burden of establishing defense in New York

2012In considering whether the defense should be charged, the trial court views the evidence “in the light most favorable to the defendant” (Harris, 95 NY2d at 320 ).

2012In considering whether the defense should be charged, the trial court views the evidence “in the light most favorable to the defendant” (Harris, 95 NY2d at 320 ).

1983In People v Laietta ( 30 NY2d 68, 75 , cert den 407 US 923 ) we noted, in upholding a statute (Penal Law, § 25.00, subd 2) imposing upon defendant the burden of establishing the defense of entrapment, that “presumptions, burdens of going forward, and burdens of persuasion in criminal cases may be placed on defendants” provided the State has “first proved enough of its case” and that there “be justifying reason to shift the burden either because knowledge of the facts is peculiar to the defendant or the onus is based on probabilities of wrongdoing.” Here the People’s case has been sufficiently

1977Subdivision 2 of section 25.00 of the Penal Law states that "When a defense declared by statute to be an 'affirmative defense’ is raised at a trial, the defendant has the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” The Court of Appeals in People v Laietta ( 30 NY2d 68, 74 ) stated, "The use of the phrase 'burden of establishing’ makes it clear, because it could have no other meaning, that the defendant carries both the burdens of going forward with the evidence and of ultimate persuasion.” Here, the defendant did not plead affirmatively the defense of entrapment, c

2022Ctr. v Daines , 101 AD3d 1434 , 1435 [2012]; Matter of Feldman v New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys. , 14 AD3d 769, 770 [2005]).

2022Ctr. v Daines , 101 AD3d 1434 , 1435 [2012]; Matter of Feldman v New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys. , 14 AD3d 769, 770 [2005]).

2013Moreover, the Supreme Court was entitled to draw an adverse inference against him (see Marine Midland Bank v Russo Produce Co., 50 NY2d at 42 ; Kuriansky v Bed-Stuy Health Care Corp., 135 AD2d at 178-179 ; Breen Belgium BVBA v International Foreign Currency, Inc., 37 AD3d at 634 ).

2013Moreover, the Supreme Court was entitled to draw an adverse inference against him (see Marine Midland Bank v Russo Produce Co., 50 NY2d at 42 ; Kuriansky v Bed-Stuy Health Care Corp., 135 AD2d at 178-179 ; Breen Belgium BVBA v International Foreign Currency, Inc., 37 AD3d at 634 ).

2013Here, the defendant had the burden of establishing his defense of an inability to pay the sum required by the January 2010 order (see Yeager v Yeager, 38 AD3d at 534 ; Popelaski v Popelaski, 22 AD3d at 737 ); his invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination did not relieve him of the obligation of coming forward with evidence in support of that defense (see United States v Rylander, 460 US at 757-759 ; Armstrong v Guccione, 470 F3d at 100 ; Access Capital v DeCicco, 302 AD2d at 51 ).

2013Here, the defendant had the burden of establishing his defense of an inability to pay the sum required by the January 2010 order (see Yeager v Yeager, 38 AD3d at 534 ; Popelaski v Popelaski, 22 AD3d at 737 ); his invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination did not relieve him of the obligation of coming forward with evidence in support of that defense (see United States v Rylander, 460 US at 757-759 ; Armstrong v Guccione, 470 F3d at 100 ; Access Capital v DeCicco, 302 AD2d at 51 ).

2013Here, the defendant had the burden of establishing his defense of an inability to pay the sum required by the January 2010 order (see Yeager v Yeager, 38 AD3d at 534 ; Popelaski v Popelaski, 22 AD3d at 737 ); his invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination did not relieve him of the obligation of coming forward with evidence in support of that defense (see United States v Rylander, 460 US at 757-759 ; Armstrong v Guccione, 470 F3d at 100 ; Access Capital v DeCicco, 302 AD2d at 51 ).

2013Here, the defendant had the burden of establishing his defense of an inability to pay the sum required by the January 2010 order (see Yeager v Yeager, 38 AD3d at 534 ; Popelaski v Popelaski, 22 AD3d at 737 ); his invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination did not relieve him of the obligation of coming forward with evidence in support of that defense (see United States v Rylander, 460 US at 757-759 ; Armstrong v Guccione, 470 F3d at 100 ; Access Capital v DeCicco, 302 AD2d at 51 ).

2013Moreover, the Supreme Court was entitled to draw an adverse inference against him (see Marine Midland Bank v Russo Produce Co., 50 NY2d at 42 ; Kuriansky v Bed-Stuy Health Care Corp., 135 AD2d at 178-179 ; Breen Belgium BVBA v International Foreign Currency, Inc., 37 AD3d at 634 ).

2013Moreover, the Supreme Court was entitled to draw an adverse inference against him (see Marine Midland Bank v Russo Produce Co., 50 NY2d at 42 ; Kuriansky v Bed-Stuy Health Care Corp., 135 AD2d at 178-179 ; Breen Belgium BVBA v International Foreign Currency, Inc., 37 AD3d at 634 ).

2013Here, the defendant had the burden of establishing his defense of an inability to pay the sum required by the January 2010 order (see Yeager v Yeager, 38 AD3d at 534 ; Popelaski v Popelaski, 22 AD3d at 737 ); his invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination did not relieve him of the obligation of coming forward with evidence in support of that defense (see United States v Rylander, 460 US at 757-759 ; Armstrong v Guccione, 470 F3d at 100 ; Access Capital v DeCicco, 302 AD2d at 51 ).

2013Here, the defendant had the burden of establishing his defense of an inability to pay the sum required by the January 2010 order (see Yeager v Yeager, 38 AD3d at 534 ; Popelaski v Popelaski, 22 AD3d at 737 ); his invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination did not relieve him of the obligation of coming forward with evidence in support of that defense (see United States v Rylander, 460 US at 757-759 ; Armstrong v Guccione, 470 F3d at 100 ; Access Capital v DeCicco, 302 AD2d at 51 ).

2013Here, the defendant had the burden of establishing his defense of an inability to pay the sum required by the January 2010 order (see Yeager v Yeager, 38 AD3d at 534 ; Popelaski v Popelaski, 22 AD3d at 737 ); his invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination did not relieve him of the obligation of coming forward with evidence in support of that defense (see United States v Rylander, 460 US at 757-759 ; Armstrong v Guccione, 470 F3d at 100 ; Access Capital v DeCicco, 302 AD2d at 51 ).

2013Here, the defendant had the burden of establishing his defense of an inability to pay the sum required by the January 2010 order (see Yeager v Yeager, 38 AD3d at 534 ; Popelaski v Popelaski, 22 AD3d at 737 ); his invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination did not relieve him of the obligation of coming forward with evidence in support of that defense (see United States v Rylander, 460 US at 757-759 ; Armstrong v Guccione, 470 F3d at 100 ; Access Capital v DeCicco, 302 AD2d at 51 ).

2013Here, the defendant had the burden of establishing his defense of an inability to pay the sum required by the January 2010 order (see Yeager v Yeager, 38 AD3d at 534 ; Popelaski v Popelaski, 22 AD3d at 737 ); his invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination did not relieve him of the obligation of coming forward with evidence in support of that defense (see United States v Rylander, 460 US at 757-759 ; Armstrong v Guccione, 470 F3d at 100 ; Access Capital v DeCicco, 302 AD2d at 51 ).

2013Here, the defendant had the burden of establishing his defense of an inability to pay the sum required by the January 2010 order (see Yeager v Yeager, 38 AD3d at 534 ; Popelaski v Popelaski, 22 AD3d at 737 ); his invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination did not relieve him of the obligation of coming forward with evidence in support of that defense (see United States v Rylander, 460 US at 757-759 ; Armstrong v Guccione, 470 F3d at 100 ; Access Capital v DeCicco, 302 AD2d at 51 ).

2013Moreover, the Supreme Court was entitled to draw an adverse inference against him (see Marine Midland Bank v Russo Produce Co., 50 NY2d at 42 ; Kuriansky v Bed-Stuy Health Care Corp., 135 AD2d at 178-179 ; Breen Belgium BVBA v International Foreign Currency, Inc., 37 AD3d at 634 ).

2013Moreover, the Supreme Court was entitled to draw an adverse inference against him (see Marine Midland Bank v Russo Produce Co., 50 NY2d at 42 ; Kuriansky v Bed-Stuy Health Care Corp., 135 AD2d at 178-179 ; Breen Belgium BVBA v International Foreign Currency, Inc., 37 AD3d at 634 ).

2002In this case, the defendant, who had the burden of establishing the factors necessary to admit this declaration against penal interest, submitted no evidence and made no offer of proof that the declarant was unavailable (see People v Brensic, supra; People v Settles, supra).

2001In this case, the defendant, who carried the burden of establishing the factors neces sary to admit a declaration against penal interest, submitted no evidence and made no offer of proof that the friend was unavailable (see, People v Brensic, supra; People v Settles, supra).

2002In this case, the defendant, who had the burden of establishing the factors necessary to admit this declaration against penal interest, submitted no evidence and made no offer of proof that the declarant was unavailable (see People v Brensic, supra; People v Settles, supra).

2001In this case, the defendant, who carried the burden of establishing the factors neces sary to admit a declaration against penal interest, submitted no evidence and made no offer of proof that the friend was unavailable (see, People v Brensic, supra; People v Settles, supra).

1998It is well established that “[t]he defendant has the burden of establishing the defense of workers’ compensation by a preponderance of the credible evidence” (Williams v Forbes, 175 AD2d 125, 126 ; see, Donatin v Sea Crest Trading Co., 181 AD2d 654, 655 ; Buchner v Pines Hotel, 87 AD2d 691, 692 , affd 58 NY2d 1019 ).

1991The defendant has the burden of establishing the defense of workers’ compensation by a preponderance of the credible evidence (see, Buchner v Pines Hotel, 87 AD2d 691 , affd 58 NY2d 1019 ).

1998It is well established that “[t]he defendant has the burden of establishing the defense of workers’ compensation by a preponderance of the credible evidence” (Williams v Forbes, 175 AD2d 125, 126 ; see, Donatin v Sea Crest Trading Co., 181 AD2d 654, 655 ; Buchner v Pines Hotel, 87 AD2d 691, 692 , affd 58 NY2d 1019 ).

1992"The defendant has the burden of establishing the defense of workers’ compensation by a preponderance of the credible evidence” (Williams v Forbes, 175 AD2d 125, 126 ).

1998It is well established that “[t]he defendant has the burden of establishing the defense of workers’ compensation by a preponderance of the credible evidence” (Williams v Forbes, 175 AD2d 125, 126 ; see, Donatin v Sea Crest Trading Co., 181 AD2d 654, 655 ; Buchner v Pines Hotel, 87 AD2d 691, 692 , affd 58 NY2d 1019 ).

1991The defendant has the burden of establishing the defense of workers’ compensation by a preponderance of the credible evidence (see, Buchner v Pines Hotel, 87 AD2d 691 , affd 58 NY2d 1019 ).

1983Whether the protected relationship involves physician, psychologist or certified social worker, all share the common purpose of encouraging the patient or client fully to disclose the nature and details of his illness or his emotions without fear of later revelation by one in whom he placed his trust and confidence (see Matter of Warrington [State of New York], 303 NY 129, 135 ; Yaron v Yaron, 83 Misc 2d 276 ).” (Perry v Fiumano, 61 AD2d 512, 516 .) While the burden of establishing the privilege rests upon the party asserting it (Bloodgood v Lynch, 293 NY 308 ), nevertheless “the welfare and b

1982There is also a logical inconsistency in making one principal in the attorney-client relationship the agent of the other for the purposes of that relationship. [9] Of course, nothing stated here is intended to shift the burden of establishing the privilege from the party asserting the privilege (see Bloodgood v Lynch , 293 N.Y. 308, 314 ).

1976When a defense declared by statute to be an ‘affirmative defense’ is raised at a trial, the defendant has the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” The Maine law found wanting in Mullaney (supra) was as: "stated succinctly: Absent justification or excuse, all intentional or criminally reckless killings are felonious homicides.

1975When a defense declared by statute to be an 'affirmative defense’ is raised at a trial, the defendant has the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” The defendant now urges that the subsequent (June 9, 1975) decision in Mullaney (supra) mandates that the burden of persuasion of the defense of entrapment rests with the People, absent some showing of a compelling State interest for a contrary view.

1888The case which has been most urged upon the attention of the court as an authority, and which, in many of the facts involved is most like the case at bar, of the decisions of our highest court is that of the Matter of The Will of Smith, 95 N. Y. 516 .

1888The case which has been most urged upon the attention of the court as an authority, and which, in many of the facts involved, is most like the case at bar of the decisions of our highest -court, is that of In re Will of Smith, 95 N. Y. 516 .