ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Anycco Rivers and Ladonta Tucker carjacked a BMW at gunpoint and led police on a high speed chase before crashing the vehicle into a guardrail and contin- ž’—ȱ‘Ž’›ȱĚ’‘ȱ˜—ȱ˜˜ǯȱȱ“ž›¢ȱŒ˜—Ÿ’ŒŽȱ‹˜‘ȱ–Ž—ȱ˜ȱŒŠ›“ŠŒ”Ȭ ’—ǯȱ ȱŠ•œ˜ȱŒ˜—Ÿ’ŒŽȱ’ŸŽ›œȱ˜ȱŒŠ››¢’—ȱŠ—ȱ’œŒ‘Š›’—ȱŠȱꛎȬ arm during and in relation to a crime of violence. Tucker, on the other hand, received a lesser conviction under the same

2 Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245 statute only for carrying—not discharging—a ꛎŠ›–ȱž›’—ȱ and in relation to the carjacking. Tucker contests ‘ŠȱꛎŠ›–ȱ conviction on appeal, and we uphold that conviction today. Rivers, for his part, challenges only his sentence, arguing the district court erred by applying a reckless endangerment enhancement. We reject this argument but nevertheless vacate Rivers’s carjacking sentence and remand to the district court in light of retroactive Guidelines amendments.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

On March 17, 2022, Anycco Rivers and Ladonta Tucker carjacked a BMW on a residential street in Bourbonnais, Illinois. The car was parked at the side of the road with its engine idling when Rivers approached the front passenger-side window. He pointed two guns at the car’s owner, who was seated in the driver’s seat, and told him to get out of the car. Tucker then searched the owner Š—ȱ ˜˜”ȱ ‘’œȱ Š••Žȱ ‹Ž˜›Žȱ •ŽĴ’—ȱ him go. Ducking behind a nearby parked car, the owner heard Rivers yell at Tucker to unlock the car. Tucker and Rivers then got into the vehicle, Tucker in the driver’s seat and Rivers in the front passenger seat. Witnesses reported seeing Rivers shoot a gun into the air as Tucker drove away, but no one ob- œŽ›ŸŽȱžŒ”Ž›ȱ ’‘ȱŠȱꛎŠ›–ǯ ȱ Ž ȱ –’—žŽœȱ •ŠŽ›ǰȱ ™˜•’ŒŽȱ œ™˜ĴŽȱ ‘Žȱ ȱ speeding and weaving around other cars. During the ensuing seven- mile high speed chase, the BMW ignored ›ŠĜŒȱœ’—œǰȱdrove erratically, and weaved ’—ȱ Š—ȱ ˜žȱ ˜ȱ ›ŠĜŒǯȱĴŽ–™’— to slow the BMW, police ˜ĜŒŽ›œ used a squad car to force the BMW toward the road’s right shoulder. Instead, the BMW collided with the squad car, then crossed into another lane of

Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245 3

›ŠĜŒǯ —˜‘Ž›ȱ˜ĜŒŽ›ȱ ŠœȱŠ‹•Žȱ˜ȱ™˜œ’’˜—ȱ‘’œȱœšžŠȱŒŠ›ȱ˜ȱ force the BMW into a guardrail, disabling it. Tucker then exited the ›’ŸŽ›ȂœȱœŽŠǰȱĚŽŽ’— west into a wooded area. Rivers followed Tucker out the driver’s-œ’Žȱ˜˜›ȱŠ—ȱĚŽȱin the opposite direction—ŠŒ›˜œœȱ‘›ŽŽȱ•Š—Žœȱ˜ȱ›ŠĜŒȱŠ—ȱdown a ravine.

˜•’ŒŽȱ˜ĜŒŽ›œȱŒ‘ŠœŽȱ‹˜‘ȱ–Ž—ȱ˜—ȱ˜˜ǯȱ ˜ȱ˜ĜŒŽ›œȱ™ž›Ȭ sued Rivers across the busy road, down a steep embankment, and into a rocky creek bed where they struggled to subdue and ę—Š••¢ȱarrest him. In the woods to the west, ˜ĜŒŽ›œȱœ’–’Ȭ larly managed to capture Tucker, discovering a latex glove in his pocket.

˜•’ŒŽȱ›ŽŒ˜ŸŽ›Žȱ‘›ŽŽȱꛎŠ›–œȱ›˜–ȱ‘ŽȱœŒŽ—Žǯȱ—ŽȱꛎȬ arm, a loaded Cobray 9mm pistol with an extended magazine, lay on the ground next to the BMW’s front driver’s-side door. T ˜ȱ˜‘Ž›ȱꛎŠ›–œǰȱŠ—ȱŽ–™¢ȱǯŚśȱŒŠ•’‹Ž›ȱ •˜Œ”ȱŠ—ȱŠȱǯŚŖȱŒŠ•’Ȭ ber Taurus (containing two rounds), were under the BMW’s front passenger seat where Rivers had sat. Police also found ten spent cartridges around the scene of the carjacking, which they later determined had all ‹ŽŽ—ȱꛎȱ›˜–ȱ‘ŽȱŠž›žœȱ™’œȬ tol. Testing revealed Tucker’s DNA on the Cobray pistol and ’ŸŽ›œȂœȱę—Ž›™›’—œȱ˜—ȱŠ••ȱ‘›ŽŽȱꛎŠ›–œ. B. Procedural Background 1. Indictment and trial A grand jury in the Central District of Illinois indicted both Rivers and Tucker on one count of carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119. The grand jury also indicted Rivers on one count of carrying and discharging the Taurus and Glock during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). Finally, the indictment charged

4 Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245

Tucker with carrying the Cobray during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).

At trial, the government presented testimony from the car- “ŠŒ”’—ȱŸ’Œ’–ǰȱ˜‘Ž›ȱ ’—ŽœœŽœǰȱŠ—ȱ™˜•’ŒŽȱ˜ĜŒŽ›œȱ’—Ÿ˜•ŸŽȱ’—ȱ the chase. The government also presented forensic evidence ›˜–ȱ ‘Žȱ ꛎŠ›–œȱ Š—ȱ œ™Ž—ȱ ŒŠ››’Žœ. At the close of evidence, both Tucker and Rivers moved for a judgment of ac- šž’ĴŠ•ǯȱ žŒ”Ž›Ȃœȱ –˜’˜—ȱ ˜—•¢ȱ Ž—Ž›Š••¢ȱ Š›žŽȱ ‘Šȱ ‘Žȱ ŽŸ’Ȭ dence was inœžĜŒ’Ž—ȱ ˜ȱ œž™™˜›ȱ Šȱ Œ˜—Ÿ’Œ’˜—ǯȱ ’ŸŽ›œȱ Œ˜—Ȭ ŽœŽȱ‘ŽȱœžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽȱŠœȱ˜ȱ‘’œȱ™˜œœŽœœ’˜—ȱ˜ȱ ‘Žȱ •˜Œ”ȱŠ—ȱŠž›žœȱŠ—ȱ‘’œȱę›’—ȱof the Taurus. The district court denied both motions.

The defense did not submit proposed jury instructions, nor did it object to jury instruction 36:

ȱ™Ž›œ˜—ȱŒŠ››’ŽœȱŠȱꛎŠ›–ȱȃ’—ȱ›Ž•Š’˜—ȱ˜ȄȱŠȱŒ›’–Žȱ if there is a connection between the use or carry- ’—ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱꛎŠ›–ȱŠ—ȱ‘ŽȱŒ›’–Žȱ˜ȱŸ’˜•Ž—ŒŽǯȱ‘Žȱ ꛎŠ›–ȱ –žœȱ ‘ŠŸŽȱ œ˜–Žȱ ™ž›™˜œŽȱ ˜›ȱ ŽěŽŒȱ ’‘ȱ respect to the crime; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or coincidence. ‘Žȱ ꛎŠ›–ȱ –žœȱ Šȱ •ŽŠœȱ ŠŒ’•’ŠŽǰȱ ˜›ȱ ‘ŠŸŽȱ ‘Žȱ potential of facilitating, the crime.

The district court thus instructed the jury accordingly. After deliberations, the jury found both defendants guilty on each of their respective charges. Both defendants renewed their –˜’˜—œȱ˜›ȱŠȱ“ž–Ž—ȱ˜ȱŠŒšž’ĴŠ•ǰȱ ‘’Œ‘ȱ‘Žȱ’œ›’ŒȱŒ˜ž›ȱ again denied.

2. Sentencing

The district court sentenced Tucker to 100 months’ imprisonment for carjacking and added the mandatory consecutive

Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245 5 sentence, 60 months, for violating § 924(c). On top of that, the court revoked Tucker’s supervised release for a prior felon-in- possession conviction and added 24 months to his sentence, resulting in a total sentence of 184 months. Tucker does not challenge his sentence on appeal.

Rivers’s Presentence Investigation Report recommended a two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment during Ě’‘ under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. Over Rivers’s objection, the district court agreed to apply the enhancement at the sentencing hearing. In support, it explained ‘Šȱȃ’ŸŽ›œȱ’—’’ŠŽȱ‘ŽȱŒŠ›Ȭ “ŠŒ”’—ǰȄȱ Š—ȱ ȃǽ‹Ǿ˜‘ȱ ˜ȱ ‘Ž–—’ȱ Š™™ŽŠ›œȱ ˜ȱ –Žȱ Š—ȱ ȱ ę—ȱ based on all the evidence that they were working together— ›’Žȱ˜ȱĚŽŽǯȄȱ‘Žȱ’œ›’ŒȱŒ˜ž›ȱŠ•œ˜ȱbased the enhancement ˜—ȱ’ŸŽ›œȂœȱĚ’‘ȱ˜—ŒŽȱ‘ŽȱŸŽ‘’Œ•e was disabled, noting that ’ŸŽ›œȱȃŒ˜ž•ȱ‘ŠŸŽȱ“žœȱœŠ¢Žȱ’—ȱ‘ŽȱŸŽ‘’Œ•Žǰȱ‹žȱ‘Žȱ’—ȂǯȄ He then led police on a chase through a ravine and continued to evade arrest—Š—ȱȃŠȱŠ—¢ȱ™˜’—ȱ’—ȱ‘Ž›Žǰȱ‘’—œȱŒ˜ž•ȱ‘ŠŸŽȱ ž›—Žȱ˜žȱŸŽ›¢ȱ‹Š•¢ǯȄ The court ultimately concluded that ȃ’ŸŽ›œȱ ŒŽ›Š’—•¢ȱ ’—žŒŽǰȱ Œ˜––Š—Žǰȱ ˜›ȱ ’›ŽŒŽȱ ›ǯȱ Tucker to do activities related to the seizing of the vehicle, the carjacking, and then all of their subsequent conduct created a great risk of bodily injury to a lot ˜ȱ™Ž˜™•ŽǯȄȱ Rivers had six criminal history points, to which the district court added two criminal history points because he commit- Žȱ ‘’œȱ —Ž ȱ ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ ‘’•Žȱ ˜—ȱ ™Š›˜•Žǯȱ The addition of these points resulted in a criminal history category of IV rather than III, with a Guidelines range of 77–96 months.

The district court ultimately sentenced Rivers to 87 months for carjacking and a 120-month mandatory consecutive sentence for violating § 924(c).

6 Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245

II. Analysis

On appeal, Tucker objects to his conviction and Rivers his sentence. For his part, Tucker insists that the evidence was in- œžĜŒ’Ž—ȱ ˜ȱ œž™™˜›ȱ his ꛎŠ›–ȱ Œ˜—Ÿ’Œ’˜—ǯȱ ’ŸŽ›œǰȱ –ŽŠ—Ȭ while, objects to the application of the reckless endangerment enhancement and asks that we vacate his sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing in view of recent amendments to the Guidelines. For the reasons explained be- •˜ ǰȱ ŽȱŠĜ›–ȱžŒ”Ž›ȂœȱŒ˜—Ÿ’Œ’˜—ȱŠ—ȱRivers’s enhancement, but we vacate and remand Rivers’s carjacking sentence to the district court to decide whether to resentence Rivers pursuant to the recent Guidelines amendments.

A. Tucker

A jury convicted Tucker of violating § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) by ŒŠ››¢’—ȱŠȱꛎŠ›–ȱȃž›’—ȱŠ—ȱ’—ȱ›Ž•Š’˜—ȱ˜ȄȱŠȱŒ›’–Žȱ˜ȱŸ’˜Ȭ lence, which includes carjacking. Tucker admits that he carried the Cobray pistol during the carjacking, but he insists that because he never revealed the weapon in the course of the carjacking or escape, it did not facilitate—and therefore was not carried in relation to—‘Žȱ˜ěŽ—œŽǯȱ Tucker’s problem is that our caselaw permits juries to con- Ÿ’Œȱ ‘Ž—ȱ‘ŽȱꛎŠ›–ȱŒŠ››’ŽȱhŠœȱȃ‘Žȱ™˜Ž—’Š•ȱof facilitatingȄȱ ‘Žȱž—Ž›•¢’—ȱ˜ěŽ—œŽ. United States v. Mancillas, 183 F.3d 682, 707 (7th Cir. 1999); see also ŽŸŽ—‘ȱ’›Œž’ȱŠĴŽ›—ȱ›’–’—Š•ȱ Jury Instructions (2023). Indeed, the jury in Tucker’s trial was given just such an instruction. Tucker did not object. He nonetheless argues he can overcome this hurdle because ˜ž›ȱȃpotential-to-facilitateȄ standard departs from Supreme Court precedent and thus requires course correction.

Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245 7

Before wading into principles of stare decisis, we must consider the standard of review. Tucker presents his appeal as a challenge to the district court’s denial of his motion for “ž–Ž—ȱ˜ȱŠŒšž’ĴŠ•ȱž—Ž›ȱŽŽ›Š•ȱž•Žȱ˜ȱ›’–’—Š•ȱ›˜ŒŽȬ dure 29. Below, Tucker made a general Rule 29 motion challenging the œžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽǰȱŠ—ȱ ‘’•ŽȱȃǽŠǾȱ–˜’˜—ȱ ž—Ž›ȱ ž•Žȱ Řşȱ ‘Šȱ –Š”Žœȱ œ™ŽŒ’ęŒȱ Š›ž–Ž—œȱ Š’ŸŽœȱ ’œœžŽœȱ —˜ȱ™›ŽœŽ—ŽǰȱdzȱŠȱŽ—Ž›Š•ȱ–˜’˜—ȱ™›ŽœŽ›ŸŽœȱŽŸŽ›¢ȱ˜‹“ŽŒ’˜—ǯȄȱ United States v. Maez, 960 F.3d 949, 959 (7th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Jones, 763 F.3d 777, 811–12 (7th Cir. 2014). Because he made a general Rule 29 motion, Tucker contends, he has preserved his arguments on appeal. The government dis- agrees, arguing that Tucker’s appeal is really a challenge to the jury instructions—which he did not challenge below— ’œž’œŽȱŠœȱŠȱœžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽȱŒ‘Š••Ž—Žȱ˜ȱsecure a more favorable standard of review.

We have at times applied de novo review to legal ques- ’˜—œȱ ›Š™™Žȱž™ȱ’—ȱŒ‘Š••Ž—Žœȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱœžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŽŸ’Ȭ Ž—ŒŽǰȱ ŽŸŽ—ȱ ‘Ž—ȱ ‘Žȱ œ™ŽŒ’ęŒȱ •ŽŠ•ȱ Š›ž–Ž—ȱ Šœȱ —˜ȱ ™›ŽȬ sented to the district court. See, e.g., United States v. Harden, 893 F.3d 434, 445 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing —’ŽȱŠŽœȱŸǯȱ˜Ĵ, 245 F.3d 890, 904 (7th Cir. 2001)); United States v. Duran, 407 F.3d 828, 840 (7th Cir. 2005); cf. United States v. Castillo, 406 F.3d 806, 813–14 (7th Cir. 2005) (appearing to apply de novo review when evaluati—ȱ‘Žȱ–ŽŠ—’—ȱ˜ȱȃ’—ȱž›‘Ž›Š—ŒŽȱ˜Ȅȱ ˜—ȱ Šȱ œžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢-of-the-evidence challenge). 1 A few other

1 —ȱŠȱŽ ȱ˜ŒŒŠœ’˜—œǰȱ Žȱ‘ŠŸŽȱ›Ž™ŽŠŽȱ‘Žȱ›ž•Žȱ‘ŠȱȃǽŠǾȱ–˜’˜—ȱž—Ž›ȱ ž•ŽȱŘşȱ‘Šȱ–Š”Žœȱœ™ŽŒ’ęŒȱŠ›ž–Ž—œȱ Š’ŸŽœȱ’œœžŽœȱ—˜ȱ™›ŽœŽ—Žǰȱ‹žȱŠȱ Ž—Ž›Š•ȱ–˜’˜—ȱ™›ŽœŽ›ŸŽœȱŽŸŽ›¢ȱ˜‹“ŽŒ’˜—ǯȄȱMaez, 960 F.3d at 959; see also United States v. Moore, 363 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded

8 Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245 circuits, meanwhile, have come to the opposite conclusion, holding that if the legal argument is not presented to the district court, the circuit will only review it for plain error, even if the defendant made a general motion ˜›ȱŠŒšž’ĴŠ•. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 979 F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2020) (applying plain error review when a defendant purported to ap- ™ŽŠ•ȱ ‘Žȱ œžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ ˜ȱ ‘Žȱ ŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽȱ ‹žȱ ’—œŽŠȱ Š›žŽȱ ‘Šȱ ȃ‘Žȱ ’œ›’Œȱ Œ˜ž›ȱ Š™™•’Žȱ ‘Žȱ ›˜—ȱ •ŽŠ•ȱ œŠ—Š›ȱ ’—ȱ ŠœȬ œŽœœ’—ȱ‘’œȱž’•ȄǼDzȱUnited States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 497 (4th Cir. 2015) (same); United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612, 617–18 (6th Cir. 2005) (same).

We need not resolve which standard of review applies here. Whether Tucker preserved his argument and secured de novo review on appeal or failed to do so and must submit to on other grounds, Jackson v. United StatesǰȱśŚřȱǯǯȱŗŗŖŖȱǻŘŖŖśǼȱǻȃ•‘˜ž‘ȱŠȱ –˜’˜—ȱ˜›ȱ“ž–Ž—ȱ˜ȱŠŒšž’ĴŠ•ȱ—ŽŽȱ—˜ȱœ™Ž••ȱ˜žȱ‘Žȱ™Š›’Œž•Š›ȱ‹Šœ’œȱ˜›ȱ ŠȱŒ‘Š••Ž—Žȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱœžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽǰȱ ‘Ž—ȱœžŒ‘ȱŠȱ–˜’˜—ȱ›Š’œŽœȱ œ™ŽŒ’ęŒȱŠ›ž–Ž—œǰȱŠ—¢ȱŒ•Š’–œȱ—˜ȱ™›ŽœŽ—Žȱ’—ȱ‘Žȱ–˜’˜—ȱŠ›Žȱ Š’ŸŽǯȄǼDzȱ United States v. HosseiniǰȱŜŝşȱǯřȱśŚŚǰȱśśŖȱǻŝ‘ȱ’›ǯȱŘŖŗŘǼȱǻȃŽȱ‘ŠŸŽȱ‘Ž•ȱ ‘Šȱ ‘Ž—ȱŠȱŽŽ—Š—ȱŒ‘Š••Ž—Žœȱ‘ŽȱœžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽȱ‹¢ȱ–˜Ȭ ’˜—ȱ˜›ȱ“ž–Ž—ȱ˜ȱŠŒšž’ĴŠ•ȱŠ—ȱ–Š”Žœȱœ™ŽŒ’ęŒȱŠ›ž–Ž—œȱ’—ȱœž™™˜›ȱ˜ȱ ‘Šȱ –˜’˜—ǰȱ Š—¢ȱ Š›ž–Ž—œȱ ˜–’ĴŽȱ Š›Žȱ ‘Ž›Ž‹¢ȱ ˜›Ž’ŽǯȄǼǯȱ We have some doubts about this rule and the perverse incentives it sets up to dis- œžŠŽȱŽŽ—Š—œȱ›˜–ȱ–Š”’—ȱ œ™ŽŒ’ęŒȱŠ›ž–Ž—œȱ’—ȱ Šȱž•ŽȱŘşȱ–˜’˜—ǯȱ See —’ŽȱŠŽœȱŸǯȱ ’Žěer, 991 F.3d 630, 637–41 (5th Cir. 2021) (Oldham, J., Œ˜—Œž››’—Ǽȱǻ—˜’—ȱ‘Šȱ™Ž›–’Ĵ’—ȱŠȱŽ—Ž›Š•ȱž•ŽȱŘşȱ–˜’˜—ȱ˜ȱ™›ŽœŽ›ŸŽȱ Š••ȱœžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱŠ›ž–Ž—œȱȃŽ—Œ˜ž›ŠŽœȱŽŽ—Š—œȱ˜ȱœŠ¢ȱŠœȱ•’Ĵ•ŽȱŠœȱ™˜œœ’Ȭ ble in the district court and to save their good arguments as ‘gotchas!’ for Š™™ŽŠ•ȄǼǯȱŽȱŠ›Žȱœ”Ž™’ŒŠ•ȱ‘Šȱȃ‹¢ȱŒŠ••’—ȱ‘Žȱ’œ›’Œȱjudge’s ŠĴŽ—’˜—ȱ˜ȱ —˜ȱ ™Š›’Œž•Š›ȱ Ž››˜›ǰȄȱ Šȱ ŽŽ—Š—ȱ ™›ŽœŽ›ŸŽœȱ ‘Žȱ ›’‘ȱ ˜ȱ Œ‘Š••Ž—Žȱ ŽŸŽ›¢ȱ conceivable problem in the court of appeals. Id. at 640. But as with the œŠ—Š›ȱ˜ȱ›ŽŸ’Ž ȱ˜›ȱžŒ”Ž›Ȃœȱ•ŽŠ•ȱŒ‘Š••Ž—Žȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ–ŽŠ—’—ȱ˜ȱȃ’—ȱ›Ž•ŠȬ ’˜—ȱ˜ǰȄȱ Žȱœ’–™•¢ȱ—˜Žȱ‘’œȱ’œœžŽȱ˜›ȱ‘ŽȱŠĴŽ—’˜—ȱ˜ȱŠȱžž›Žȱ™Š—Ž•ǯ

Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245 9 plain error review in accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), the outcome is the same. For the reasons we explain below, even under the more generous de novo re- Ÿ’Ž ȱ œŠ—Š›ǰȱ Žȱ ›ŽŠĜ›–ȱ Œ’›Œž’ȱ ™›ŽŒŽŽ—ȱ ™Ž›–’Ĵ’—ȱ § 924(c) convictions when a defendant carries a ꛎŠ›–ȱž›Ȭ ’—ȱŠȱ™›Ž’ŒŠŽȱ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ ’‘ȱ‘Žȱ™˜Ž—’Š•ȱ˜ȱŠŒ’•’ŠŽȱ‘Šȱ˜Ȭ fense. Consequently, we ŠĜ›–ȱžŒ”Ž›ȂœȱŒ˜—Ÿ’Œ’˜—. 1. Meaning of “in relation to” Tucker claims the district court used too loose a standard to judge the relationship between his gun and the carjacking. Yet he did not object to this § 924(c) ™ŠĴŽ›—ȱ“ž›¢ instruction:

ȱ™Ž›œ˜—ȱŒŠ››’ŽœȱŠȱꛎŠ›–ȱȃ’—ȱ›Ž•Š’˜—ȱ˜ȄȱŠȱŒ›’–Žȱ if there is a connection between the use or carry- ’—ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱꛎŠ›–ȱŠ—ȱ‘ŽȱŒ›’–Žȱ˜ȱŸ’˜•Ž—ŒŽǯȱ‘Žȱ ꛎŠ›–ȱ –žœȱ ‘ŠŸŽȱ œ˜–Žȱ ™ž›™˜œŽȱ ˜›ȱ ŽěŽŒȱ ’‘ȱ respect to the crime; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or coincidence. ‘Žȱ ꛎŠ›–ȱ –žœȱ Šȱ •ŽŠœȱ ŠŒ’•’ŠŽǰȱ ˜›ȱ ‘ŠŸŽȱ ‘Žȱ potential of facilitating, the crime.

This instruction draws on language in Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993), and its progeny in this circuit. We have repeatedly stated that for a § 924(c) conviction for carrying a ꛎŠ›–ȱž›’—ȱŠ—ȱ’—ȱ›Ž•Š’˜—ȱ˜ȱŠȱŒ›’–Žȱ˜ȱŸ’˜•Ž—ŒŽǰȱȃ’—ȱ›Ž•ŠȬ ’˜—ȱ˜Ȅȱ–ŽŠ—œȱ‘Šȱ‘Žȱž—ȱŠŒ’•’ŠŽȱ˜›ȱ‘Šȱ‘Žȱ™˜Ž—’Š•ȱ˜ȱ facilitate the crime. See, e.g., ˜Ĵ, 245 F.3d at 906; United States v. Pike, 211 F.3d 385, 389 (7th Cir. 2000); —’ŽȱŠŽœȱŸǯȱ˜Ĵ˜—, 101 F.3d 52, 55–56 (7th Cir. 1996).

Because our precedent is clearǰȱ žŒ”Ž›ȱ –žœȱ ™›ŽœŽ—ȱ ȃŠȱ Œ˜–™Ž••’—ȱ›ŽŠœ˜—ȱ˜ȱ˜ŸŽ›ž›—Ȅȱ’ǯȱSantos v. United States, 461 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting McClain v. Retail Food

10 Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245

Emps. Joint Pension Plan, 413 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2005)). Neither simple disagreement with a rule nor the possibility that a rule is debatable constitutes a compelling reason. Id. at 893; see also United States v. Lamon, 893 F.3d 369, 371 (7th Cir. 2018). ž›ȱ›Žœ™ŽŒȱ˜›ȱȃ™›’—Œ’™•Žœȱ˜ȱœŠ›ŽȱŽŒ’œ’œȱ›Žšž’›ŽǽœǾ that we give considerable weight to prior decisions of this court unless and until they have been overruled or undermined by the decisions of a higher court, or other supervening developments, suc‘ȱŠœȱŠȱœŠž˜›¢ȱ˜ŸŽ››ž•’—ǯȄȱSantos, 461 F.3d at 891 (cleaned up). A decision from the Supreme Court need not be ’›ŽŒ•¢ȱ˜—ȱ™˜’—ǯȱŸŽ—ȱŠ—ȱȃ’—Ž›ŸŽ—’—ȱž™›Ž–Žȱ˜ž›ȱŽŒ’Ȭ œ’˜—ȱ‘Šȱ’œ™•ŠŒŽœȱ‘Žȱ›Š’˜—Š•Žȱ˜ȱ˜ž›ȱ™›ŽŒŽŽ—ȄȱŒ˜ž—œȱŠœȱŠȱ compelling reason to overturn circuit precedent. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC, 937 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2019).

Recognizing this high bar, Tucker lines up multiple Supreme Court cases, arguing they compel us to trim back cir- Œž’ȱ™›ŽŒŽŽ—ȱ˜—ȱ‘Žȱ–ŽŠ—’—ȱ˜ȱȃ’—ȱ›Ž•Š’˜—ȱ˜ǯȄȱžȱ—˜—Žȱ˜ȱ those cases provide the basis to overturn our precedent.

First, contrary to Tucker’s argument, the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith œž™™˜›œȱŠȱŽę—’’˜—ȱ˜ȱȃ’—ȱ›Ž•Š’˜—ȱ˜Ȅȱ‘Šȱ includes the potential to facilitate ‘Žȱ ž—Ž›•¢’—ȱ ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ ‘Ž—ȱŠȱŽŽ—Š—ȱŒŠ››’ŽœȱŠȱꛎŠ›–ȱž›’—ȱŠȱŒ›’–Žȱ˜ȱŸ’˜•Ž—ŒŽȱ ŠœȱŽę—Žȱ‹¢ȱȗ 924(c). See 508 U.S. at 238. The statute estab- •’œ‘Žœȱ ™Ž—Š•’Žœȱ ‘Ž—ȱ Šȱ ™Ž›œ˜—ȱ ȃžœŽœȱ or ŒŠ››’Žœȱ Šȱ ꛎŠ›–ǯȄȱ § 924(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see also Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 136 ǻŗşşŞǼȱǻ‘˜•’—ȱ‘ŠȱȃžœŽœȄȱŠ—ȱȃŒŠ›Ȭ ›’ŽœȄȱ‘ŠŸŽȱ’—Ž™Ž—Ž—ȱ–ŽŠ—’—ǼǯȱSmith limited the meaning ˜ȱȃ’—ȱ›Ž•Š’˜—ȱ˜Ȅȱ ‘Ž—ȱŠȱŽŽ—Š—ȱ’œȱŒ‘Š›Žȱ ’‘ȱusing a ꛎŠ›–ȱž›’—ȱŠȱ™›Ž’ŒŠŽȱ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ˜ȱŠȱžœŽȱ‘ŠȱȃŠŒ’•’ŠŽœȱ˜›ȱ ž›‘Ž›œȄ that ˜ěŽ—œŽǯ śŖŞȱǯǯȱŠȱŘřŘǯȱžȱžŒ”Ž›ȂœȱŠĴŽ–™ȱ˜ȱ

Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245 11

™Ž›œžŠŽȱžœȱ‘Šȱ‘’œȱ‘˜•’—ȱŠ•˜—ŽȱŽę—Žœȱ‘ŽȱœŒ˜™Žȱ˜ȱȃ’—ȱ ›Ž•Š’˜—ȱ˜ȄȱŠ••œȱœ‘˜›ǯȱSmith went ˜—ȱ˜ȱŽę—Žȱȃ’—ȱ›Ž•Š’˜—ȱ˜Ȅȱ more broadly when the defendant is charged with merely carrying, not using ŠȱꛎŠ›–. In this context, Smith explained the ’—‘ȱ’›Œž’ȱ‘Šœȱ‘Ž•ȱ‘Šȱȃ‘Žȱž—ȱŠȱ•ŽŠœȱ–žœȱȁŠŒ’•’ŠǽŽǾǰȱ ˜›ȱ‘ŠǽŸŽǾȱ‘Žȱ™˜Ž—’Š•ȱ˜ȱŠŒ’•’Š’—ǰȂȄ ‘Žȱ™›Ž’ŒŠŽȱ˜ěŽ—œŽǯ Id. at 238 (quoting United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir. 1985)). Instead of disclaiming this standard, the Court simply noted ‘Šȱ ’ȱ —ŽŽȱ —˜ȱ ȃŽŽ›–’—Žȱ ‘Žȱ ™›ŽŒ’œŽȱ Œ˜—˜ž›œȄȱ˜ȱȃ’—ȱ›Ž•Š’˜—ȱ˜ǰȄȱŠœȱ‘ŽȱꛎŠ›–ȱ’—ȱšžŽœ’˜—ȱ™•Š¢Žȱ Šȱ–žŒ‘ȱ•Š›Ž›ȱ›˜•Žȱ‘Š—ȱ‘Žȱȃȁ˜›’—Š›¢ȱŒŠœŽȂȱž—Ž›ȱȗ 924(c)(1), ’—ȱ ‘’Œ‘ȱ‘Žȱž—ȱ–Ž›Ž•¢ȱŠŒ’•’ŠŽœȱ‘Žȱ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ‹¢ȱ™›˜Ÿ’’—ȱŠȱ –ŽŠ—œȱ ˜ȱ ™›˜ŽŒ’˜—ȱ ˜›ȱ ’—’–’Š’˜—ǯȄȱ Id. (quoting United States v. Phelps, 895 F.2d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 1990)). Even if we were to accept Tucker’s argument that, by quoting the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court was not endorsing a potential-to-facilitate standard, that concession does not constitute a compelling reason to overturn our precedent. The Court, at the very least, left the door open to the possibility that a potential-to-facilitate standard is appropriate when ™˜œœŽœœ’˜—ȱ˜ȱŠȱꛎŠ›–ȱ’œȱŠȱ’œœžŽǯ Nor do Supreme Court decisions issued shortly after Smith compel a narrower reading of Smith. First, while Bailey v. United States –Š”ŽœȱŒ•ŽŠ›ȱ‘ŠȱȃŠŒ’ŸŽȱŽ–™•˜¢–Ž—Ȅȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱꛎȬ arm is necessary when a defendant is charged with using a ꛎŠ›–ȱ’—ȱŸ’˜•Š’˜—ȱ˜ § 924(c), it distinguished between the ˜ȱ¢™Žœȱ˜ȱŒ˜—žŒȱŠ›ŽœœŽȱ‹¢ȱ‘ŽȱœŠžŽǰȱœŽĴ’—ȱ‘Žȱ›ŽȬ quirements for a carrying charge aside. 516 U.S. 137, 143–45 (1995); see also Castillo, 406 F.3d at 812 (explaining that Bailey ›Ž“ŽŒŽȱŠȱ‹›˜Šȱ’—Ž›™›ŽŠ’˜—ȱ˜ȱȃžœŽȄǼ. And Bailey did not Žę—Žȱȃ’—ȱ›Ž•Š’˜—ȱ˜ǯȄȱŽ’‘Ž›ȱ’ȱMuscarello, the other case

12 Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245

Tucker points to as an indication that we have misinterpreted Smith. In fact, Muscarello read Bailey to mean that a § 924(c) Œ‘Š›Žȱ ˜›ȱ ŒŠ››¢’—ȱ Šȱ ꛎŠ›–ȱ —ŽŽȱ —˜ȱ ’—Ÿ˜•ŸŽȱ ȃŠŒ’ŸŽȱ Ž–Ȭ ™•˜¢–Ž—Ȅȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ ŽŠ™˜— at all. 524 U.S. at 136. 2 Finally, Tucker argues that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110 (2023), compels us to revisit decisions resting on the potential to facilitate. Dubin Žę—Žȱ ȃŠ›ŠŸŠŽȱ ’Ž—’¢ȱ ‘ŽȄȱ Š—ȱ ‘Žȱ –ŽŠ—’—ȱ ˜ȱ ȃ’—ȱ›Ž•Š’˜—ȱ˜Ȅȱ’— 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). Id. at 116–17. In doing so, it explicitly left § 924(c) caselaw undisturbed because ‘Žȱ ›Ž•ŽŸŠ—ȱ Ž›–œǰȱ ’—Œ•ž’—ȱ ȃžœŽȄȱ Š—ȱ ȃ’—ȱ ›Ž•Š’˜—ȱ ˜Ȅȱ Š›Žȱ context dependent. Id. at 119 & n.4. Consequently, Dubin does not present the necessary reason to overcome stare decisis. Without a compelling reason to overturn circuit prece- Ž—ǰȱ Žȱ›ŽŠĜ›–ȱ˜ž›ȱŒ’›Œž’Ȃœȱ•Š ȱ‘Šȱ ‘Ž—ȱŠȱŽŽ—Š—ȱ’œȱ Œ‘Š›Žȱ ’‘ȱŒŠ››¢’—ȱŠȱꛎŠ›–ȱž›’—ȱŠȱ Œ›’–Žȱ˜ȱŸ’˜•Ž—ŒŽǰȱ ‘ŠȱꛎŠ›–ȱ–žœȱŠŒ’•’ŠŽȱ˜›ȱ‘ŠŸŽȱ‘Žȱ™˜Ž—’Š•ȱ˜ȱŠŒ’•’ŠŽȱ the crime.

2. Application

ŠŸ’—ȱ Œ˜—ę›–Žȱ ‘Žȱ •ŽŠ•ȱ œŠ—Š›ȱ —ŽŒŽœœŠ›¢ȱ ˜›ȱ Šȱ § 924(c) conviction, we turn to whether the evidence pre- œŽ—ŽȱŠȱ›’Š•ȱ ŠœȱœžĜŒ’Ž— for a reasonable jury to convict

2 Tucker mentions a few other Supreme Court cases to justify recon- sideration. None are persuasive. See Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 573 (2009) (explaining that Smith Žę—Žȱ ȃ’—ȱ ›Ž•Š’˜—ȱ ˜Ȅȱ ˜ȱ –ŽŠ—ȱ ȃ‘Šȱ ‘Žȱ ꛎŠ›–ȱ–žœȱ‘ŠŸŽȱœ˜–Žȱ™ž›™˜œŽȱ˜›ȱŽěŽŒȱ ’‘ȱ›Žœ™ŽŒȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ›žȱ›ŠȬ ęŒ”’—ȱŒ›’–ŽDzȱ’œȱ™›ŽœŽ—ŒŽȱ˜›ȱ’—Ÿ˜•ŸŽ–Ž—ȱŒŠ——˜ȱ‹Žȱ‘Žȱ›Žœž•ȱ˜ȱŠŒŒ’Ž—ȱ ˜›ȱŒ˜’—Œ’Ž—ŒŽȄȱǻšž˜’—ȱSmith, 508 U.S. at 238)); Watson v. United States, śśŘȱǯǯȱŝśȱǻŘŖŖŝǼȱǻŠ—Š•¢£’—ȱ‘Žȱ–ŽŠ—’—ȱ˜ȱȃžœŽǰȄȱ‹žȱ—˜ȱŽę—’—ȱȃ’—ȱ ›Ž•Š’˜—ȱ˜ȄǼǯ

Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245 13

žŒ”Ž›ǯȱ‘Ž—ȱŽŸŠ•žŠ’—ȱ‘ŽȱœžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽǰȱ Žȱ view that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecu- ’˜—ȱŠ—ȱȃ ’••ȱ›ŽŸŽ›œe only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury Œ˜ž•ȱę—ȱž’•ȱ‹Ž¢˜—ȱ›ŽŠœ˜—Š‹•Žȱ˜ž‹ǯȄȱMaez, 960 F.3d at 966 (cleaned up). ‘’œȱ œŠ—Š›ȱ ’–™˜œŽœȱ Šȱ ȃ—ŽŠ›•¢ȱ ’—œž›Ȭ –˜ž—Š‹•Žȱ‘ž›•ŽǯȄȱUnited States v. Johnson, 874 F.3d 990, 998 (7th Cir. 2017).

Tucker does not dispute that he carried the Cobray pistol during the carjacking. So the only issue we must resolve is ‘Ž‘Ž›ȱ‘ŽȱŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽȱ ŠœȱœžĜŒ’Ž—ȱ˜ȱę—ȱ‘Šȱ‘ŽȱŒŠ››’Žȱ‘Žȱ ꛎŠ›–ȱin relation to the crime—’—ȱ˜‘Ž›ȱ ˜›œǰȱ‘Šȱ‘ŽȱꛎȬ arm facilitated or had the potential to facilitate the carjacking.

Tucker carried the Cobray while participating in a carjacking in which his co-defendant forced the driver out of the car at gunpoint. Tucker then drove the car—at dangerous speeds— ‘’•Žȱ ĚŽŽ’— from police. A reasonable jury could Œ˜—Œ•žŽȱ ‘Šǰȱ ž—Ž›ȱ ‘ŽœŽȱ Œ’›Œž–œŠ—ŒŽœǰȱ ‘Žȱ ꛎŠ›–ȱ ™›˜Ȭ Ÿ’ŽȱžŒ”Ž›ȱ ’‘ȱȃŠȱ–ŽŠ—œȱ˜ȱ™›˜ŽŒ’˜—ǰȄȱSmith, 508 U.S. at 238, or ȃŠȱ—ŽŒŽœœŠ›¢ȱœŽ—œŽȱ˜ȱœŽŒž›’¢ǰȄȱ—’ŽȱŠŽœȱŸǯȱŠĴŽ›Ȭ son, 348 F.3d 218, 227 (7th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by Simpson v. United States, 376 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2004). The jury could fairly reach the commonsense conclusion that a ꛎŠ›–ȱŒŠ››’Ž during a carjacking—even if not revealed—at least had the potential to facilitate the carjacking and escape. Cf. Castillo, 406 F.3d at Şŗśȱǻ—˜’—ȱ‘Šȱȃǽ˜ǾŽ—ǰȱ‘ŽȱŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽȱ regarding the underlying drug crime and the weapon will be so intertwined that establishing the link will be easy, at least Šȱ‘ŽȱœžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽȱœŠŽȄǼǯȱ ‘Žȱ˜ŸŽ›—–Ž—ȱ™›ŽœŽ—ŽȱœžĜŒ’Ž—ȱŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽȱ›˜–ȱ ‘’Œ‘ȱ a reasonable jury could conclude that Tucker carried the

14 Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245

˜‹›Š¢ȱ’—ȱ›Ž•Š’˜—ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŒŠ›“ŠŒ”’—ǰȱŠ—ȱ ŽȱŠĜ›–ȱ‘Žȱ’œ›’Œȱ Œ˜ž›ȂœȱŽ—’Š•ȱ˜ȱ‘’œȱ–˜’˜—ȱ˜›ȱŠŒšž’ĴŠ•ǯ B. Rivers Unlike Tucker, Rivers takes aim at his sentence on appeal. He asks that we vacate his carjacking sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 2119 and remand to the district court for resentencing on two grounds. First, he contends the district court improperly applied the reckless endangerment enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. And second, he argues we should give the district court the opportunity to apply a retroactive Guidelines amendment. Although Žȱ ę—ȱ —˜ȱ Ž››˜›ȱ ’—ȱ ‘Žȱ ’œ›’Œȱ court’s application of the reckless endangerment enhancement, we agree with Rivers that, in light of a retroactive adjustment in the method for calculating criminal history points under the Guidelines, his carjacking sentence merits vacatur and a remand to the district court.

1. Enhancement

The district court applied U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2, Reckless Endangerment During Flight, to Rivers’s carjacking sentence calculation. That enhancement adds two points to the total of- Ž—œŽȱ•ŽŸŽ•ȱȃǽ’Ǿȱ‘ŽȱŽŽ—Š—ȱ›ŽŒ”•Žœœ•¢ȱŒ›ŽŠŽȱŠȱœž‹œŠ—’Š•ȱ risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the Œ˜ž›œŽȱ ˜ȱ ĚŽŽ’—ȱ ›˜–ȱ Šȱ •Š ȱ Ž—˜›ŒŽ–Ž—ȱ ˜ĜŒŽ›ǯȄ U.S.S.G. § řŗǯŘȱǻŘŖŘřǼǯȱ‘ŽȱŽ—‘Š—ŒŽ–Ž—ȱŠ™™•’Žœȱȃwhere the conduct ˜ŒŒž›œȱ’—ȱ‘ŽȱŒ˜ž›œŽȱ˜ȱ›Žœ’œ’—ȱŠ››ŽœǯȄȱId., comment. (n.3). The endangerment must result ›˜–ȱ ȃ‘Žȱ ŽŽ—Š—Ȃœȱ ˜ —ȱ conduct and … Œ˜—žŒȱ‘Šȱ‘ŽȱŽŽ—Š—ȱŠ’Žȱ˜›ȱŠ‹ŽĴŽǰȱ counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully ŒŠžœŽǯȄȱId., comment. (n.5)ǯȱȃǽǾ˜–Žȱ˜›–ȱ˜ȱ’›ŽŒȱ˜›ȱŠŒ’ŸŽȱ ™Š›’Œ’™Š’˜—ȱ ’œȱ —ŽŒŽœœŠ›¢ǰȄȱ United States v. ’‹‹ŽĴ, 97 F.4th

Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245 15

477, 481 (7th Cir. 2024), and the district court must make fac- žŠ•ȱę—’—œȱ˜ȱ‘ŠȱŽěŽŒǰȱUnited States v. Seals, 813 F.3d 1038, 1046 (7th Cir. 2016).

’ŸŽ›œȱŠ›žŽœȱ‘ŠǰȱŠœȱŠȱ–ŠĴŽ›ȱ˜ȱ•Š ǰȱ‘Žȱž—’œ™žŽȱŠŒœȱ do not support the enhancement, so we review the application of the enhancement de novo. United States v. House, 883 F.3d 720, 723 (7th Cir. 2018). The facts as determined by the district court need only support the enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence. ’‹‹ŽĴ, 97 F.4th at 480.

‘Žȱ ’œ›’Œȱ Œ˜ž›ȱ –ŠŽȱ Š—ȱ ž—Žšž’Ÿ˜ŒŠ•ȱ ŠŒžŠ•ȱ ę—’—ȱ that Rivers actively participated in endangering others during ‘Žȱ Œ˜ž›œŽȱ ˜ȱ ‘Žȱ ŽœŒŠ™Žȱ ŠĴŽ–™ǯȱ ȱ ˜ž—ȱ ‘Šȱ ’ŸŽ›œȱ ȃŒŽ›Ȭ tainly induced, commanded, or directed Mr. Tucker to do activities related to the seizing of the vehicle, the carjacking, and then all of their subsequent conduct created a great risk of ‹˜’•¢ȱ ’—“ž›¢ȱ ˜ȱ Šȱ •˜ȱ ˜ȱ ™Ž˜™•ŽǯȄȱ ‘Šȱ ŠŒžŠ•ȱ Œ˜—Œ•žœ’˜—ȱ rested upon the district court’s view of the totality of the circumstances and detailed fŠŒžŠ•ȱę—’—œȱŠ‹˜žȱ‘ŽȱŒŠ›“ŠŒ”’—ȱ Š—ȱĚ’‘ǯȱ‘ŽȱŒ˜ž›ȱ˜ž—ȱ‘Šȱȃ’ŸŽ›œȱ’—’’ŠŽȱ‘ŽȱŒŠ›“ŠŒ”Ȭ ’—Ȅȱ‹¢ȱ˜›Œ’—ȱ‘ŽȱŸ’Œ’–ȱ˜ȱœž››Ž—Ž›ȱ‘ŽȱŸŽ‘’Œ•ŽǰȱŠ—ȱ‹˜‘ȱ ŽŽ—Š—œǰȱ ȃ ˜›”’—ȱ ˜Ž‘Ž›ǽǰǾȱ ›’Žȱ ˜ȱ ĚŽŽǯȄȱ ’ŸŽ›œȱ ‘Ž—ȱ got out of the stolen vehicle once it was no longer drivable and ’—Ž™Ž—Ž—•¢ȱŒ‘˜œŽȱ˜ȱŒ˜—’—žŽȱ‘’œȱŠĴŽ–™ŽȱŽœŒŠ™ŽȱŠŒ›˜œœȱ ‘Žȱ›˜Šǰȱ‘›˜ž‘ȱŠȱ ˜˜ŽȱŠ›ŽŠǰȱȃ˜ —ȱ’—˜ȱŠȱŒ›ŽŽ”ǰȱ‘›˜ž‘ȱ Šȱ›’ŸŽ›ȱǽ˜›ȱŒ›ŽŽ”ǾǰȄȱŠ—ȱ‘Ž—ȱœ›ž•Žȱ ’th police ˜ĜŒŽ›œ in the river. The district court was clear that, although it considered facts from the underlying crime and high speed chase, Rivers’s escape on foot could alone support application of the Ž—‘Š—ŒŽ–Ž—ǯȱ‘ŽȱŒ˜ž›ȱŒ˜—Œ•žŽȱ‘ŠȱȃŠȱŠ—¢ȱ™˜’—ȱ’—ȱ‘Ž›Žǰȱ things could have turned out very ‹Š•¢ǰȄȱ ‘Ž‘Ž›ȱž›’—ȱ‘Žȱ car chase or the subsequent foot pursuit. Finally, the court

16 Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245 stated it applied the enhancement žŽȱ˜ȱȃ‘Žȱ’—’’Š•ȱŒŠ›“ŠŒ”Ȭ ing, portions of the high-œ™ŽŽȱŒ‘ŠœŽȱǽŠ—ȱ‘ŽȱŠ—Ž›ȱ™˜•’ŒŽȱ Ž›Žȱ ’—ȱ ‘Ž—ȱ ŠĴŽ–™’—ȱ ˜ȱ œ˜™ȱ ‘Žȱ ŸŽ‘’Œ•ŽǾǰȱ Š—ȱ ‘Ž—ȱ ‘Žȱ ĚŽŽ’—ȱŠŽ›ȱ‘ŽȱŒ‘ŠœŽȱ’—˜ȱthe ›’ŸŽ›ǯȄȱ Framing his argument as a legal challenge, Rivers contends ‘Šȱ‘Žȱ’œ›’ŒȱŒ˜ž›ȱ’–™•’Œ’•¢ȱŠ™™•’ŽȱŠȱȃ›ŽŠœ˜—Š‹•Žȱ ˜›ŽœŽŽŠ‹’•’¢ȄȱœŠ—Š›ȱ˜ȱ“žœ’¢ȱŠ™™•’ŒŠ’˜—ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŽ—‘Š—ŒŽȬ ment rather than, as our precedent requires, active participation. To the contrary, the district court explicitly found that Rivers himself created a danger when he continued his escape ˜—ȱ˜˜ǯȱ‘ŽȱŠŒžŠ•ȱę—’—œȱŠ‹˜ŸŽȱŒ•ŽŠ›•¢ȱœž™™˜›ȱ‘Žȱ’œ›’Œȱ Œ˜ž›Ȃœȱ Ž¡™•’Œ’ȱ ę—’—ȱ ‘Šȱ ’ŸŽ›œȱ ȃŒŽ›Š’—•¢ȱ ’—žŒŽǰȱ Œ˜–Ȭ –Š—Žǰȱ˜›ȱ’›ŽŒŽȄȱŠŒtivities that created a dangerous environment, a conclusion reinforced by his own conduct, which ȃŒ›ŽŠŽȱŠȱ›ŽŠȱ›’œ”ȱ˜ȱ‹˜’•¢ȱ’—“ž›¢ȱ˜ȱŠȱ•˜ȱ˜ȱ™Ž˜™•ŽǯȄȱ Rivers’s own actions justify the enhancement under the guideline and our precedent.

Yet Rivers argues that nonbinding caselaw from other circuits shows his participation was not active enough to legally support the enhancement. He arrives at this conclusion by separating the car chase from the foot chase and arguing that each event in isolation is ’—œžĜŒ’Ž— to show active participation. Here, too, Rivers’s argument fails. Unlike other cases rejecting the application of the enhancement, the district court considered the totality of the circumstances and made exten- œ’ŸŽȱŠŒžŠ•ȱę—’—œȱŠ‹out Rivers’s active participation in endangering lives during the high speed chase and when ‘ŽȱĚŽȱ from police on foot, viewing the escape as a single continuous event. See, e.g., United States v. Reggs, 909 F.3d 911, 913–14 (8th ’›ǯȱŘŖŗŞǼȱǻę—’—ȱ‘Šȱ‘Šȱ ‘’•ŽȱŠ—ȱ’—Ž›Ž—ŒŽȱ˜ȱŠŒ’ŸŽȱ™Š›Ȭ ’Œ’™Š’˜—ȱ ’—ȱ Šȱ ŒŠ›ȱ Œ‘ŠœŽȱ ›˜–ȱ •ŠŽ›ȱ Ě’‘ȱ ˜—ȱ ˜˜ȱ –’‘ȱ ‹Žȱ

Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245 17

™Ž›–’œœ’‹•Žǰȱ ȃ˜—ȱ ‘’œȱ ›ŽŒ˜›ȱ ’ȱ ’œȱ —˜ȱ ›ŽŠœ˜—Š‹•ŽȄǼDzȱ United States v. JohnsonǰȱŜşŚȱǯřȱŗŗşŘǰȱŗŗşŝȱǻŗŗ‘ȱ’›ǯȱŘŖŗŘǼȱǻę—’—ȱ that the defendant’s Ě’‘ȱ ˜—ȱ ˜˜ȱ ŠŽ›ȱ ‘Žȱ ŽŠ Š¢ȱ ŒŠ›ȱ crashed did not illuminate the question of the enhancement’s application ‹ŽŒŠžœŽȱ‘Žȱ’œ›’ŒȱŒ˜ž›ȱ’ȱ—˜ȱȃ–Š”ŽȱŠȱœ™ŽŒ’ęŒȱ ę—’—ȱ ‘Šȱ ‘Žȱ ŽŽ—Š—ȱ ŠŒ’ŸŽ•¢ȱ ŒŠžœŽȱ ˜›ȱ ™›˜Œž›Žȱ ‘Žȱ ›ŽŒ”•Žœœȱ‹Ž‘ŠŸ’˜›ȱŠȱ’œœžŽȄǼDzȱUnited States v. Cespedes, 663 F.3d 685, 691 ǻřȱ’›ǯȱŘŖŗŗǼȱǻę—’—ȱ‘ŽȱŽŽ—Š—Ȃœȱ™Š›’Œ’™Š’˜—ȱ in planning the bank robbery and the district court’s general references to a foot pursuit after the defendant exited the get- Š Š¢ȱŸŽ‘’Œ•Žȱ’—œžĜŒ’Ž—ȱ˜ȱœž™™˜›ȱ‘ŽȱŽ—‘Š—ŒŽ–Ž—Ǽǯȱ ˜›Žȱ‘Š—ȱ‘Žȱ–Ž›ŽȱŠŒȱ˜ȱĚ’‘ǰȱ‘Žȱ’œ›’ŒȱŒ˜ž›ȱ˜ž—ȱ ‘Šȱ‘Žȱ™Š›’Œž•Š›ȱ—Šž›Žȱ˜ȱ’ŸŽ›œȂœȱĚ’‘ȱŒ›ŽŠŽȱŠȱŠ—Ž›ȱ ˜›ȱ™˜•’ŒŽȱ ‘Ž—ȱ‘Žȱ›Š—ȱŠŒ›˜œœȱ–ž•’™•Žȱ•Š—Žœȱ˜ȱ›ŠĜŒ, through a wooded area, and into a rocky ravine. The details of the carjacking, high speed chase, and subsequent foot chase draw this case closer to United States v. Byrd, 689 F.3d 636 (6th Cir. 2012), upon which the district court relied when applying the Ž—‘Š—ŒŽ–Ž—ǰȱ Š—ȱ ‘’Œ‘ȱ ’ŸŽ›œȱ ŠĴŽ–™œȱ ˜ȱ ’œ’—ž’œ‘ǯȱ —ȱ that case, the Sixth Circuit found an inference of active partic- ’™Š’˜—ȱ™Ž›–’œœ’‹•Žȱ ‘Ž—ȱ‘Žȱž—Ž›•¢’—ȱ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ’—Ÿ˜•ŸŽȱŠȱ bank robbery and the defendant urged co-conspirators to hurry up by honking the horn of the getaway car. Id. at 641. He later rode as a passenger in another getaway car, recklessly driven, before continuing ‘’œȱĚ’‘ȱ˜—ȱ˜˜ǯȱId. ȃ••ȱ˜ȱ ‘ŽœŽȱ ŠŒœǰȄȱ ‘Žȱ Œ˜ž›ȱ Œ˜—Œ•žŽǰȱ ȃœ‘˜ ȱ ¢›Ȃœȱ Žœ’›Žȱ ˜ȱ evade capture, from which one could infer that Byrd encour- ŠŽȱ˜›ȱœž™™˜›Žȱǽ‘Žȱ˜‘Ž›ȱ›’ŸŽ›ȂœǾȱ›ŽŒ”•Žœœȱ›’Ÿing, which ŠœȱŠ•œ˜ȱ–˜’ŸŠŽȱ‹¢ȱŠȱŽœ’›Žȱ˜ȱŽœŒŠ™ŽǯȄȱId. Here, too, Rivers’s own conduct indicates a desire to evade capture and a willingness to endanger others to achieve that goal.

18 Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245

‘Žȱ’œ›’ŒȱŒ˜ž›Ȃœȱ‘˜›˜ž‘ȱŠ—ȱŽŠ’•ŽȱŠŒžŠ•ȱę—’—œȱ adequately support the application of the reckless endangerment enhancement.

2. Guidelines amendments

In keeping with the Guidelines ’—ȱ ŽěŽŒȱ at the time, the Presentence Investigation Report added two criminal history points to Rivers’s carjacking sentence calculation because Riv- Ž›œȱ Šœȱȃž—Ž›ȱǽaǾ Œ›’–’—Š•ȱ“žœ’ŒŽȱœŽ—Ž—ŒŽȄ—parole—when ‘ŽȱŒ˜––’ĴŽȱ‘Žȱ˜ěŽ—œŽȱŠȱ’œœžŽǯȱU.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) (2021). Without those two points, rather than a Guidelines range of 77–96 months, Rivers’s Guidelines range for carjacking would have been 63–78 months. The district court imposed a within- Guidelines sentence of 87 months for carjacking and did not expressly state that it would apply the same sentence regardless of the suggested Guidelines range.

While Rivers’s appeal was pending before this court, the United States Sentencing Commission proposed two amendments that Ž—ȱ’—˜ȱŽěŽŒȱ˜—ȱ˜ŸŽ–‹Ž›ȱŗǰȱŘŖŘřǯȱSee United States v. Claybron, 88 F.4th 1226, 1228 (7th Cir. 2023). Amendment 821 did away with additional criminal history points ȃ ‘Ž—ȱ ‘Žȱ ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ ˜ȱ Œ˜—Ÿ’Œ’˜—ȱ Šœȱ Œ˜––’ĴŽȱ ‹¢ȱ ‘Žȱ ŽȬ Ž—Š—ȱ ‘’•Žȱ ž—Ž›ȱ Š—¢ȱ Œ›’–’—Š•ȱ “žœ’ŒŽȱ œŽ—Ž—ŒŽǯȄ Id. Instead, district courts should only ȃǽŠǾȱŗȱ™˜’—ȱ’ȱ‘ŽȱŽŽ—Ȭ Š—ȱǻŗǼȱ›ŽŒŽ’ŸŽœȱŝȱ˜›ȱ–˜›Žȱ™˜’—œȄȱ˜›ȱ™›’˜›ȱœŽ—Ž—ŒŽœǰȱȃŠ—ȱǻŘǼȱ Œ˜––’ĴŽȱ‘Žȱ’—œŠ—ȱ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ ‘’•Žȱž—Ž›ȱŠ—¢ȱŒ›’–’—Š•ȱ“žœȬ ’ŒŽȱœŽ—Ž—ŒŽǯȄȱU.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e) (2023). The second amendment, Amendment 825, makes Amendment 821 retroactive, ™Ž›–’Ĵ’—ȱ ǻ‹žȱ —˜ȱ›Žšž’›’—ǼȱŒ˜ž›œȱ˜ȱȃŒ˜—žŒǽǾȱœŽ—Ž—ŒŽȱ reduction proceedings and enterǽǾ orders under 18 U.S.C. § řśŞŘǻŒǼǻŘǼȄȱ˜›ȱœŽ—Ž—ŒŽœȱ ’‘ȱŽěŽŒ’ŸŽȱŠŽs prior to February 1, 2024. Claybron, 88 F.4th at 1228.

Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245 19

In Claybronǰȱ Žȱ Œ˜—Œ•žŽȱ ‘Šȱ Š•‘˜ž‘ȱ ‘ŽœŽȱ œ™ŽŒ’ęŒȱ amendments to the Guidelines provide a pathway for people under criminal sentences to seek sentence reduction proceedings directly from the district court through 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), t‘Ž›Žȱ ’œȱ —˜ȱ ž—Œ’˜—Š•ȱ ’쎛Ž—ŒŽȱ ‹Ž ŽŽ—ȱ § 3582(c)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 2106, a statute authorizing us to ŸŠŒŠŽȱŠ—ȱ›Ž–Š—ȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ’œ›’ŒȱŒ˜ž›ȱŠ—¢ȱ“ž–Ž—ȱȃ•Š Ȭ ž••¢ȱ ‹›˜ž‘ȱ ‹Ž˜›Žȱ ǽžœǾȱ ˜›ȱ ›ŽŸ’Ž ǯȄȱ Id. at 1229 (quoting § 2106)ǯȱ —ŽŽǰȱ™Ž›–’Ĵ’—ȱœžŒ‘ȱŠȱ›Ž–Š—ȱž—Ž›ȱ§ ŘŗŖŜȱȃ™›˜Ȭ –˜Žœȱ“ž’Œ’Š•ȱŽŒ˜—˜–¢ǯȄ Id. at 1231.

In light of these two amendments and our recent decision in Claybron, Rivers asks that we vacate his carjacking sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing. The government does not oppose this request. Accordingly, we vacate Rivers’s carjacking sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 2119 and remand to the district court for the opportunity to conduct a limited resentencing on that conviction in light of Amendments 821 and 825. On remand, the district court can reassess ’ŸŽ›œȂœȱœŽ—Ž—ŒŽȱŒ˜—œ’Ž›’—ȱ‘Žȱ–Ž—–Ž—ȂœȱŽěŽŒȱ˜—ȱ‘’œȱ Guidelines range and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Such a reconsideration may, if the district court deems it appropriate, include a new hearing and opportunity for the parties to argue the impact of the § 3553(a) factors. See id.

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, Tucker’s sentence is AFFIRMED. Rivers’s § 2119 carjacking sentence is VACATED and REMANDED to the district court for resentencing in light of Amendments 821 and 825.

20 Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245

KIRSCH, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join the opinion but write separately to add to the majority’s discussion of our standard of review. At trial, Ladonta Tucker made a general –˜’˜—ȱ˜›ȱ“ž–Ž—ȱ˜ȱŠŒšž’ĴŠ•ȱž—Ž›ȱŽŽ›Š•ȱž•Žȱ˜ȱCriminal Procedure 29, Œ‘Š••Ž—’—ȱ‘ŽȱœžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱgovernment’s evidence. On appeal, however, Tucker’s argument effectively challenges the jury instructions, which he did not object to at trial. Nevertheless, he claims de novo review applies because his general Rule 29 motion preserved all challenges, including his purely legal argument. The majority correctly notes that our cases “have at times applied de novo review to •ŽŠ•ȱšžŽœ’˜—œȱ ›Š™™Žȱž™ȱ’—ȱŒ‘Š••Ž—Žœȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱœžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ˜ȱ the evidence, eve—ȱ ‘Ž—ȱ‘Žȱœ™ŽŒ’ęŒȱ•ŽŠ•ȱŠ›ž–Ž—ȱ Šœȱ—˜ȱ presented to the district court.” Ante, at 7. However, the standard of review was not disputed in those cases, and the legal questions presented were directly tied to the œžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ of the evidence, unlike the case here. See, e.g., United States v. HardenǰȱŞşřȱǯřȱŚřŚǰ 446 (7th Cir. 2018) (analyzing whether ‘ŽȱŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽȱœžĜŒ’Ž—•¢ȱœ‘˜ Žȱ‘Šȱ‘ŽȱŽŽ—Š—Ȃœȱ‘Ž›˜’—ȱ was the “but-for” cause of the victim’s death). The majority avoids deciding whether de novo or plain error review applies in this case because, either way, Tucker loses. I write separately to clarify our law and Ž¡™•Š’—ȱ ‘¢ȱŠȱœ™ŽŒ’ęŒȱ•ŽŠ•ȱŠ›Ȭ gument like Tucker’s challenge was not preserved by his general Rule 29 motion and should be reviewed only for plain Ž››˜›ǯȱŽǯȱǯȱ›’–ǯȱǯȱśŘǻ‹Ǽǯȱ ȱœžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽȱŒ‘Š••Ž—Žȱ’œȱ•’–’Žȱ’—ȱœŒ˜™Žǯ Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 243 (2016) (“—ȱœžĜȬ ciency review, a reviewing court makes a limited inquiry tai- lored to ensure that a defendant receives the minimum that due process requires: a ‘meaningful opportunity to defend’ ŠŠ’—œȱ ‘Žȱ Œ‘Š›Žȱ ŠŠ’—œȱ ‘’–ȱ Š—ȱ Šȱ “ž›¢ȱ ę—’—ȱ ˜ȱ ž’•ȱ

Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245 21

‘beyond a reasonable doubt.ȂȄǼȱ ǻšž˜Š’˜—ȱ ˜–’ĴŽǼǯ In reviewing such a challenge, we only ask “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. JacksonǰȱśȱǯŚ‘ȱŜŝŜǰȱŜŞŘȱǻŝ‘ȱ’›ǯȱŘŖŘŗǼ (emphasis in original) (cleaned up). In other words, a defendant brings his œžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱŒ‘Š••Ž—Žȱ‹¢ȱfocusing on the evidence presented by the government and arguing that it ’ȱ —˜ȱ œžĜŒ’Ž—•¢ȱ prove one or more of the charged crime’s essential elements. ŽŽȱŽǯȱǯȱ›’–ǯȱǯȱŘşǻŠǼȱǻȃǽǾhe court … must enter a judg- –Ž—ȱ˜ȱŠŒšž’ĴŠ•ȱ˜ȱŠ—¢ȱ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ˜›ȱ ‘’Œ‘ȱ‘ŽȱŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽȱ’œȱ’—Ȭ œžĜŒ’Ž—ȱ˜ȱœžœŠ’—ȱŠȱŒ˜—Ÿ’Œ’˜—ǯ”). And as mentioned above, a defendant can ™›ŽœŽ›ŸŽȱ Š••ȱ ˜ȱ ‘ŽœŽȱ œžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ Œ‘Š••Ž—Žœ (for example, as to each separate element) with a general mo- ’˜—ȱ˜›ȱ“ž–Ž—ȱ˜ȱŠŒšž’ĴŠ• under Rule 29.

But a defendant who raises a new, purely legal argument on appeal regarding the meaning of an element of his crime ǻ›Š‘Ž›ȱ ‘Š—ȱ ›ŽŠ›’—ȱ ‘Žȱ œžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ ˜ȱ ‘Žȱ ŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽȱ Šœȱ ˜ȱ that element) ˜Žœȱ—˜ȱ™›ŽœŽ›ŸŽȱ‘’œȱŠ›ž–Ž—ȱœ’–™•¢ȱ‹¢ȱę•’—ȱ Šȱ Ž—Ž›Š•ȱ –˜’˜—ȱ ˜›ȱ “ž–Ž—ȱ ˜ȱ ŠŒšž’ĴŠ•. In that circumstance, the defendant’s argument goes well beyond the scope ˜ȱ Šȱ –Ž›Žȱ œžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ ˜ȱ ‘Žȱ ŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽȱ Œ‘Š••Ž—Ž and instead presents a question of law. See United States v. Compian-Torres, ŝŗŘȱ ǯřȱ ŘŖřǰȱ ŘŖŝȱ ǻś‘ȱ ’›ǯȱ ŘŖŗ3) (“Compian’s appeal is ™‘›ŠœŽȱŠœȱŠȱŒ‘Š••Ž—Žȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱœžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽǰȱ‹žȱ it in fact presents a pure question of law.”); cf. Lexington Ins. Co. v. Horace Mann Ins. Co.ǰȱŞŜŗȱǯřȱŜŜŗǰȱŜŜşȱǻŝ‘ȱ’›ǯȱŘŖŗŝǼȱǻ’—ȱ the civil context, noting that “ŠœȱŠȱŽ—Ž›Š•ȱ–ŠĴŽ›ǰȱ™ž›ŽȱšžŽœȬ tions of law ought not to be included in a Rule 50(a) motion ’—ȱ‘Žȱę›œȱ™•ŠŒŽǰȱŠœȱ˜’—ȱœ˜ȱŽŽŠœȱ‘Žȱ™ž›™˜œŽȱ˜ȱ‘Šȱ–˜Ȭ ’˜—ǰȱ ‘’Œ‘ȱ ’œȱ ˜ȱ Œ‘Š••Ž—Žȱ ‘Žȱ œžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ ˜ȱ ‘Žȱ ŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽ”)

22 Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245

(cleaned up). Such a challenge falls outside the narrow bounds of a Rule 29 motion.

That is precisely the posture of Tucker’s appeal. Rather than bring a true œžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱevidence challenge, Tucker raises a purely legal question about the proper interpretation of “in relation to” within 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Try as he might to convince us otherwise, his challenge has nothing to do with the evidentiary œžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ˜ŸŽ›—–Ž—ȂœȱŒŠœŽ against him, and it therefore ˜Žœȱ—˜ȱŽȱ‘Žȱ‹Ž—Žęȱ˜ȱ™›ŽœŽ›ŸŠ’˜—ȱ under our forgiving rule for general Rule 29 motions. Rather, Tucker’s argument is a belated objection to a jury instruction; it asks žœȱ˜ȱŽěŽŒ’ŸŽ•¢ȱœ›’”Žȱ‘Žȱȃ™˜Ž—’Šl of facilitating” lan- žŠŽȱ›˜–ȱ˜ž›ȱ™ŠĴŽ›—ȱjury ’—œ›žŒ’˜—ȱŽę—’—ȱ‘Žȱȃ’—ȱ›Ž•ŠȬ tion to” element of § 924(c). No doubt, Tucker’s principal concern is that the jury convicted him based on erroneous law. But jury instructions are how parties and the court “provide fair and accurate summaries of the law” at trial. United States v. CurryǰȱśřŞȱǯřȱŝŗŞǰȱŝřŗȱǻŝ‘ȱ’›ǯȱŘŖŖŞǼǯ Therefore, the jury instruction conference, not a general Rule 29 motion for judg- –Ž—ȱ ˜ȱ ŠŒšž’ĴŠ•ǰ was Tucker’s opportunity to object to the “in relation to” Žę—’’˜—ȱžœŽȱŠȱ›’Š•. He did not take that opportunity, so plain error review applies. Žǯȱ ǯȱ ›’–ǯȱ ǯȱ 30(d) (“Š’•ž›Žȱ ˜ȱ ˜‹“ŽŒȱ ǽ˜ȱ “ž›¢ȱ ’—œ›žŒ’˜—œǾȱ in accordance with this rule precludes appellate review, except ǽ˜›ȱ™•Š’—ȱŽ›Ȭ ›˜›ǾȱŠœȱ™Ž›–’ĴŽȱž—Ž›ȱž•ŽȱśŘǻ‹Ǽǯ”). Other courts have come to the same conclusion in analogous contextsǯȱ˜›ȱŽ¡Š–™•Žǰȱ’—ȱUnited States v. FuertesǰȱŞŖśȱǯřȱ 485 (4th Cir. 2015), ‘ŽȱŽŽ—Š—ǰȱ˜›ȱ‘Žȱę›œȱ’–Žȱ˜—ȱŠ™™ŽŠ•ǰȱ Œ‘Š••Ž—Žȱ ‘Ž‘Ž›ȱœŽ¡ȱ›ŠĜŒ”’—ȱšžŠ•’ęŽȱŠœ a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3). Id. at 497. He argued, like Tucker, ‘Šȱ‘’œȱŽ—Ž›Š•ȱ–˜’˜—ȱ˜›ȱ“ž–Ž—ȱ˜ȱŠŒšž’ĴŠ•ȱ™›ŽœŽ›ŸŽȱŠ••ȱ

Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245 23

˜ȱ ‘’œȱ œžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ ˜ȱ ‘Žȱ ŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽȱ Œ‘Š••Ž—Žœǯȱ Id. ‘Žȱ ˜ž›‘ȱ Circuit rejected that argument:

The government, however, points out, correctly we think, that Ventura’s objection is not about ŠŒžŠ•ȱ˜›ȱŽŸ’Ž—’Š›¢ȱœžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢Dzȱ›Š‘Ž›ǰȱ‘’œȱŠ›Ȭ gument is a purely legal one. … Ventura takes issue with the district court’s instruction … that œŽ¡ȱ›ŠĜŒ”’—ȱ‹¢ȱ˜›ŒŽǰȱ›Šžǰȱ˜›ȱŒ˜Ž›Œ’˜—ȱ’œȱŒŠȬ egorically a crime of violence.

Id. The court then held that “Ventura’s motion for judgment ˜ȱŠŒšž’ĴŠ•ǰȱ ‘’Œ‘ȱŽŠ•ȱ˜—•¢ȱ ’‘ȱœžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽǰȱ did not preserve a purely legal challenge to the jury instruction ….” Id.

‘Žȱ’‘ȱ’›Œž’ȱ’—ȱUnited States v. BraceǰȱŗŚśȱǯřȱŘŚŝȱǻś‘ȱ Cir. 2018) (en banc), reached a similar conclusion. There, the court held that the defendant’s general motion for judgment ˜ȱ ŠŒšž’ĴŠ• preserved his œžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ ˜ȱ ‘Žȱ ŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽȱ Œ‘Š•Ȭ lenge, but it did not preserve his novel argument that his charged crime required the proof of an additional element. Id. at 258 n.2. Thus, ‘’•Žȱ‘ŽȱŒ˜ž›ȱ›ŽŸ’Ž Žȱ‘ŽȱœžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ˜ȱ the evidence challenge de novo, it did so “under existing relevant precedent,” thereby disregarding the defendant’s new legal argument on appeal. Id. at 263; see also United States v. HaggertyǰȱşşŝȱǯřȱŘşŘǰȱŘşŜȱǻś‘ȱ’›ǯȱŘŖŘŗǼȱǻȃRegardless, how- ŽŸŽ›ǰȱ ˜ȱ ‘Ž‘Ž›ȱ ŠŽ›¢ȱ ‘Šœȱ ™›ŽœŽ›ŸŽȱ Šȱ Ž—Ž›Š•ȱ œžĜȬ ciency-of-the-evidence challenge, there are serious reasons to think that Haggerty has not preserved the underlying legal argument that a defendant’s Indian or non-Indian status is an ŽœœŽ—’Š•ȱ Ž•Ž–Ž—ȱ ˜ȱ Š—¢ȱ ˜ěŽ—œŽȱ ™›˜œŽŒžŽȱ ™ž›œžŠ—ȱ ˜ȱ § 1152.”) (emphasis in original).

24 Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245

Reviewing newly raised legal arguments de novo as part ˜ȱŠȱŽ—Ž›Š•ȱœžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽȱŒ‘Š••Ž—Ž contravenes our adversarial system, the Supreme Court’s guidance, and ‘ŽȱŽŽ›Š•ȱž•Žœȱ˜ȱ›’–’—Š•ȱ›˜ŒŽž›ŽǯȱSimply put, de novo review is not the default standard for arguments raised for the ę›œȱ’–Žȱ˜—ȱŠ™™ŽŠ•. Rather, appellate courts “normally will not correct a legal error made in criminal trial court proceedings” at all “ž—•Žœœȱ‘ŽȱŽŽ—Š—ȱę›œȱ‹›˜ž‘ȱ‘ŽȱŽ››˜›ȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ trial court’œȱŠĴŽ—’on.” Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 268 (2013). The exception to that general principle is plain error review under Rule 52(b). Id. But notably, the Supreme Court has “cautioned against any unwarranted expansion of Rule 52(b).” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 (1997). —ȱȃǽŽǾŸen less appropriate than an unwarranted expansion of the Rule would be the creation out of whole cloth of an exception to it, an exception which we have no authority to make.” Id.; see also United States v. Yijun ZhouǰȱŞřŞȱǯřȱŗŖŖŝǰȱ 1014–16 (9th Cir. 2016) (Graber, J., concurring) (noting that ȃǽǾ‘Žȱž™›Ž–Žȱ˜ž›ȱ‘Šœȱ•ŽȱŸŽ›¢ȱ•’Ĵ•Žȱ›˜˜–—if any at all— for the judicial creation of exceptions to Rule 52(b)” and em- phasizing that pure questions of law not raised in the district court should be reviewed, at most, for plain error).

There is simply no reason to review de novo a legal argument not previously raised before the district court. This is true even if the claimed error is as serious as a potentially in- Œ˜››ŽŒȱŽę—’’˜—ȱ˜ȱŠ—ȱŽ•Ž–Ž—ȱ˜ȱŠȱŒ›’–Ž, like Tucker claims here. See JohnsonǰȱśŘŖȱǯǯȱŠȱŚŜŜȱǻȃǽǾhe seriousness of the error claimed does not remove consideration of it from the am- ‹’ȱ ˜ȱ ‘Žȱ ŽŽ›Š•ȱ ž•Žœȱ ˜ȱ ›’–’—Š•ȱ ›˜ŒŽž›Žǯ”). Indeed, plain error review, on its own, œŽ›ŸŽœȱŠœȱŠȱœžĜŒ’Ž—ȱ‹ŠŒ”œ˜™ȱ for such a concern. or instance, if a jury instruction wholly ˜–’ĴŽȱ Šȱ Ž••-established element of a crime, that error

Nos. 23-1781, 23-2201, & 23-2245 25 would likely be plain and subject to reversal under Rule 52(b). But that is not Tucker’s case, as he asks us to overrule our ™›ŽŒŽŽ—ȱ Š—ȱ ›Ž ›’Žȱ ˜ž›ȱ ™ŠĴŽ›—ȱ “ž›¢ȱ ’—œ›žŒ’˜—œǯȱ ŽŽȱ United States v. FreedǰȱşŘŗȱǯřȱŝŗŜǰȱŝŘŗȱǻŝ‘ȱ’›ǯȱŘŖŗşǼȱǻȃŠĴŽ›—ȱ instructions are presumed to accurately state the law.”). In a case like this one, where a novel legal argument is raised, the argument needs to ę›œȱbe presented to the district court so that the court and the parties have a chance to adjudicate it; ˜—•¢ȱ‘Ž—ȱ ’••ȱŠ—ȱŠ™™Ž••ŠŽȱŒ˜ž›ȱŠě˜›ȱthe argument de novo review.

Because Tucker’s argument on appeal—a purely legal Œ‘Š••Ž—Žȱ˜ȱŠȱŽę—’’˜—ȱŒ˜—Š’—Žȱ’—ȱŠȱ™ŠĴŽ›—ȱ“ž›¢ȱ’—œ›žŒȬ tion—does not qualify ŠœȱŠȱœžĜŒ’Ž—Œ¢ of the evidence challenge under Rule 29, and because he did not otherwise raise the argument before the district court or object to the relevant jury instruction as required under Rule 30, it is forfeited. Žǯȱ R. Crim. P. 51 (explaining the requirements for preserving a claim of error). Our review should therefore only be for plain error under Rule 52(b). United States v. LealǰȱŝŘȱǯŚ‘ȱŘŜŘǰȱŘŜ5 ǻŝ‘ȱ’›ǯȱŘŖŘřǼȱǻȃǽ Ǿf a defendant does not object to a jury instruction, … he may only challenge the instruction for plain error on appeal.”).