Pease v. Com., 588 S.E.2d 149 (Va. 2003). · Go Syfert
Pease v. Com., 588 S.E.2d 149 (Va. 2003). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
122 citation events (122 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Jeremy Wayne Dodge v. Commonwealth of Virginia (vactapp, 2022-02-22)
Treatment trajectory · 2003 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2003 2014 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see" Jeremy Wayne Dodge v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Va. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pease v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 342, 355 (2002) (en banc) (“The trier of fact has the responsibility . . . ‘to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 )), aff’d, 266 Va. 397 (2003) (per curiam).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Larry Eugene Coney, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia (2×)
Va. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence low
It merely echoes “the standard applicable to every criminal case.” Cook v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 427, 433 , 309 S.E.2d 325, 329 (1983); see also Pease v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 342, 360 , 573 S.E.2d 272, 280 (2002) (en banc) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd, 266 Va. 397 , 588 S.E.2d 149 (2003) (per curiam order adopting reasoning of the Court of Appeals).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Michael Ray Jennings v. Commonwealth of Virginia (2×)
Va. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence low
It merely echoes “the standard applicable to every criminal case.” Cook v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 427, 433 , 309 S.E.2d 325, 329 (1983); see also Pease v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 342, 360 , 573 S.E.2d 272, 280 (2002) (en banc), aff’d, 266 Va. 397 , 588 S.E.2d 149 (2003) (per curiam) (adopting the opinion of the Court of Appeals).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Tony Garcia, a/k/a Eddy Alvarez, s/k/a Eddy S. Alvarez v. Commonwealth of Virginia (2×)
Va. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence low
Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 257 , 584 S.E.2d 444, 447 (2003) (en banc) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 ); see also Pease v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 342, 355 , 573 S.E.2d 272, 278 (2002) (en banc) (“We let the decision stand unless we conclude no rational juror could have reached that decision.”), aff’d, 266 Va. 397 , 588 S.E.2d 149 (2003).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Vasquez v. Commonwealth (2×)
Va. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence low
It merely echoes "the standard applicable to every criminal case." Cook v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 427 , 433, 309 S.E.2d 325 , 329 (1983) ; see also Pease v. Commonwealth, 39 Va.App. 342 , 360, 573 S.E.2d 272 , 280 (2002) (en banc), aff'd, 266 Va. 397 , 588 S.E.2d 149 (2003) (per curiam) (adopting the opinion of the Court of Appeals).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ramaan Alfred Burton v. Commonwealth (2×)
Va. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Pease v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 342, 355 , 573 S.E.2d 272, 278 (2002) (en banc) (“We let the decision stand unless we conclude no rational juror could have reached that decision.”), aff’d, 266 Va. 397 , 588 S.E.2d 149 (2003); O’Connell v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 719, 726 , 634 S.E.2d 379, 382 (2006) (“This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (…
examined Cited "see, e.g." Neel v. Commonwealth (4×)
Va. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Pease v. Commonwealth, 39 Va.App. 342, 355 , 573 S.E.2d 272, 278 (2002) (en banc) ("We let the decision stand unless we conclude no rational juror could have reached that decision."), aff'd, 266 Va. 397 , 588 S.E.2d 149 (2003); O'Connell v. Commonwealth, 48 Va.App. 719, 726 , 634 S.E.2d 379, 382 (2006).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Merry Christine PEASE
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.
030081.
Supreme Court of Virginia.
Oct 31, 2003.
588 S.E.2d 149
Per Curiam.
Published

Gerald L. Gray, Clintwood (Robert M. Galumbeck; Dudley, Galumbeck, Necessary and Dennis, Tazewell, on brief), for appellant.

John H. McLees, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen. (Jerry W. Kilgore, Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellee.

Present: HASSELL, C.J., LACY, KEENAN, KOONTZ, and LEMONS, JJ., and CARRICO and STEPHENSON, Senior Justices.

PER CURIAM.

We granted the petition for appeal in this case to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court did not err in (1) failing to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, (2) failing to disqualify the special prosecutor and to dismiss and quash the indictment, and (3) failing to set aside the jury verdict because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law.

We have considered the questions, and, for the reasons stated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals reported in 39 Va.App. 342, 573 S.E.2d 272 (2002), we will affirm its judgment.

Affirmed.