green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
6.5 score
“he defendant who has wrongfully broken a contract should not be permitted to reap advantage from his own wrong by insisting on proof which by reason of his breach is unobtainable”
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984
2005
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 19 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Meadowbrook Center, Inc. v. Buchman
he defendant who has wrongfully broken a contract should not be permitted to reap advantage from his own wrong by insisting on proof which by reason of his breach is unobtainable
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Houston
See Case, 884 P.2d at 1277 & n. 5 (emphasizing that only the originating officer is required to have reasonable suspicion and that the second officer may accept the information "at face value"). ¶19 In State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 , 104 S.Ct. 241 , 78 L.Ed.2d 231 (1983), the Utah Supreme Court upheld a level two traffic stop under similar cireumstances.
cited
Cited "see"
Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc.
See Jay Edwards, Inc. v. New England Toyota Distrib., Inc., 708 F.2d 814, 821 (1st Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 , 104 S.Ct. 241 , 78 L.Ed.2d 231 (1983); Computer Sys.
discussed
Cited "see"
Serpa Corp. v. McWane, Inc.
See generally, Jay Edwards Inc. v. New England Toyota Distributor, Inc., 708 F.2d 814 (1st Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 , 104 S.Ct. 241 , 78 L.Ed.2d 231 (1983). 3 The mere fact that a plaintiffs rivals merge to the detriment of a competitor does not alone grant the competitor standing.
cited
Cited "see"
Sign-A-Way, Inc. v. Mechtronics Corp.
See Jay Edwards, Inc. v. New England Toyota Distrib., Inc., 708 F.2d 814, 819 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 , 104 S.Ct. 241 , 78 L.Ed.2d 231 (1983).
discussed
Cited "see"
Medina v. Town and Country Ford, Inc.
(2×)
See Kerr v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 735 F.2d 281 (8th Cir.1984) and Jay Edwards, Inc. v. New England Toyota Distributor, 708 F.2d 814 (1st Cir.) cert. denied 464 U.S. 894 , 104 S.Ct. 241 , 78 L.Ed.2d 231 (1983).
discussed
Cited "see"
Stamps v. Ford Motor Co.
Even if a defendant can be termed a manufacturer, it cannot be held directly liable unless it is a party to the franchise agreement. 15 U.S.C. § 1221 (b); see Olson Motor Co. v. General Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 284 , 287 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 , 104 S.Ct. 240 , 78 L.Ed.2d 231 (1983); York Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 447 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir. 1971); Bonnano v. Chrysler Corp., 603 F.Supp. 832, 835 (S.D.Ohio 1985).
cited
Cited "see"
Cottrell v. Candy Workers Union, Local 342
See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 , 96 S.Ct. 1048 , 78 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 , 87 S.Ct. 903 , 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967).
discussed
Cited "see"
Falcon v. General Telephone Co. of Southwest
Id. at 832-33 ; see abo Wheeler v. City of Columbus, 703 F.2d 853 , 855 (5th Cir.1983) ("Discrimination in its broadest sense is the only question alleged that is common to Wheeler and the class she sought to create and represent.”) In Everitt v. City of Marshall, 703 F.2d 207 (5th Cir.), cert. denied [- U.S. -] 104 S.Ct. 241 [ 78 L.Ed.2d 231 ] (1983), this court concluded that the named plaintiffs discrimination claims lacked a sufficient nexus with those of the proposed class.
discussed
Cited "see"
Bonnano v. Chrysler Corp.
See Olson Motor Co. v. General Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 284 , 287 n. 3 (8th Cir.1983), cert. den., — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 240 , 78 L.Ed.2d 231 (1983); DeValk Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 550 F.Supp. 1199 (N.D.Ill.1982).
discussed
Cited "see"
Wahsner v. American Motors Sales Corp.
See Olson Motor Co. v. General Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 284 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 240 , 78 L.Ed.2d 231 (1983) (question of release’s validity submitted to jury); Fabert Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F.2d 888 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 939 , 86 S.Ct. 1462 , 16 L.Ed.2d 539 (1966) (plaintiff acted with counsel’s advice and negotiations concerning plaintiff’s resignation and the release were conducted over a period of months during which several offers and counter offers were made); Schmitt-Norton Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 524 F.Supp. 1099 (D.Minn.198…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Cargill, Inc. v. Sears Petroleum & Transport Corp.
Compare Jay Edwards Inc. v. New England Toyota Dis tributor, Inc., 708 F.2d 814, 821-22 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 , 104 S.Ct. 241 , 78 L.Ed.2d 231 (1983) (defendant could not object to jury’s reasonable interpretation of plaintiffs damages evidence after the fact when it could have come forward with its own evidence) with Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 142-45 (2d Cir.1998) (allowing remand for recalculation of damages when district court based calculation on unforeseen theory and neither party had opportunity to present evidence; distinguishing situation where a party o…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Pearson v. Ford Motor Co.
See, e.g., Olson Motor Co. v. General Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 284, 289 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 , 104 S.Ct. 240 , 78 L.Ed.2d 231 (1983) (sole stockholder of corporate dealership who had personally guaranteed corporate obligations lacked standing); Sherman v. British Leyland Motors, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429, 439 (9th Cir.1979) (sole stockholder of corporate dealership who had personally guaranteed corporate obligations lacked standing); Vincel v. White Motor Corp., 521 F.2d 1113, 1120 (2nd Cir.1975) (‘When, as here, a dealership is doing business in corporate form, the statute contains…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Schott Motorcycle Supply, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Company, Inc.
See Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 381 Mass. 284 , 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1378 (Mass.1980) (oral representations are relevant to issue of good or bad faith under the Uniform Commercial Code even if the representations cannot be used to vary terms of written agreement); see also Jay Edwards, Inc. v. New England Toyota Distributor, Inc., 708 F.2d 814, 817-19 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 , 104 S.Ct. 241 , 78 L.Ed.2d 231 (1983) (distributor’s alleged harassment of dealer, including wrongful accusations and lies, presented jury issue as to whether distributor had engaged in conduct which is arb…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Larsen v. A.C. Carpenter, Inc.
See, e.g., Jay Edwards, Inc. v. New England Toyota Distributor, Inc., 708 F.2d 814 , 820 n. 4 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 , 104 S.Ct. 241 , 78 L.Ed.2d 231 (1983) (“[T]he bulk of plaintiff’s evidence came from ...
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Chancellor
See also State v. Gibson, Utah, 665 P.2d 1302 (1983), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 241 , 78 L.Ed.2d 231 (1983).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
K-B Trucking Company and Keith Collins, Cross-Appellants v. Riss International Corporation and World Leasing, Inc., Cross-Appellees
See, e.g., Jay Edwards, Inc. v. New England Toyota Distributor, Inc., 708 F.2d 814, 823 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S. - — ~, 104 S.Ct. 241 , 78 L.Ed.2d 231 (1983); see generally 1 J.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank
Id at 832-33; see also Wheeler v. City of Columbus, 703 F.2d 853 , 855 (5th Cir.1983) (“Discrimination in its broadest sense is the only question alleged that is common to Wheeler and the class she sought to create and represent.”) In Everitt v. City of Marshall, 703 F.2d 207 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 104 S.Ct. 241 , 78 L.Ed.2d 231 (1983), this court concluded that the named plaintiff’s discrimination claims lacked a sufficient nexus with those of the proposed class.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
33 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1521, 33 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,160 Joan Rance Vuyanich, Cross-Appellant, and Marisu Fenton, Intervenor-Appellee, Marjorie Lee Jackson and Dorothy Hooks, Intervenors-Appellants, and Portia Williams and Martha Davis, Movants-Appellants v. Republic National Bank of Dallas, Cross-Appellee. Ellen Johnson, Cross-Appellant v. Republic National Bank of Dallas, Cross-Appellee
Id. at 832-33 ; see also Wheeler v. City of Columbus, 703 F.2d 853 , 855 (5th Cir.1983) ("Discrimination in its broadest sense is the only question alleged that is common to Wheeler and the class she sought to create and represent.") In Everitt v. City of Marshall, 703 F.2d 207 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 241 , 78 L.Ed.2d 231 (1983), this court concluded that the named plaintiff's discrimination claims lacked a sufficient nexus with those of the proposed class.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Gibson
v.
Utah
v.
Utah
No. 83-250.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 11, 1983.
Published
Citer courts: Connecticut Appellate Court (1)
Sup. Ct. Utah. Certiorari denied.