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Cal. Civil Code § 3 (2026)

Edition and currency
leginfo export of Sept. 26, 2026 (applied Oct. 1, 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTleginfo export of Sept. 26, 2026 (applied Oct. 1, 2026) cited 1932–2026 76citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 76 opinions since 1932, 13 of them in the last five years.

No part of it is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.

The 20 cases that cite Cal. Civil Code § 3 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENEvangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188 (1988).
cites § 3 22×cited by 418 cases
Where it cites § 3
“Under Civil Code section 3 and the general principles of statutory interpretation, if the measure was intended to be applied retroactively, a provision directing retroactive application should have been included. In the absence of such an express declaration of retroactivity, we…”
The case’s holding
A statute modifying the doctrine of joint and several liability does not apply to claims accruing before its effective date absent a clear legislative statement (retroactivity).
Later courts cite it for
“in the absence of an express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the legislature or the voters must have intended a retroactive application.” · 16 citing courts
2
GREENDiGenova v. State Bd. of Educ., 57 Cal. 2d 167 (1962).
cites § 3 4×cited by 212 cases
Where it cites § 3
“" (Civ. Code, § 3; Code Civ. Proc., § 3; Pen.”
The case’s holding
Legislative intent for the retrospective operation of a statute cannot be implied from the mere fact that the statute is remedial and subject to liberal construction.
Later courts cite it for
“the statement in the education code that its provisions are to be liberally construed with the view to effect its objects and promote justice . . . cannot be interpreted as a declaration that any of its sections is to be given retroactive effect.” · 3 citing courts
3
GREENPeople v. Brown, 54 Cal. 4th 314 (2012).
cites § 3 1×cited by 683 cases
Where it cites § 3
“When the Legislature has not made its intent on the matter clear with respect to a particular statute, the Legislature’s generally applicable declaration in section 3 provides the default rule: “No part of [the Penal Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.”
The case’s holding
A statute providing behavioral incentives rather than mitigating punishment for a specific crime operates prospectively unless the legislature clearly expresses an intent for retroactivity.
Later courts cite it for
“estrada is today properly understood, not as weakening or modifying the default rule of prospective operation codified in penal code section 3, but rather as informing the rule's application in a specific context by articulating the reasonable presumption that a legislative act mitigating the punishment for a particular criminal offense is intended to apply to all nonfinal judgments.” · 38 citing courts
4
GREENPeople v. Vela, 11 Cal. App. 5th 68 (Ct. App. 2017).
cites § 3 1×cited by 46 cases
Where it cites § 3
“Code, § 3; Civ. Code, § 3; Code Civ. Proc., § 3.)”
The case’s holding
Amendments requiring a judicial transfer hearing for minors prosecuted as adults apply retroactively to cases not yet final on appeal.
Later courts cite it for
“diminished culpability and unique rehabilitation possibilities” · 4 citing courts
5
GREENPeople v. Vela, 21 Cal. App. 5th 1099 (Ct. App. 2018).
cites § 3 1×cited by 44 cases
Where it cites § 3
“Further undesignated statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code.”
The case’s holding
Proposition 57 applies retroactively to pending cases by requiring a juvenile transfer hearing before a minor can be prosecuted in adult criminal court.
Later courts cite it for
“there had been a sea change in penology regarding the relative culpability and rehabilitation possibilities for juvenile offenders” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENSacramento Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Eugene B., 192 Cal. App. 3d 771 (Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 3 3×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 3
“) Civil Code section 3 provides that “No part of [the Civil Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.”
The case’s holding
An amended statute expanding grounds for terminating parental rights applies only prospectively and cannot rest on pre-amendment dependency adjudications absent clear legislative intent and fair parental notice.
Later courts cite it for
“the retroactive application of a statute is one that affects rights, obligations or conditions that existed before the time of the statute's enactment, giving them an effect different from that which they had under the previously existing law. .” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENPeople v. Hayes, 49 Cal. 3d 1260 (1989).
cites § 3 2×cited by 57 cases
Where it cites § 3
“" (Civ. Code, § 3; Code Civ. Proc., § 3; Pen.”
The case’s holding
New statutes are presumed to operate prospectively unless the legislature expresses a clear intent for retroactive application.
Later courts cite it for
“a new statute is generally presumed to operate prospectively absent an express declaration of retroactivity or a clear and compelling implication that the legislature intended otherwise.” · 6 citing courts
8
GREENCabral v. Martins, 177 Cal. App. 4th 471 (Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 3 1×cited by 104 cases
Where it cites § 3
“The child support evasion statutes were not enacted until over a year later, and did not become effective until January 1, 2007.”
The case’s holding
All communicative acts performed by attorneys as part of their representation in a judicial proceeding or petitioning context are per se protected petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.
Later courts cite it for
“under the plain language of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) and (2), as well as the case law interpreting those provisions, all communicative acts performed by attorneys as part of their representation of a client in a judicial proceeding or other petitioning context are per se protected as petitioning activity by the anti-slapp statute.” · 23 citing courts
9
GREENHohm v. City of Rapid City, 2008 S.D. 65, 753 N.W.2d 895.
cites § 3 2×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 3
“Dak, Civil Code § 3 (1877)) to override the common law is "[b]y statutes enacted by the Legislature[.”
Later courts cite it for
“reconsideration of precedent is appropriate where a shift in position results from an intervening development of the law through the growth of judicial doctrine or through further action taken by a legislative body.” · 1 citing court
10
GREENUSS-POSCO Indus. v. Floyd Case, 244 Cal. App. 4th 197 (Ct. App. 2016).
cites § 3 1×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 3
“, § 3 [“[n]o part of [this code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared”]; Lab. Code, § 4 [“No action or proceeding commenced before this code takes effect, and no right accrued, is affected by the provisions of this code, but all procedure thereafter taken therein shall…”
Later courts cite it for
“the california supreme court and many, many courts of appeal have treated legislation affecting the recovery of costs, including attorney fees, as addressing a 'procedural' matter that is 'prospective' in character and thus not at odds with the general presumption against retroactivity.” · 3 citing courts
11
GREENPantoja v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
cites § 3 1×cited by 56 cases
Where it cites § 3
“Cal. Civ. Code § 3 . Section 2923.52 does not contain any retroactivity declarations.”
The case’s holding
A claim under the unlawful business practices prong of the Unfair Competition Law fails if all underlying predicate violations are dismissed.
Later courts cite it for
“since the court has dismissed all of plaintiff's predicate violations, plaintiff cannot state 3 a claim under the unlawful business practices prong of the ucl.” · 7 citing courts
12
GREENPeople v. Litmon, 162 Cal. App. 4th 383 (Ct. App. 2008).
cites § 3 1×cited by 51 cases
Where it cites § 3
“) “California continues to adhere to the time-honored principle, codified by the Legislature in Civil Code section 3 and similar provisions, that in the absence of an express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very clear from…”
The case’s holding
Procedural due process in involuntary sexually violent predator commitments requires a trial to be conducted in advance of the potential commitment term.
Later courts cite it for
“the inquiry 'necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case' since the right to a speedy trial is relative.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 3 2×cited by 107 cases
Where it cites § 3
“1 does not apply to any of the four judgments here on appeal. [18] We begin with the general presumption that legislative changes do not apply retroactively unless the Legislature expresses its intention that they should do so.”
The case’s holding
Legislative changes to penalties do not apply retroactively unless the legislature expresses an intent to do so.
Later courts cite it for
“we begin with the general presumption that legislative changes do not apply retroactively unless the legislature expresses its intention that they should do so.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENRussell v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d 810 (Ct. App. 1986).
cites § 3 2×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 3
“” (Civ. Code, § 3.) Only when the legislative intent is clear is retroactive application permissible; even then the Legislature is not empowered to retroactively legislate to the impairment of contracts or the abrogation of vested rights.”
The case’s holding
A statute limiting noneconomic damages applies only to causes of action accruing on or after its effective date unless the legislature clearly intends retroactive application.
Later courts cite it for
“the phrase 'shall be,' to the commonsensical mind, connotes the future and implies the application of the subject under discussion to future events. the use of 'shall be' has been held to connote a legislative intent to apply a statutory amendment prospectively only” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENHogan v. Ingold, 38 Cal. 2d 802 (1952).
cites § 3 2×cited by 55 cases
Where it cites § 3
“At best those words are equivocal and must be read in the light of section 4 of the Corporations Code that: "No action or proceeding commenced before this code takes effect, and no right accrued, is affected by the provisions of this code, but all procedure thereafter *823 taken…”
The case’s holding
Statutes regulating the conditions for maintaining derivative suits are procedural and apply prospectively to actions instituted after the statute becomes effective, even if the underlying wrongs occurred earlier.
Later courts cite it for
“the numerous illustrative cases which are cited show that statutes either increasing or decreasing the allowable costs, including attorney fees, are consistently applied to litigation pending when such statutes became effective, unless a contrary intent clearly appears from the statute.” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENSagadin v. Ripper, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1141 (Ct. App. 1985).
cites § 3 1×cited by 58 cases
Where it cites § 3
“In looking at the express language of section 25602 and Civil Code section 1714, we note the obvious.”
The case’s holding
An appellate court may modify and affirm a judgment from the record to avoid unnecessary delay or expense instead of remanding the case for a new determination.
Later courts cite it for
“whenever an appellate court may make a final determination of the rights of the parties from the record on appeal, it may, in order to avoid subjecting the parties to any further delay or expense, modify the judgment and affirm it, rather than remand for a new determination.” · 4 citing courts
17
GREENScott v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1034 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
cites § 3 1×cited by 51 cases
Where it cites § 3
“It therefore should be applied only prospectively and not to this case. 14 . The literal language of section 16607 refers to employers and employees.”
The case’s holding
California law governs the enforceability of non-compete covenants in franchise agreements regardless of a contractual choice-of-law provision selecting another state's law.
Later courts cite it for
“while it is true that the existence of a trade secret would normally constitute a factual question, . . . some types of information may not be a trade secret as a matter of law, and summary judgment may be appropriate in cases where a party has failed to meet its burden of proof for the purposes of a summary judgment motion by generating through evidentiary submissions a genuine issue of material fact.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 3 1×cited by 218 cases
Where it cites § 3
“The rule of liberal construction and the rule that statutes should ordinarily be construed to operate prospectively are neither inconsistent nor mutually exclusive. They relate to different aspects of the interpretation of statutes, and are found in most of the codes, including…”
The case’s holding
Statutes are not given retrospective operation unless the legislative intent to do so is clearly expressed.
Later courts cite it for
“it is an established canon of interpretation that statutes are not to be given a retrospective operation unless it is clearly made to appear that such was the legislative intent.” · 18 citing courts
19
GREENStrauch v. Superior Court, 107 Cal. App. 3d 45 (Ct. App. 1980).
cites § 3 1×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 3
“(Civ. Code, § 3.) “A statute is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon facts existing prior to its enactment.”
The case’s holding
A statute is procedural when it neither creates a new cause of action nor deprives a defendant of any defense on the merits.
Later courts cite it for
“a statute is procedural when it neither creates a new cause of action nor deprives defendant of any defense on the merits.” · 1 citing court
20
GREENPlotkin v. Sajahtera, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 4th 953 (Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 3 1×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 3
“) A legislative body’s intent with regard to prospective or retroactive application may be determined either from the language in the statute itself or, if the extrinsic sources are sufficiently clear, legislative history.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
193219792026

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 8 cases in 2014–2015. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Cal. Ct. App.58Cal.129th Cir.2N.D. Cal.2E.D. Cal.1S.D.1
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: leginfo export of Sept. 26, 2026 (applied Oct. 1, 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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