Nyflot v. Minnesota Comm'r of Pub. Saf., 474 U.S. 1027 (1985). · Go Syfert
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Nyflot v. Minnesota Comm'r of Pub. Saf., 474 U.S. 1027 (1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
181 citation events (32 in the last 25 years) across 28 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Commonwealth v. Neary-French (mass, 2016-08-15)
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Neary-French
Mass. · 2016 · confidence medium
Safety, 474 U.S. 1027, 1029 (1985), addressed whether a defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel before deciding whether to consent to a blood alcohol test.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Neary-French (2×)
Mass. · 2016 · confidence medium
Id. at 1029.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Iowa v. John Arthur Senn Jr. (2×)
Iowa · 2016 · confidence medium
Safety, 474 U.S. 1027, 1027 , 106 S. Ct. 586, 586 , 88 L.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Amended September 21, 2016 State of Iowa v. John Arthur Senn Jr.
Iowa · 2016 · confidence medium
Safety, 474 U.S. 1027, 1027 , 106 S. Ct. 586, 586 , 88 L.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State of Iowa v. John Arthur Senn Jr.
Iowa · 2016 · confidence medium
Safety, 474 U.S. 1027, 1027 , 106 S. Ct. 586, 586 , 88 L.
discussed Cited "see" Kanikaynar v. Sisneros (2×)
10th Cir. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See id.
discussed Cited "see" Dobbins v. Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles (2×)
Ohio · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nyflot, 474 U.S. at 1029 , 106 S.Ct. at 587 [ 88 L.Ed.2d at 569 ].
discussed Cited "see" Dobbins v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles (2×)
Ohio · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nyflot 474 U.S. at 1029 , 106 S.Ct. at 587 [, 88 L.Ed.2d at 569 ].
discussed Cited "see" People v. Holt (2×)
Ill. App. Ct. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 , 478 N.E.2d 267, 277 , cert. denied (1985), 474 U.S. 1027 , 88 L.
discussed Cited "see" Roberts v. State of Maine
1st Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See McVeigh v. Smith, ___ _______ _____ 872 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding that the Supreme Court -8- rejected the argument that a suspect's right to counsel attaches prior to taking a blood alcohol test in Nyflot v. Minnesota ______ _________ Comm'r of Public Safety, 474 U.S. 1027 (1985), in which the _________________________ Supreme Court dismissed an appeal raising the right to counsel argument for lack of substantial federal question); Langelier v. _________ Coleman, 861 F.2d 1508 , 1510 n.3 (11th Cir. 1988) (noting right _______ to counsel had not yet attached when suspect was asked t…
examined Cited "see" Roberts v. State of Maine (4×)
1st Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See McVeigh v. Smith, 872 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding that the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a suspect’s right to counsel attaches prior to taking a blood alcohol test in Nyflot v. Minnesota Comm’r of Public Safety, 474 U.S. 1027 , 106 S.Ct. 586 , 88 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985), in which the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal raising the right to counsel argument for lack of substantial federal question); Langelier v. Coleman, 861 F.2d 1508 , 1510 n. 3 (11th Cir.1988) (noting right to counsel had not yet attached when suspect was asked to take a blood/alcohol test).
cited Cited "see" Pamela A. McVeigh v. Earl Smith
6th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nyflot, 474 U.S. at 1029 , 106 S.Ct. at 587 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Perez v. Pima County Superior (2×)
9th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1290-91 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting argument that a suspect’s right to counsel attaches prior to submitting to a sobriety test); McVeigh v. Smith, 872 F.2d 725, 727-28 (6th Cir.1989) (same); Langelier v. Coleman, 861 F.2d 1508 , 1510 n. 3 (11th Cir.1988) (same); see also Nyflot v. Minnesota Comm’r of Public Safety, 474 U.S. 1027 , 106 S.Ct. 586 , 88 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985) (dismissing for lack of a substantial federal question Appellant’s claim that her Constitutional rights were violated when she was refused counsel prior to submitting to a sobriety test).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Langelier v. Coleman (2×)
11th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Pauline, 625 F.2d 684 (5th Cir.1980) (when defendant dies pending direct appeal of criminal conviction, all proceedings had in the prosecution from its inception are abated). 4 5 Moreover, the Supreme Court may have rejected Langelier's constitutional arguments in Nyflot v. Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety, 474 U.S. 1027 , 106 S.Ct. 586 , 88 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Langelier v. Coleman (2×)
11th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Pauline, 625 F.2d 684 (5th Cir.1980) (when defendant dies pending direct appeal of criminal conviction, all proceedings had in the prosecution from its inception are abated). 4 Moreover, the Supreme Court may have rejected Langelier’s constitutional arguments in Nyflot v. Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety, 474 U.S. 1027 , 106 S.Ct. 586 , 88 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Cichowski (2×)
Conn. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
Ed. 2d 867 (1971); Seders v. Powell, 298 N.C. 453 , 259 S.E.2d 544 (1979); McNulty v. Curry, 42 Ohio St. 2d 341 , 328 N.E.2d 798 (1975); State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788 , 636 P.2d 393 (1981); Law v. Danville, 212 Va. 702 , 187 S.E.2d 197 (1972); see also Nyflot v. Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety, 474 U.S. 1027 , 106 S. Ct. 586 , 88 L.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." McCambridge v. State
Tex. App. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, e.g., State v. Armfield, 693 P.2d 1226 (Mont.1984); State v. Braunesreither, 276 N.W.2d 139 (S.D.1979); see also Nyflot v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512, 516-17 (Minn.), appeal dismissed, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 586 , 88 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Janice Marie Nyflot
v.
Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety
85-636.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Dec 16, 1985.
474 U.S. 1027
White, Stevens.
Cited by 83 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.

Justice WHITE, with whom Justice STEVENS joins, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

Appeal from Sup. Ct. Minn, dismissed for want of substantial federal question.

Dissent

Justice White, with whom Justice Stevens joins,

dissenting.

Shortly after 1:30 o’clock on the morning of September 23, 1984, appellant Janice Nyflot was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. She immediately requested that she be allowed to speak with an attorney, but this request was denied. She was then taken to the local law enforcement center. There, she was advised that state law required that she be tested to determine if she was under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance and that refusal to allow such a test would result in her driver’s license being revoked for a minimum of one year. She was[*1028] further advised that refusal to take the test could be offered in evidence against her at trial. Finally, she was told that if she consented to the test and the test indicated that she was under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, she would be subject to criminal prosecution and her right to drive could be revoked for a minimum of 90 days. And she was advised that she had the right, after submitting to the testing, to consult with an attorney and to have additional tests done by someone of her own choosing. These admonitions complied with the advice requirements of the state implied consent statute. See Minn. Stat. §169.123, subd. 2(b) (1984).

After being thus advised, Nyflot informed the police officer that she would not submit to testing without first speaking to an attorney. She was again told that she would not be allowed to speak with an attorney before deciding whether to take the test. She again declined to consent to the test. The police officer then informed her that she had effectively refused the test and allowed her to contact her attorney. Immediately after contacting her attorney, she indicated her willingness to take the test, but she was told that she had been deemed to have refused it and could no longer consent. Her license was then revoked for one year based on her refusal.

The state trial court upheld the revocation against Nyflot’s challenge that she had a right to counsel for the purpose of determining whether to consent to the blood alcohol test, which right had been unconstitutionally denied. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a limited right to counsel was provided by state law. 365 N. W. 2d 266 (1985). The Minnesota Supreme Court, with two justices dissenting, reversed again and upheld the revocation. 369 N. W. 2d 512 (1985).

The Minnesota Supreme Court first rejected the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that a right to counsel in this situation was provided by state law. Then, turning to Nyflot’s federal constitutional challenge, the court held that no Sixth Amendment right to counsel extended to the decision whether to consent to testing. The court reasoned that Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682 (1972), concluded that “the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not attach until judicial proceedings are formally commenced (by indictment, complaint or substitute for complaint).” 369 N. W. 2d, at 516. See also United States v. Gouveia, 467 U. S. 180 (1984). Although acknowledging that this Court has recognized exceptions[*1029] to this rule for the purposes of protecting a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights, see, e. g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that this Court “is unlikely to find other situations requiring a triggering of the right to counsel before the formal initiation of a criminal prosecution” and that “[i]t is also clear that the right to counsel recognized in Miranda does not apply to the limited questioning of a driver to determine if he will consent to a chemical test.” 369 N. W. 2d, at 516 (citing South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 564 n. 15 (1983)).

Nyflot now appeals, claiming that she had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel with respect to the decision whether to consent to the blood alcohol test. She asserts that in the special context of a driving-while-intoxicated offense, formal proceedings must be considered to have commenced with the issuance of a traffic ticket, which is in essence a summons to appear in court and the functional equivalent of a complaint. Since the ticket could be given before the test (because the driver is not taken in for testing unless she is unable to pass field sobriety or breath tests), the actual police procedures may not be manipulated so as to change the time when adversary proceedings are considered to have begun. Thus, adversary proceedings should be deemed to have been initiated before the test. The right to counsel having attached, Nyflot then argues that the decision whether to consent to the test is a “critical stage” in the proceeding, since it in essence is a decision as to what type of evidence will be available to be used against the driver — the results of the test or the refusal to consent to it. See Gouveia, supra, at 189.

Most of the courts that have considered this issue have rejected the argument that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel covers the stage at which the decision whether to consent to the blood alcohol test must be made. See, e. g., Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 711, 481 A. 2d 192 (1984) (collecting cases). A few, however, have found that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does extend to this stage. See, e. g., Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646 (SD), vacated as moot, 682 F. 2d 201 (CA8 1982); Forte v. State, 686 S. W. 2d 744 (Tex. App.), review granted by Tex. Ct. App., Oct. 23, 1985, No. 2-84-012-Cr.; State v. Welch, 135 Vt. 316, 376 A. 2d 351 (1977) (superseded by state statutory right to counsel, see State v. Duff, 136 Vt. 537, 394 A. 2d 1145 (1978)). Other courts have found a right to counsel based on state law,[*1030] see, e. g., State v. Fitzsimmons, 94 Wash. 2d 858, 620 P. 2d 999 (1980), or on general due process guarantees, see, e. g., State v. Newton, 291 Ore. 788, 636 P. 2d 393 (1981) (en banc plurality).

Given these varying results, I would note probable jurisdiction to settle the question presented.