green
Positive treatment
6.6 score
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984
2005
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 15 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
cited
Cited "see"
Steven Charles Landrum v. State
See Clayton v. State, 652 S.W.2d 950, 956 (Tex.Cr.App 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1046 , 104 S.Ct. 719 , 79 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984).
cited
Cited "see"
Steven Charles Landrum v. State
See Clayton v. State, 652 S.W.2d 950, 956 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1046 , 104 S.Ct. 719 , 79 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984).
cited
Cited "see"
Steven Charles Landrum v. State
See Clayton v. State, 652 S.W.2d 950, 956 (Tex.Cr.App 1983), cert. denied , 464 U.S. 1046 , 104 S.Ct. 719 , 79 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984).
discussed
Cited "see"
Crum v. State
(2×)
See Clayton v. State, 652 S.W.2d 950, 956 (Tex.Crim.App.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1046 , 104 S.Ct. 719 , 79 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Brian John Tibesar
To challenge for cause, a party must show "actual partiality growing out of the nature and circumstances of [the] particular case[ ]." United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 149 , 57 S.Ct. 177, 186 , 81 L.Ed. 78 (1936); see Rogers v. Rulo, 712 F.2d 363 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1046 , 104 S.Ct. 719 , 79 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984) (court rejected a per se theory of implied bias and required that actual prejudice be shown).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Aguilar
See United States v. Stearns, 707 F.2d 391 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047 , 104 S.Ct. 720 , 79 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984). 13 26 In the present case, however, we are compelled to conclude that the complexities of the claimed due diligence exception are not properly before us, and for that reason we must delay our construction of its scope and validity for a later occasion. 27 Whatever its legitimate application, the burden of proving the due diligence exception falls certainly upon the government.
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Aguilar
See United States v. Stearns, 707 F.2d 391 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047 , 104 S.Ct. 720 , 79 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984). 13 In the present case, however, we are compelled to conclude that the complexities of the claimed due diligence exception are not properly before us, and for that reason we must delay our construction of its scope and validity for a later occasion.
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Wilfredo Cejas, Jr.
See United States v. Stearns, 707 F.2d 391, 394 (9th Cir.1983), aff'g 546 F.Supp. 805 (D.Hawaii 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047 , 104 S.Ct. 720 , 79 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984).
discussed
Cited "see"
Dancy v. State
(2×)
See Clayton v. State, 652 S.W.2d 950, 954, 955 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), U.S. cert. den., 464 U.S. 1046 , 104 S.Ct. 719 , 79 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984); Brooks v. State, supra, at 797; Ellerbee v. State, 631 S.W.2d 480 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) (opinion on rehearing) and cases there cited.
discussed
Cited "see"
Higgins v. Hicks Co.
(2×)
See Rogers v. Rulo, 712 F.2d 363, 367 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 719 , 79 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984).
discussed
Cited "see"
Linda Higgins, as Trustee for the Heirs and Next of Kin of Steven Martinez, and as Personal Representative for the Estate of Steven Martinez, Decedent v. The Hicks Company and the State of South Dakota, Mallard Teal v. The Hicks Company and the State of South Dakota
(2×)
See Rogers v. Rulo, 712 F.2d 363, 367 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 719 , 79 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Michael Rabb
See Weathersby v. Morris, 708 F.2d 1493 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 719 , 79 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984).
cited
Cited "see"
James David Irons v. A.L. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Dept. Of Corrections
See Rogers v. Rulo, 712 F.2d 363, 367 (8th Cir.1983), cert, denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 719 , 79 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States Ex Rel. Allen v. Hardy
United States v. Cotton, 721 F.2d 350, 352-53 (11th Cir.1983), ce rt. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1614 (1984); Willis, 720 F.2d at 1217-21 ; Childress, 715 F.2d at 1320-21 ; United States v. Whitfield, 715 F.2d 145, 146-47 (4th Cir.1983); United States v. Canel, 708 F.2d 894, 898 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 165 -66, 78 L.Ed.2d 151 (1983); United States v. Jenkins, 701 F.2d 850, 859-60 (10th Cir.1983); see Weathersby v. Morris, 708 F.2d 1493 , 1496-97 & n. 2 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 719 , 79 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984). 3.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Levasseur
The simple fact is that the dismissal of the previous indictment under these circumstances does not insulate the facts from further exploration and use.” United States v. Rivero, 532 F.2d 450, 457 (5th Cir.1976); see also United States v. Stearns, 707 F.2d 391, 394 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that the dismissal of defendants’ theft charge after the vacation of defendants’ theft conviction had no collateral es-toppel effect on the issue of whether a theft was committed in defendants’ felony murder trial), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047 , 104 S.Ct. 720 , 79 L.Ed.2d 181 , 79 L.Ed.2d 182 (1984).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Clayton
v.
Texas
v.
Texas
No. 83-5437.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jan 9, 1984.
Cited by 2 opinions | Published
Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.