McGregor v. State, 789 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 2001). · Go Syfert
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McGregor v. State, 789 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 2001). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
28 citation events (28 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Marcus Roland Maye v. State of Florida (fla, 2026-05-15)
Treatment trajectory · 2001 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2001 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Marcus Roland Maye v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2026 · confidence medium
McGregor v. State, 789 So. 2d 976, 977 (Fla. 2001); Galindez, 955 So. 2d at 521 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Marcus Roland Maye v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2026 · confidence medium
McGregor v. State, 789 So. 2d 976, 977 (Fla. 2001); Galindez, 955 So. 2d at 521 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gerald Brown v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
At a minimum, we fail to see how Apprendi and Blakely would require retroactive application.1 Finally, given the postconviction court did not attach any records to its order, our record is insufficient for us to conduct a harmless error analysis, Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517 , 522–23 (Fla. 2007), or to determine if Brown’s Apprendi argument was preserved, McGregor v. State, 789 So. 2d 976, 977 (Fla. 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marco T. Denson v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
VI, U.S. Const. However, I write to explain why I would reverse on this issue if I were not bound by this court’s decision in Simmons v. State, 332 So. 3d 1129 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022).3 In my view, Simmons is wrongly decided because it is inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 1 Our supreme court has instructed that Apprendi claims are subject to both the rule on preservation, see McGregor v. State, 789 So. 2d 976, 977 (Fla. 2001), and a harmless error analysis, see Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517 , 522–23 (Fla. 2007).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ivory Lee Robinson v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
McGregor v. State, 789 So.2d 976, 977 (Fla. 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) William J. Plott v. State of Florida (2×)
Fla. · 2014 · confidence medium
In so holding, the district court relied on this - 12 - Court’s decision in McGregor v. State, 789 So. 2d 976, 977 (Fla. 2001), which held that an Apprendi error is procedural in nature and must be preserved for review.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mack v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
See Gudinas v. State, 879 So.2d 616, 618 (Fla.2004); Robinson v. State, 793 So.2d 891, 892-93 (Fla.2001); McGregor v. State, 789 So.2d 976, 977-78 (Fla.2001).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Hughes v. State (3×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 2005 · confidence medium
Finally, concerning Apprendi , we held in McGregor v. State, 789 So.2d 976, 977 (Fla. 2001), that a claim of Apprendi error must be preserved for review and we expressly rejected the assertion that such error is fundamental.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gudinas v. State
Fla. · 2004 · confidence medium
Accordingly, proof to the jury of a defendant's release which subjects a defendant to a sentence under the Act is not required."); Parker v. State, 790 So.2d 1033, 1035-36 (Fla.2001); McGregor v. State, 789 So.2d 976, 977-78 (Fla.2001); Sheffield v. State, 794 So.2d 592, 594 (Fla.2001); Barnes v. State, 794 So.2d 590, 592 (Fla.2001); Smith v. State, 793 So.2d 889, 891 (Fla.2001); Marshall v. *619 State, 789 So.2d 969, 970-71 (Fla.2001); McDowell v. State, 789 So.2d 956, 957 (Fla. 2001); Sheffield v. State, 789 So.2d 340, 342 (Fla.2001); Balkcom v. State, 789 So.2d 949, 950-51 (Fla.2000).
cited Cited "see" Luton v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See McGregor v. State, 789 So.2d 976, 977 (Fla.2001).
cited Cited "see" Gurley v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See McGregor v. State, 789 So.2d 976 (Fla.2001).
discussed Cited "see" Sheffield v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See McGregor v. State, 789 So.2d 976 (Fla.2001) (holding that Apprendi was not applicable to prison releasee reoffender sentences); McBride v. State, 884 So.2d 476 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (recognizing that neither Apprendi nor Blakely is applicable to habitual offender sentences).
cited Cited "see" Cassels v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See McGregor v. State, 789 So.2d 976 (Fla.2001); Gorham v. State, 454 So.2d 556, 557 (Fla.1984).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Reeves v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Jackson v. State, 802 So.2d 387 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Robbinson v. State, 784 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); see also McGregor v. State, 789 So.2d 976 (Fla.2001).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Steven McGREGOR, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
SC00-1215.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jul 12, 2001.
789 So. 2d 976
Lewis.
Cited by 17 opinions  |  Published

[*977] Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Phil Patterson, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.

LEWIS, J.

We have for review McGregor v. State, 763 So.2d 1222 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

The petitioner challenges his sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act (the "Act") on several grounds, many of which have been previously addressed by opinions of this Court. See Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla.2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act and holding that the Act violates neither the single subject rule for legislation nor principles of equal protection); McKnight v. State, 769 So.2d 1039 (Fla.2000) (holding that a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the Act and to challenge the State's evidence regarding the defendant's eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender); State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla.2000) (holding that the Act does not permit a "victim veto" which would violate a defendant's due process rights by precluding application of the Act in some instances but not others, as well as holding that the Act is not void for vagueness and does not constitute a form of cruel or unusual punishment); Ellis v. State, 762 So.2d 912 (Fla.2000) (recognizing that publication in the Laws of Florida or the Florida Statutes gives all citizens constructive notice of the consequences of their actions).

Finally, the petitioner asserts that he is entitled to relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). First, the petitioner did not properly preserve the issue for appellate review. Even if he had, we would hold that an argument for relief under Apprendi lacks merit here. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court stated: "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The petitioner now asserts that because sentencing under the Act requires that a defendant "commit[], or attempt[] to commit" any of an enumerated list of crimes "within 3 years of being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor," section 775.082(9)(a)(1).,[1] Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998), the reasoning in Apprendi requires that a defendant's release be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.

In our view, Apprendi did not overrule the Supreme Court's previous decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986). In[*978] McMillan, the Supreme Court considered a statute which imposed a mandatory minimum sentence in connection with an offense committed while a defendant possessed a visible firearm and held that proof of the possession of the firearm was not required because the possession did not alter the maximum penalty or create a separate offense calling for a separate penalty. The Apprendi Court made clear that it was not overruling McMillan when it stated:

The principal dissent accuses us of today "overruling McMillan." We do not overrule McMillan. We limit its holding to cases that do not involve the imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury's verdict— a limitation identified in the McMillan opinion itself.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487 n. 13, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The Apprendi Court reasoned that the statute addressed in McMillan neither altered the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor created a separate offense calling for a separate penalty. The statute was viewed solely as a limitation upon the sentencing court's discretion to select the penalty within the range already available.

It is our opinion that the Act does not increase the maximum statutory penalty. Here the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the statutory range is simply limited. Accordingly, proof to the jury of a defendant's release which subjects a defendant to a sentence under the Act is not required.

We agree with the reasoning of the Fourth District in Kijewski v. State, 773 So.2d 124 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), review denied, No. SC01-181, 790 So.2d 1105 (Fla. Apr.30, 2001). We hold that Apprendi does not require that the petitioner's release be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. We also determine that the petitioner's related arguments based on Apprendi are similarly unavailing.[2] Moreover, it is important to note that we have previously reached a similar conclusion in connection with sentencing under another recidivist statute. See Eutsey v. State, 383 So.2d 219, 224 (Fla.1980) (rejecting a petitioner's due process argument that particular facts required for his sentencing under a habitual offender statute were subject to standard of being proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury). Accordingly, we approve the decision of the district court to the extent it is consistent with Grant, McKnight, Cotton, and Ellis.

It is so ordered.

WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, and PARIENTE, JJ., concur. QUINCE, J., dissents.

1 Prior to the Act's amendment in 1998, similar language appeared in subsection (8)(a)(1).
2 We further reject the assertion that relief is warranted under the fundamental error doctrine.