Mobil Oil Corp. v. Blanton Et Al., 471 U.S. 1007 (1985). · Go Syfert
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Mobil Oil Corp. v. Blanton Et Al., 471 U.S. 1007 (1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
43 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 16 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Geas v. DuBois (mad, 1994-10-31)
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see" Geas v. DuBois
D. Mass. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559-60 , 99 S.Ct. at 1884-85 ; see United States v. Caldwell, 750 F.2d 341 (5th Cir.1984), cert. den., 471 U.S. 1007 , 105 S.Ct. 1873 , 85 L.Ed.2d 166 (1985) (digital rectal search of inmate, conducted in accordance with prison regulations, not unconstitutional); United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240, 1246 (5th Cir.1978) (body cavity searches of inmates are not per se unreasonable); see generally Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 , 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084 , 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) (correction facilities may use force in a number of circumstances). 9 .
cited Cited "see" Berg v. First State Insurance
9th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blanton v. Mobil Oil Corp., 721 F.2d 1207, 1217 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1007 , 105 S.Ct. 1874 , 85 L.Ed.2d 166 (1985).
cited Cited "see" Harold Berg Willard S. Boothby, Jr. Harold C. Stuart A. Alfred Taubman John W. Teets Laurence A. Tisch Henry Wendt v. First State Insurance Company the Harbor Insurance Company, Harold Berg Willard S. Boothby, Jr. Harold C. Stuart A. Alfred Taubman John W. Teets Laurence A. Tisch Henry Wendt v. First State Insurance Company, Harold Berg Willard S. Boothby, Jr. Harold C. Stuart A. Alfred Taubman John W. Teets Laurence A. Tisch Henry Wendt v. First State Insurance Company, and the Harbor Insurance Company
1st Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blanton v. Mobil Oil Corp., 721 F.2d 1207, 1217 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1007 , 105 S.Ct. 1874 , 85 L.Ed.2d 166 (1985).
cited Cited "see" Edmund A. Rachel, AKA Peter Rachel, D/B/A Wildlife Interiors, Plaintiff v. Banana Republic, Inc., Fisher Development, Inc., and the Gap, Inc.
9th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blanton v. Mobil Oil Corp., 721 F.2d 1207 , 1219 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1007 , 105 S.Ct. 1874 , 85 L.Ed.2d 166 (1985).
discussed Cited "see" Consul, Ltd. v. Transco Energy Company, Formerly Known as Transco Companies, Inc., and Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation, (Two Cases) Consul, Ltd. v. Transco Energy Company, Formerly Known as Transco Companies, Inc., and Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation
4th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blanton v. Mobil Oil Corp., 721 F.2d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir.1983) (plaintiff not required to prove a relevant market to show attempted monopolization under Sec. 2 when defendant engaged in per se violations of Sec. 1), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1007 , 105 S.Ct. 1874 , 85 L.Ed.2d 166 (1985); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 , 84 S.Ct. 1920 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1964) (decided prior to Walker Process ).
discussed Cited "see" Consul, Ltd. v. Transco Energy Co.
4th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blanton v. Mobil Oil Corp., 721 F.2d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir.1983) (plaintiff not required to prove a relevant market to show attempted monopolization under § 2 when defendant engaged in per se violations of § 1), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1007 , 105 S.Ct. 1874 , 85 L.Ed.2d 166 (1985); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 , 84 S.Ct. 1920 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1964) (decided prior to Walker Process).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Tracy Ray Vaughan v. James D. Ricketts
9th Cir. · 1988 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare United States v. Caldwell, 750 F.2d 341 (5th Cir.1984) (no eighth amendment violation where rectal search was called off when possibility of injury arose, and no unnecessary force was used), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1007 , 105 S.Ct. 1873 , 85 L.Ed.2d 166 (1985).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hewlett v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
Golson v. State , 34 Ala. App. 396 , 40 So.2d 725 (1949) and cases cited therein; see also Veith v. State , 48 Ala. App. 688 , 267 So.2d 480 (1972) and cases cited therein." See also United States v. Caldwell , 750 F.2d 341 , 346 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied , 471 U.S. 1007 , 105 S.Ct. 1873 , 85 L.Ed.2d 166 (1985); United States v. Pepe , 747 F.2d 632 , 654 (11th Cir. 1984).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Mobil Oil Corporation
v.
Jerry A. Blanton and Roy H. Healey
83-1896.
Supreme Court of the United States.
May 20, 1985.
471 U.S. 1007
White.
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

See 471 U.S. 1120, 105 S.Ct. 2369.

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice WHITE, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Justice White,

dissenting.

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict that petitioner had attempted to monopolize in violation of §2 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 2, and was therefore liable to respondents for treble damages. 721 F. 2d 1207 (1983). Ordinarily, a finding of attempted monopolization depends on a showing that there was a dangerous probability that the defendant would succeed in monopolizing a relevant market. See Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U. S. 172, 177 (1965); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 396 (1905); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F. 2d 263, 271-275 (CA2 1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1093 (1980). In this case, the jury found that the relevant submarket that petitioner had attempted to monopolize consisted of sales of “Mobil-branded and non-Mobil-branded oil, lubricants, and [tires, batteries, accessories and specialties] to Mobil dealers.”

On appeal, petitioner contended that, as a matter of law, sales to Mobil dealers only could not constitute a relevant submarket. The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to address this contention, for it concluded that the finding of attempted monopolization could be sustained without reference to the effects of petitioner’s conduct in any relevant market. The court relied in part on the Ninth Circuit’s earlier ruling in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327[*1008] F. 2d 459, cert. denied, 377 U. S. 993 (1964), in which the court had held that the relevant market was not an issue in an attempted monopoly case. In subsequent cases, the Ninth Circuit had refined the holding of Lessig to allow avoidance of the issue of effects in a relevant market only in cases where the plaintiff had proved “either predatory conduct or a per se violation of § 1 [of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. §1].” Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F. 2d 381, 390 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U. S. 936 (1979). Relying on the “Lessig doctrine” as modified in Gough, the court held that because respondents had proved that petitioner had engaged in practices that constitute per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act, the attempted monopolization verdict could be sustained without reference to the probability that petitioner’s conduct would lead to monopolization of any relevant market.

Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act are directed to different sorts of threats to competition in our economy. Section 1 proscribes concerted action — contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. Such concerted action is so inherently threatening to competition that in certain instances it is forbidden without regard to whether it has actually damaged competition in a particular market. Section 2 regulates unilateral conduct by outlawing monopolization and attempted monopolization. Because unilateral conduct is far less likely than concerted action to pose a threat to competition, “[t]he conduct of a single firm is governed by §2 alone and is unlawful only when it threatens actual monopolization.” Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U. S. 752, 767 (1984).

Because the Lessig doctrine allows a violation of § 2 to be found on the basis of a per se violation of § 1, without regard to the effect of a defendant’s conduct in any relevant market, it appears to be in tension with these principles. In addition, the doctrine, although accepted within the Ninth Circuit for over 20 years, has been explicitly rejected by a number of Courts of Appeals outside the Ninth Circuit. See Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F. 2d 105, 117 (CA3 1980), cert. denied, 451 U. S. 911 (1981); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F. 2d 704, 711-712 (CA7 1979), cert. denied, 445 U. S. 917 (1980); Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 575 F. 2d 256, 276, and n. 69 (CA5 1978), cert. denied, 440 U. S. 939 (1979); FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F. 2d 1019,[*1009] 1030 (CA2 1976), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1097 (1977); E. J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne Bell, Inc., 525 F. 2d 296, 305 (CA10 1975), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 907 (1976); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F. 2d 547, 550 (CA1 1974), cert. denied, 421 U. S. 1004 (1975); Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Products Co. 479 F. 2d 269, 287 (CA8), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1022 (1973). The questionable validity of the doctrine on which the decision of the Ninth Circuit in this case rested and the longstanding conflict among the Circuits over the issue indicate that this case is one that this Court ought to resolve. I would therefore grant the petition for certiorari.