McCarren Et Al. v. Town of Springfield, Vermont, Et Al., 464 U.S. 942 (1983). · Go Syfert
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McCarren Et Al. v. Town of Springfield, Vermont, Et Al., 464 U.S. 942 (1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 1 distinct case · “the federal judiciary’s supervisory powers] over prosecutorial activities that take place outside the courthouse is extremely limited, if it exists at all”
cited 3× by 1 distinct case · “The Thirteenth Amendment, however, is inapplicable where involuntary servitude is imposed as punishment for a crime.”
75 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 29 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Arango (flsd, 1987-06-16)
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 20 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. Arango
S.D. Fla. · 1987 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the federal judiciary's supervisory powers over prosecutorial activities that take place outside the courthouse is extremely limited, if it exists at all
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. James C. Ausmus, Jr.
6th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the thirteenth amendment, however, is inapplicable where involuntary servitude is imposed as punishment for a crime.
discussed Cited "see" American Financial Services Assn. v. Burke
D. Conn. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 393 , 108 S.Ct. 636 , 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988); see Town of Springfield v. McCarren, 549 F.Supp. 1134, 1144 (D.Vt.1982), aff'd, 722 F.2d 728 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 360 , 78 L.Ed.2d 322 (1983) (“Parties who object to state statutes ... on Supremacy Clause ... grounds frequently prefer to bring anticipatory challenges ... rather than await the opportunity to make their defense in state enforcement actions in which they face the danger of punishment should their objections turn out to be ill-founded.”).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Santana
1st Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hasting, 16The Second Circuit has gone even further, reading the Supreme Court's cases to suggest that "the federal judiciary's supervisory powers over prosecutorial activities that take place outside the courthouse is extremely limited, if it exists at all." United States v. Lau Tung Lam, 714 F.2d 209, 210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942 (1983).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Santana
1st Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hasting, ___ _______ ____________________ 16The Second Circuit has gone even further, reading the Supreme Court's cases to suggest that "the federal judiciary's supervisory powers over prosecutorial activities that take place outside the courthouse is extremely limited, if it exists at all." United States v. Lau Tung Lam, 714 F.2d 209, 210 (2d ______________ _____________ Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942 (1983).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Daniel Lee Watson
8th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Drefke, 707 F.2d 978, 980-81 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 359 , 78 L.Ed.2d 321 (1983).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Eugene R. Rosnow, United States of America v. Melford H. Haugen, United States of America v. Juanita M. Dewey, United States of America v. David C. Rodewald, United States of America v. Kermit H. Rodewald, United States of America v. Wallace H. Rodewald, United States of America v. Leland Frederick Erickson, United States of America v. Robert M. Dick, United States of America v. Harry E. Carlson, United States of America v. Duane C. Hansen, United States of America v. Roger Walter Sands, United States of America v. Dennis W. Sands, United States of America v. Jeffry R. Morse, United States of America v. George A. Yant, United States of America v. Karl H. Peters
8th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Drefke, 707 F.2d 978, 981 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 359 , 78 L.Ed.2d 321 (1983).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Rosnow
8th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Drefke, 707 F.2d 978, 981 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 359 , 78 L.Ed.2d 321 (1983).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Dirk Francis Jennings, John Daniel Cornwell, Jr., United States of America v. Jason Coler Nichols, Jose Luis Casas, Angela Mary Casas
9th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Lau Tung Lam, 714 F.2d 209, 210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 359 , 78 L.Ed.2d 322 (1983).
discussed Cited "see" Kenneth G. Geimer v. Samuel T. Pastrovich, Jr., Samuel T. Pastrovich, III (2×)
8th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Drefke, 707 F.2d 978, 983 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 359 , 78 L.Ed.2d 321 (1983). 24 Geimer also argues that the district court erred by allowing opposing counsel to examine him on the details of where he was looking when he stepped into the hole.
cited Cited "see" State v. Green
Neb. · 1991 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord, United States v. Drefke, 707 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 942 , 104 S. Ct. 359 , 78 L.
discussed Cited "see" Terril W. Huelsman Richard K. Yackey v. Civic Center Corporation Sportservice Corporation
8th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Drefke, 707 F.2d 978, 983 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 359 , 78 L.Ed.2d 321 (1983); accord Henn v. National Geographic Soc’y, 819 F.2d 824, 831 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 454 , 98 L.Ed.2d 394 (1987); United States v. Thomann, 609 F.2d 560, 566 (1st Cir.1979).
discussed Cited "see" Federal Express Corp. v. Tennessee Public Service Commission
M.D. Tenn. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Town of Springfield v. McCarren, 549 F.Supp. 1134, 1138-39 (D.Vt.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 360 , 78 L.Ed.2d 322 (1983), citing First Federal Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417 , 423 n. 8 (1st Cir.1979); Braniff Int'l Inc. v. Florida Public Service Comm'n, 576 F.2d 1100, 1104-06 (5th Cir.1978); Conference of Federal Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir.1979), aff’d mem. 445 U.S. 921 , 100 S.Ct. 1304 , 63 L.Ed.2d 754 (1980).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Podolsky
N.D. Ill. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Lau Tung Lam, 714 F.2d 209, 210-22 (2d Cir. 1983) (defendant himself committed substantive jurisdictional act of bringing drugs into country), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 359 , 78 L.Ed.2d 322 (1983); United States v. Giordano, 693 F.2d 245, 250-51 (2d Cir.1982) (Archer distinguished in case under 18 U.S.C. § 844 (i) where defendant agreed with government agents to destroy a fictitious store); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 610-11 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (reversing judgment of acquittal in the largely fictitional “ABSCAM” undercover operation), cert. d…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Ming He, Also Known as Tony Jai
2d Cir. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
We too have recognized that courts cannot “fashion their own ‘sub-constitutional’ limitations on the conduct of law enforcement agents.” United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 847 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961 , 103 S.Ct. 2437 , 2438, 77 L.Ed.2d 1322 (1983); see also United States v. Lau Tung Lam, 714 F.2d 209, 210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 359 , 78 L.Ed.2d 322 (1983) (explaining that supervisory power over DEA conduct in a sting operation is “extremely limited”).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Landen Max Dula and Accrabond Corporation
5th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 709 F.2d 903, 907 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 360 , 78 L.Ed.2d 322 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Isidro Farias-Farias
5th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 709 F.2d 903, 908 (5th Cir.) (extrinsic evidence of prior instances of conduct was admissible under Rule 404(b) to establish requisite element of defendant’s intent), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 360 , 78 L.Ed.2d 322 (1983); Carson, 689 F.2d at 574-75 (extrinsic evidence of prior conduct admissible as relevant to material issue); Opager, 589 F.2d at 801 (extrinsic evidence of prior conduct admissible to disprove a specific fact material to defense); United States v. Contreras, 602 F.2d 1237, 1241-1242 (5th Cir.) (extrinsic evidence of defendant�…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. John A. Kroh, Jr. (2×)
8th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence low
"Although jurors may indeed have the power to ignore the law, their duty is to apply the law as interpreted by the court and they should be so instructed." United States v. Krzyske, 836 F.2d 1013, 1021 (6th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1027 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 905 , 104 S.Ct. 1683 , 80 L.Ed.2d 157 (1984)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832 , 109 S.Ct. 89 , 102 L.Ed.2d 65 (1988); see also United States v. Drefke, 707 F.2d 978, 982 (8th Cir.) ("federal courts have uniformly recognized the right and duty of the judge to instruct the jury on the law and the jur…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Harry Lee Wendt v. James A. Lynaugh, Director, Texas Department of Corrections
5th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Drefke, 707 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Jameson v. United States, 464 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 359 , 78 L.Ed.2d 321 (1983), in which the Court said at p. 983: “The Thirteenth Amendment ... is inapplicable where involuntary servitude is imposed as punishment for crime.” To the same effect are Piatt v. MacDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir.1985); Ray v. Mabry, 556 F.2d 881, 882 (8th Cir.1977); Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir.1966).
cited Cited "see, e.g." UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. LANDEN MAX DULA and ACCRABOND CORPORATION
unknown court · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 709 F.2d 903, 907 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
V. Louise McCarren
v.
Town of Springfield, Vermont and Vermont Public Power Supply Authority
82-1861.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 31, 1983.
464 U.S. 942
Rehnquist.
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 75%
Citer courts: Sixth Circuit (1) · S.D. Florida (1)
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice REHNQUIST, dissenting from denial of certiorari.

Lead Opinion

C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Justice Rehnquist,

dissenting.

The town of Springfield, Vermont, wishes to construct and operate a hydroelectric generating facility on the neighboring Black[*943] River, and in June 1978, applied to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for a license to do so. FERC has never ruled on this application. In January 1980, the town of Cavendish, Vermont, petitioned the Vermont Public Service Board for a declaratory judgment that Springfield’s proposed project was subject to the provisions of Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 30, §248 (Supp. 1983), which states that “[n]o company as defined [herein] . . . may begin site preparation for or construction of an electric generating facility within the state . . . unless the . . . board . . . [issues a certificate of public good].” App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a-59a.

Springfield appeared before the Public Service Board and contended that FERC’s licensing jurisdiction pre-empted the authority of the Board, but after briefing and argument the Board ruled that it had jurisdiction under § 248 and prohibited Springfield from commencing site preparation until Springfield obtained a certificate of public good.

Although Vermont law afforded Springfield a right of appeal from the Board’s decision to the Supreme Court of Vermont, Springfield did not avail itself of this right. Instead, it collaterally attacked the Board’s ruling by an action filed in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Board’s ruling was null and void on pre-emptive grounds. The District Court, in a thorough and well-reasoned opinion, canvassed the related issues raised by petitioners as a defense to its proceeding with the respondent’s suit: res judicata, abstention, and the principles of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). 549 F. Supp. 1134 (1982). Rejecting all of them, it ruled in favor of respondents on the merits of the preemption claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed substantially for the reasons set forth in the opinion of the District Court. 722 F. 2d 728 (1983). I would grant certiorari to review the District Court’s refusal to accord any res judicata weight to the determination of the Vermont Public Service Board.

The District Court held that res judicata did not apply, because “the policy against permitting [the Board] to act beyond its jurisdiction outweighs the policy underlying the doctrine of res judi-cata.” 549 F. Supp., at 1148. The District Court, relying on our decisions in Durfee v. Duke, 375 U. S. 106 (1963), and Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U. S. 433 (1940), in effect held that where the merits of the issue tendered by the federal plaintiff could result in[*944] a conclusion that the federal regulatory scheme ousted the state regulatory scheme, res judicata does not apply. I think this misreads the decisions upon which the District Court relied, and slights our recent decision in Insurance Corporation of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U. S. 694, 702, n. 9 (1982), where the Court said:

“A party that has had an opportunity to litigate the question of subject-matter jurisdiction may not, however, reopen that question in a collateral attack upon an adverse judgment. It has long been the rule that principles of res judicata apply to jurisdictional determinations — both subject matter and personal. See Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938).”

Kalb v. Feuerstein was a case in which Congress had confided exclusive jurisdiction for settlement of claims to the federal bankruptcy courts, and thereby ousted the state courts of jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims. 308 U. S., at 440. But here, although the federal courts may have reached an entirely correct conclusion on the merits of the federal pre-emption issue, there is not the remotest suggestion that Congress by enactment of legislation authorizing federal licensing of hydroelectric projects intended to deprive the Vermont Public Service Board of authority to hear any claim relating to such projects that would otherwise be within the jurisdiction of the Board.

Although the fact that the adjudicating agency in this case was a state agency, rather than a state court, may make some difference as to the extent to which res judicata principles apply, it is by no means dispositive of the issue.* “Occasionally courts have used language to the effect that res judicata principles do not apply to administrative proceedings, but such language is certainly too broad.” United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U. S. 394, 421-422 (1966) (footnotes omitted).

[*945] At a time when judges and observers are increasingly concerned with the workload of the federal courts, the application of principles of res judicata to disputes such as this might both conserve the time of the federal courts and make for a more orderly resolution of this and similar disputes.

This case may also present a question left open in Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 575-577 (1973): whether respondents were required by the line of cases beginning with Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), to pursue their avenues of appeal from the administrative ruling within the state court system. As this Court observed in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd,., 420 U. S. 592, 608 (1975), “[virtually all of the evils at which Younger is directed . . . inhere in federal intervention prior to completion of state appellate proceedings.”