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Treatment trajectory · 1993 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1993
2009
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 26 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Bryan Thornton
See United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 (1993).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Bryan Thornton
See United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 (1993).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Mackey
See U.S. v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149 , 155-56 (3rd Cir.1993) (holding that a trial judge "is usually well-aware of the ambience surrounding a criminal trial and the potential for juror apprehensions" and that in determining whether to question jurors about their safety concern, a trial judge is in a much better position than an appellate court to balance the probable harm resulting from the emphasis such action would place upon the jurors' safety concern against any potential prejudice resulting from the jurors' safety concern), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 , 114 S.Ct. 483 , 126 L.Ed.2d 433 (1993).
discussed
Cited "see"
O'Bryan v. State
See Delk v. State, 855 S.W.2d 700, 711 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 , 114 S.Ct. 481 , 126 L.Ed.2d 432 (1993) (holding that information obtained from the NCIC system provides an investigating officer with reasonable suspicion to detain a driver and conduct further investigation); Stevens v. State, 667 S.W.2d 534, 538 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (holding that the NCIC stolen-vehicle return provided independent probable cause to arrest appellant for theft of the automobile); see also Williams v. State, No. 14-08-00268-CR, 2009 WL 3643513 , at *4 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 5, 2009,…
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Luna (USA)
See United States v. Lechuga, 994 F.2d 346, 349 (7th 11 Cir.) (en banc) (“A person who sells a gun knowing that the buyer intends to murder someone 12 may or may not be an aider or abettor of the murder, but he is not a conspirator, because he and 13 his buyer do not have an agreement to murder anyone.”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 (1993); 14 United States v. Tyler, 758 F.2d 66, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1985) (reversing conviction for conspiracy to 15 distribute heroin of defendant who helped willing buyer find willing seller, but affirming his 16 conviction for aiding and abetting heroin distributi…
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Hawkins
See United States v. Lechuga, 994 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (“A person who sells a gun knowing that the buyer intends to murder someone may or may not be an aider or abettor of the murder, but he is not a conspirator, because he and his buyer do not have an agreement to murder anyone.”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 , 114 S.Ct. 482 , 126 L.Ed.2d 433 (1993); United States v. Tyler, 758 F.2d 66, 70-71 (2d Cir.1985) (reversing conviction for conspiracy to distribute heroin of defendant who helped willing buyer find willing seller, but affirming his conviction for aiding and abetting he…
discussed
Cited "see"
Curtis v. State
(2×)
See id. (citing Delk v. State, 855 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex. Crim.App.), cert denied, 510 U.S. 982 , 114 S.Ct. 481 , 126 L.Ed.2d 432 (1993)).
cited
Cited "see"
Kenneth Ray Andrews v. State
Feldman v. State , 71 S.W.3d 738, 755-56 (Tex.Cr.App.2002); see Delk v. State , 855 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. den’d , 510 U.S. 982 (1993).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Reno
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); see United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 972 (10th Cir.) (“The existence of probable cause is a ‘common-sense standard’ requiring ‘facts sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in belief that an offense has been committed.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1439 (10th Cir.1990)) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 , 114 S.Ct. 482 , 126 L.Ed.2d 433 (1993).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Warren
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); see United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 972 (10th Cir.) (“The existence of probable cause is a ‘commonsense standard’ requiring ‘facts sufficient “to warrant a man of reasonable caution in belief that an offense has been committed.” ’ ”) (quoting United States v. MesaRincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1439 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 , 114 S.Ct. 482 , 126 L.Ed.2d 433 (1993)).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Wright
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); see United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 972 (10th Cir.) (“The existence of probable cause is a ‘commonsense standard’ requiring ‘facts sufficient’ ” to warrant a man of reasonable caution in belief that an offense has been committed” ’ ”) (quoting United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1439 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949))), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 (1993).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Wiseman
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); see United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 972 (10th Cir.1993) (“The existence of probable cause is a ‘common-sense standard’ requiring ‘facts sufficient “to warrant a man of reasonable caution in belief that an offense has been committed.” ’ ”) (quoting United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1439 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 , 114 S.Ct. 482 , 126 L.Ed.2d 433 (1993)).
discussed
Cited "see"
Metts v. State
See Delk v. State, 855 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex.Crim.App.), cer t. denied, 510 U.S. 982 , 114 S.Ct. 481 , 126 L.Ed.2d 432 (1993); see also Royal v. State, 944 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1997, pet. refd).
cited
Cited "see"
Lopez v. State
See Delk v. State, 855 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 , 114 S.Ct. 481 , 126 L.Ed.2d 432 (1993); Prescott v. State, 744 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Tex. Crim.App.1988).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Cobb
See United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 152 (3d Cir.1993) (Third Circuit affirms the more than 1,000 kg. drug quantity and the violent nature of JBM), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 , 114 S.Ct. 483 , 126 L.Ed.2d 433 (1993). .
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Chandler
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); see United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 972 (10th Cir.) (‘The existence of probable cause is a “common-sense standard” requiring “facts sufficient ‘to warrant a man of reasonable caution in belief that an offense has been committed.’”) (quoting United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1439 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 , 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 , 114 S.Ct. 482 , 126 L.Ed.2d 433 [1993]).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Kelley
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); see United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 972 (10th Cir.) (“The existence of probable cause is a ‘common-sense standard’ requiring ‘facts sufficient “to warrant a man of reasonable caution in belief that an offense has been committed.’””) (quoting United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1439 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 , 114 S.Ct. 482 , 126 L.Ed.2d 433 (1993)).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Lee
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); see United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 972 (10th Cir.) (“The existence of probable cause is a ‘common-sense standard’ requiring ‘facts sufficient “to warrant a man of reasonable caution in belief that an offense has been committed.” ’ ”) (quoting United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1439 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 , 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 , 114 S.Ct. 482 , 126 L.Ed.2d 433 (1993)).
discussed
Cited "see"
DiCesare v. Cowley
See United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964 , 978 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 (1993); United States v. LaBonte, 70 F.3d 1396 , 1412-13 (1st Cir.1995), cert. granted, 116 S.Ct. 2545 (U.S. June 24, 1996) (No. 95-1726); Cuppett v. Duckworth, 8 F.3d 1132, 1139 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1180 (1994); Holloway v. United States, 960 F.2d 1348, 1358 (8th Cir.1992).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Roger Turner
See United States v. Lechuga, 994 F.2d 346 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 , 114 S.Ct. 482 , 126 L.Ed.2d 433 (1993).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Hogan
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); see United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 972 (10th Cir.) (“The existence of probable cause is a ‘common-sense standard’ requiring facts sufficient ‘ “to warrant a man of reasonable caution in belief that an offense has been committed.’””) (quoting United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1439 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 , 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 , 114 S.Ct. 482 , 126 L.Ed.2d 433 (1993)).
cited
Cited "see"
United States Assistance to Countries That Shoot Down Civil Aircraft Involved in Drug Trafficking
See U nited States v. Lechuga, 994 F.2d 346, 350 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 982 (1993).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Vega v. Commissioner of Correction
(2×)
See, e.g., United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 158 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982, 114 S. Ct. 483, 126 L.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Rogers v. McDaniel
I, § 10, cl. 1; see also Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990) (law that aggravates a crime, after it was committed, violates Ex Post Facto Clause); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30 , 101 S.Ct. 960 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (change in sentencing procedures violates ex post facto clause “if it is both retrospective and more onerous than the law in effect on the date of the offense”); United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir.1985) (Ex Post Facto Clause bars any law that “imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time …
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Boidi
Compare United States v. Hawkins, 547 F.3d 66, 74-75 (2d Cir.2008), and United States v. Lechuga, 994 F.2d 346, 350-51 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (Posner, *30 J.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 , 114 S.Ct. 482 , 126 L.Ed.2d 433 (1993). 4 . 2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 12.2(c)(6), at 285 (2d ed. 2003) ("[TJhere must be a common design, so that if only one party to the agreement has the necessary mental state then even that person may not be convicted of conspiracy.”); see Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv.L.Rev. 922, 927 (1959). 5 .
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Reyna v. State
See Prescott, 744 S.W.2d at 130-31 ; see also Delk v. State, 855 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 , 114 S.Ct. 481 , 126 L.Ed.2d 432 (1993).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Austin
v.
Linahan, Warden
v.
Linahan, Warden
93-6205.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 15, 1993.
510 U.S. 982
Published
Austin
v.
Linahan, Warden.
No. 93-6205.
Supreme Court of United States.
November 15, 1993.
1
Appeal from the C. A. 11th Cir.
2
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 993 F. 2d 1555.