Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

No. 2019AP1877

¶1 PER CURIAM. Eight years after the parties’ divorce, Kimberly Anderson filed various motions with the circuit court to reopen the divorce judgment and to enforce its terms. She now appeals that part of a circuit court order entered on August 14, 2019, denying her request for reimbursement of uninsured medical expenses and variable costs, claiming the court erred by imposing conditions for reimbursement that were not included in the divorce judgment. She also argues the court erred by relying on WIS. STAT. § 806.07 instead of WIS. STAT. § 767.127 (2017-18)1 when denying her motion to reopen the property division. Finally, she argues the court erroneously exercised its discretion in ordering Utgaard to pay less than the amount of attorney fees she incurred and requested. We reject Anderson’s arguments and affirm. BACKGROUND ¶2 The parties were married on May 24, 1992 and had four minor children at the time of their divorce on March 3, 2011. The parties were both self-represented during their divorce proceedings, and the divorce judgment incorporated the terms of their marital settlement agreement (“MSA”) and their divorce and child support agreement. A joint financial disclosure statement was filed listing, as relevant here, that Utgaard owned two life insurance policies, “NWML 7394266” and “NWML 6903234,” and representing that neither account had any cash values. ¶3 As relevant to this appeal, the MSA provided that uninsured medical expenses and variable costs incurred for their minor children would be shared No. 2019AP1877

equally. The parties agreed to consult with one another before incurring variable costs. In addition, a party’s request to the other for reimbursement of variable costs was required to be made “in writing within 30 days from the day the cost was incurred,” with the non-incurring party reimbursing the other for their one-half share “within 10 days from the date of the request.” Requests for uninsured medical expenses were also required to be made in writing, but they were not required to be made within thirty days after the medical expenses were incurred, and they were to be reimbursed within ten days after receiving a written request. ¶4 The parties also agreed to equally share expenses regarding insurance, uninsured medical expenses, dental/orthodontics, schooling, automobiles, and other expenses of the children. A party’s request for reimbursement of these additional child-related expenses was payable by the 20th of each month. ¶5 From the date of divorce until late 2012, Anderson made written requests for reimbursement of medical expenses, other child expenses, and variable costs, but she then stopped making further requests because Utgaard was being “argumentative.” The parties’ daughter testified at a contempt hearing regarding an incident in which Utgaard pulled out a gun at the home during an altercation when Anderson requested child support payments. The parties disagree as to what actually occurred during that incident. ¶6 On October 19, 2018, Anderson filed a motion for remedial contempt against Utgaard, alleging that he had violated the divorce judgment by No. 2019AP1877

failing to pay child support, variable and uninsured medical expenses, spousal maintenance, and a 2010 income tax liability of $24,307.542 to be shared equally by Utgaard and Anderson. Anderson sought reimbursement for a total of $144,000 in expenses dating back to the date of the divorce. Anderson also alleged that Utgaard had failed to annually provide his tax returns or business financial information to her as required by the divorce judgment. ¶7 After an April 11, 2019 hearing, the circuit court found Utgaard in contempt for nonpayment of $3,201.56 in child support and $19,948 in spousal maintenance. The court further acknowledged that the parties’ MSA required them to share equally in the cost of uninsured medical and variable expenses. However, the court found that Anderson failed to provide credible evidence of the amounts she claimed that she incurred for those expenses. ¶8 Specifically, the circuit court found that Anderson provided written demands for reimbursement of the children’s uninsured medical and variable expenses from March 2011 through June 2012, but she provided no supporting documentation regarding the expenses. Further, the court found that Anderson offered no evidence verifying that she made any written demand of Utgaard between March 2011 and June 2012 for reimbursement of any expenses she claimed to have incurred for the children, and that “[h]er testimony regarding the [claimed expenses] was incomplete and unconvincing.” The court also noted that “[h]ad this been an ordinary debtor action, [Anderson]’s claim would have been stale as the statute of limitations [had] expired.” Finally, the court was unwilling No. 2019AP1877

to accept Anderson’s testimony with only her memory as the sole evidence supporting her claim for past variable and uninsured medical expenses. ¶9 Additionally, the circuit court found that Utgaard was not ordered by the divorce judgment to share in the 2010 income tax liability and that no continuing contempt existed for his failure to supply financial records because he had cured any alleged noncompliance by producing the financial records after the contempt motion was filed. Lastly, the court awarded Anderson $3,000 in reasonable attorney fees because of “the size of the delinquency, the length of time it persisted and the litigation that was necessary to adjudicate the matter.” The court did not award Anderson the full amount of attorney fees she had incurred and requested because she did not prevail on all of her claims. ¶10 On April 4, 2019, Anderson filed another motion for remedial contempt and/or reopening the property division in order to award her one-half of the cash balances of the life insurance policies that were awarded to Utgaard in the divorce judgment’s property division. Anderson also asked that Utgaard be found in contempt for having failed to carry a $100,000 life insurance policy with Anderson named as the beneficiary. Anderson also sought attorney fees. ¶11 On May 20, 2019, Anderson filed a motion for reconsideration. As relevant to this appeal, Anderson argued the circuit court erred by rejecting her claim for unreimbursed variable and medical expenses. Again, the court found that Anderson failed to meet her burden of proof because she provided no documentation to substantiate her claim. Anderson provided no invoices, receipts, canceled checks, or any other type of documentary proof to support her demand for reimbursement. In addition, the court found that Anderson failed to meet her burden of proving her compliance with the MSA because she made no written No. 2019AP1877

payment demands after June 2012, and her testimony regarding the expenses in question was insufficient. The court therefore denied Anderson’s motion for reconsideration. ¶12 In its decision and order, the circuit court first addressed one topic from Anderson’s earlier contempt motion, which related to withheld proceeds from the sale of a stainless steel Flair Fountain. The court found Utgaard in contempt for withholding one-half of the sale proceeds because the fountain was the parties’ joint personal property. On that issue, the court ordered Utgaard to pay Anderson $2,250, plus $500 in attorney fees. ¶13 The circuit court next addressed Anderson’s motion to reopen the property division. The court found that Anderson’s motion was untimely under WIS. STAT. § 806.07.3 The court noted that more than eight years had passed before Anderson filed her motion. The court concluded that the eight-year delay was unreasonable because Anderson knew of the life insurance policies’ existence at the time of the divorce, and she could have verified their values at that time. The court was unwilling to reopen or modify the property division after such a significant lapse of time. ¶14 Finally, the circuit court found that from the date of divorce until June 2019, Utgaard willfully failed to carry the required, unencumbered life insurance with Anderson as the named beneficiary. Anderson discovered the noncompliance during the discovery phase of the October 19, 2018 contempt No. 2019AP1877

motion. Although Utgaard later obtained the insurance and kept it unencumbered, the court determined the contempt had continued during the earlier period4 because he was required to continuously maintain an unencumbered policy for Anderson’s benefit. The court permitted Utgaard to purge his contempt by maintaining the required insurance and paying reasonable attorney fees related to the life insurance matter within sixty days. Anderson now appeals. DISCUSSION I. Uninsured Medical and Variable Expenses ¶15 Anderson argues the circuit court erred in failing to enforce the terms of the MSA, the divorce judgment and the child support agreement by denying her request for uninsured medical and variable expenses incurred for the parties’ children. The interpretation of a marital settlement agreement, which is “in the nature of a contract,” is a question of law we review de novo. Rosplock v. Rosplock, 217 Wis. 2d 22, 30, 577 N.W.2d 32 (Ct. App. 1998). When the terms of a contract are unambiguous, we will construe the contract as it stands without examining extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent. Id. at 31. Whether a contract is ambiguous also presents a question of law for our independent review. Borchardt v. Wilk, 156 Wis. 2d 420, 427, 456 N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1990). Trial courts, not appellate courts on review, weigh the sufficiency of the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses. Mecha v. Mecha, 36 Wis. 2d 29, 35, 152 N.W.2d 923 (1967). Here, we conclude the MSA is unambiguous because No. 2019AP1877 No. 2019AP1877 No. 2019AP1877 No. 2019AP1877 No. 2019AP1877 No. 2019AP1877 No. 2019AP1877

WIS. STAT. § 767.127 (emphasis added). Anderson contends that if the court had applied § 767.127, it would have found that Utgaard intentionally or negligently failed to disclose the cash value of his life insurance policies and, thus, the values should be held in a constructive trust. ¶27 Anderson is correct that Utgaard’s failure to disclose the life insurance policies would violate WIS. STAT. § 767.27(1) (1995-96). See Stevenson v. Stevenson, 2009 WI App 29, ¶23, 316 Wis. 2d 442, 765 N.W.2d 811 (holding that failing to make proper financial disclosure was a violation of WIS. STAT. § 767.27(1)).6 If the circuit court had found that Utgaard, under that statute, intentionally or negligently failed to disclose the life insurance values, the court would be required to impose a constructive trust as required by § 767.127(5). ¶28 Ultimately, it is immaterial here whether the circuit court applied WIS. STAT. § 767.127 or WIS. STAT. § 806.07 in deciding Anderson’s motion because the court found that Utgaard did not fail to disclose the policies. In fact, Anderson acknowledges that Utgaard disclosed the existence of the two policies in the parties’ original financial disclosure statement. The MSA also reflects that the policies were disclosed and considered in the divorce proceeding. Although Utgaard represented that the policies had no cash value, Anderson knew the policies existed at that time, and she had the opportunity to confirm whether they had cash values prior to the parties’ divorce hearing. The court therefore did not erroneously exercise its discretion by finding that Anderson’s eight-year delay in raising the issue regarding the policies’ values was not reasonable.

No. 2019AP1877

III. Attorney Fees ¶29 When a circuit court awards attorney fees, the amount of the award is left to the discretion of the court. Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2004 WI 112, ¶22, 275 Wis. 2d 1, 683 N.W.2d 58. Accordingly, we will uphold the circuit court’s determination unless it erroneously exercised its discretion. Id. We are to give deference to the circuit court’s decision because it is familiar with local billing norms and will likely have witnessed first hand the quality of the service rendered by counsel. Id. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court, but we will instead explore the court’s explanation to determine if the court employed a logical rationale based on the appropriate legal principles and facts of record. Id. The circuit court can consider the factors enumerated in Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 20:1.5(a) in determining the reasonableness of attorney fees. Id., ¶25. One of these factors includes “the amount involved and the results obtained.” SCR 20:1.5(a)(4). ¶30 “[T]he party seeking an award of [attorney] fees should submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed. Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the … court may reduce the award accordingly.” Kolupar, 275 Wis. 2d 1, ¶31 (citation omitted). Stated differently, the party submitting the request for attorney fees has the burden to prove the reasonableness of the amount requested after it is questioned. Standard Theatres, Inc. v. DOT, 118 Wis. 2d 730, 748, 349 N.W.2d 661 (1984). ¶31 Anderson argues the circuit court erred by ordering Utgaard to pay a lesser amount of attorney fees than she incurred and requested. Anderson asserts that she incurred $7,500 in attorney fees just in bringing her first motion, all of which fees arose out of a “common core of facts.” While we discern no question No. 2019AP1877

that Anderson was properly awarded attorney fees based on Utgaard’s contemptuous conduct under WIS. STAT. § 785.04(1), Anderson cites case law for the proposition that a “losing party is not entitled to a reduction in attorney’s fees for time spent on unsuccessful claims, if the winning party achieved substantial success and the unsuccessful claims were brought or pursued in good faith” especially where all of the “claims arise out of a common core of facts.” Rand v. Rand, 2010 WI App 98, ¶7, 327 Wis. 2d 778, 787 N.W.2d 445 (quoting Radford v. J.J.B. Enters., Ltd., 163 Wis. 2d 535, 550, 472 N.W.2d 790 (Ct. App. 1991)). ¶32 Anderson, however, did not provide the circuit court with any supporting documentation for her attorney fee request. In fact, the only reference to $7,500 was the last sentence in her memorandum in support of her motion for contempt, which states Utgaard “should also pay attorney fees in the amount of $7,500.00 based on the gross underpayments and [Anderson’s] incurred fees.” ¶33 The circuit court found Utgaard in contempt for nonpayment of court-ordered child support and maintenance. Utgaard owed $3,201.56 for child support and $19,948 plus eight percent compound interest for spousal maintenance. In light of the court’s determination that Anderson failed to follow the MSA’s requirements for seeking expense reimbursement, her failure to meet her burden of proof on the sought-after expenses, and her lack of diligence in verifying the life insurance policies’ cash values when she knew of the policies’ existence, the court could reasonably reduce the amount of the fees sought by Anderson to $3,000, as she was not successful on all claims. While the court could award all fees sought, in its discretion, Anderson provides no authority No. 2019AP1877

stating the court was required to do so. Additionally, the court’s determination of the fee calculation was reasonable, especially given that Anderson provided no other method for calculating fees. ¶34 In Anderson’s reply brief, she acknowledges that she did not provide an underlying factual basis to support her claim for $7,500 in attorney fees, but she nonetheless argues that the circuit court did not request specific evidence to support her claim. The court, however, was not required to do so, as Anderson had the burden in the first instance to prove the reasonableness of the fees she sought. See Standard Theatres, 118 Wis. 2d at 748. CONCLUSION ¶35 For all the foregoing reasons, we reject Anderson’s argument that the circuit court erred by not ordering reimbursement for uninsured medical and variable expenses. We also conclude the court reasonably exercised its discretion by denying Anderson’s motion to reopen the property division and by declining to award Anderson the full amount of attorney fees she sought. Accordingly, we affirm. By the Court.—Order affirmed. This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.