Dir. Gen. of Railroads v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25 (1923). · Go Syfert
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Dir. Gen. of Railroads v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25 (1923). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1996 · …the question is not whether the antitrust defendant thought the facts to constitute probable cause, but whether the court thinks they did. ≈ altered
252 citation events (47 in the last 25 years) across 45 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Thermalloy v. Aavid Engineering (nhd, 1996-08-15) · Strongest negative: City of Nome v. Ailak (alaska, 1977-09-23)
Treatment trajectory · 1923 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1923 1974 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 28 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited "but see" City of Nome v. Ailak (3×)
Alaska · 1977 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Director General of Railroads v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25 , 44 S.Ct. 52 , 68 L.Ed. 146 (1923); United States ex rel.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Thermalloy v. Aavid Engineering
D.N.H. · 1996 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the guestion is not whether the antitrust defendant thought the facts to constitute probable cause, but whether the court thinks they did.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. (2×)
SCOTUS · 1993 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
the question is not whether the defendant thought the facts to 64 constitute probable cause, but whether the court thinks they did
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Thermalloy Inc. v. Aavid Engineering, Inc. (3×)
D.N.H. · 1996 · signal: see · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
the question is not whether the antitrust defendant thought the facts to constitute probable cause, but whether the court thinks they did.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Celestin v. Caribbean Air Mail, Inc.
2d Cir. · 2022 · confidence medium
Gen. of R.Rs. v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 27 (1923))).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jordan v. Town of Waldoboro
1st Cir. · 2019 · confidence medium
Gen. of R.R.s v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 28 (1923) ("Probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact.
cited Cited as authority (rule) (PS) Clemons v. McGlynn
E.D. Cal. · 2019 · confidence medium
Dist. of Columbia 24 Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 25 413, 415 (1923); see also Samuel v. Michaud, 980 F. Supp. 1381, 1411 (D.
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re: James Ellis Arden
9th Cir. BAP · 2015 · confidence medium
Gen. v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1923) 3 (“Kastenbaum”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re: James Ellis Arden
9th Cir. BAP · 2015 · confidence medium
Gen. v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1923) 3 (“Kastenbaum”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Edwards v. City of Mount Vernon (2×)
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2014 · confidence medium
Moreover, the City bears the burden of establishing its defense of qualified immunity based upon the existence of probable cause (see Director General of Railroads v Kastenbaum, 263 US 25, 27 [1923] [in an action for false imprisonment “the burden is on the defendant to establish probable cause for the arrest”]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Tucker v. Kenner
9th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Gen. v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1923)) (emphasis in Shel- don Appel Co.). [2] The elements of malice and probable cause therefore require different showings.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Samuel v. Stevedoring Services of America
Cal. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Co. (1929) 279 U.S. 377, 386-388 [ 73 L.Ed. 747, 751-752 , 49 S.Ct. 355 ] [New York statute prohibiting suits by foreign corporations sufficient to defeat jurisdiction *421 under the F.E.L.A.]; Director General v. Kastenbaum (1923) 263 U.S. 25, 27-28 [ 68 L.Ed. 146, 147-148 , 44 S.Ct 52 ] [plaintiff’s state claim against national government valid because federal statute specifically provided “ ‘in any action of law .... no defense shall be made thereto upon the grounds that the carrier is an instrumentality or agency of the Federal Government’ ”]; Ches. & Ohio Ry. v. Carnahan (1916) …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sosinsky v. Grant
Cal. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
As Chief Justice Taft’s explanation of the probable cause element indicates, however, the jury’s factual inquiry into the defendant’s belief or knowledge is not properly an inquiry into ‘whether [the defendant] thought the facts to constitute probable cause’ (Director General [v. Kastenbaum (1923)] 263 U.S. 25, 28 [ 68 L.Ed. 146, 148 ]); when the state of the defendant’s factual knowledge is resolved or undisputed, it is the court which decides whether such facts constitute probable cause or not.” ( 47 Cal.3d at p. 881 .) As was stated in Leonardini , “the legal tenability stan…
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Huff
Wash. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
Ed. 146 , 44 S. Ct. 52, 53 (1923).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (2×)
Cal. · 1989 · confidence medium
The question is not whether he thought the facts to constitute probable cause, but whether the court thinks they did.” (Director General v. Kastenbaum (1923) 263 U.S. 25, 27-28 [ 68 L.Ed. 146, 147-148 , 44 S.Ct. 52 ], italics added.) When there is a dispute as to the state of the defendant’s knowledge and the existence of probable cause turns on resolution of that dispute, Franzen, supra, 192 Cal. 572 , and similar cases hold that the jury must resolve the threshold question of the defendant’s factual knowledge or belief.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Jackson
Mass. App. Ct. · 1987 · confidence medium
Rs. v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 28 (1923), cases of malicious prosecution or false imprisonment in which it was held that it is the court’s function to determine probable cause if the facts are undisputed and that the jury’s function must be confined to resolving disputes as to the underlying facts.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Hyde
Cal. · 1974 · confidence medium
(See Sibron v. New York (1968) 392 U.S. 40, 66-67 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 917, 936-937 , 88 S.Ct. 1889 ]; Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1, 21, fn. 18 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 ]; Aguilar v. Texas (1964) 378 U.S. 108, 114 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 723, 728-729 , 84 S.Ct. *173 1509]; Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 479-484 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 450-453 , 83 S.Ct. 407 ]; Brinegar v. United States (1949) 338 U.S. 160, 175 [ 93 L.Ed. 1879 , 1890, 69 S.Ct. 1302 ]; Carroll v. United States (1925) 267 U.S. 132, 159-162 [ 69 L.Ed. 543, 554-555 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 39 A.L.R. 790 }; Director General v. Kastenbaum (1923) 263 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Adams v. Williams (2×)
SCOTUS · 1972 · confidence medium
Probable cause means that the "facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offence has been committed . . . ." Stacey v. Emery, 97 U. S. 642, 645 (1878). "[G]ood faith is not enough to constitute probable cause." Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U. S. 25, 28 (1923).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York
8th Cir. · 1929 · confidence medium
Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U. S. 25, 28 [44 S. Ct. 52 , 68 L.
cited Cited "see" Nieves v. Bartlett
SCOTUS · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Director General of Railroads v. Kastenbaum, 263 U. S. 25, 27 (1923); accord, Brief for United States as Amicus Cu- riae 9.
examined Cited "see" Nieves v. Bartlett (3×)
SCOTUS · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Director General of Railroads v. Kastenbaum , 263 U.S. 25 , 27, 44 S.Ct. 52 , 68 L.Ed. 146 (1923) ; accord, Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9.
examined Cited "see" Personnel Department, Inc. v. Professional Staff Leasing Corp. (3×)
10th Cir. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Director Gen. of R.R.s v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 28 , 44 S. Ct. 52 , 68 L.Ed. 146 (1923) (stating that although the salient question is whether the court believes the facts constitute probable cause, “[p]robable cause is a mixed question of law and fact.
examined Cited "see" Walczyk v. Rio (6×)
2d Cir. · 2007 · signal: accord · confidence high
See Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 194 , 25 L.Ed. 116 (1878) (observing that whether facts alleged to show probable cause are true is a matter of fact, "but whether, supposing them to be true, they amount to a probable cause, is a question of law" (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Director Gen. of Railroads v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 28 , 44 S.Ct. 52 , 68 L.Ed. 146 (1923) (observing that where facts are in dispute, court submits the question of probable cause to the jury, but "with instructions as to what facts will amount to probable cause if proved"); Sanders v. Palmer, 55 F. …
examined Cited "see" In Re Buspirone Patent Litigation (3×)
S.D.N.Y. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Id. at 63 , 113 S.Ct. 1920 (citing Director General of Railroads v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 28 , 44 S.Ct. 52 , 68 L.Ed. 146 (1923)).
examined Cited "see" Faglie v. State (3×)
Tex. App. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Director General of Railroads v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25 , 44 S.Ct. 52 , 68 L.Ed. 146 (1923); Jordan v. State, 562 S.W.2d 472 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Second, the charge given did not inform the jury at what point probable cause was required.
examined Cited "see" Eduardo Trejo v. Ivan Perez (3×)
5th Cir. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Director General of Railroads v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 27-28 , 44 S.Ct. 52, 53 , 68 L.Ed. 146 (1923); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 44, 118-121 (1965). 9 .
examined Cited "see" Gilliam v. United States (6×)
6th Cir. · 1951 · signal: see · confidence high
See Director General of Railroads v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 27 , 44 S.Ct. 52 , 68 L.Ed. 146 ; Wisniew-ski v. United States, 6 Cir., 47 F.2d 825 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." The People v. Williams (2×)
Ill. · 1963 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, n.4 , 3 L. ed. 2d 327, 79 S. Ct. 329, n.4 ; see also Director General of Railroads v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25 , 68 L. ed. 146, 44 S. Ct. 52 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Director General of Railroads
v.
Kastenbaum
39.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 12, 1923.
263 U.S. 25
1923 U.S. LEXIS 2714
Mr. Thomas R. Wheeler, with whom Mr. Lyman M. Bass was on the brief, for petitioner., ■Mr. Israel G. Holender for respondent.
Taft.
Cited by 106 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 80%
Citer courts: D. New Hampshire (3)
Mr. Chief Justice Taft

delivered the opinion of the Court.

[*26] •Respondent brought an action in the Supreme Court of Erie County, New York, against the Director General of Railroads, seeking damages for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The trial court, at the close of the plaintiff’s case, dismissed the^cause of action for malicious prosecution, but allowed the trial to proceed to verdict and judgment for $500- for false imprisonment. The judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court and a motion for leave to appeal was denied by the Court of Appeals of the State. .

The brief for petitioner on the merits states the single question to be-:

Does an action for false arrest lie against the petitioner, an- officer of the United. States Government, under the provisions of § 10 of the Act of Congress of March 21, 1918, c. 25, 40 Stat. 451, providing .for federal .control of carriers?

Twenty-one tubs of butter were taken from a freight car of the Lehigh. Valley Railroad in Buffalo. A trolley car-of that» city, late at night, collided with a horse and wagon and, in the wreck which followed, the stolen tubs of butter were discovered. Two men who had been driving the wagon escaped. The detective force of the railway company sought to discover the owner of the horse and thought they had traced the ownership to Kasten-baum, who was a huckster. The railroad detective notified the police authorities of the city, who detailed .two policemen to accompany him to Kastenbaum’s house, where they arrested him without warrant. They took him to a police station and kept him there over night and until he was released the next day on bail. He was brought to a hearing before an examining magistrate bn a charge of grand larceny and burglary. After four or five adjournments, at the instance of the prosecution, the magistrate discharged Kastenbaum. His horse proved to be one of another color. • Under the charge of the court[*27] the jury were permitted to return only compensatory damages.

Section 10 of the Federal Control Act provides:

“ That carriers while under Federal control shall be subject to all laws and liabilities as common carriers, whether arising under State or Federal laws or at common law, except in so far as may be inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or any other act applicable to such Federal control or with any order of the President. Actions at law or suits in equity may be brought by and against such carriers and judgments rendered as now provided by law; and in any action at law or suit in equity against the carrier, no defense shall be made thereto upon the ground that the carrier is an instrumentality or agency of the Federal Government.”

By General Order No. 50, .the Executive so-limited suits-to be brought against carriers for injuries to person or property under the section as to exclude those for recovery of fines, penalties and forfeitures.

As we said in Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. v. Ault, 256 U. S. 554, 563:

“ The Government undertook as carrier to observe all existing laws; it undertook to compensate any person injured through a departure by its agents or servants from their duty under such law; but it did not undertake to punish itself for any departure by the imposition upon itself of fines and penalties or to permit any other sovr ereignty to punish it.”

The action for false imprisonment is in the nature of a trespass for a wrong or illegal act in which the defendant •must have personally participated directly or by indirect procurement. The gist of it is an unlawful detention, and that being shown the burden is on the defendant to establish probable cause for the arrest. The want of probable cause, certainly in the absence of proof of guilt or conviction of the plaintiff, is measured by the state of[*28] the defendant's knowledge, not by his intent. It means the absence of probable cause known to the defendant when he instituted the suit. But the standard applud to defendant’s consciousness is external to it. The question is not whether he thought the facts to constitute probable cause, but whether the court thinks they did. Holmes on the Common Law, 140. Probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact. The court' submits the evidence of it to the jury, with instructions as to what facts will amount to probable cause if proved. Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187, 194; Pollock on Torts, 8th ed., p. 225; Cooley on Torts, 3d ed., Vol. 1, p. 321. Counsel for petitioner contends that, in an action against the sovereign government, it must be conclusively presumed that good faith existed upon its part so far as it is responsible for the arrest, and therefore that a complete defense of probable cause on its part is always made out. But, as we have seen, good faith is not enough to constitute probable cause. That faith must be grounded on facts within knowledge of the Director General’s agent, which in the judgment of the court would make his faith reasonable.

The Government under § 10, in a Case of false imprisonment, stands- exactly as if it were a railway corporation operating as a common carrier. Such a corporation would clearly be responsible for an arrest of the kind here shown, if without probable cause and made by one of its detec-. tives employed 'to protect the property entrusted to its care as a common carrier. It is within the scope of the agency of such an employee to discover the perpetrators of crime against the property in order to recover it and to procure the arrest of supposed offenders and their prosecution and conviction in order to deter others from further depredations. - If, in the field of such employment, the agent acts without probable cause and an illegal arrest without judicial, warrant is made, the corporation[*29] is liable as for any other act of its agents within the scope of their employment in carrying on the business of a common carrier. Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore R. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202, 210; Genga v. Director General of Railroads, 243 Mass. 101.

We have not. before us the question whether the Director General might be held for exemplary damages in a case like this, under the restrictions of Order No. 50, as construed in the Ault Case, because, as already said, the court limited the recovery to compensatory damages.

Affirmed.