Lormand v. Aries Marine Corp., 484 U.S. 1031 (1988). · Go Syfert
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Lormand v. Aries Marine Corp., 484 U.S. 1031 (1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“it remains the defendant's burden to show the existence and continuance of federal jurisdiction.”
106 citation events (13 in the last 25 years) across 26 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Various v. Various (paed, 2009-12-10)
Treatment trajectory · 1988 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1988 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Various v. Various
E.D. Pa. · 2009 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
it remains the defendant's burden to show the existence and continuance of federal jurisdiction.
discussed Cited "see" Balthazar v. Atlantic City Medical Center
D.N.J. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
State Office of Ct. Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir.1996); see Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch and Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir.1987) (holding that a “lack of subject matter jurisdiction voids any decree entered in a federal court and the continuation of litigation in a federal court without jurisdiction would be futile”), cert. dismissed, 484 U.S. 1021 , 108 S.Ct. 739 , 98 L.Ed.2d 756 (1988).
cited Cited "see" Fleming & Hall, Ltd. v. Cope
D. Del. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Steel Valley Authority v. Union Switch and Signal Division, 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir.1987), cert. dismissed, 484 U.S. 1021 , 108 S.Ct. 739 , 98 L.Ed.2d 756 (1988).
cited Cited "see" Gilberg v. Stepan Co.
D.N.J. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006 ,1012 n. 6 (3d Cir.1987), cert, dismissed, 484 U.S. 1021 , 108 S.Ct. 739 , 98 L.Ed.2d 756 (1988).
cited Cited "see" Moorco International, Inc. v. Elsag Bailey Process Automation
E.D. Pa. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006 , 1010 (3d Cir.1987), cert. dismissed, 484 U.S. 1021 , 108 S.Ct. 739 , 98 L.Ed.2d 756 (1988).
discussed Cited "see" Ryan v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority
D.N.J. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Steel Valley Authority v. Union Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006 , 1010-11 (3d Cir.1987), cert. dismissed, 484 U.S. 1021 , 108 S.Ct. 739 , 98 L.Ed.2d 756 (1988) (“when a nondiverse party is added to a federal proceeding and that party’s presence is indispensable to the furnishing of complete relief, remand is mandated where federal subject matter jurisdiction depends on diversity jurisdiction, even though removal was originally proper.”).
cited Cited "see" In Re Business Men's Assurance Company of America
8th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006 , 1010 (3d Cir.1987), cert. dismissed, 484 U.S. 1021 , 108 S.Ct. 739 , 98 L.Ed.2d 756 (1988).
discussed Cited "see" Steven L. Easley v. Southern Shipbuilding Corporation (2×)
5th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lormand v. Superior Oil Co., 845 F.2d 536, 540 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 1031 , 108 S.Ct. 739 , 98 L.Ed.2d 774 (1988); Barrett v. Chevron, U.S.A., 781 F.2d 1067, 1076 (5th Cir.1986). 6 If we were to analyze Easley’s assignment with respect to seaman status instead of longshoreman status, we would be forced to the same conclusion even accepting the plaintiff’s argument that he was a “regular” substitute deckhand.
discussed Cited "see" Jon C. Wilander, Cross-Appellant v. McDermott International, Inc., Cross-Appellee (2×)
5th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lormand v. Aries Marine Corporation, et al., 484 U.S. 1031 , 108 S.Ct. 739 , 98 L.Ed.2d 774 (1988) dissent by Justice White, denial of certiorari.
discussed Cited "see" The Travelers Indemnity Company v. Richard A. Dingwell, D/B/A McKin Company, (Two Cases). Appeal of Chicago Insurance Company, the Travelers Indemnity Company v. Richard A. Dingwell, D/B/A McKin Company, Appeal of American Policyholders Insurance Company, Amoco Oil Company v. Richard A. Dingwell, D/B/A McKin Company, (Three Cases). Appeal of Chicago Insurance Company, Intervenor. Appeal of the Travelers Indemnity Company, Intervenors. Appeal of American Policyholders Insurance Company, Intervenor
1st Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Steel Valley Authority v. Union Switch & Signal Division, 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir.1987), cert. dismissed, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 739 , 98 L.Ed.2d 756 (1988); Haas v. Jefferson National Bank, 442 F.2d 394, 395 (5th Cir.1971); McVay v. Western Plains Service Corp., 823 F.2d 1395, 1401 (10th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited "see" Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Dingwell
1st Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Steel Valley Authority, v. Union Switch & Signal Division, 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir.1987), cert. dismissed, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 739 , 98 L.Ed.2d 756 (1988); Haas v. Jefferson National Bank, 442 F.2d 394, 395 (5th Cir.1971); McVay v. Western Plains Service Corp., 823 F.2d 1395, 1401 (10th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited "see" Masinter v. Tenneco Oil Co. (2×)
5th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lormand v. Superior Oil Co., 845 F.2d 536, 541 (5th Cir.1987) (“Recovery for injury to a person, other than a Jones Act seaman, working on the outer continental shelf is governed by the LHWCA....”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 739 , 98 L.Ed.2d 774 (1988).
discussed Cited "see" Masinter v. Tenneco Oil Co. (2×)
5th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lormand v. Superior Oil Co., 845 F.2d 536, 541 (5th Cir.1987) ("Recovery for injury to a person, other than a Jones Act seaman, working on the outer continental shelf is governed by the LHWCA...."), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 739 , 98 L.Ed.2d 774 (1988).
discussed Cited "see" Estate of Rainsford v. Washington Island Ferry Line, Inc. (2×)
E.D. Wis. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lormand v. Aries Marine Corporation, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 739, 739-40 , 98 L.Ed.2d 774 (White, J., dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari).
cited Cited "see" Lykins v. Westinghouse Electric
E.D. Ky. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Steel Valley Authority v. Union Switch and Signal Division, 809 F.2d 1006 (3d Cir.1987), cert. dismissed, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 739 , 98 L.Ed.2d 756 (1988).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Halpin v. Atkinson-Kiewit, JV (2×)
D. Mass. · 1995 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Lormand v. Superior Oil Co., 845 F.2d 536, 541 (5 Cir., 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1031 , 108 S.Ct. 739 , 98 L.Ed.2d 774 (1988); Levene v. Pintail Enterprises, Inc., 943 F.2d 528, 533 (5 Cir., 1991).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Marshall v. Overhead Door Corp.
E.D. Pa. · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence low
To use the familiar but confusing terminology, the decision to proceed is a decision that the absent person is merely “necessary” while the decision to dismiss is a decision that he is “indispensable.” Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 118 , 88 S.Ct. 733, 742 , 19 L.Ed.2d 936 (1968); see also, Steel Valley Authority v. Union Switch and Signal Division, 809 F.2d 1006, 1013 (3d Cir.1987), cert. dismissed, 484 U.S. 1021 , 108 S.Ct. 739 , 98 L.Ed.2d 756 (1988).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Petty v. Dakota Barge Service (2×)
D. Minnesota · 1989 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Lormand v. Superior Oil Co., 845 F.2d 536, 540 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1031 , 108 S.Ct. 739 , 98 L.Ed.2d 774 (1988).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Lormand
v.
Aries Marine Corp.
No. 87-388.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jan 19, 1988.
484 U.S. 1031
Blackmun, White, Whom.
Cited by 16 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 66%
Citer courts: E.D. Pennsylvania (1)

Lead Opinion

C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Justice White, with whom Justice Blackmun joins,

dissenting.

The issue here is the proper definition of seaman status under the Jones Act. Petitioner, an employee for a welding company, was injured while working aboard a barge. He brought suit in District Court against his employer and the owner of the barge. The suit was unsuccessful, and in particular the District Court granted summary judgment for petitioner’s employer on the Jones Act claim, ruling that petitioner was not a “seaman” as that term is used in 46 U. S. C. §688. The Fifth Circuit affirmed on appeal, adhering to the test for determining seaman status that it had recently stated in an en banc decision. Lormand v. Superior Oil Co., 845 F. 2d 536, 539 (1987), citing Barrett v. Chevron U. S. A., Inc., 781 F. 2d 1067 (CA5 1986) (en banc). Judge Rubin stated that he concurred in the opinion only because he was bound to do so by the Barrett decision, though he continued to adhere to his dissent in Barrett. Judge Brown concurred separately on a different issue.

In Barrett, the Fifth Circuit as a whole reaffirmed its adherence to the test it had followed for almost 30 years, which states that to qualify as a “seaman” a person must either be assigned permanently to a vessel or perform a substantial part of his work aboard it, and also that the person’s duties or capacities must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission. Barrett, supra, at 1070-1074; Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F. 2d 769 (CA5 1959). Of the eight judges who formed the major[*1032] ity in Barrett, however, four concurred specially, noting that they joined the majority only to establish a firm rule but would have preferred to adopt the test formulated by the Seventh Circuit, which puts the issue of seaman status to a jury whenever the person “had a more or less permanent connection with a vessel in navigation” and “made a significant contribution to the maintenance, operation, or welfare of the transportation function of the vessel.” Johnson v. John F. Beasley Constr. Co., 742 F. 2d 1054, 1063, cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1211 (1985). Judge Rubin dissented, joined by five other judges, stating that the Robison test should be supplemented by considering the person’s status not only in light of his permanent job assignment but also in light of any assignment imposed on him for a hitch of more limited duration. Barrett, supra, at 1077-1078.

The test used by the Fifth Circuit to determine seaman status is inconsistent with the test used by the Seventh Circuit. In addition, the Third Circuit has formulated the second part of the Robison test as whether the person is aboard the vessel “primarily to aid in its navigation.” Simko v. C. & C. Marine Maintenance Co., 594 F. 2d 960, 964, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 833 (1979). The split among the Circuits on this issue warrants our granting certiorari.