Ex Parte Lyles, 891 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). · Go Syfert
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Ex Parte Lyles, 891 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
34 citation events (22 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Monty Durell Bryant v. the State of Texas (texapp, 2023-06-16)
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 15 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Monty Durell Bryant v. the State of Texas
Tex. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
“A defendant’s mere acquiescence in proceeding to trial without a jury does not constitute an express waiver.” Id. (citing Ex parte Lyles, 891 S.W.2d 960, 962 (Tex. Crim.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) the State of Texas v. Juan Manuel Perez (2×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
“A defendant’s mere acquiescence in proceeding to trial without a jury does not constitute an express waiver.” Id. (citing Ex parte Lyles, 891 S.W.2d 960, 962 (Tex. Crim.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Trahan v. State
Tex. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
In Ex parte Lyles, 891 S.W.2d 960, 961 (Tex.Crim.App.1995), the Court of Criminal Appeals found that the presumption of regularity in the judgment’s recital concerning a written jury waiver had been overcome by evidence in support of habeas corpus application, where the trial court found that there was no written waiver in the record, that there was no oral waiver in the statement of facts, and that the trial court did not ask defendant if he waived his right to jury trial.
cited Cited as authority (rule) John B. Konek and David R. Postlewait v. Bob Bullock, Lieutenant Governor, and Dan Morales, Attorney General
Tex. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Ex parte Lyles, 891 S.W.2d 960, 961 (Tex. Crim.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ex Parte George (2×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Ex parte Lyles, 891 S.W.2d 960, 961 (Tex.Crim.
cited Cited "see" Jose Werner Munguia v. the State of Texas
Tex. App. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ex parte Lyles, 891 S.W.2d 960, 962 (Tex. Crim.
cited Cited "see" Jose Werner Munguia v. the State of Texas
Tex. App. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ex parte Lyles, 891 S.W.2d 960, 962 (Tex. Crim.
cited Cited "see" Michael E. C. Donald v. State
Tex. App. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Hardemann v. State, 868 S.W.2d 404 , 405–07 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993), pet. dism’d, 891 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. Crim.
cited Cited "see" Davidson v. State
Tex. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ex parte Lyles, 891 S.W.2d 960, 961 (Tex.Crim.App.1995).
cited Cited "see" Rodney D. Davidson v. State
Tex. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ex parte Lyles , 891 S.W.2d 960, 961 (Tex. Crim.
discussed Cited "see" Enriquez v. State (2×)
Tex. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See (Hardeman v. State, 868 S.W.2d 404, 405 (Tex.App.—Austin 1993), pet. dism’d as improvidently granted, 891 S.W.2d 960 (Tex.Crim.App.1995)).
cited Cited "see" Enriquez, Eliseo v. State
Tex. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hardeman v. State , 868 S.W.2d 404, 405 (Tex. App.--Austin 1993), pet. dism'd as improvidently granted, 891 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. Crim.
discussed Cited "see" Ex Parte Tovar (2×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 1995 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord, Ex parte Lyles, 891 S.W.2d 960, 961-962 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (granting relief in post-conviction habeas corpus application where no written jury waiver was filed and harm was established).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Egger v. State
Tex. App. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence medium
If, however, Egger had never waived his right to trial by jury at all, then “such an error would go far beyond mere irregularity in the proceedings below.” Garcia, 905 S.W.2d at 9 ; see also Ex parte Lyles, 891 S.W.2d 960, 961-62 (Tex.Crim.App.1995).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ludwig v. State
Tex. App. · 1998 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Hardeman v. State, 868 S.W.2d 404, 405 (Tex.App.—Austin 1993), pet. dism’d, 891 S.W.2d 960 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); Polk v. State, 865 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1993, pet. ref'd); Hutson v. State, 843 S.W.2d 106, 107 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1992, no pet.).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Ex Parte James Ernest LYLES
72019.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Feb 1, 1995.
891 S.W.2d 960
Randy Martin, Houston, for appellant., John B. Holmes, Jr., Dist. Atty., John S. Klassen, Asst. Dist. Atty., Houston, and Robert Hittash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.
Maloney.
Cited by 17 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

MALONEY, Judge.

This is a post-conviction application for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07, V.A.C.C.P. In a trial before the court Applicant was convicted of theft. Punishment, enhanced with two prior convictions, was assessed at forty years of confinement. The conviction was affirmed. Lyles v. State, No. 01-92-817-CR, 1993 WL 143375 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st], delivered May 5, 1993).

Applicant contends, among other things, that he was denied his right to a jury trial. An affidavit from Applicant’s trial counsel states that counsel told Applicant they would try the case to the judge and that Applicant voiced no objection. Applicant’s affidavit states that neither the trial court nor counsel asked Applicant if he wanted to waive a jury trial. Applicant asserts he did not want to waive a jury trial and he did not sign any jury waiver. Applicant avers counsel told him they were going to have the trial to the court and then the trial began. The trial court entered findings of fact. The court found the judgment recites Applicant waived in writing his right to a jury trial. The court found there was no written waiver in the record, there was no oral waiver in the statement of facts, and the trial court did not ask Applicant if he waived his right to a jury trial.

The presumption of regularity in the judgment’s recital concerning a written jury waiver has been overcome by the evidence in support of this application. See Breazeale v. State, 683 S.W.2d 446 (Tex.Cr.App.1984). However, the absence of a written jury waiver is not a ground for setting aside a conviction by habeas corpus. Ex parte Sadberry, 864 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tex.Cr.App.1993).

In Sadbeiry, this Court pointed out that the applicant was not contending he was denied his constitutional right to a jury trial or that he did not agree to waive that right. Id. at 543. In Meek v. State, 851 S.W.2d 868, 870-71 (Tex.Cr.App.1993), we noted the inviolate nature of a defendant’s right to trial by jury. This Court has recognized the right to a jury trial is fundamental to the proper[*962] functioning of our adjudicatory process. Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 278-79 (Tex.Cr.App.1993). Habeas corpus review is available for the denial of fundamental or constitutional rights. Sadberry, 864 S.W.2d at 542-43. Because of its fundamental nature, we conclude that the denial of the constitutional right to a jury trial is a matter for habeas corpus review.

A defendant’s right to a jury trial is not extinguished by inaction alone. Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 278-79. If a defendant wants to relinquish this right, he must expressly do so. Id. In the present ease, Applicant did not expressly waive, in any form to the trial court, his right to a jury trial. Consequently, his right to a jury trial went unobserved.

The judgment in Cause No. 615777 in the 339th District Court of Harris County is set aside and it is ordered that Applicant be returned to the custody of the Harris County Sheriff to answer the indictment in this cause.

Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional and Pardons and Paroles Divisions.