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Positive treatment
4.7 score
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995
2010
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 15 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "but see"
United States v. Robert Holifield, A/K/A Jim Davis, A/K/A Philip Sharp, A/K/A David Jones, Robert Holifield, United States of America v. Robert A. Holifield, Robert Holifield
But see United States v. Duranseau, 26 F.3d 804, 810-11 (8th Cir.) (noting if methodology other than that in Sec. 5G1.3 is used, the district court must employ a departure analysis), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 341 , 130 L.Ed.2d 298 (1994)
discussed
Cited "but see"
United States v. Robert Holifield
But see United States v. Duranseau, 26 F.3d 804, 810-11 (8th Cir.) (noting if methodology other than that in § 5G1.3 is used, the district court must employ a departure analysis), cert. denied, -U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 341 , 130 L.Ed.2d 298 (1994).
discussed
Cited "but see"
United States v. Wiley-Dunaway
But see United States v. Duranseau, 26 F.3d 804, 810-11 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 341 , 130 L.Ed.2d 298 (1994) (treating use of methodology outside the guideline formula as an upward departure).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Robinson
See United States v. Watson, 815 F.Supp. 827, 834 (E.D.Pa.1993), aff 'd, 26 F.3d 124 (3rd Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 939 , 115 S.Ct. 341 , 130 L.Ed.2d 298 (1994) (federal anticar-jacking statute held not violate equal protection on basis that Congress’ failure to also prohibit the armed theft of cars that had never been in interstate commerce (i.e., “intrastate cars”) creates an unconstitutional classification with respect to carjackings involving interstate commerce).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Joseph D. Comstock
See United States v. Duranseau, 26 F.3d 804 , 811 n. 7 (8th Cir.1994), ce rt. denied, 513 U.S. 939 , 115 S.Ct. 341 , 130 L.Ed.2d 298 (1994).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Christopher Hamilton
See United States v. Moore, 25 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.—, 115 S.Ct. 341 , 130 L.Ed.2d 297 (1994).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Edward L. Morris and Steven M. Gardner
See United States v. Moore, 25 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 341 , 130 L.Ed.2d 297 (1994); Young, 20 F.3d at 764 ; Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d 1287, 1297 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142 , 106 S.Ct. 2251 , 90 L.Ed.2d 697 (1986).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Kenneth Blankenship
See United States v. Duranseau, 26 F.3d 804, 808 (8th Cir.) (citing Koory, 20 F.3d at 847 ), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 341 , 130 L.Ed.2d 298 (1994); see also United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1566 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. - and — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1113 and 115 S.Ct. 1825 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1077 and 131 L.Ed.2d 746 (1995).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. John C. Marsanico
See United States v. Duranseau, 26 F.3d 804 , 811 n. 7 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 341 , 130 L.Ed.2d 298 (1994).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Michael Henderson and Leroy Nolan
See United States v. Moore, 25 F.3d 563, 568 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 341 , 130 L.Ed.2d 297 (1994).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Jay C. Brassell
See United States v. Duranseau, 26 F.3d 804, 810-11 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, -U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 341 , 130 L.Ed.2d 298 (1994); United States v. Brewer, 23 F.3d 1317, 1321 (8th Cir.1994).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Timothy N. Van Someren
See also United States v. Duranseau, 26 F.3d 804, 808 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 939 , 115 S.Ct. 341 , 130 L.Ed.2d 298 (1994).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Timothy Van Someren
See also United States v. Duranseau, 26 F.3d 804, 808 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 341 (1994).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Kanchan Bala Sharma, Also Known as Kay Bala, Also Known as Kay Daken, Also Known as Kanchan B. Daken
Departure from the applicable range is permissible only upon a finding that “there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (b); see also United States v. Duranseau, 26 F.3d 804, 811 (8th Cir.1994), ce rt. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 341 , 130 L.Ed.2d 298 (1994).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Stewart Boyles
Sentencing Boyles’s final argument is: “Under all the factual circumstances, particularly when viewed through the eyes of the requisite mens rea necessarily involved in these criminal offenses, the sentence was patently excessive.” Our jurisdiction to review sentencing determinations is limited to those grounds enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (a). 23 United States v. Hayes, 939 F.2d 509, 512 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1042 , 112 S.Ct. 896 , 116 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992); see also United States v. Moore, 25 F.3d 563, 570 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Anderson v. United States, �…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Head
v.
North Carolina
v.
North Carolina
No. 94-5810.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 11, 1994.
Published
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.