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Treatment trajectory · 1992 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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2009
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Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
cited
Cited "see"
Rose v. Johnson
See Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 879 (5th Cir.1989), ce rt. denied, 494 U.S. 1012 , 110 S.Ct. 1311 , 108 L.Ed.2d 487 (1990).
cited
Cited "see"
Rose v. Johnson
See Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 879 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1012 , 110 S.Ct. 1311 , 108 L.Ed.2d 487 (1990).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Curtis
See Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 877 (5th Cir.1989) (was a tactical decision not to argue intoxication evidence already before jury), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1012 , 110 S.Ct. 1311 , 108 L.Ed.2d 487 (1990); see also Davis v. Executive Director of the Department of Corrections, 891 F.Supp. 1459, 1464 (D.Col.1995).
discussed
Cited "see"
Guinn v. Lines (In Re Trans-Lines West, Inc.)
The doctrine “involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.” Worth, at 498, 95 S.Ct. at 2205 ; accord Franchise Tax Bd. v. Alcan Aluminium Ltd., 493 U.S. 331 , 334-35, 110 S.Ct. 661, 664 , 107 L.Ed.2d 696 (1990), reh’g denied, 494 U.S. 1012 , 110 S.Ct. 1311 , 108 L.Ed.2d 488 (1990).
discussed
Cited "see"
Emery v. Johnson
See Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 879 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1012 , 110 S.Ct. 1311 , 108 L.Ed.2d 487 (1990) (holding petitioner failed to show Strickland prejudice when evidence for which counsel failed to block admission was duplicative of admissible evidence).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Curtis
See Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 877 (5th Cir.1989) (was a tactical decision not to argue intoxication evidence already before jury), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1012 , 110 S.Ct. 1311 , 108 L.Ed.2d 487 (1990); see also Davis v. Executive Director of the Department of Corrections, 891 F.Supp. 1459, 1464 (D.Col.1995).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Rodriguez
(2×)
See Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 877 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that counsel’s decision not to argue the absurd or burden the jury with the obvious did not amount to ineffective assistance), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1012 , 110 S.Ct. 1311 , 108 L.Ed.2d 487 (1990); Davis, 871 P.2d at 769 (stating that “rather than attempt to argue the absurd,” trial counsel conceded the obvious strength of the prosecution’s case and instead focused on preventing a death sentence).
discussed
Cited "see"
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant v. Frank D. RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
See Romero v. Lynaugh , 884 F.2d 871, 877 ( 5th Cir. 1989 ) ( holding that counsel 's decision not to argue the absurd or burden the jury with the obvious did not amount to ineffective assistance ) , cert. denied , 494 U.S. 1012 , 110 S.Ct. 1311 , 108 L.Ed.2d 487 ( 1990 ) ; Davis , 871 P.2d at 769 ( stating that "rather than attempt to argue the absurd," trial counsel conceded the obvious strength of the prosecution 's case and instead focused on preventing a death sentence ) .
cited
Cited "see"
Jesus Romero, Jr. v. James A. Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division
See Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1012 , 110.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Davis v. People
(2×)
See, e.g., Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 877 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1012 , 110 S.Ct. 1311 , 108 L.Ed.2d 487 (1990) (counsel's decision not to burden jury with the obvious nor to argue the absurd held reasonable); Coleman, 802 F.2d at 1236 (not violative of Strickland to limit closing argument to an appeal to jury's merciful instincts).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Bosley v. BALTIMORE CTY., MD.
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 , 90 S.Ct. 827 , 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970)), and that “the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interest of third parties.” Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474 , 102 S.Ct. at 760 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 , 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)); see also Franchise Tax Bd. of California v. Alcan Aluminium, 493 U.S. 331 , 335, 110 S.Ct. 661, 665 , 107 L.Ed.2d 696 , reh’g denied, 494 U.S. 1012 , 110 S.Ct. 1311 , 108 L.Ed.2d 488 (1990).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Romero
v.
Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division
v.
Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division
No. 89-6390.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Feb 26, 1990.
Brennan, Marshall.
Cited by 3 opinions | Published
Lead Opinion
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Dissent
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,
dissenting.
Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.