In Re McA, 589 S.E.2d 331 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · Go Syfert
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In Re McA, 589 S.E.2d 331 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
51 citation events (51 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: In the Interest of M. F., a Child (gactapp, 2020-02-20)
Treatment trajectory · 2003 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2003 2014 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Interest of M. F., a Child
Ga. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
A., 263 Ga. App. 770, 771 (2) ( 589 SE2d 331 ) (2003) (“To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts need 6 Davis testified that he observed the Appellant attempting to lift the door handle of his car.
cited Cited as authority (rule) In the Interest of A. C. R-M.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
A., 263 Ga. App. 770, 772 (2) ( 589 SE2d 331 ) (2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Acr-M.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] OCGA § 16-7-23(a)(1). [2] (Punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of C.H., 306 Ga.App. 834, 836-837 (3), 703 S.E.2d 407 (2010). [3] D.S. was tried at the same time, and he was also adjudicated delinquent for committing criminal damage to property in the second degree. [4] In the Interest of M.C.A., 263 Ga.App. 770, 772 (2), 589 S.E.2d 331 (2003). [5] (Punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of J.S., 296 Ga.App. 144, 147 (2)(a), 673 S.E.2d 645 (2009). [6] See Adams v. State, 300 Ga.App. 294, 300 (2)(b), 684 S.E.2d 404 (2009); J.S., 296 Ga.App. at 147-148 (2)(a), 673 S.E.2d 645 . [7] See…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lewis v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
A., 263 Ga. App. 770, 771 (1) ( 589 SE2d 331 ) (2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) King v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
A., 263 Ga. App. 770, 771-772 (2) ( 589 SE2d 331 ) (2003). 10 Johnson, supra at 749 (citation omitted).
discussed Cited "see" In Re JS (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See In the Interest of M.C.A., supra, 263 Ga.App. at 771-772(2), 589 S.E.2d 331 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Interest of M.C.A., a child.
A03A1346.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Oct 24, 2003.
589 S.E.2d 331
Mikell.
Published

Eric A. Ballinger, Canton, for appellant.

Garry T. Moss, Dist. Atty., for appellee.

MIKELL, Judge.

M.C.A. was adjudicated a delinquent for committing the offenses of entering an automobile with the intent to commit a theft therein, OCGA § 16-8-18, and theft by taking, OCGA § 16-8-2. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an adjudication[*332] of delinquency, we construe the evidence and every inference from the evidence in favor of the juvenile court's adjudication to determine if a reasonable finder of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the juvenile committed the acts charged.[1]

Viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's adjudication, the evidence shows that on January 13, 2003, 16-year-old J.N. drove his 1987 Chevrolet truck to school. J.N. testified that he left the passenger side door unlocked. When he returned to his truck at 4:30 p.m., J.N. discovered that his cell phone, a Nokia 5150, was missing from his duffel bag. J.N. testified that he had placed the phone in the bag on the passenger side floorboard. J.N. met his girlfriend behind the gym and used her cell phone to call his phone. S.R., a teenager whom J.N. knew, answered. J.N. retrieved his phone from S.R. later that evening.

S.R. testified that he rode a school bus with M.C.A. on the date in question and that M.C.A. was "ranting about `ganking' some kid's cell phone." S.R. explained that "ganking" was a slang term for stealing. Two other teenagers who rode the same bus, J.C. and A.J., testified that they overheard him remark that he "ganked" the phone. Both J.C. and S.R. observed M.C.A. talking on the phone.

J.C. sat next to S.R. and directly behind M.C.A. S.R. testified that he wanted to return the phone to its rightful owner, so he asked J.C., who was a friend of M.C.A., to ask him to use the phone. When M.C.A. handed it to J.C., J.C. scrolled through the numbers that were stored in the phone but did not recognize any of them. Then the phone rang, and J.C. passed it to S.R., who answered it. It was J.N. calling.

1. "A person commits the offense of theft by taking when he unlawfully takes or ... appropriates any property of another with the intention of depriving him of the property...."[2] "Intent to use the property of another without the owner's authorization evinces an intent to commit a theft."[3] M.C.A. argues that the evidence failed to show that he possessed J.N.'s phone without authorization. We disagree. M.C.A.'s boasting on the school bus that he "ganked," or stole, the cell phone, coupled with the victim's testimony that his phone was "missing," provided ample circumstantial evidence from which the trier of fact could have determined that M.C.A. was not authorized to possess the phone.

2. M.C.A. further claims that the circumstantial evidence does not support his conviction of entering an automobile because the facts do not exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than his guilt.[4] M.C.A. offers two alternatives to the state's theory that he obtained J.N.'s cell phone by entering his truck. M.C.A. maintains that he could have stolen the phone from another individual who moved it from the truck or that M.C.A. may have lied about stealing it and found it instead. "To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts need exclude only reasonable hypotheses—not bare possibilities that the crime could have been committed by someone else."[5] Questions of reasonableness are reserved for the factfinder, and we will not disturb its finding that the evidence was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt unless the adjudication of delinquency is unsupportable as a matter of law.[6] In this case, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to determine beyond reasonable doubt that[*333] M.C.A. committed the offense of entering an automobile with the intent of committing theft.[7]

Judgment affirmed.

JOHNSON, P.J., and ELDRIDGE, J., concur.

1 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of J.M., 237 Ga.App. 298(1), 513 S.E.2d 742 (1999); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
3 Smith v. State, 253 Ga.App. 504, 505, 559 S.E.2d 537 (2002), citing Sorrells v. State, 267 Ga. 236, 238(1)(b), 476 S.E.2d 571 (1996).
5 (Emphasis omitted.) Morris v. State, 202 Ga. App. 673, 674, 415 S.E.2d 485 (1992).
6 Id. See also Truax v. State, 207 Ga.App. 506, 507(1), 428 S.E.2d 611 (1993).
7 Jackson v. Virginia, supra.