Grappin v. State, 450 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1984). · Go Syfert
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Grappin v. State, 450 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1984). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 2011 · …if the congress does not fix the punishment for federal offenses clearly and without ambiguity ... then the rule of lenity applies and the ambiguity is to be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses. ✓
90 citation events (51 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Suggs v. State (fladistctapp, 2011-10-12)
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 21 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Suggs v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
if the congress does not fix the punishment for federal offenses clearly and without ambiguity ... then the rule of lenity applies and the ambiguity is to be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) State v. Parrella
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
unlawful taking of two or more firearms during the same criminal episode is subject to separate prosecution and punishment" because the statute modifies the term "firearm" with the article "a" denoting legislative intent to "make each firearm a separate unit of prosecution
discussed Cited as authority (rule) TRAVIS MONTEZ EDWARDS v. STATE OF FLORIDA (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
See Bautista, 863 So. 2d at 1185 (finding that the legislature intended two convictions for two deaths resulting from a single collision in violation of a single DUI statute); Grappin v. State, 450 So. 2d 480, 483 (Fla. 1984) (finding that taking five firearms from the same place at the same time in violation of a single firearm theft statute could result in five convictions); McKnight, 906 So. 2d at 374 (holding that the unit of prosecution of a vehicular homicide statute is each victim).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Gutierrez
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Alverson, 666 F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir. 1982) (phrase “to receive or possess a firearm” expresses legislative intent to allow separate prosecution for each firearm); Sanders v. United States, 441 F.2d 412, 414-15 (10th Cir. 1971) (each firearm is a separate offense under statute that makes it unlawful for any person to receive or possess “a firearm which is not registered to him”); Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480, 482 (Fla. 1984) (article “a” in reference to “firearm” in statute clearly shows legislature intended to make each firearm a separate unit of…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Anthony v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
See § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2008) (“The provisions of this code and offenses defined by other statutes shall be strictly construed; when the language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the accused.”); Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480, 481 (Fla.1984) (where legislature does not establish allowable unit of prosecution with clarity, ambiguity must be resolved in accused’s favor).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bautista v. State (2×)
Fla. · 2003 · confidence medium
But we also stated that "[w]here legislative intent as to punishment is clear ... the rule of lenity does not apply." Grappin, 450 So.2d at 482.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. DeSantiago
Wash. · 2003 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Alverson, 666 F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir. 1982); Grappin v. State, 450 So. 2d 480, 482 (Fla. 1984) (“[T]he phrase ‘to receive or possess a firearm’ has been held to express a legislative intent to allow separate prosecutions for each firearm.” “We find that the use of the article ‘a’ in reference to ‘a firearm’. . . clearly shows that the legislature intended to make each firearm a separate unit of prosecution.”); State v. Nichols, 865 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (“The plain and ordinary meaning of the word ‘a’ is the singular ‘one.�…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. DeSantiago
Wash. · 2003 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Alverson, 666 F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir.1982); Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480, 482 (Fla.1984) ("[T]he phrase `to receive or possess a firearm' has been held to express a legislative intent to allow separate prosecutions for each firearm." "We find that the use of the article `a' in reference to `a firearm' ... clearly shows that the legislature intended to make each firearm a separate unit of prosecution."); State v. Nichols, 865 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Mo.App.1993) ("The plain and ordinary meaning of the word `a' is the singular `one.' Therefore, each knife which Defendant …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Nome Commercial Co. v. National Bank of Alaska
Alaska · 1997 · confidence medium
Co., 580 *450 So.2d 480, 481 (La.App.1991) (holding eviction for non-payment of rent is proper and not a valid basis for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Kidd
Iowa · 1997 · confidence medium
E.g., United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383, 390 (8th Cir.1991) (holding statute prohibiting carrying “a firearm” authorized multiple prosecutions, one for each weapon carried by the defendant); United States v. Alverson, 666 F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir.1982) (holding proper unit of prosecution under statute prohibiting possession of “an unregistered machine gun” was each gun possessed); Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480, 482 (Fla.1984) (holding statute which prohibits theft of “a firearm” defines unit of prosecution as a single firearm); State v. Lindsey, 583 So.2d 1200, 1204 (La.App…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) C.S. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480, 482 (Fla.1984) (citing, inter alia, United States v. Alverson, 666 F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir.1982); Sanders v. United States, 441 F.2d 412, 414-15 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 846 , 92 S.Ct. 147 , 30 L.Ed.2d 82 (1971)).
discussed Cited "see" PATRICK GAMMAGE v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Grappin v. State, 450 So. 2d 480, 482 (Fla. 1984) (explaining the "a/any" test and noting that a statute that criminalizes the act of taking "any firearm" is ambiguous such that only one prosecution will be permitted for all firearms taken in a single episode).
cited Cited "see" Thibeault v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480 (Fla.1984).
cited Cited "see" Burk v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480, 481 (Fla.1984).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Tonya Rennay Medders v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2026 · signal: compare · confidence medium
Compare Grappin v. State, 450 So. 2d 480, 482 (Fla. 1984) (holding that the term “a firearm” in a theft statute indicates one prosecution for each firearm stolen) with State v. Watts, 462 So. 2d 813, 814 (Fla. 1985) (holding that the term “any firearm or weapon” in a prison contraband statute is ambiguous, applying the rule of lenity to allow only one prosecution for the possession of two prison-made knives), and Wallace v. State, 724 So. 2d 1176, 1180 (Fla. 1998) (applying Grappin and Watts and holding that the term “any officer” in a violent arrest statute is ambiguous, allowing …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." City of St. Petersburg v. Austrino
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 , 79 S.Ct. 329 , 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); see also Smith v. State, 450 So.2d 480, 480 (Fla.1984) (holding that the State in "demonstrating the veracity of hearsay information relied on for an arrest" need not show "both the credibility of the informant and the reliability of his information").
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Baldwin v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence low
"Where two violations of the same statute rather than two violations of different statutes are charged, courts determine whether a single offense is involved ... by asking what act the legislature intended as the `unit of prosecution' under the statute." United States v. Weathers, 186 F.3d 948, 952 (D.C.Cir.1999) (citing Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 , 98 S.Ct. 2170 , 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978)); see also State v. Grappin, 427 So.2d 760, 761 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), approved, 450 So.2d 480 (Fla.1984); Burk v. State, 705 So.2d 1003, 1004 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Williams
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480 (Fla.1984) (holding that use of the article "a" in conjunction with theft of firearms under section 812.014(2)(c)5 indicated legislative intent to allow multiple punishments for stealing a number of firearms from one person at the same time).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Thomas v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare State v. Watts, 462 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1985) (defendant's possession of two knives in prison was a single offense where statute proscribed possession of "any firearm") with Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480 (Fla. 1984) (theft of five guns was five offenses where statute proscribed theft of "a firearm").
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Kirk
Cal. Ct. App. · 1989 · signal: see also · confidence low
(Compare United States v. Brown 623 F.2d at 58 (use of ‘any’) with Sanders v. United States, 441 F.2d at 414-415 (use of ‘a’).” (Id. at p. 347; see also Grappin v. State (Fla. 1984) 450 So.2d 480, 481-483 .) This substantial body of federal law persuades us that former section 12020, subdivision (a) is facially ambiguous.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Johnson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480 (Fla. 1984) (use of article "a" in reference to theft of firearms under section 812.014(2)(b)3 indicated legislative intent to allow multiple punishments for stealing a number of firearms from one person at the same time), with State v. Watts, 462 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1985) (use of word "any" in section 944.47 regarding possession of firearms in correctional institutions established legislative intent of single prosecution).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Kent Edward GRAPPIN, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
63450.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 10, 1984.
450 So. 2d 480
Overton.
Cited by 45 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 86%
Citer courts: District Court of Appeal of Fl… (3)

[*481] Jerry Hill, Public Defender, and Allyn Giambalvo, Asst. Public Defender, Clearwater, for petitioner.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Robert J. Krauss, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for respondent.

OVERTON, Justice.

This is a petition to review a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal reported as State v. Grappin, 427 So.2d 760 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), in which the district court held that the unlawful taking of two or more firearms during the same criminal episode is subject to separate prosecution and punishment under the theft statute as to each firearm taken. We find direct conflict with Thomas v. State, 405 So.2d 1015 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Drakes v. State, 400 So.2d 487 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 411 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1981); and Joiner v. State, 382 So.2d 1357 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 388 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 1980). We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, and we approve the decision of the district court.

The facts reflect that the petitioner was charged in a five-count information which alleged that he committed five separate acts of second-degree grand larceny by stealing five firearms during the course of a single burglary. Petitioner moved to dismiss the information contending that, under the circumstances of this case, he could only be charged with one larceny offense. At the hearing on petitioner's motion to dismiss, it was agreed that the firearms in question were owned by the same individual and were taken from the same place at the same time. The trial court dismissed the information without prejudice to the state to file an amended information. Relying on Hearn v. State, 55 So.2d 559 (Fla. 1951), the trial court held that where several items are taken at the same time and place as one continuous act, the offense is a single theft.

The state appealed the dismissal of the information and the district court reversed the trial court's order. The district court recognized the principle that the "legislature can treat the simultaneous unlawful taking of two or more of a particular object of property as separate thefts." 427 So.2d at 762. The district court further recognized, however, that where the "legislature does not establish the allowable unit of prosecution with clarity, the ambiguity must be resolved in the accused's favor." Id. In construing the theft statute, section 812.014(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), to determine the allowable unit of prosecution intended by the legislature,[*] the district court concluded that in the statute the legislature used the articles "a" and "any" to signify the permissible unit of prosecution. Because the article "a" was used in reference to "a firearm" in section 812.014(2)(b)3, the district court determined, the legislature intended "to treat separately each stick in the bundle," id. at 763, and to allow separate prosecution and punishment for the taking of each firearm. The trial court's reliance on Hearn v. State, the district court determined, was incorrect because Hearn "antedated the enactment of the theft statute ... [and] conflicts with the legislature's intent regarding the allowable unit of prosecution under parts 2 through 4 of section 812.014(2)(b)." Id. at 762. The district court concluded that

a common sense reading of the plain language of section 812.014(2)(b) demonstrates[*482] that the legislature unmistakably intended for the simultaneous unlawful taking of more than one firearm to be subject to a separate prosecution (and punishment) as to each firearm so taken. One who reads subsection (2)(b) is not only placed on guard that the unlawful taking of a single firearm is a single violation of the theft statute but is also provided with a fair warning that the simultaneous stealing of several firearms is several violations of the theft statute. In short, a single firearm is the unit of prosecution.

Id. at 763.

The petitioner contends that this Court should reject the district court's construction of the statute and reaffirm the rule in Hearn that where several items are stolen in a single criminal episode only one larceny has occurred. Petitioner argues that to allow the state to divide a single theft offense into several separate larcenies is violative of double jeopardy protections because there has been only one taking. Further, petitioner asserts, the district court's strained reading of the theft statute and its distinction between the articles "a" and "any" does not result in a common sense interpretation of the statute; both articles carry the same meaning and refer to one thing. Finally, the petitioner maintains that, at best, the legislative intent as to the permissible unit of prosecution is ambiguous and that, as the district court noted, any such doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.

We agree with the district court and approve its decision. In our recent decision in State v. Getz, 435 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1983), which was decided after the district court issued its opinion in this case, we held that the grand theft of a firearm and the petit theft of a calculator and coins at the same time from the same place constitute separate offenses under section 812.014(2)(b) and (c). We concluded that "as the theft statute is written, the legislature intended to make theft of a firearm under subsection (2)(b)3 and theft of property worth less than one hundred dollars under subsection (2)(c) separate and distinct offenses, even where the thefts occur in a single criminal episode." Id. at 791. In Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955), the United States Supreme Court held that "[t]he punishment appropriate for the diverse federal offenses is a matter for the discretion of Congress...." Id. at 82, 75 S.Ct. at 621. If the Congress does not fix the punishment for federal offenses clearly and without ambiguity, the Court held, then the rule of lenity applies and the ambiguity is to be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses. Where legislative intent as to punishment is clear, however, the rule of lenity does not apply. In Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 78 S.Ct. 1280, 2 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1958), the United States Supreme Court found the legislative intent clear, distinguished Bell, and upheld three separate convictions and sentences arising out of a single criminal episode of narcotics distribution.

We find that the use of the article "a" in reference to "a firearm" in section 812.014(2)(b)3 clearly shows that the legislature intended to make each firearm a separate unit of prosecution. The construction which this Court and the district court place on this statute is consistent with federal court decisions construing similar federal statutes. Federal courts have held that the term "any firearm" is ambiguous with respect to the unit of prosecution and that several firearms taken at the same time must be treated as a single offense with multiple convictions and punishments being precluded. See United States v. Rosenbarger, 536 F.2d 715 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965, 97 S.Ct. 2920, 53 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1977); United States v. Kinsley, 518 F.2d 665 (8th Cir.1975). On the other hand, the phrase "to receive or possess a firearm" has been held to express a legislative intent to allow separate prosecutions for each firearm. In United States v. Alverson, 666 F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir.1982), the court stated:

Use of the article "a" stands in marked contrast to other language in other weapons statutes that have been interpreted[*483] to preclude prosecution for each object of the offense. Compare United States v. Brown [Brown v. United States], 623 F.2d 54 at 58 (use of "any") with Sanders v. United States, 441 F.2d 412 at 414-15 (use of "a").

In conclusion, we agree with the district court that this Court's decision in Hearn is not controlling here. Hearn is not applicable here because the legislature unambiguously intended that the taking of each firearm be treated as a theft. Multiple thefts of firearms which occur in a single episode are to be considered separate crimes under the statute.

For the reasons expressed, we approve the decision of the district court and disapprove the decisions in Thomas, Drakes, and Joiner to the extent that they conflict with our decision here.

It is so ordered.

ALDERMAN, C.J., and BOYD, McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.

ADKINS, J., dissents with an opinion.

ADKINS, Justice, dissenting.

I dissent.

The charges were made under the same subsection of section 812.014(2)(b) and all the firearms were taken during the same episode. State v. Getz, 435 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1983), involved charges based on two different subsections of section 812.014(2).

Under the rule pronounced by the majority, an accused charged with stealing one hundred "hundred dollar bills" could be charged with one hundred grand thefts. If there were some extra change, he would face an additional petit larceny charge for each coin. This result is ridiculous.

[*] Section 812.014(2)(b) reads as follows:

(b) It is grand theft of the second degree and a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in ss. 775.082, 775.083, and 775.084, if the property stolen is:

1. Valued at $100 or more, but less than $20,000.

2. A will, codicil, or other testamentary instrument.

3. A firearm.

4. A motor vehicle.

5. Any member of the genus Bos (cattle) or the genus Equus (horse), or any hybrid of the specified genera.

6. Any fire extinguisher.

7. Any amount of citrus fruit consisting of 2,000 or more individual pieces of fruit.

8. Taken from a designated construction site identified by the posting of a sign as provided for in s. 810.09(2)(d).

(Emphasis added.)