Decker v. Urrutia, 528 U.S. 1021 (1999). · Go Syfert
Decker v. Urrutia, 528 U.S. 1021 (1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
68 citation events (64 in the last 25 years) across 22 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Bond v. National Financial Services (In re U.S. Mortgage Corp.) (njb, 2013-04-23)
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see" Bond v. National Financial Services (In re U.S. Mortgage Corp.)
Bankr. D.N.J. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int’l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int’l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505, 515 (3d Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 531 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999) (noting that “[s]ection 546(f) is similar to section 546(e) except that it applies specifically to settlement payments made ‘by or to a repo participant in connection with a repurchase agreement.’ ”) In Bevill, the Third Circuit found that the term “settlement payment” has an “extremely broad” definition, consistent with Congress’s intent.
discussed Cited "see" Bond v. Vining Sparks (In re U.S. Mortgage Corp.)
Bankr. D.N.J. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int’l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int’l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505, 515 (3d Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 531 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999) (noting that “[s]ection 546(f) is similar to section 546(e) except that it applies specifically to settlement payments made ‘by or to a repo participant in connection with a repurchase agreement.’ ”) In Bevill, the Third Circuit found that the term “settlement payment” has an “extremely broad” definition, consistent with Congress’s intent.
discussed Cited "see" Kennard v. Indianapolis Life Insurance
N.D. Tex. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Urrutia v. Decker, 992 S.W.2d 440 (Tex.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 530 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999); see also Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York v. Daddy$ Money, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
cited Cited "see" Sanchez v. State
Tex. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sanchez v. State, 995 S.W.2d 677, 680, 689-90 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 531 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999) (Sanchez II).
cited Cited "see" Estep v. Dallas County, TX
5th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Horton v. City of Houston, 179 F.3d 188, 191 ,(5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 (1999).
discussed Cited "see" Jeffrey L. Estep v. Dallas County, Texas, William F. Peace, Conley, Officer J.C. Quillen (2×)
5th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Horton v. City of Houston, 179 F.3d 188, 191 (5th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 530 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999).
discussed Cited "see" Parker v. Phillips
6th Cir. · 2001 · signal: accord · confidence high
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 , 114 S.Ct. 2364 ; accord Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391, 398 (6th Cir.) (§ 1983 claim alleging illegal search and seizure brought by arrestee after criminal charges arising from search and seizure were dismissed accrued on date charges were dismissed), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 531 , 145 L.Ed.2d 412 (1999).
discussed Cited "see" White v. State
Tex. App. · 2001 · signal: accord · confidence high
To determine whether the challenged statute provides fair notice (and thus is not unconstitutionally vague), we examine whether it: (1) “give[s] the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited;” and (2) “provide[s] explicit standards for those who apply [it].” Bynum, 767 S.W.2d at 773 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)); accord Sanchez v. State, 995 S.W.2d 677, 689 (Tex.Crim.App.), ce rt. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 531 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999).
cited Cited "see" Krasny v. Gi Nam (In Re Gi Nam)
Bankr. E.D. Pa. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lowenschuss v. Resorts International, Inc. (In re Resorts International, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505 , 514 & n. 6 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 531 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999).
cited Cited "see" Sanchez v. State
Tex. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sanchez v. State, 995 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex.Crim.App.), ce rt. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 531 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999) (Sanchez II).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In re D.L.C.
Tex. App. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence low
Tex. Fam.Code ÁNN. § 54.0405(a)(2); see also Sanchez v. State, 995 S.W.2d 677, 688 (Tex.Crim.App.) (stating we interpret a statute in accordance with the plain meaning of its language unless the language is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to absurd results), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 531 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re DLC
Tex. App. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence low
Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 54.0405(a)(2); see also Sanchez v. State, 995 S.W.2d 677, 683 (Tex.Crim.App.) (stating we interpret a statute in accordance with the plain meaning of its language unless the language is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to absurd results), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 531 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Demarest v. Athol/Orange Community Television, Inc.
D. Mass. · 2002 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See e.g., Horton v. Houston, 179 F.3d 188 , 190 n. 3 (5th Cir.1999) (parties did not dispute that PEG channel was state actor on appeal), cert. denied 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 530 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999); Coplin v. Fairfield, 111 F.3d 1395 , 1401-1402,(8th Cir.1997) (assuming that public access television committee was state actor).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Decker
v.
Urrutia
No. 99-539.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 29, 1999.
528 U.S. 1021
Published

Sup. Ct. Tex. Cer-tiorari denied.