Johnson v. Alabama, 488 U.S. 876 (1988). · Go Syfert
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Johnson v. Alabama, 488 U.S. 876 (1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
17 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Thomas Cameron Kincade (ca9, 2004-08-18)
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Thomas Cameron Kincade
9th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
In such a setting, we think it reasonable to dispense with the warrant requirement. 488 U.S. at 876-77, 107 S.Ct. 3164 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carroll v. City of Westminster
D. Maryland · 1999 · confidence medium
Moreover, the Supreme Court stated, “[tjhis interest also ‘requires and justifies the exercise of supervision to assure that the restrictions are in fact observed.’ ” Id. quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 488 U.S. at 876, 107 S.Ct. 3164 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Dill v. State (2×)
Ala. Crim. App. · 1991 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 521 So.2d 1006 (Ala. Crim.App.1986), aff'd, 521 So.2d 1018 (Ala.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 876 , 109 S.Ct. 193 , 102 L.Ed.2d 162 (1988).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Anthony Keith Johnson
v.
Alabama
87-7098.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 28, 1988.
488 U.S. 876
Brennan, Marshall.
Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

See 488 U.S. 976, 109 S.Ct. 518.

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice BRENNAN, dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

Justice MARSHALL, dissenting.

I continue to adhere to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2973, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). I also continue to believe that the death penalty's cruel and unusual nature is made all the more arbitrary and freakish when it is imposed by a judge in the face of a jury determination that the appropriate penalty is life imprisonment. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 467, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3166, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984) (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Therefore, I would grant the petition for writ of certiorari and vacate petitioner's death sentence for the reasons I expressed in Jones v. Alabama, 470 U.S. 1062, 1063, 105 S.Ct. 1779, 1780, 84 L.Ed.2d 838 (1985) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).

Lead Opinion

Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Justice Brennan,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

Dissent

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

I continue to adhere to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). I also continue to believe that the death penalty’s cruel and unusual nature is made all the more arbitrary and freakish when it is imposed by a judge in the face of a jury determination that the appropriate penalty is life imprisonment. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447, 467 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Therefore, I would grant the petition for writ of certiorari and vacate petitioner’s death sentence for the reasons I expressed in Jones v. Alabama, 470 U. S. 1062, 1063 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

In this case, after a full hearing, the jury determined that life imprisonment, not death, was the punishment which petitioner deserved. Nevertheless, following Alabama law which allows him wide discretion in death sentences, the trial judge overrode the jury’s determination and sentenced petitioner to death. I continue to believe that “[i]t approaches the most literal sense of the word ‘arbitrary’ to put one to death in the face of a contrary jury determination where it is accepted that the jury had indeed responsibly carried out its task.” Jones v. Alabama, supra, at 1065.