green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
5.9 score
G Cite
cited 9× by 5 distinct cases ·
"unsupported allegations in [a non-movant's] memorandum and pleadings are insufficient to repel summary judgment"
Treatment trajectory · 1991 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1991
2008
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 32 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Merckle GmbH v. Johnson & Johnson
unsupported allegations in memorandum and pleadings are insufficient to repel summary judgment
discussed
Cited "see"
Butler v. Rapides Foundation
See Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 504-05 (3d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) (stating that, although the district court may not assess fees against counsel under Title VII, it could do so under FRCP 11 or § 1927).
discussed
Cited "see"
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chester Holdings, Ltd.
See Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.) (noting that nonmovant must set forth “specific facts” and “may not rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or ... vague statements ... ”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991).
cited
Cited "see"
Harris v. SmithKline Beecham
See Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 501 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991).
cited
Cited "see"
Scalzo v. Insalaco's Markets
See Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991).
cited
Cited "see"
Opinion No.
See Ryalls v. Pigott, 580 So.2d 1140 (Miss. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 (1991).
discussed
Cited "see"
Union Center Redevelopment Corp. v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
See The Curators of Univ. of Missouri v. Brown, 809 S.W.2d 64, 65-67 (Mo.Ct.App.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 375 , 116 L.Ed.2d 326 (1991); Arata v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 351 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Mo.1961).
discussed
Cited "see"
Union Center Redevelopment Corporation v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation
See The Curators of Univ. of Missouri v. Brown, 809 S.W.2d 64, 65-67 (Mo.Ct.App.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 375 , 116 L.Ed.2d 326 (1991); Arata v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 351 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Mo.1961). 31 We affirm the judgment of the district court. 1 The Honorable George F. Gunn, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri 2 The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 was recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 24101 et seq., and reenacted as part of a general restructuring of the United States Code, which took effect on July 5, 1994.
discussed
Cited "see"
70 Fair empl.prac.cas. (Bna) 247, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,940, 43 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1022 Mary Corneveaux, and Cross-Appellee v. Cuna Mutual Insurance Group, And
See Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 504 (3d Cir.) (recognizing Title VII "does not authorize assessment of fees against the loser's attorney"), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers, Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370 , 1374 n. 1 (6th Cir.1987) ("an award under section 1988 may only be charged against the losing party, not the party's attorney."); Hamer v. County of Lake, 819 F.2d 1362, 1370 (7th Cir.1987) ("[s]ection 1988 only authorizes the imposition of fees against parties to the litigation, not their attorneys."); Durrett v. J…
discussed
Cited "see"
Corneveaux v. CUNA Mutual Insurance Group
See Quiroga, v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 504 (3d Cir.) (recognizing Title VII “does not authorize assessment of fees against the loser’s attorney”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers, Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370 , 1374 n. 1 (6th Cir.1987) (“an award under section 1988 may only be charged against the losing party, not the party’s attorney.”); Hamer v. County of Lake, 819 F.2d 1362, 1370 (7th Cir.1987) (“[s]ection 1988 only authorizes the imposition of fees against parties to the litigation, not their attorneys…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
SAMPLE v. U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
See Kirlies, 560 F.3d at 161 ; see also Trap Rock Indus., Inc., 982 F.2d at 890 (“[The] non-moving party may not ‘rest upon mere allegations, general denials or . . . vague statements’” at the summary judgment stage) (quoting Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 (1991)) (second alteration in original).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Richardson v. Carrasco
In Waco v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., the Supreme Court held that while the remand order itself was not appealable, the parties may appeal an order dismissing a claim that precedes and order of remand. 293 U.S. 140 , 55 S.Ct. 6 , 79 L.Ed. 244 (1934); see also Calderon v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, 929 F.2d 599, 601-02 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) (discussing Waco).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Peter Bay Owners Ass'n v. Stillman
The non-moving party must “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Serbin, 96 F.3d at 69 n. 2 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 , 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); see also Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) (declaring that non-movant may not “rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or vague statements”).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
PETER BAY OWNERS ASS'N, INC. v. Stillman
The non-moving party must "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Serbin, 96 F.3d at 69 n. 2 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 , 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); see also Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) (declaring that non-movant may not "rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or vague statements").
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Koch v. Koch Industries, Inc.
Cottam v. First Baptist Church of Boulder, 756 F.Supp. 1433, 1439 (D.Colo.1991), aff'd, 962 F.2d 17 (10th Cir.1992) (Table); see Garrett v. Barnes, 961 F.2d 629, 632 (7th Cir.1992); Therrell v. Georgia Marble Holdings Corp., 960 F.2d 1555, 1569 (11th Cir.1992); Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 861-62 (Fed.Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 980 , 112 S.Ct. 2957 , 119 L.Ed.2d 579 (1992); see, e.g., Anderson v. United Telephone Co. of Kansas, 933 F.2d 1500, 1502 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 375 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991); Ware v. Unified School Dist. 492…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States Ex Rel. Haskins v. Omega Institute, Inc.
The non-moving party must “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Serbin, 96 F.3d at 69 n. 2 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); see also Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) (declaring that nonmovant may not “rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or vague statements”).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Keenan v. Louisiana Ex Rel. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University Agricultural & Mechanical College
See also Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 501 (3rd Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991). 40 .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Score Board, Inc. v. Upper Deck Co.
Rather, the non-moving party must “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Serbin at 69 n. 2 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 , 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); see also Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) (declaring that a non-movant may not “rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or ... vague statements”).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Gagliardi v. Omaha Property and Ins. Co.
The non-moving party must “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Serbin, 96 F.3d at 69 n. 2 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 , 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); see also Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) (declaring that non-movant may not “rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or ... vague statements”).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Arc of New Jersey, Inc. v. State of NJ
Rather, the non-moving party must “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Serbin at 69 n. 2 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); see also Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) (declaring that a non-movant may not “rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or ... vague statements”).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Dirkes v. Borough of Runnemede
Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 618 (3d Cir.1987) (Becker, J., concurring), and not just “some metaphysical doubt as to material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 , 106 S.Ct. at 1356 ; see also, Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) (In opposing summary judgment, a non-movant may not “rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or ... vague statements.”); Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990) (“unsupported allegations in [a non- *238 movant’…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
69 Fair empl.prac.cas. (Bna) 1328, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,894 Dale Nelson, Appellee/cross-Appellant v. J.C. Penney Company, Inc., Appellant/cross-Appellee. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Amicus Curiae
See, e.g., Caudill v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 919 F.2d 83, 86-87 (8th Cir.1990) (close temporal proximity between filing of age discrimination charges and firing of plaintiff was only a "slender reed of evidence" for which "rank speculation" would be required to assume causal connection between the two events, in light of other evidence presented); see also Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 501 (3d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) ("inference based on timing alone" was insufficient in light of other evidence presented).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Dale Nelson v. J.C. Penney Co.
See, e.g., Caudill v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 919 F.2d 83, 86-87 (8th Cir.1990) (close temporal proximity between filing of age discrimination charges and firing of plaintiff was *347 only a “slender reed of evidence” for which “rank speculation” would be required to assume causal connection between the two events, in light of other evidence presented); see also Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 501 (3d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) (“inference based on timing alone” was insufficient in light of other evidence presented).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
In Re Tutu Wells Contamination Litigation
Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 618 (3d Cir.1987) (Becker, J., concurring), and not just "some metaphysical doubt as to material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 , 106 S.Ct. at 1356 ; see also, Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.1991), cert denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) (In opposing summary judgment, a non-movant may not "rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or ... vague statements."); Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990) ("unsupported allegations in [a non-movant's] memorandum a…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Harthman v. Texaco Inc.
Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 618 (3d Cir.1987) (Becker, J., concurring), and not just “some metaphysical doubt as to material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 , 106 S.Ct. at 1356 ; see also, Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) (In opposing summary judgment, a non-movant may not “rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or ... vague statements.”); Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir.1990) (“unsupported allegations in [a non-movant’s] …
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Harthman v. Texaco Inc.
Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 618 (3d Cir.1987) (Becker, J., concurring), and not just “some metaphysical doubt as to material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 , 106 S.Ct. at 1355 ; see also, Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.1991), cert denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) (In opposing summary judgment, a non-movant may not “rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or ... vague statements.”); Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir.1990) (“unsupported allegations in [a non-movant’s] m…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
In Re Tutu Wells Contamination Litigation
Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 618 (3d Cir.1987) (Becker, J., concurring), and not just "some metaphysical doubt as to material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 , 106 S.Ct. at 1355 ; see also, Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.1991), cert denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) (In opposing summary judgment, a non-movant may not "rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or ... vague statements."); Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990) ("unsupported allegations in [a nonmovant's] memorandum an…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Harthman v. Texaco Inc.
Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 618 (3d Cir.1987) (Becker, J., concurring), and not just “some metaphysical doubt as to material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 , 106 S.Ct. at 1355 ; see also, Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.1991), cert denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) (In opposing summary judgment, a non-movant may not “rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or ... vague statements.”); Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir.1990) (“unsupported allegations in [a non-movant’s] m…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Harthman v. Texaco Inc.
Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 618 (3d Cir.1987) (Becker, J., concurring), and not just “some metaphysical doubt as to material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 , 106 S.Ct. at 1356 ; see also, Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.1991), cert denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) (In opposing summary judgment, a non-movant may not “rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or ... vague statements.”); Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir.1990) (“unsupported allegations in [a non-movant’s] m…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
In Re Tutu Wells Contamination Litigation
Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 618 (3d Cir.1987) (Becker, J., concurring), and not just "some metaphysical doubt as to material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 , 106 S.Ct. at 1355 ; see also, Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.1991), cert denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) (In opposing summary judgment, a non-movant may not "rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or ... vague statements."); Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990) ("unsupported allegations in [a non-movant's] memorandum a…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Nelson v. J.C. Penney Co.
See, e.g., Caudill v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 919 F.2d 83, 86-87 (8th Cir.1990) (close temporal proximity between filing of age discrimination charges and firing of plaintiff was only a “slender reed of evidence” for which “rank speculation” would be required to assume causal connection between the two events, in light of other evidence presented); see also Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 501 (3d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) (“inference based on timing alone” was insufficient in light of other evidence presented).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
69 Fair empl.prac.cas. (Bna) 468, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,823 Dale Nelson, Appellee/cross-Appellant v. J.C. Penney Company, Inc., Appellant/cross-Appellee. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Amicus Curiae
See, e.g., Caudill v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 919 F.2d 83, 86-87 (8th Cir.1990) (close temporal proximity between filing of age discrimination charges and firing of plaintiff was only a "slender reed of evidence" for which "rank speculation" would be required to assume causal connection between the two events, in light of other evidence presented); see also Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 501 (3d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 , 112 S.Ct. 376 , 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) ("inference based on timing alone" was insufficient in light of other evidence presented).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Brown
v.
Curators of the University of Missouri
v.
Curators of the University of Missouri
No. 91-403.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 4, 1991.
502 U.S. 940
Published
Citer courts: D. New Jersey (1)
Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Certiorari denied.