Albert v. Comm'r, 13 T.C. 129 (Tax Ct. 1949). · Go Syfert
Albert v. Comm'r, 13 T.C. 129 (Tax Ct. 1949). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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Expenses for meals, lodging, and commuting between a permanent home and a regular place of employment are personal living expenses rather than deductible business travel expenses.

A taxpayer residing in Gloucester, Massachusetts, commuted daily to her employment in Lowell, Massachusetts, and claimed deductions for meals, lodging, and transportation. The court must determine whether these expenses constitute deductible traveling expenses while away from home in pursuit of a trade or business. The court applies the rule that expenses incurred for meals and lodging at a taxpayer's regular place of employment, as well as commuting expenses between a permanent home and that place, are personal living expenses rather than business expenses. Because the taxpayer’s employment was indefinite in duration and she maintained a permanent home for personal reasons, the court holds that the claimed expenses are not deductible. The court affirms the deficiency determination.

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At page 131 Distinguishing temporary versus indefinite employment status16 citing cases“the sort of employment in which termination within a short period could be foreseen.”15 citing courts quote it
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Beatrice H. Albert
v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Docket No. 19152.
United States Tax Court.
Jul 22, 1949.
Published opinion
13 T.C. 129
1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 121
Louis Albert, Esq ., for the petitioner. Melvin L. Sears, Esq ., for the respondent.
Murdock.
Cited by 54 opinions  |  Published

OPINION.

Murdock, Judge:

The Commissioner concedes that the expenditures were reasonable in amount and of the type that would be deduc-tibie in a proper case, but argues that this taxpayer’s post of duty or employment was in Lowell, and the expenditures were personal or living expenses due to the petitioner’s desire to continue to reside in Gloucester. Here, as in the cases of Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U. S. 465, and Barnhill v. Commissioner, 148 Fed. (2d) 913, the taxpayer had but one job and, for personal reasons, rather than to prosecute or develop the business, chose to reside at a long established home away from this particular place of employment.

This case is not distinguishable in principle from the early case of Mort L. Bixler, 5 B. T. A. 1181. The petitioner in that case was the husband, while here the wife is the petitioner, but in each the alleged traveler was, so far as the record shows, the only one in the family gainfully employed. The employment in each case lacked permanence, but, on the other hand, was indefinite in duration rather than obviously temporary, in that it was not the sort of employment in which termination within a short period could be foreseen, as was the situation in Harry F. Schurer, 3 T. C. 544, and E. G. Leach, 12 T. C. 20. The suggestion or warning that there might be a change of station upon short notice does not justify extensive discussion, since the evidence fails to show how probable this possibility was, except for the fact that the petitioner actually remained on duty in Lowell from 1943 until the end of 1945. Other cases similar to this one involving employment for a limited, indefinite period are Ney v. United States, 171 Fed. (2d) 449; certiorari denied, 336 U. S. 967; George W. Lindsay, 34 B. T. A. 840; John D. Johnson, 8 T. C. 303; and Robert F. Green, 12 T. C. 656.

Commuting expenses have never been allowed as deductions. Frank H. Sullivan, 1 B. T. A. 93.

Decision will be entered for the respondent.