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Positive treatment
5.7 score
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000
2013
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "see"
Bond v. National Financial Services (In re U.S. Mortgage Corp.)
See Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int’l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int’l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505, 515 (3d Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 531 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999) (noting that “[s]ection 546(f) is similar to section 546(e) except that it applies specifically to settlement payments made ‘by or to a repo participant in connection with a repurchase agreement.’ ”) In Bevill, the Third Circuit found that the term “settlement payment” has an “extremely broad” definition, consistent with Congress’s intent.
discussed
Cited "see"
Bond v. Vining Sparks (In re U.S. Mortgage Corp.)
See Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int’l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int’l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505, 515 (3d Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 531 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999) (noting that “[s]ection 546(f) is similar to section 546(e) except that it applies specifically to settlement payments made ‘by or to a repo participant in connection with a repurchase agreement.’ ”) In Bevill, the Third Circuit found that the term “settlement payment” has an “extremely broad” definition, consistent with Congress’s intent.
discussed
Cited "see"
Kennard v. Indianapolis Life Insurance
See Urrutia v. Decker, 992 S.W.2d 440 (Tex.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 530 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999); see also Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York v. Daddy$ Money, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
cited
Cited "see"
Sanchez v. State
See Sanchez v. State, 995 S.W.2d 677, 680, 689-90 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 531 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999) (Sanchez II).
cited
Cited "see"
Estep v. Dallas County, TX
See Horton v. City of Houston, 179 F.3d 188, 191 ,(5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 (1999).
discussed
Cited "see"
Jeffrey L. Estep v. Dallas County, Texas, William F. Peace, Conley, Officer J.C. Quillen
(2×)
See Horton v. City of Houston, 179 F.3d 188, 191 (5th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 530 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999).
discussed
Cited "see"
Parker v. Phillips
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 , 114 S.Ct. 2364 ; accord Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391, 398 (6th Cir.) (§ 1983 claim alleging illegal search and seizure brought by arrestee after criminal charges arising from search and seizure were dismissed accrued on date charges were dismissed), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 531 , 145 L.Ed.2d 412 (1999).
discussed
Cited "see"
White v. State
To determine whether the challenged statute provides fair notice (and thus is not unconstitutionally vague), we examine whether it: (1) “give[s] the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited;” and (2) “provide[s] explicit standards for those who apply [it].” Bynum, 767 S.W.2d at 773 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)); accord Sanchez v. State, 995 S.W.2d 677, 689 (Tex.Crim.App.), ce rt. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 531 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999).
cited
Cited "see"
Krasny v. Gi Nam (In Re Gi Nam)
See Lowenschuss v. Resorts International, Inc. (In re Resorts International, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505 , 514 & n. 6 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 531 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999).
cited
Cited "see"
Sanchez v. State
See Sanchez v. State, 995 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex.Crim.App.), ce rt. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 531 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999) (Sanchez II).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
In re D.L.C.
Tex. Fam.Code ÁNN. § 54.0405(a)(2); see also Sanchez v. State, 995 S.W.2d 677, 688 (Tex.Crim.App.) (stating we interpret a statute in accordance with the plain meaning of its language unless the language is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to absurd results), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 531 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
In Re DLC
Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 54.0405(a)(2); see also Sanchez v. State, 995 S.W.2d 677, 683 (Tex.Crim.App.) (stating we interpret a statute in accordance with the plain meaning of its language unless the language is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to absurd results), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 531 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Demarest v. Athol/Orange Community Television, Inc.
See e.g., Horton v. Houston, 179 F.3d 188 , 190 n. 3 (5th Cir.1999) (parties did not dispute that PEG channel was state actor on appeal), cert. denied 528 U.S. 1021 , 120 S.Ct. 530 , 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999); Coplin v. Fairfield, 111 F.3d 1395 , 1401-1402,(8th Cir.1997) (assuming that public access television committee was state actor).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Decker
v.
Urrutia
v.
Urrutia
No. 99-539.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 29, 1999.
Published
Sup. Ct. Tex. Cer-tiorari denied.