is the discovery of information after the trial, which was known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense during the trial.” Davis, ¶ 22, 406 P.3d at 1238 (quoting Thomas v. State, 2006 WY 34, ¶ 16 , 131 P.3d 348, 353 (Wyo. 2006)) (emphasis in original); see also Relish v. State, 860 P.2d 455, 459 (Wyo. 1993) (“Evidence is not ‘suppressed’ if the defendant either knew or should have known of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence.”) (quoting United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 618 (2d Cir.1982…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
James v. State
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 , 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97 .” Hendrix v. State, 589 So.2d 769, 770 (Ala.Crim.App.1991). “ ‘There is no Brady violation where the information in question could have been obtained by the defense through its own efforts.’ Johnson [v. State], 612 So.2d [1288] at 1294 [ (Ala.Crim.App.1992) ]; see also Jackson v. State, 674 So.2d 1318 (Ala.Cr.App.1993), aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala.1995). ‘ “Evidence is not ‘suppressed’ if the defendant either knew ... or should have known ... of the essential facts permitting him to take ad…
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Skakel
Ed. 2d 954 (2001); see also United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 618 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S. Ct. 823 , 74 L.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Flowers v. State
Thus, the appellant could have obtained all of the evidence in question by exercising due diligence. `There is no Brady violation where the information in question could have been obtained by the defense through its own efforts.' Johnson , 612 So.2d at 1294 ; see also Jackson v. State , 674 So.2d 1318 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala. 1995). `"Evidence is not `suppressed' if the defendant either knew . . . or should have known . . . of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence." United States v. LeR…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Flowers v. State
Thus, the appellant could have obtained all of the evidence in question by exercising due diligence. ‘There is no Brady violation where the information in question could have been obtained by the defense through its own efforts.’ Johnson, 612 So.2d at 1294 ; see also Jackson v. State, 674 So.2d 1318 (Ala.Cr.App.1993), aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala.1995). ‘ “Evidence is not ‘suppressed’ if the defendant either knew ... or should have known ... of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence.” United Stat…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Giles v. State
As we have stated: "`There is no Brady violation where the information in question could have been obtained by the defense through its own efforts.' Johnson [v. State ], 612 So.2d [1288] at 1294 [(Ala.Crim.App. 1992)]; see also Jackson v. State , 674 So.2d 1318 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala. 1995). `"Evidence is not `suppressed' if the defendant either knew . . . or should have known . . . of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence." United States v. LeRoy , 687 F.2d 610 , 618 (2d Cir. 1982)[, …
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Jenkins v. State
Moreover, any evidence about Jenkins's childhood that he alleges was withheld was information within his knowledge. "`There is no Brady violation where the information in question could have been obtained by the defense through its own efforts.' Johnson [v. State ], 612 So.2d [1288] at 1294 [(Ala.Crim.App.1992)]; see also Jackson v. State, 674 So.2d 1318 (Ala.Cr.App.1993), aff'd in part and rev'd *158 in part on other grounds, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala.1995). `"Evidence is not `suppressed' if the defendant either knew . . . or should have known . . . of the essential facts permitting him to take adv…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Waldrop v. State
Thus, the appellant could have obtained all of the evidence in question by exercising due diligence. `There is no Brady violation where the information in question could have been obtained by the defense through its own efforts.' Johnson, 612 So.2d at 1294 ; see also Jackson v. State, 674 So.2d 1318 (Ala.Cr.App.1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 674 So.2d 1365 (Ala.1994). `"Evidence is not `suppressed' if the defendant either knew... or should have known ... of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence." United States v. LeRoy, 687 F…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Guastella
See, e.g., United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 619 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983); United States v. Polanco, No. 97 Cr. 106, 1997 WL 452389 at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Magnotta v. Berry
“The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.” Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109-10 , 96 S.Ct. at 2400 ; see also United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 619 (2d Cir.1982) (“The rationale underlying Brady is not to supply a defendant with all the evidence in the Government’s possession which might conceivably *918 assist the preparation of his defense, but to assure that the defendant will not be denied access to exculpatory evidence only …
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639
See also United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 616-17 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983); United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 , 103 S.Ct. 492 , 74 L.Ed.2d 634 (1982).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639 James F. Woodward v. Michael Dipalermo Maria Triggs, Secretary/treasurer, Yellow Bus Lines
See also United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 616-17 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983); United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 , 103 S.Ct. 492 , 74 L.Ed.2d 634 (1982). 29 We do not necessarily dispute the Second Circuit's views about what section 1962(c) does not require.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Barbara Eunice Carrasco, United States of America v. Barbara Eunice Carrasco and German Rivera-Jiminez
Advisory committee note, supra, at 4; accord United States v. McHugh, 583 F.Supp. 290, 293-94 (D.R.I.1984); see also United States v. Burns, 684 F.2d 1066, 1071 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Thomas Streifel, and Daniel J. Quinn
See, e.g., United States v. Burns, 684 F.2d 1066, 1074 (2d Cir.1982) ("[Fourth amendment] [cjases refusing to apply decisions retroactively have generally involved good faith searches by police officers that later became plainly unconstitutional under intervening Supreme Court decisions.”), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983). 13 .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Kalevas
B. [47] See United States v. Shakur, 543 F.Supp. 1059, 1061 (S.D.N.Y.1982); see also United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 619 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983); United States v. Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599, 604 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 , 93 S.Ct. 2772 , 37 L.Ed.2d 398 (1973). [48] See United States v. Chitty, 760 F.2d 425, 428-29 (2d Cir.1985); see also Perkins v. LeFevre, 691 F.2d 616, 619-20 (2d Cir.1982); United States v. Seijo, 514 F.2d 1357, 1363-65 (2d Cir.1975). [49] 273 U.S. 77, 80-81 , 47 S.Ct. 300, 301-02 , 71 L.Ed. 545 (1927…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Kalevas
See United States v. Shakur, 543 F.Supp. 1059, 1061 (S.D.N.Y.1982); see also United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 619 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983); United States v. Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599, 604 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 , 93 S.Ct. 2772 , 37 L.Ed.2d 398 (1973). .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Odinga
The Sixth Amendment does not compel immunity for defense witnesses and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is not “a general requirement that defense witness immunity must be ordered whenever it seems fair to grant it.” United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 777 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 [ 101 S.Ct. 856 , 66 L.Ed.2d 800 ] (1981); see also United States v. Burns, 684 F.2d 1066, 1077 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, [— U.S. —] 103 S.Ct. 823 [ 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 ] (1983).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Calvente
The Sixth Amendment does not compel immunity for defense witnesses and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is not “a general requirement that defense witness immunity must be ordered whenever it seems fair to grant it.” United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 777 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 , 101 S.Ct. 856 , 66 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981); see also United States v. Burns, 684 F.2d 1066, 1077 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Jose Calvente
The Sixth Amendment does not compel immunity for defense witnesses and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is not "a general requirement that defense witness immunity must be ordered whenever it seems fair to grant it." United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 777 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 , 101 S.Ct. 856 , 66 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981); see also United States v. Burns, 684 F.2d 1066, 1077 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 823 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Brake
v.
United States
v.
United States
No. 82-5483.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jan 24, 1983.
Published
Citer courts: Supreme Court of Iowa (1)
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.