Won Bok Lee v. Won Sun Lee, No. 13, September Term, 2019

MARYLAND RULE 2-601(b) – ENTRY OF JUDGMENT – TIME FOR FILING APPEAL – RENEWAL OF JUDGMENT – CREATION OF LIEN – EXPIRATION OF LIEN – Court of Appeals held that, to constitute effective judgment under Maryland Rule 2-601 and start thirty-day appeal period set forth in Maryland Rule 8-202(a), judgment must satisfy both Maryland Rule 2-601(b)(2) and (b)(3). Maryland Rule 2-601’s plain language makes clear that judgment must be entered in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-601(b) to be effective and thus trigger thirty-day appeal period. Maryland Rule 2- 601(a)(4) clearly states that “judgment is effective only when [] set forth [on separate document] and when entered as provided in section (b) of this Rule.” This means that judgment must be entered as described in Maryland Rule 2-601(b)(2) and (b)(3)—namely, clerk must enter judgment on docket of circuit court’s electronic case management system “along with such description of [] judgment as [] clerk deems appropriate[,]” and “[u]nless shielding is required . . . , docket entry and [] date of [] entry shall be available to [] public through [] case search feature on [] Judiciary website[.]” Court of Appeals held that docket entries in this case failed to satisfy requirements of Maryland Rule 2-601(b)(3) because date of entry of judgment was unclear and not available to public through Case Search.

Court of Appeals held that trial court erred in denying motion to vacate renewal of judgment. Request to file notice of lien based on federal judgment, and clerk’s recording and indexing of federal judgment, created lien against Respondent’s property, not new judgment. Maryland Rule 2-625 applies to money judgments only and does not authorize renewal of lien. In this case, when Petitioner sought to renew judgment, federal judgment had expired, and neither original federal judgment nor lien that had been created when federal judgment was recorded and indexed were effective, leaving nothing to renew.

Circuit Court for Howard County Case No. 13-C-55-045573 Argued: December 9, 2019 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND No. 13

September Term, 2019 ______________________________________

WON BOK LEE v. WON SUN LEE ______________________________________

Barbera, C.J. McDonald Watts Hotten Getty Booth Raker, Irma S. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________

Opinion by Watts, J. ______________________________________

Filed: January 23, 2020

Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2020-01-23 14:49-05:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk Maryland Rule 2-601(b)(2) provides that “[t]he clerk shall enter a judgment by making an entry of it on the docket of the electronic case management system used by that court[,]” and Maryland Rule 2-601(b)(3) provides that, “[u]nless shielding is required . . ., the docket entry and the date of the entry shall be available to the public through the case search feature on the Judiciary website[.]” Maryland Rule 2-601(a)(4) expressly states that “[a] judgment is effective only when [] set forth [on a separate document] and when entered as provided in section (b) of this Rule.” The main issue in this case is whether an entry of a judgment must satisfy only Maryland Rule 2-601(b)(2) or both Maryland Rule 2-601(b)(2) and Maryland Rule 2- 601(b)(3) to start the thirty-day appeal period set forth in Maryland Rule 8-202(a). Stated differently, the question here is whether the date of an entry of a judgment is when the clerk enters the judgment on the circuit court’s electronic case management system docket or when that docket entry and the date of the entry of the judgment are made available to the public through Case Search on the Judiciary website. We also consider whether an attempt in a circuit court to renew a judgment, which was obtained in federal court, was effective. In July 2002, in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, Won Bok Lee (“Petitioner”) obtained a default judgment against his brother, Won Sun Lee (“Respondent”). In May 2004, in the Circuit Court for Howard County, Petitioner submitted a Request to File Notice of Lien based on the federal judgment. On June 1, 2004, the clerk entered the notice on the docket and indicated that judgment had been entered as of that date.1 Over a decade later, in July 2015, Petitioner filed a Request to Renew Judgment, and that same month, the clerk entered “Notice of Renewed Judgment” on the docket. Several months later, in March 2016, Respondent filed a Motion to Vacate Renewal of Judgment and Request for Hearing. On June 2, 2016, the circuit court conducted a hearing and denied the motion. On the same date, the circuit court issued a one-page order to the same effect, which the clerk stamped “Entered” on June 3, 2016. This time, the circuit court clerk entered a docket entry into the circuit court’s electronic case management system (“ECMS”) and on the case search feature on the Judiciary website. Neither the entry on the circuit court’s ECMS nor the initial entry on Case Search expressly set forth the date of the entry of the judgment. On July 6, 2016, Respondent noted an appeal. Petitioner moved to strike the notice of appeal as untimely. After a remand by the Court of Special Appeals and the circuit court’s issuance of a memorandum explaining the sequence of events in this case, the Court of Special Appeals denied a motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that the notice of appeal, although initially premature, had become ripe. Additionally, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court’s denial of the motion to vacate, and remanded the case to the circuit court with instruction to vacate the renewal of the judgment. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and hold that, to constitute an effective judgment under Maryland Rule 2-601 and start the thirty-day appeal period set Petitioner and the Court of Special Appeals refer to the entry as a “docket entry,” 1 and Respondent refers to an entry being made by the clerk on the circuit court’s “docket.” On June 1, 2004, this was likely a docket entry into the circuit court’s court file. This entry now appears on the circuit court’s electronic case management system docket.

forth in Maryland Rule 8-202(a), the entry of the judgment must satisfy both Maryland Rule 2-601(b)(2) and (b)(3). Maryland Rule 2-601’s plain language makes clear that a

judgment must be entered in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-601(b) to be effective and thus trigger the thirty-day appeal period. Maryland Rule 2-601(a)(4) clearly states that “[a] judgment is effective only when [] set forth [on a separate document] and when entered as provided in section (b) of this Rule.” This means that a judgment must be entered as

described in Maryland Rule 2-601(b)(2) and (b)(3)—namely, the clerk must enter the judgment on the docket of the ECMS that the circuit court uses “along with such description of the judgment as the clerk deems appropriate[,]” and, “[u]nless shielding is required . . . , the docket entry and the date of the entry shall be available to the public through the case search feature on the Judiciary website[.]”

Applying that holding to the circumstances of this case, we hold that the initial

docket entries concerning the denial of the motion to vacate failed to satisfy the requirements of Maryland Rule 2-601(b) because the date of entry of the judgment was unclear and not available to the public through Case Search; i.e., the docket entries failed to satisfy the requirements of Maryland Rule 2-601(b)(3). The docket entries did not provide notice of the date when judgment was entered as required under Maryland Rule 2-

601(b)(3) and, accordingly, did not trigger the thirty-day appeal period.

As to the merits, we hold that the trial court erred in denying the motion to vacate the renewal of the judgment. The request to file a notice of lien based on the federal judgment, and the clerk’s recording and indexing of the federal judgment, created a lien against Respondent’s property in Howard County, not a new judgment. Maryland Rule 2- 625 applies to money judgments only, and does not authorize the renewal of a lien. In this

case, when Petitioner sought to renew the judgment, the federal judgment had expired, and neither the original federal judgment nor the lien that had been created when the federal judgment was recorded and indexed in Howard County were effective, leaving nothing to renew.

BACKGROUND

Initial Proceedings in Federal and State Court

On July 23, 2002, in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, Petitioner obtained a default judgment against his brother, Respondent, in the principal amount of $141,059.44, plus attorney’s fees of $499.50, court costs, and post-judgment interest.^[2]

On May 21, 2004, in the Circuit Court for Howard County, Petitioner submitted a

“Request to File Notice of Lien” based on the federal judgment. On June 1, 2004, the clerk made the following two docket entries: “Notice of Lien of Judg[]ment Received From

United States District Court” and “Judgment entered on 06/01/04[.]”

Thereafter, the case was dormant for over a decade until July 23, 2015, when

Petitioner filed a “Request to Renew Judgment[.]” In the request, Petitioner stated that

“[t]he judgment ha[d] not expired (12 years from entry)[,]” and asked that the circuit court “renew the judgment[.]” On July 28, 2015, the clerk made the following docket entry:

“Notice of Renewed Judgment[.]”

On March 24, 2016, Respondent filed a “Motion to Vacate Renewal of Judgment and Request for Hearing.” Respondent argued that Petitioner’s 2004 filing in the circuit

court did not create a new judgment; that the date of the entry of the judgment was July 23, 2002; and that the judgment expired twelve years from that date—on July 23, 2014—and could not be renewed after its expiration. Respondent requested that the circuit court vacate the judgment that the clerk had entered on June 1, 2004, and the July 28, 2015 docket entry that stated: “Notice of Renewed Judgment.”

On June 2, 2016, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion. After hearing argument from the parties, the circuit court agreed with Respondent that the May 21, 2004 filing by Petitioner created a lien, but ruled that the lien was nevertheless subject to renewal. The circuit court explained: “[I]t was entered in 2004 as a lien, it was recorded

and indexed that the 12 years begins at that point. Not from the original date that the original judgment was issued in federal court. . . . [T]herefore, it was within the 12 years.”

Accordingly, the circuit court denied the motion to vacate.

On that same day, the circuit court issued a one-page order, stating in its entirety:

This Court, having considered [Respondent]’s Motion to Vacate Renewal of Judgment, the Opposition to that Motion filed by [Petitioner], and the arguments of counsel for both parties before this Court on June 2, 2016, hereby ORDERS that [Respondent]’s Motion is hereby DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED.

(Emphasis in original). The order contained the circuit court judge’s signature, the handwritten date “6/2/16[,]” a stamp from the Clerk’s Office stating that the Order was “ENTERED” on June 3, 2016, a true copy test certification, and the notation “6000” on the bottom-right corner.

Docket Entry 6000 appears in the circuit court’s ECMS3 as follows:

In the circuit court’s ECMS, Docket Entry 6000 states that the date “Filed[,]” as well as the date “Entered[,]” is “03/24/16[,]” and that the date “Closed” is “06/03/16[.]” Docket Entry 6000 also notes the “Jdg” as “WVT” (the circuit court judge’s initials)4 and notes the “Ruling” as “Denied[.]” At the relevant time, on the case search feature on the Judiciary website, the same entry appeared as follows: The entry stated that the “File Date” and “Entered Date” were “03/24/2016” for the document “Motion to Vacate Judgment and Request for Hearing[.]” (Bolding omitted). The entry also stated: “Decision: Denied” and “04/20/16 per [circuit court j]udge []: Set for hearing[ ]Copies mailed[ ]06/03/16 copies mailed[.]” (Bolding omitted).

Notably, Docket Entry 6000 now appears differently than it originally did when viewed through the case search feature on the Judiciary website. The Court of Special

Appeals observed that, as of January 11, 2019, Docket Entry 6000 appeared in Case Search with the following comment:

Motion: . . . Create Date: 03/24/2016 . . . Update Date: 06/03/2016 MMOT - Motion to Vacate Judgment and Request for Hearing 04/20/16 per [circuit court j]udge []: Set for hearing Copies mailed 06/03/16 copies mailed Filed: 03/24/2016 Decision: Denied - 06/03/2016

Won Sun Lee v. Won Bok Lee, 240 Md. App. 47, 56, 201 A.3d 1, 7 (2019). The Case

Search entry also included a “File Date” of “03/24/2016” and a “Close Date” of “06/03/2016[.]” Id. at 56, 201 A.3d at 7. The Court of Special Appeals explained that “the change occurred after July 6, 2016[,]” and that the updated Case Search “entry now includes the following information: ‘Decision: Denied - 06/03/2016.’” Id. at 56, 201 A.3d at 7.

A second entry pertaining to the case, Docket Entry 14000, appears in the circuit court’s ECMS as follows:

In the circuit court’s ECMS, Docket Entry 14000 states that the date “Filed” is “06/02/16[,]” that the date “Entered” is “06/06/16[,]” and that the date “Closed” is “03/07/17[.]” Docket Entry 14000 also notes the “Jdg” as “WVT” (the circuit court judge’s initials).

At the relevant time, Docket Entry 14000 appeared on Case Search on the Judiciary website as:

The docket entry stated: “Hearing o[n] Motion[ ]DEF Motion to Vacate Judgment is denied[ ]PLT to prepare and submit Order[.]” (Bolding omitted). The Case Search entry noted that the “Document Name” was “Open Court Proceeding[,]” with a “File Date” of “06/02/2016” and an “Entered Date” of “06/06/2016[.]” (Bolding omitted). On July 6, 2016, Respondent noted an appeal. Petitioner moved to strike the notice of appeal as untimely, stating that the June 2, 2016 Order had been entered on June 3, 2016, that a notice of appeal was required to be filed within thirty days, and that the July 6, 2016 notice of appeal was filed late. Respondent filed an opposition to the motion, arguing, among other things, that, although the clerk stamped the June 2, 2016 Order with “Entered” on June 3, 2016, the clerk did not make an entry on the ECMS until June 6, 2016, when the clerk noted that the motion to vacate was denied and stated that the “Entered Date” was “06/06/2016[.]” Thus, according to Respondent, a notice of appeal was due within thirty days of June 6, 2016, “the only date memori[ali]zing when the clerk physically made an ECMS entry referring to the Order.” On August 9, 2016, the circuit court granted the motion and struck the notice of appeal. On August 17, 2016, Respondent filed a timely notice of appeal.

Appeal

On August 24, 2017, in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals determined that the record did not reflect “when (or if) the judgment was ever placed on a

separate document, and so [the Court did not] know whether [Respondent]’s notice of appeal [was] timely or [was] premature.” Won Sun Lee v. Won Bok Lee, No. 945, Sept.

Term, 2016, 2017 WL 3634056, at *3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 24, 2017). The Court

concluded that, based on the record, there was insufficient evidence as to whether June 6, 2016, was the date of the entry of the judgment because it was unclear whether the circuit

court “signed a document that conformed to the separate document rule.” Id. at *2. The Court posited that there were “three logical explanations”: (1) the circuit court recorded the judgment on a separate document before June 6, but, because the judgment was entered on

the circuit court’s ECMS on June 6, 2016, that date was the date of the entry of the judgment, and the July 6, 2016 notice of appeal was timely; (2) the judgment was not recorded on a separate document as of June 6, 2016, but later was set forth in a separate document on an unknown date, so the notice of appeal was either timely or premature, but

was, at that time, ripe; or (3) the judgment was never set forth in a separate document and, as such, the judgment was still not final and the notice of appeal remained premature. See id.

The Court reversed the order striking the notice of appeal and “remand[ed] the matter to allow the circuit court to determine [whether] there [was] a judgment that

complie[d] with the separate document rule[,] and, if a judgment that complie[d] with the separate document ha[d] not yet been created, to create one.” Id. at *3. The Court stated that, “[o]nce the circuit court determine[d] either that there [was] an existing judgment that complie[d] with the separate document rule or create[d] a new judgment that complie[d] with the separate document rule, [Respondent]’s appeal c[ould] proceed.” Id. The Court’s mandate provided that the matter was remanded for the circuit court to determine the date of the entry of the judgment or to enter the judgment on a separate document. See id.

Circuit Court Proceedings on Remand On remand, the circuit court asked the clerk for an explanation of the clerk’s practices with respect to entries in the circuit court’s ECMS. In a memorandum dated

December 4, 2017, the clerk advised the circuit court that the June 2, 2016 Order—denying the motion to vacate the renewal of the judgment—was entered on the circuit court’s

ECMS on June 3, 2016, under Docket Entry 6000. The clerk’s memorandum explained:

[] It is the clerk’s practice that[,] when the clerk enters a ruling/order from the [circuit c]ourt, the Order is “entered” stamped. Which in this case was June 3, 2016.

[] It is the clerk’s practice to update the original motion in [the ECMS]. In this case[,] the clerk entered the ruling of Denied under docket entry 6000 as of June 3, 2016[,] and mailed copies of the Order on June 3, 2016.

[] Adjacent to the ruling of Denied is the closed date of the motion of June 3, 2016[,] which also corresponds to the date of entry.

[] Therefore[,] the written Order Denying the Motion to Vacate [Renewal of] Judgment was entered by the clerk on June 3, 2016.

After receiving the clerk’s memorandum, the circuit court issued its own memorandum on December 29, 2017, providing an explanation of the process and events.

As to Docket Entry 6000 in the circuit court’s ECMS, the circuit court explained that the entry reflected several different events—namely, the filing of the motion to vacate the - 10 -

renewal of the judgment on March 24, 2016; the scheduling of a hearing on the motion, which occurred on April 20, 2016; and the denial of the motion, which was entered on June

3, 2016. According to the circuit court, “[t]he original motion was docketed on 03/24/16 and updated with the 06/03/16 denial and entry of the Order and the mailing of copies to

the litigants.” The circuit court stated that the closed date for Docket Entry 6000—June 3, 2016—reflected “the date that the open motion was closed by the clerk with the entry of an order.”

As to Docket Entry 14000 in the ECMS, the circuit court explained that, “[f]or every hearing[,] the clerk [] prepares a hearing sheet[,] which is a summary of what occurred

during a proceeding[,]” and that “[t]he hearing sheet is also entered into the [ECMS].” The circuit court stated that the information in Docket Entry 14000 reflected “the hearing

results[,]” that the hearing sheet was dated June 2, 2016, and that it was entered in the ECMS on June 6, 2016. According to the circuit court:

The entry of the hearing sheet on June 6, 2016 is just that, the entering of the hearing sheet into the [ECMS]. It is not an order, nor does it have the effect of an order. It just lists the outcome of the hearing[,] which was the denial of the motion to vacate and [Petitioner]’s counsel to submit the Order.

In response to the questions that the Court of Special Appeals raised, the circuit

court explained that it had issued a separate order that had been signed on June 2, 2016 and entered in the ECMS on June 3, 2016. Specifically, the circuit court stated:

[T]his Court issued a separate Order that was signed on June 2, 2016, and that Order was entered by the clerk [] on June 3, 2016. The Order has the number 6000 written in the lower[-]right corner, and has an Entered stamp of June 3, 2016. The Order was entered by the clerk in the [ECMS] on June 3, 2016[,] and copies were mailed on June 3, 2016. The Court issued a separate document that complies with the separate

- 11 - document rule[,] and that separate document was entered by the clerk [] and mailed to the parties on June 3, 2016.

Subsequent Appellate Proceedings

After the circuit court issued its memorandum, the case returned to the Court of Special Appeals. On March 14, 2018, Respondent filed an Appellant’s Brief. On April

11, 2018, Petitioner filed an Appellee’s Brief and Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner argued, based on the circuit court’s memorandum, that the denial of the motion to vacate was entered on June 3, 2016, and that, therefore, the notice of appeal was untimely. In a reply

brief, Respondent opposed the motion to dismiss, contending that, because the Court of Special Appeals had previously concluded that the appeal was not late and that it would proceed after the remand, the Court’s determination had become the law of the case.

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals

On January 30, 2019, in a reported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals denied the motion to dismiss, reversed the circuit court’s denial of the motion to vacate, and remanded the case with instruction to vacate the renewal of the judgment. See Won Sun Lee, 240

Md. App. at 50, 57, 201 A.3d at 3, 7. The Court of Special Appeals determined that it was not precluded from considering whether Respondent’s appeal was late, explaining:

Here, the evidence and record [] is substantially different now from the prior appeal because we now have explanations from the circuit court and [the] clerk of the June 2[, 2016] Order and the docket entries about which the prior panel was uncertain. We now know definitively that (1) the circuit court intended the June 2[, 2016] Order to be the separate order entering judgment in this case, (2) the clerk intended to enter that order in the court’s electronic case management system on June 3[, 2016] by adding the word “Denied” to Docket Entry 6000, and (3) Docket Entry 14000 is merely a hearing sheet[,] and does not reflect the entry of any written order. With this additional information[,] and in light of our independent obligation to ensure

- 12 -

that we have jurisdiction, we conclude that we are not precluded from revisiting the question of whether [Respondent]’s original notice of appeal was late.

Id. at 58-59, 201 A.3d at 8.

The Court of Special Appeals addressed the motion to dismiss, and concluded that

Respondent’s appeal, although initially premature, had become ripe. See id. at 59, 201

A.3d at 8. The Court determined that “the circuit court’s memorandum establishes that the June 2[, 2016] Order is indeed the ‘separate document’ setting forth the court’s judgment that is required by [Maryland] Rule 2-601(a)[(1)].” Id. at 59, 201 A.3d at 8. The Court stated that the circuit court’s explanation made clear that the notation in Docket Entry

14000—that an order was forthcoming—“reflects the situation that existed when the court closed the June 2[, 2016] hearing, not the situation that existed when that docket entry was made on June 6,” 2016. Id. at 59, 201 A.3d at 8. The Court concluded that the June 2, 2016

Order satisfied the separate document requirement of Maryland Rule 2-601(a)(1). Id. at

67, 201 A.3d at 13.

As to the issue of whether the clerk entered the judgment on the ECMS, the Court observed that that matter was “more complicated.” Id. at 59, 201 A.3d at 8. The Court stated that the circuit court’s explanation that Docket Entry 14000 does not reflect the entry

of any written order eliminated the possibility that Docket Entry 14000 constituted the entry of the judgment in the ECMS. See id. at 59, 201 A.3d at 8. The Court was not convinced, however, that Docket Entry 6000 established that June 3, 2016 was the date on which the clerk entered the judgment in the ECMS. See id. at 59-60, 201 A.3d at 8-9. The Court explained:

- 13 -

Our difficulty in accepting . . . June 3[, 2016] as the trigger date for the [thirty-day] appeal period [set forth in Maryland Rule 8-202(a)] lies in the fact that Docket Entry 6000 itself—and particularly the version of that docket entry that was available on the Judiciary website in June and July of 2016—failed to establish clearly when the clerk added the “Denied” notation to the entry.

Id. at 60, 201 A.3d at 9 (footnote omitted).

The Court ultimately held that Docket Entry 6000 did not comply with the requirement set forth in Maryland Rule 2-601(b)(3)—that the docket entry and date of entry of judgment be made available to the public through the case search feature on the Judiciary website—“because the date of entry was not available to the public.” Id. at 67, 201 A.3d at 13. The Court observed that Docket Entry 6000, as it appeared through the case search feature, provided an “Entered Date” of March 24, 2016, but that date reflected the date on which the clerk entered the motion, not the date of the entry of the judgment. Id. at 68, 201

A.3d at 13-14. According to the Court, “the ‘Entered Date’ of March 24[, 2016] is unhelpful at best and potentially quite confusing” for a litigant or member of the public seeking to ascertain the date of entry of the judgment. Id. at 68, 201 A.3d at 14.

The Court explained that Docket Entry 6000, as originally displayed on Case Search on the Judiciary website, had been unclear and “failed to provide litigants and the public

with a clear indication of when judgment was entered.” Id. at 68, 201 A.3d at 14. The Court concluded that the original Docket Entry 6000 failed to provide notice of the date when judgment was entered, as required by Maryland Rule 2-601(b), and, as such, did not trigger the thirty-day appeal period set forth in Maryland Rule 8-202(a), making

Respondent’s appeal premature when it was filed on July 6, 2016. See id. at 69, 201 A.3d

- 14 - at 14. The Court observed that, significantly, Docket Entry 6000, as displayed on Case Search, was, at some unknown date after July 2016, updated to clearly indicate that the decision to deny the motion to vacate was entered on June 3, 2016. See id. at 69, 201 A.3d at 14. As such, the Court concluded that Respondent’s appeal was ripe to proceed, explaining: Pursuant to [Maryland] Rule 8-602(f), the July 6, 2016 notice of appeal is treated as having been “filed on the same day as, but after, the entry on the docket.” Although we do not know for certain when Docket Entry 6000 changed in this way, we know it was after July 31, 2016. For that reason, [Respondent]’s appeal is now ripe to proceed. Id. at 69, 201 A.3d at 14 (footnote omitted). Finally, the Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court erred in denying the motion to vacate the renewal of the judgment. See id. at 69, 201 A.3d at 14. The Court explained that Petitioner’s 2004 filing in the circuit court established a lien, not a new judgment, i.e., that “the effect of recording and indexing any judgment is the establishment of a lien.” Id. at 72, 201 A.3d at 16 (citation omitted). The Court also concluded that Maryland Rule 2-625, authorizing renewal of a judgment, does not apply to a lien, and thus could not “have authorized a renewal of the lien that was created by the 2004 filing.” Id. at 74, 201 A.3d at 18. The Court determined that the federal judgment had expired by the time of Petitioner’s 2015 filing—i.e., that, by that time, the judgment that Petitioner had obtained against Respondent “on July 23, 2002 was no longer extant and could not be renewed[,]” as it had expired after twelve years. Id. at 75, 201 A.3d at 18 (cleaned up). The Court explained that “the lien that [Petitioner]’s 2004 filing in Howard County had created was - 15 - itself destroyed automatically by the expiration of the federal judgment in 2014 because a lien is of no effect in the absence of a predicate judgment.” Id. at 75-76, 201 A.3d at 18. The Court concluded: [B]y the time [that Petitioner] made his 2015 filing, neither his original 2002 federal judgment nor the lien [that had been] created when he recorded that judgment in Howard County in 2004 remained effective. Simply put, there was nothing for him to renew. The circuit court thus erred in denying [Respondent]’s motion to vacate the [] renewal of the [] judgment. Id. at 76, 201 A.3d at 18. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari On March 18, 2019, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, raising the following two issues: 1. When a judgment has been entered properly in a circuit court’s electronic case management system in compliance with [Maryland] Rule 2-601(b)(2), must the docket entry and its date of entry also be identified clearly on the [c]ase [s]earch feature of the Judiciary website in order for there to have been an “entry” of the judgment to begin the 30-day time period in which an appeal must be filed? 2. When a federal court judgment is recorded and entered in a Maryland circuit court, may the [S]tate court judgment be renewed independently of any renewal of the federal court judgment? On May 14, 2019, this Court granted the petition. See Won Bok Lee v. Won Sun Lee, 463 Md. 637, 207 A.3d 1215 (2019). STANDARD OF REVIEW In Green v. State, 456 Md. 97, 125, 171 A.3d 1162, 1177-78 (2017), we set forth the standard for interpreting a Maryland Rule, stating: A court interprets a Maryland Rule by using the same canons of construction that the court uses to interpret a statute. First, the court considers the Rule’s - 16 - plain language in light of: (1) the scheme to which the Rule belongs; (2) the purpose, aim, or policy of this Court in adopting the Rule; and (3) the presumption that this Court intends the Rules and this Court’s precedent to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law. If the Rule’s plain language is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the Rule’s apparent purpose, the court applies the Rule’s plain language. Generally, if the Rule’s plain language is ambiguous or not clearly consistent with the Rule’s apparent purpose, the court searches for rulemaking intent in other indicia, including the history of the Rule or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the rulemaking process, in light of: (1) the structure of the Rule; (2) how the Rule relates to other laws; (3) the Rule’s general purpose; and (4) the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions. (Citation omitted). Moreover, “[w]here a Rule’s language is clear, a court neither adds nor deletes language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the Rule.” Id. at 125, 171 A.3d at 1178 (cleaned up). “Unambiguous language will be given its usual, ordinary meaning unless doing so creates an absurd result.” Id. at 125, 171 A.3d at 1178 (cleaned up). As to interpretation of the Maryland Rules and a trial court’s rulings on any other question of law, we review such matters without deference. See, e.g., Lisy Corp. v. McCormick & Co., Inc., 445 Md. 213, 221, 126 A.3d 55, 60 (2015) (“Because an interpretation of the Maryland Rules is appropriately classified as a question of law, we review the issue de novo to determine if the trial court was legally correct in its rulings on these matters.” (Cleaned up)); Griffin v. Lindsey, 444 Md. 278, 285, 119 A.3d 753, 757 (2015) (“We review questions of law without deference.” (Citation omitted)). - 17 - DISCUSSION I. The Parties’ Contentions Petitioner contends that the date of an entry of a judgment is the date when the judgment is entered on the docket in the circuit court’s ECMS, not the date when the judgment is made available to the public through the case search feature of the Judiciary website. Petitioner argues that Maryland Rule 2-601(b)(2) is the subsection that sets forth the method of an entry of a judgment, and notes that Maryland Rule 2-601(d) defines the date of a judgment that was entered on or after July 1, 2015 as the date when the clerk enters the judgment on the ECMS. Petitioner asserts that Maryland Rule 2-601(b)(3) requires only that the date of an entry of a judgment be made available on the case search feature of the Judiciary website, and does not address the date of the entry of the judgment. Petitioner contends that, in this case, the June 2, 2016 Order was entered on June 3, 2016—the date that it was entered in the circuit court’s ECMS—thereby triggering the thirty-day appeal period set forth in Maryland Rule 8-202(a). As such, Petitioner argues that the notice of appeal was due by July 5, 2016, and that the notice of appeal filed by Respondent on July 6, 2016 was untimely. Petitioner asserts that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the June 3, 2016 entry of the June 2, 2016 Order on the circuit court’s ECMS did not render June 3, 2016 the date of the entry of the judgment. Petitioner contends that the holding of the Court of Special Appeals erroneously adds a third requirement for an entry of a judgment—entry of the judgment on the case search feature of the Judiciary website. - 18 - Respondent counters that the Court of Special Appeals correctly denied Petitioner’s motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely because the July 6, 2016 notice of appeal was not filed within thirty days after the date of the entry of the judgment. Respondent contends that an entry of a judgment does not occur until the clerk makes an entry of the judgment on the docket of the circuit court’s ECMS pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-601(b)(2) and that the judgment and its date of entry are made available to the public on Case Search pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-601(b)(3). Stated otherwise, Respondent asserts that, for purposes of Maryland Rules 2-601 and 8-202(a), a judgment is not entered unless the requirements of both Maryland Rule 2-601(b)(2) and Maryland Rule 2-601(b)(3) are satisfied. Respondent contends that, in this case, Docket Entry 6000 did not comply with Maryland Rule 2-601(b)(3) because the date of entry was not made available to the public, and argues that the entry itself was insufficient under Maryland Rule 2-601(b)(2) because it failed to specify the date of the entry of the judgment. Respondent asserts that the Court of Special Appeals correctly determined that Docket Entry 6000, as it originally existed in June and July 2016, failed to satisfy the requirements of Maryland Rule 2-601(b), as both the ECMS and Case Search entries failed to establish the date of entry of the June 2, 2016 order. Respondent contends the Court of Special Appeals correctly concluded that the original Docket Entry 6000 on Case Search failed to satisfy Maryland Rule 2-601(b) and did not trigger the thirty-day appeal period, but that the appeal became ripe when Docket Entry 6000 was changed at some point after July 31, 2016. Relevant Maryland Rules Maryland Rule 1-202(o) defines a “judgment” as “any order of court final in its - 19 - nature entered pursuant to these rules.” For purposes of obtaining appellate review in the Court of Special Appeals, Maryland Rule 8-202(a) provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Rule or by law, the notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken.” And Maryland Rule 8-202(f) states that the term “‘[e]ntry’ as used in this Rule occurs on the day when the clerk of the lower court enters a record on the docket of the electronic case management system used by that court.” Determination of a judgment’s date of entry for purposes of Maryland Rule 8-202 is set forth in Maryland Rule 2-601. See Hiob v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 440 Md. 466, 471, 103 A.3d 596, 599 (2014) (“The date of [an] ‘entry of [a] judgment’ is determined under Maryland Rule 2-601.”). Under Maryland Rule 2-601(a)(4), a final judgment becomes effective once it is set forth on a “separate document,” as required by Maryland Rule 2-601(a)(1), and is entered in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-601(b). Maryland Rule 2-601(a) provides, in relevant part, that “[e]ach judgment shall be set forth on a separate document and include a statement of an allowance of costs as determined in conformance with Rule 2-603[,]” Md. R. 2-601(a)(1), and that “[a] judgment is effective only when so set forth and when entered as provided in section (b) of this Rule[,]” Md. R. 2-601(a)(4). Maryland Rule 2-601(d) provides that, “[o]n and after July 1, 2015, regardless of the date a judgment was signed, the date of the judgment is the date that the clerk enters the judgment on the electronic case management system docket in accordance with section (b) of this Rule.” Because the date of an entry of a judgment is governed by Maryland Rule 2-601(b), it is helpful to examine the recent history of the section. Prior to July 1, 2015, Maryland - 20 - Rule 2-601(b) provided in its entirety as follows: Method of Entry – Date of Judgment. The clerk shall enter a judgment by making a record of it in writing on the file jacket, or on a docket within the file, or in a docket book, according to the practice of each court, and shall record the actual date of the entry. That date shall be the date of the judgment. See Hiob, 440 Md. at 478, 103 A.3d at 603; Court of Appeals of Maryland, Rules Order at 64-65 (Mar. ^[2], 2015), available at https://www.mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules/ order/ro186supp.pdf [https://perma.cc/ V9J7-TFCT]. On September 26, 2014, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (“the Rules Committee”) submitted its One Hundred Eighty-Sixth Report to this Court. See Rules Committee, One Hundred Eighty-Sixth Report at 3 (Sept. 26, 2014), available at https://www.mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules/reports/186th.pdf [https:// perma.cc/BW75-YPT9]. The Rules Committee proposed amendments to Maryland Rule 2-601, among other Rules, “to clarify . . . when a judgment is deemed to be entered.” Id. at 10. The Rules Committee explained that the proposed amendments involved “how judgments are entered and when they are deemed to be entered[,]” and urged that the proposed amendments were needed due to “the lack of uniformity throughout the State in how clerks go about entering judgments and the fact that [then-current] Rule[] 2-601(b) . . . , governing the method of entering judgments, [was] obsolete and [was] not being followed anywhere in the State.” Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted). The Rules Committee stated that it had been advised that no clerks used the methods of entering judgments as set forth in former Maryland Rule 2-601(b) “because all judgments are entered electronically so they can go on [c]ase [s]earch” and that such practice would continue under the - 21 - Maryland Electronic Courts (MDEC) case management system. Id. The Rules Committee proposed the following amendments to Maryland Rule 2-601: (1) amending Rule[] 2-601(b) . . . to provide (i) that the clerk enter a judgment by making an entry of it on the docket of the electronic case management system used by that court, along with such description of the judgment as the clerk deems appropriate, and (ii) that, unless shielding is required by law or court order, the docket entry and the date of the entry shall be available to the public through the [c]ase [s]earch feature on the Judiciary website and in accordance with [specific Maryland] Rules . . . ; and (2) adding a new section (d) to Rule 2-601 . . . to provide that, on and after the effective date of the amendment . . . , the date of the judgment is the date that the clerk enters the judgment on the electronic case management system, regardless of the date the judgment was signed. Id. (emphasis omitted). The Rules Committee stated that its “overarching intent” was that “the date of entry of the judgment be the date when the judgment becomes accessible to the public.” Id. According to the Rules Committee, it had “been advised that a judgment [would] become accessible through [c]ase [s]earch automatically and immediately upon its entry on the court’s electronic case management system.” Id. The Rules Committee proposed conforming amendments to Maryland Rule 8-202, among other Rules. Id. Thus, in the Report, the Rules Committee proposed to AMEND Rule 2-601 to add an applicability provision in subsection (b)(1); to delete language from and add language to subsection (b)(2) to modify how a judgment is entered; to add subsection (b)(3), which provides that subject to a shielding exception, a docket entry is available to the public through a search feature on the Judiciary website and in accordance with certain Rules . . . ; and to add section (d), which provides how the date of a judgment is determined before and after the date of the amendment to Rule 2-601[.] Id. at 71. In a Rules Order dated March 2, 2015, this Court adopted the proposed amendments - 22 - to Maryland Rule 2-601, which became effective on July 1, 2015. See Rules Order at 3-5. The amendments to Maryland Rule 2-601 included: (1) replacing the requirement that the clerk enter a judgment “according to the practice of each court” with the requirement that the clerk enter a judgment “by making an entry of it on the docket of the electronic case management system used by that court”; (2) adding a new requirement that, “[u]nless shielding is required by law or court order, the docket entry and the date of the entry shall be available to the public through the case search feature on the Judiciary website”; and (3) adding section (d), which provided that, “[o]n and after July 1, 2015, . . . the date of the judgment is the date that the clerk enters the judgment on the electronic case management system in accordance with section (b) of this Rule.” Id. at 64-66. This Court also adopted an amendment to Maryland Rule 8-202(f) to provide that “entry,” for purposes of determining the time for filing a notice of appeal, “occurs on the day when the clerk of the lower court enters a record on the docket of the electronic case management system used by that court.” Id. at 136. As a result of these amendments and other 2015 amendments,5 from January 1, 2016, to July 1, 2016, Maryland Rule 2-601 provided as follows: (a) Separate Document – Prompt Entry.