J.W. v. State, 467 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). · Go Syfert
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J.W. v. State, 467 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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Presence at the scene of an offense and flight from the scene are legally insufficient to establish guilt as an aider and abettor.

A juvenile is adjudicated delinquent for criminal mischief, burglary, and possession of burglary tools based on evidence that he was present at the scene and fled when discovered. The state offers no direct evidence identifying the juvenile as the perpetrator, leaving only circumstantial evidence to establish his guilt as an aider and abettor. The court examines whether presence at the scene and flight are sufficient to prove the intent to participate and assistance required for accomplice liability. Applying the rule that circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, the court finds the state failed to eliminate the possibility that the juvenile was merely a witness. Consequently, the evidence is legally insufficient to support the adjudication.

38 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: H.M. v. State, 802 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985 2005 2026
How cited ↗
Cited for
At page 797 Insufficient evidence for aiding and abetting based on presence and flight14 citing cases“presence at the scene of the offense and flight from the scene is legally insufficient to establish appellant's guilt as an aider and abettor.”3 citing courts quote it · passage not found verbatim in the opinion (92%) · 10 listed here
  • H.M. v. State, 802 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).published
    (Presence at the scene of the offense and flight from the scene is legally insufficient to establish appellant’s guilt as an aider and abettor.)
  • James Warmington v. State of Florida, 149 So. 3d 648 (Fla. 2014).published 2 cites
    After Warmington asserted that he was actually innocent, the State was required under Florida law to refute any reasonable hypothesis of his innocence — which it did, partly by way of the testimony it elicited from Warmington. 3 But see ge…
  • ASF v. State, 70 So. 3d 754 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).published 4 cites
    Id. (citing J.W. v. State, 467 So.2d 796, 797 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)).
  • R.M. v. State, 763 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).published 2 cites
    "Presence at the scene of the offense and flight from the scene is legally insufficient to establish appellant's guilt...." Id. (quoting J.W. v. State, 467 So.2d 796, 797 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)).
  • A.B.G. v. State, 605 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 1992).published
    See, e.g., C.P.P. v. State, 479 So.2d 858, 859 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); J.W. v. State, 467 So.2d, 796, 797 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); In re A.R., 460 So.2d 1024, 1025 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); G.C. v. State, 407 So.2d 639, 640 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
  • E.B. v. State, 568 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).published
    J.W. v. State, 467 So.2d 796, 797 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); T.J.T. v. State, 460 So.2d 508, 509 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); see also Staten v. State, 519 So.2d 622, 624 (Fla.1988).
  • M.F. v. State, 549 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).published 2 cites
    "Where the state relies on circumstantial evidence to establish the accused's assistance and intent to participate, it is necessary for the state to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." J.W. v. State, 467 So.2d 796, 797 (Fla.…
  • In the Interest of B.W. v. State, 546 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).published
    “Where the State relies on circumstantial evidence to establish the accused’s assistance and intent to participate, it is necessary to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” J.W. v. State, 467 So.2d 796, 797 (Fla.3d DCA 1985).
  • C.P.P. v. State, 479 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).published 2 cites
    "Where the state relies on circumstantial evidence to establish the accused's assistance and intent to participate, it is necessary to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." J.W. v. State, 467 So.2d 796, 797 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
  • D.F.J. v. State, 60 So. 3d 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).published
    See J.W. v. State, 467 So.2d 796, 797 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
Other citing cases2 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
J.W., a Juvenile, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
84-469.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Apr 23, 1985.
Published opinion
467 So. 2d 796
1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 13576
Hendry, Baskin and Daniel S. Pearson.
Published

[*797] Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Howard K. Blumberg, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Diane Leeds and Carolyn Snurkowski, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

Before HENDRY, BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.

HENDRY, Judge.

J.W., a juvenile, appeals from an adjudication of delinquency arising from a determination that he was guilty of criminal mischief, burglary and possession of burglary tools.

The issue in this appeal is whether the state adduced sufficient evidence to establish that appellant was an aider and abettor to the offenses charged. The facts, briefly stated, were as follows. After Vivian Taylor parked her car at her sister's house and went inside, appellant and another individual were observed standing next to the driver's side of Taylor's car. Appellant and the other individual were by the car when the driver's window was smashed. One individual was observed leaning into the car while the other was seen standing with his hand on the front of the automobile, looking toward the house. When occupants of a nearby house came out, the appellant and the other person ran away. No one at the adjudicatory hearing could identify which individual had broken the window, or who had leaned into the window. After the state offered this evidence, it rested its case. The appellant then moved for a judgment of acquittal, which motion was denied. He was thereafter adjudicated delinquent.

Since no one at the hearing could identify who broke the window or leaned into the window, it must be assumed it was not the appellant. J.L.B. v. State, 396 So.2d 761 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); K.W.U. v. State, 367 So.2d 647 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 378 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1979). Appellant could then only be found guilty of the offenses charged if he acted as an aider and abettor. For appellant to be guilty as an aider and abettor, the state must prove that he had an intent to participate in the criminal act and rendered assistance to the actual perpetrator of the crime. N.W. v. State, 10 FLW 645 (Fla. 1st DCA Mar. 14, 1985); A.R. v. State, 460 So.2d 1024 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); T.J.T. v. State, 460 So.2d 508 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); G.C. v. State, 407 So.2d 639 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); J.L.B. v. State, 396 So.2d at 762; Pack v. State, 381 So.2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); J.H. v. State, 370 So.2d 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 379 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1980).

Appellant contends that the state's only evidence against him is that he was present at the scene of the commission of a crime and that he fled therefrom. He contends the state offers no evidence that he assisted in the perpetration of a crime or that he had the intent to join in the crime. We agree with appellant's assertions.

Where the state relies on circumstantial evidence to establish the accused's assistance and intent to participate, it is necessary for the state to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Jaramillo v. State, 417 So.2d 257 (Fla. 1982); McArthur v. State, 351 So.2d 972 (Fla. 1977); Davis v. State, 90 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1956); Pack v. State, 381 So.2d at 1200; Lockett v. State, 262 So.2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). This the state has not done.

The state has not excluded the reasonable hypothesis that the appellant was merely a witness to the crime. Presence at the scene of the offense and flight from the scene is legally insufficient to establish appellant's guilt as an aider and abettor. J.L.B. v. State, 396 So.2d at 762; D.M. v. State, 394 So.2d 520 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); J.O. v. State, 384 So.2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Pack v. State, 381 So.2d at 1200; J.H. v. State, 370 So.2d at 1220. Therefore the order of adjudication and commitment is reversed and the case remanded with directions to discharge the appellant.

Reversed and remanded.