green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
6.4 score
“t is well-established that a savings clause ... does not 'save' common law actions that would subvert a federal statutory or regulatory scheme.”
Treatment trajectory · 1991 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1991
2008
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp.
t is well-established that a savings clause ... does not 'save' common law actions that would subvert a federal statutory or regulatory scheme.
discussed
Cited "see"
Fenje v. Feld
See Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1254-55 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Moscowitz, 850 F.Supp. at 1195 ; Peterson v. Unified School District No. 418, 724 F.Supp. 829, 833-34 (D.Kan.1989).
discussed
Cited "see"
Cooper v. General Motors Corp.
(2×)
See Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116, 1122 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990).
discussed
Cited "see"
Muntz v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation
See Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990) (the question of express preemption is properly analyzed only after consideration of both Sections 1392(d) and 1397(k)).
discussed
Cited "see"
Wilson v. Pleasant
(2×)
Accord, Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116, 1121 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 825 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 402 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 782 (1990).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. John & Patricia Forma
See Magnone v. United States, 902 F.2d 192, 193 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990).
discussed
Cited "see"
Cornelius Marshall v. Wilbert Allen, Richard Anderson, and Anthony J. Fusco, Jr.
See Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); IDK, Inc. v. Clark County, 836 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir.1988); Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir.1984); see also City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 , 109 S.Ct. 1591, 1595 , 104 L.Ed.2d 18 (1989) (stating that the Constitution does not recognize a "generalized right of 'social association' that includes chance encounters in dance halls").
discussed
Cited "see"
Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked, and Abandoned Vessel, Believed to Be the SB \Seabird\""
See Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); see also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 , 54 S.Ct. 505, 510-11 , 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934).
discussed
Cited "see"
Jordan v. Paccar, Inc.
The Safety Act and Regulations The express and primary purpose of the Safety Act is “to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents.” 15 U.S.C. 1381; See Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116, 1122 (3rd Cir.1990), cert. denied — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Heath v. General Motors Corp., 756 F.Supp. 1144, 1148 (S.D.Ind.1991).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Prestop Holdings, LLC v. United States
See also Magnone v. United States, 733 F.Supp. 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y.1989), aff'd, 902 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990) ("Indeed, a taxpayer who owes back taxes for several years may pay interest on and sue with respect to only one of them.”); Whittington v. United States, 240 F.R.D. 344, 350 (S.D.Tex.2006) ("the key ... is whether the taxpayer has paid the full tax liability assessed by the IRS for that specific year”); see generally, Green v. United States, 220 Ct.Cl. 712, 713 , 1979 WL 30892 (1979) (implying this, albeit in obiter dicta…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Royal Denim for Import and Export, Inc. v. United States
See also Magnone v. United States, 902 F.2d 192, 193 (2d Cir.1990)(“First, the full payment rule requires as a prerequisite for federal court jurisdiction over a tax refund suit, that the taxpayer make full payment of the assessment, including penalties and interest.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
General Electric Co. v. United States
See, e.g., Magnone v. United States, 902 F.2d 192, 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Weiner v. United States, 255 F.Supp.2d 624 (S.D.Tex.2002); see also B & M Gross Corp. v. United States, 4 Cl.Ct. 792, 794 (1984).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Masel
See, e.g., Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990) (casual chit-chat between two people not protected First Amendment activity).
examined
Cited "see, e.g."
Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado
(5×)
Id. §§ 1410b(b)(2), 1410b(f)(2); see also Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116, 1123-24 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990). .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Ortiz v. San Miguel County
See id. at 620 , 104 S.Ct. at 3250-51 (noting the “broad, range of human relationships that may make greater or lesser claims to constitutional protection from particular incursions by the State” but declining to “mark the potentially significant points on this terrain with any precision”); compare Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1204-05 (3d Cir.1988) (friendship between brother-in-law and sister-in-law not protected as intimate human relationship), with O’Leary v. Luongo, 692 F.Supp. 893, 900 (N.D.Ill.1988) (“[The plaintiffs] relationship with his neighbors and friends might…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Cellucci v. General Motors Corp.
(2×)
See also Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116, 1124-25 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990) (a common law rule cannot prohibit the exercise of a federally granted option).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Contreras v. City of Chicago
In short, First Amendment protection does not extend to “opportunities of association that do not pertain to expressive association, even if they might be described as ‘associational’ in common parlance.” Glatt v. Chicago Park Dist., 847 F.Supp. 101, 104 (N.D.Ill.1994); see also Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1252 (7th Cir.) (noting that it would be erroneous to suggest that the First Amendment protects nonexpressive association), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Janus Petroleum Co., Inc. v. United States
See also Magnone v. United States, 902 F.2d 192, 193 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Hernandez-Gomez v. Leonardo
See, e.g., Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116, 1123 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 827 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Foutz v. United States
See, e.g., Magnone v. United States, 902 F.2d 192, 193 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990) (per curiam); Boyd v. United States, 762 F.2d 1369, 1371-72 (9th Cir.1985). 8 .In effect, the United States argues that the ten-year statute of limitation applies to all cases where, on the date of enactment of the 1990 Act (November 5, 1990), either (1) the six-year limitation period established by section 6502(a)(1) for collection had not expired, or (2) a consensual extension entered into pursuant to section 6502(a)(2) had not expired. 9 .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Shahar v. Bowers
See, e.g., Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir.1990), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990) (associations for purposes other than expression are more properly viewed as stemming from the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process rather than from the First Amendment).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Heath Ex Rel. Estate of Heath v. General Motors Corp.
See, e.g., Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990); Kolbeck v. General Motors Corp., 702 F.Supp. 532 (E.D.Pa.1988); Schick v. Chrysler Corp., 675 F.Supp. 1183 (D.S.D.1987); Baird v. General Motors Corp., 654 F.Supp. 28 (N.D.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Swank
v.
Smart, Individually and as City Marshal of Carthage, Illinois
v.
Smart, Individually and as City Marshal of Carthage, Illinois
No. 90-173.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 1, 1990.
Published
Citer courts: Texas Supreme Court (1)
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.