Maine v. Thibodeau, 475 U.S. 1144 (1986). · Go Syfert
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Maine v. Thibodeau, 475 U.S. 1144 (1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 1 distinct case · “[W]hile Mattheson complains that counsel failed to exercise any peremptory challenges, Mattheson does not identify the juror or jurors that should have been removed by counsel, nor alleges that any were unfavorably disposed to Mattheson.”
cited 3× by 1 distinct case · “Plain error is obvious and substantial error that affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
cited 3× by 1 distinct case · “There is no doubt that the district court must make an independent evaluation of whether the named plaintiffs were adequate representatives of the class-”
127 citation events (31 in the last 25 years) across 32 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Prezant v. De Angelis (del, 1994-02-03)
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 33 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Prezant v. De Angelis
Del. · 1994 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
there is no doubt that the district court must make an independent evaluation of whether the named plaintiffs were adequate representatives of the class-
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. Anthony Ray Jefferson and Roosevelt Jefferson, Jr.
10th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
plain error is obvious and substantial error that affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. Delbert Taylor
10th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
hile mattheson complains that counsel failed to exercise any peremptory challenges, mattheson does not identify the juror or jurors that should have been removed by counsel, nor alleges that any were unfavorably disposed to mattheson.
cited Cited as authority (rule) TATES, ELIJAH v. the State of Texas
Tex. Crim. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Filed: July 2, 2025 Publish 19 See Maine v. Thibodeau, 475 U.S. 1144, 1146 (1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. O. Flores-Sandoval
8th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
A custodial interrogation is defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way." Maine v. Thibodeau, 475 U.S. 1144, 1146 (1986), quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (1966).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Tally
Mo. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
The Werner court cautioned that this list is “not exhaustive,” Id. (citing Maine v. Thibodeau, 475 U.S. 1144, 1146 , 106 S.Ct. 1799, 1800-01 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343, 345-46 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)), adding that in “examining the totality of the circumstances, courts may also consider an individual’s personal background, experience, familiarity with police questioning, maturity, education, and intelligence.” Id. at 595-96 (citing United States v. Zahrey, 963 F.Supp. 1273, 1278 (E.D.N.Y.1997)).
cited Cited "see" Dale v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.
Mo. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Malchman v. Davis, 761 F.2d 893 (2nd Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143 , 106 S.Ct. 1798 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986); Fischer v. Int’l Tel. & Tel.
examined Cited "see" State v. Londagin (3×)
Mo. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Maine v. Thibodeau, 475 U.S. 1144, 1146 , 106 S.Ct. 1799 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986).
examined Cited "see" State v. Werner (3×)
Mo. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Maine v. Thibodeau, 475 U.S. 1144, 1146 , 106 S.Ct. 1799 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986).
discussed Cited "see" Matter of Skinner Group, Inc.
Bankr. N.D. Ga. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Malchman v. Davis, 761 F.2d 893, 906-08 (2d Cir.1985) (Newman, J., concurring), ce rt. denied, 475 U.S. 1143 , 106 S.Ct. 1798 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986) ("It is unlikely that a defendant will gratuitously accede to the plaintiffs’ request for a ‘clear sailing' clause without obtaining something in return.
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Crop Growers Corp.
D.D.C. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Guzman, 781 F.2d 428, 432-33 (5th Cir.1986) (per curiam), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143 , 106 S.Ct. 1798 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986); United States v. Bennett, 702 F.2d 833 (9th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Loving
C.A.A.F. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mattheson v. King, 751 F.2d 1432 (5th Cir.1985) (rejecting a post-trial attack on counsel’s performance where appellant did not tell counsel he was intoxicated at the time of the offense), cert. dismissed, 475 U.S. 1138, 106 S.Ct. 1798 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986); Bertolotti v. Dugger, 883 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir.1989) (counsel not ineffective where he failed to raise voluntary intoxication defense to murder where defendant told police that he lied about his intoxication and where evidence of intoxication was not sufficient), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031 , 110 S.Ct. 3296 , 111 L.Ed.2d 804 (1990).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Powell
cma · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Matheson v. King, 751 F.2d 1432, 1440 (5th Cir. 1985) (counsel not deficient for failing to raise intoxication defense where appellant did not tell counsel he was intoxicated at time of offense), cert. dismissed as moot, 475 U.S. 1138 , 106 S.Ct. 1798 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986); Bertolotti v. Dugger, 883 F.2d 1503, 1520 (11th Cir.1989) (counsel not deficient for failing to raise intoxication defense where defendant told police he lied about his intoxication), cer t. denied, 497 U.S. 1032 , 110 S.Ct. 3296 , 111 L.Ed.2d 804 (1990).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Antonio Martinez-Cortez (2×)
5th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.032, 481.102, 481.115 (Vernon 1992) 3 See 18 U.S.C.S. § 924 (e)(2)(A)(ii) 4 United States v. Vidaure, 861 F.2d 1337, 1338 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1088 , 109 S.Ct. 1551 , 103 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989); see United States v. Silva, 957 F.2d 157, 161 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 250 , 121 L.Ed.2d 182 (1992) 5 United States v. Lopez, 923 F.2d 47, 49 (5th Cir.) (citing United States v. Brunson, 915 F.2d 942, 944 (5th Cir.1990)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2032 , 114 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991) 6 Id. at 50 (citing United States v. G…
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Mavroules
D. Mass. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Guzman, 781 F.2d 428, 432-33 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143 , 106 S.Ct. 1798 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986) (false statements, made in separate documents, constitute separate crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 ).
discussed Cited "see" Markham Duff-Smith v. James A. Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division
5th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mattheson v. King, 751 F.2d 1432 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1138 , 106 S.Ct. 1798 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986); United States v. Jones, 712 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.1983). 25 . 474 U.S. 159 , 106 S.Ct. 477 , 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). 26 . 377 U.S. 201 , 84 S.Ct. 1199 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). 27 . 473 U.S. 667 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (failure of the state to reveal favorable information such as inducements may violate due process). 28 .
discussed Cited "see" William L. Wiley v. Steve W. Puckett, Superintendent, Mississippi State Penitentiary, and Mike Moore, Attorney General
5th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mattheson v. King, 751 F.2d 1432, 1445-46 (5th Cir.1985) (prosecutor’s reference to victim’s head as having been blown off and into the ceiling did not render trial unfair, in light of evidence at trial), cert. dism’d, 475 U.S. 1138 , 106 S.Ct. 1798 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986).
cited Cited "see" Permian Petroleum Company v. Petroleos Mexicanos, A/K/A Pemex, Permian Petroleum Company, Dallas International Bank, Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellee v. Petroleos Mexicanos, A/K/A Pemex, Defendant-Appellant-Appellee
5th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Guzman, 781 F.2d 428, 431-32 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143 , 106 S.Ct. 1798 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986).
cited Cited "see" Permian Petroleum Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos
5th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Guzman, 781 F.2d 428, 431-32 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143 , 106 S.Ct. 1798 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986).
cited Cited "see" William Weinberger v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp.
1st Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Malchman v. Davis, 761 F.2d 893 , 906-08 (2d Cir.1985) (Newman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143 , 106 S.Ct. 1798 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986); In re WICAT Secur.
discussed Cited "see" United States v. John v. Capozzi
8th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mattheson v. King, 751 F.2d 1432 (5th Cir.1985), cert. dismissed, 475 U.S. 1138 , 106 S.Ct. 1798 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986); Pennell, 737 F.2d at 527 ; United States v. Hunter, 672 F.2d 815, 818 (10th Cir.1982); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 639-40 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 , 103 S.Ct. 57 , 74 L.Ed.2d 61 (1982); United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.1980); Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Juan Francisco Valdez
5th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Guzman, 781 F.2d 428, 432 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143 , 106 S.Ct. 1798 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986); United States v. Berkowitz, 662 F.2d 1127, 1136 (5th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited "see" Jimmy L. Glass v. Frank Blackburn, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, Louisiana
5th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mattheson v. King, 751 F.2d 1432 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied as moot, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1798 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986); Celestine v. Blackburn, 750 F.2d 353 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 3490 , 87 L.Ed.2d 624 , reh’g denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 16 , 87 L.Ed.2d 695 (1985); Willie v. Maggio, 737 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir.1984). 4.
examined Cited "see, e.g." A.M., a Minor v. Jerry Butler, Superintendent of the Illinois Youth Center (3×)
7th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Maine v. Thibodeau, 475 U.S. 1144, 1146 , 106 S.Ct. 1799 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986). 26 With that in mind, the following is the full extent of the Illinois court's discussion on whether Morgan was in custody: 27 In deciding whether an interrogation was custodial for Miranda purposes, the trial court must first evaluate evidence and weigh the testimony of the witnesses to determine: "the location, length, mood, and mode of the interrogation; the number of police officers present; and indicia of formal arrest or evidence of restraint; the intentions of the officers; and the extent of the …
cited Cited "see, e.g." M., A. v. Butler, Jerry
7th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also, Maine v. Thibodeau, 475 U.S. 1144, 1146 (1986).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. James Oscar Cooper
5th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 781 F.2d 428, 432 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (concluding that false name on two different documents in same transaction constitutes two separate offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 , which prohibits the knowing and willful false representation of material fact to a United States agency), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143 , 106 S.Ct. 1798 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986); United States v. McDonald, 692 F.2d. 376, 378 (5th Cir.1982) (finding that two separate physical deliveries of a controlled substance on two different days, all part of a single financial scheme involving the sa…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Woody F. Lemons
5th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
“Moreover, ‘[wjhether a continuous transaction results in the commission of but a single offense or separate offenses ... is determined by whether separate and distinct prohibited acts, made punishable by law, have been committed.’ ” Id. at 1536 (quoting United States v. Shaid, 730 F.2d 225, 231 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 844 , 105 S.Ct. 151 , 83 L.Ed.2d 89 (1984)); see also United States v. Guzman, 781 F.2d 428, 432 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143 , 106 S.Ct. 1798 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Willie Albert Smith v. Lee Roy Black, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections
5th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Mattheson v. King, 751 F.2d 1432, 1445-46 (5th Cir.1985), cert. dismissed as moot, 475 U.S. 1138 , 106 S.Ct. 1798 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986); Whittington v. Estelle, 704 F.2d 1418, 1423 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 , 104 S.Ct. 428 , 78 L.Ed.2d 361 (1983); Tijerina v. Estelle, 692 F.2d 3, 7 (5th Cir.1982).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Mokhiber v. Davis (2×)
D.C. · 1988 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d 426 (2d Cir.1983), on remand, 588 F.Supp. 1047 (S.D.N.Y.1984), aff'd as modified, 761 F.2d 893 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143 , 106 S.Ct. 1798 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." David Earl Wilson v. Robert H. Butler, Sr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, Louisiana
5th Cir. · 1987 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare with Mattheson v. King, 751 F.2d 1432, 1441 (5th Cir.1985), cert. dismissed, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1798 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986); Willie v. Maggio, 737 F.2d at 1394 . . 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 546 , 88 L.Ed.2d 475 (1985). . 793 F.2d 672, 676-77 (5th Cir.), stay granted, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 37 , 92 L.Ed.2d 789 (1986).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Bridges (2×)
Me. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Maine v. Thibodeau, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1799 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of cert.), and State v. Gardner, 509 A.2d 1160 (Me.1986).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Leon Rutherford King v. O.L. McCotter Director, Texas Department of Corrections
5th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Mattheson v. King, 751 F.2d *518 1432, 1435 n. 5 (5th Cir.1985) (“in a capital case it is essential that a district court set forth those specific findings of fact and conclusions of law that underlie its ultimate disposition of the case”), cert. dismissed, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 1798 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986); Willie v. Maggio, 737 F.2d 1372, 1377 (5th Cir.1984) (“More important, however, particularly in a capital ease, is the requirement that the district court set forth ... those specific findings of fact and conclusions of law that underlie its ultimate conclusion to grant …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JAMES OSCAR COOPER
unknown court · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 781 F.2d 428, 432 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (concluding that false name on two different documents in same transaction constitutes two separate offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 , which prohibits the knowing and willful false representation of material fact to a United States agency), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143 , 106 S.Ct. 1798 , 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986); United States v. McDonald, 692 F.2d. 376, 378 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that two separate physical deliveries of a controlled substance on two different days, all part of a single financial scheme involving the s…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Maine
v.
Jay G. Thibodeau
85-744.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Apr 28, 1986.
475 U.S. 1144
Burger.
Cited by 15 opinions  |  Published
3 passages pin-cited by 3 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 67%
Citer courts: Tenth Circuit (2) · Supreme Court of Delaware (1)
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

The motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Chief Justice BURGER, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Chief Justice Burger,

dissenting.

John Tower’s brother reported him missing on October 27, 1988; his mother told police that he had last been seen taking respondent Jay Thibodeau for a test drive in his car that he had for sale. On the morning of October 28, police officers went to the Thibodeau apartment where they spoke with respondent in the presence of his parents for about 10 minutes. Respondent told police that he and Tower had gone for a test drive the previous day, after which Tower dropped him off at home.

Two police officers returned to the Thibodeau household that afternoon and asked respondent to show them the route he and Tower had taken the day before. Respondent agreed and got into the backseat of the police car, a two-door automobile. For about an hour and a half the three retraced the complicated route respondent described to the police, after which respondent was returned home. At no time did respondent ask to leave the car. At one point in the journey respondent asked if he was a suspect. The police stated that he had been the last person seen with the victim, to which respondent replied, “Well, I guess I am.”

Two days later police found John Tower’s body, shot in the head with a .22-caliber rifle. The next day, police discovered that respondent had traded in his .22-caliber rifle for another gun. Police arrested respondent on November 1. After waving his Miranda rights, respondent confessed to the killing.

At trial respondent moved to suppress his statements to the police on the morning and afternoon of October 28 on the ground that he was subjected to custodial interrogations without the necessary Miranda warnings. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the statements were “voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt” and that “the circumstances did not constitute custodial interrogation” because respondent had willingly cooperated with the police in generally noncoercive settings.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, three justices dissenting, reversed respondent’s murder conviction on the ground that the afternoon session with police constituted a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. 496 A. 2d 635 (1985). The court listed the following criteria for determining whether there had[*1145] been a custodial interrogation: (1) the locale where the statements were made; (2) the party initiating the contact; (3) the existence or nonexistence of probable cause to arrest; (4) the subjective intent of the police; (5) the subjective belief of the defendant; and (6) the focus of the investigation. Applying these factors to this case, the court noted that the officers’ suspicions had “increased dramatically since the morning” and that, although no crime had yet been detected, respondent “was the only suspect.” Id., at 639. Furthermore, a reasonable person would have felt, as did respondent, that he had no choice but to accompany the officers. Finally, by placing him in the backseat of a two-door automobile, police had deprived him of his freedom in a significant way.

This decision of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court illustrates an acute need for clarification of the proper factors to be considered in making the “in custody” determination — a clarification perhaps made necessary by our own lack of clarity as to the standards to be applied. However, four of the six factors enumerated by the Maine court have been rejected by either this Court or other state and federal courts.

(1) We plainly rejected the relevancy of the “subjective intent of the police” in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 442 (1984), where we stated “[a] policeman’s unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was ‘in custody’ at a particular time.”

(2) In Beckwith v. United States, 425 U. S. 341 (1976), we held that whether police suspicion had focused upon the defendant has no bearing whatever on the “in custody” determination: “‘If was the compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation, and not the strength or content of the government’s suspicions at the time the questioning was conducted, which led the Court to impose the Miranda requirements with regard to custodial questioning.’” Id., at 346-347 (quoting United States v. Caiello, 420 F. 2d 471, 473 (CA2 1969)). See also People v. Black, 698 P. 2d 766 (Colo. 1984) (trial court erred in suppressing evidence by considering whether the police’s investigation had “focused” on the defendant). Cf. Green v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 126, 707 P. 2d 248 (1985) (lack of police suspicion dispositive).

(3) The Ninth Circuit has held that the existence of probable cause at the time of the interrogation is similarly irrelevant. See United States v. Woods, 720 F. 2d 1022 (1983).

[*1146] (4) In Berkemer we noted that “the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation.” 468 U. S., at 442. The Maine court eschewed this objective test, substituting instead the “subjective belief of the defendant.” But see State v. Willis, 145 Vt. 459, 475, 494 A. 2d 108, 116 (1985) (“Inquiring into the subjective thoughts of either the police or the defendant is likely to pervert the factfinding process in a Miranda hearing . . .”); State v. Cruz-Mata, 138 Ariz. 370, 373, 674 P. 2d 1368, 1371 (1983) (the test is not whether the defendant “felt” he or she was in custody, but rather whether objective indicia of arrest are present, including the site of the questioning, the length of the interrogation, and the method used to summon the individual); People v. Viduya, 703 P. 2d 1281, 1286 (Colo. 1985) (“We have held that this question of custody turns on an objective assessment of whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would believe himself to be deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way”). The Oregon Supreme Court espouses yet a third view, stating that the touchstone of the “in custody” determination is whether “the officer should be aware that the totality of circumstances in which the interrogation takes place is such that the person questioned would reasonably believe he is not free to leave.” State v. White, 297 Ore. 302, 310, 685 P. 2d 983, 987 (1984).

With this confusion, it is perhaps helpful to turn for guidance to the Miranda decision itself. In Miranda, the Court stated that “[b]y custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 444 (1966). As the trial court found, in this case there is no indication that the questioning took place in a context where respondent’s freedom was restricted in any significant way. Respondent voluntarily accompanied the officers. He never asked to leave. The police never told him that he was not free to leave, never used any physical restraint of any kind, never threatened him, never confronted him with any incriminating evidence, and dropped him off at home at the end of the trip. Respondent was not being coerced by the “inherently compelling pressures” of a custodial setting. See Miranda, supra, at 467. As he testified in the suppression hearing, he took police on the long road trip “to keep them off [his] track.” It was he, and not the police, who exploited the situation.[*1147] Respondent may have therefore unwisely placed himself in an uncomfortable position, but no more so than a suspect who voluntarily comes to the police station for questioning, see Beckwith, supra; Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492 (1977), or a motorist who is involuntarily detained for questioning concerning a traffic violation. See Berkemer, supra.

The- Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s rejection of the factual findings of the trial court cannot be reconciled with the decisions of this and other courts. I would grant the petition and give plenary consideration to this case.