Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938). · Go Syfert
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Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, last quoted 1978 · 3 courts · …public policy forbids disclosure of an informer's identity unless essential to the defense, as, for example, where this turns upon an officer's good faith. at p. 254 ✓
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 2018–2019 · 2 courts · …the open garage closely followed by the observing officer ✓
cited 3× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1965 · …unless essential to the defense, . ✓
1,059 citation events (118 in the last 25 years) across 90 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1939 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1939 1982 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Jesus Velarde-Villarreal v. United States (6×)
9th Cir. · 1965 · quote attribution · 6 verbatim quotes · confidence low
unless essential to the defense, . . . .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. USA - 2255
D. Maryland · 2020 · confidence medium
As of the time of the search, the Supreme Court had upheld a warrantless search of a car inside the curtilage of a residence, where the car had just been driven into the defendant’s garage, the police officers could have stopped and searched the car just before it entered the garage, and “no search was made of the garage.” Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Madigan (2×)
Mass. · 2007 · confidence medium
Failure to disclose information about the relationship, if any, between Doe and law enforcement or information as to any promises or inducements made to Doe by the government would defeat the defendant’s ability to establish his defense of entrapment.* 11 As this court recognized some decades ago: “It is the government that claims the ‘privilege,’ see Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938), which is confined to its purpose, and cannot in any event be asserted where it interferes with a fair defence.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 365 Mass. 534, 544 (1974). 12 The Commonwealth co…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Amral (2×)
Mass. · 1990 · confidence medium
Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Schooley v. Commonwealth
Ky. · 1982 · confidence medium
Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 [ 59 S.Ct. 174, 176 , 83 L.Ed. 151 ]; In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532 [ 15 S.Ct. 959 , 39 L.Ed. 1080 ]; Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 316 [ 4 S.Ct. 12,14 , 28 L.Ed. 158 ].
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Johnson
Mass. · 1974 · confidence medium
It is the government that claims the “privilege,” see Scher v. United States, 305 U. S. 251, 254 (1938), which is confined to its purpose, and cannot in any event be asserted where it interferes with a fair defence.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Ennis
Mass. App. Ct. · 1973 · confidence medium
Where the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.” The court quoted Scher v. United States, *502 305 U. S. 251, 254 (1938): “[P]ublic policy forbids disclosure of an informer’s identity unless essential to the defense, as, for example, where this turns upon an officer’s good faith.” Am.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Superior Court (2×)
Cal. · 1970 · confidence medium
Thus in Carroll the officers knew from past experience that the defendants were in the bootlegging business at Grand Rapids; the defendants were observed returning to that city from the direction of Detroit, known to be a major source of illegally imported liquor; and the defendants were traveling “in the same automobile they had been in the night when they tried to furnish the whisky to the officers which was thus identified as part of the firm equipment.” ( 267 U.S. at p. 160 [ 69 L.Ed. at p. 554 ]; see also Husty v. United States (1931) 282 U.S. 694, 700-701 [ 75 L.Ed. 629, 632-633 , 51…
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Hall
Conn. Super. Ct. · 1969 · confidence medium
Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938); Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390 (1932); see cases cited at 63 Yale L.J. 214 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pueblo v. López Rivera
prsupreme · 1965 · confidence medium
Roviaro v. U.S., 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957); Scher v. U.S., 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938); In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 316 (1884).
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. López Rivera
prsupreme · 1965 · confidence medium
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938); In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 316 (1884).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pueblo v. Tribunal Superior de Puerto Rico
prsupreme · 1964 · confidence medium
Roviaro v. U.S., 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957); Scher v. U.S., 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938); In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 316 (1884).
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico
prsupreme · 1964 · confidence medium
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938); In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 316 (1884).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Ortiz
Cal. Ct. App. · 1962 · confidence medium
(Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 [ 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 ] ; People v. Williams, 51 Cal.2d 355, 359 [ 333 P.2d 19 ] ; People v. Alcala, 169 Cal.App.2d 468, 471 [ 337 P.2d 558 ] ; People v. Alesi, 169 Cal.App.2d 758, 761 [ 337 P.2d 838 ].) In the case at bench the acts of appellant that were observed by the officers constituted the basis for the officers’ entrance, seizure of the evidence and arrest of appellant.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Brajevich
Cal. Ct. App. · 1959 · confidence medium
(Carroll v. United States, supra; Husty v. United States, *444 282 U.S. 694 [ 51 S.Ct. 240 , 75 L.Ed. 629 , 74 A.L.R. 1407 ]; Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 [4] [ 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 ].) In speaking of the problem of protecting citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and at the same time giving reasonable flexibility to law enforcement, the Supreme Court of the United States uses the following language: “The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often o…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Muniz
Cal. Ct. App. · 1959 · confidence medium
(Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 [ 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 ] ; People v. Williams, 51 Cal.2d 355, 359 [ 333 P.2d 19 ] ; People v. Amado, 167 Cal.App.2d 345, 348 [ 334 P.2d 254 ] ; People v. Smith, 166 Cal.App.2d 302, 306-307 [ 333 P.2d 208 ].) The judgment is affirmed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Garcia
Cal. Ct. App. · 1959 · confidence medium
(See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 [ 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 ].) There was no testimony that the informer was with the officers, nor does it appear that the informer gave the police any names of any persons whomsoever.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Durazo (2×)
Cal. · 1959 · confidence medium
(See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 [ 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 ].) The Williams case must be taken to establish the limits of the rule therein.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Alesi
Cal. Ct. App. · 1959 · confidence medium
(Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 [ 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 ] ; People v. Williams, 51 Cal.2d 355, 359 [ 333 P.2d 19 ]; People v. Amado, 167 Cal.App.2d 345, 347-348 [ 334 P.2d 254 ]; People v. Smith, 166 Cal.App.2d 302, 307 [ 333 P.2d 208 ].) Since the defendant’s arrest was valid apart from the information provided by the informant, the latter’s identity need not be revealed under Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812 [ 330 P.2d 39 ].
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mitchell v. Roma
3rd Cir. · 1959 · confidence medium
Roviaro v. U.S., 353 U.S. 53, 62 , 77 S.Ct. 623 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639 . 16 In Scher U.S., 305, U. S. 251, 59 S.Ct. 174, 176 , 83 L.Ed. 151 , defense counsel undertook to question the arresting officers relative to the source of information which led them to observe the defendant's actions.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Alcala
Cal. Ct. App. · 1959 · confidence medium
(Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 [ 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 ]; People v. Williams, 51 Cal.2d 355, 359 [ 333 P.2d 19 ]; People v. Amado, 167 Cal. App.2d 345, 347, 348 [ 334 P.2d 254 ]; People v. Smith, 166 Cal.App.2d 302, 306 [ 333 P.2d 208 ].) Defendant’s argument that the informant’s identity should have been revealed under the ruling in People v. MocShann, 50 Cal.2d 802 [ 330 P.2d 33 ], is not valid since the informer was neither a participant nor a material witness to the offense for which defendant was prosecuted, nor does it *472 appear that he would have been able to giv…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Priestly v. Superior Court (2×)
Cal. · 1958 · confidence medium
The reasons supporting this rule are stated in the following federal cases cited with approval in the Roviaro case: Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 [ 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 ] : In this case the officers had sufficient independent evidence to justify the arrest and search without relying on information from an informer: "In the circumstances the source of the information which caused him to be observed was unimportant to petitioner’s defense.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Dewson (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1957 · confidence medium
(Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 at pp. 253-254 [ 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 ] ; United States v. One 1941 Oldsmobile Sedan, 158 F.2d 818, 820 .) In some states it has been held (in cases where only informer information was relied upon) that the identity of the informer must be disclosed to test the officers’ justification in making the arrest.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Alaniz (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1957 · confidence medium
Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 [ 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 ]; In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532 [ 15 S.Ct. 959 , 39 L.Ed. 1080 ]; Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 316 [ 4 S.Ct. 12 , 28 L.Ed. 158 ].
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Gonzales
Cal. Ct. App. · 1956 · confidence medium
(See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 [ 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 ]; Annotated at 83 L.Ed., p. 155; also, anno. to United States v. Ragen, 95 L.Ed. at 431; VIII Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.) § 2374, p. 751.) Suppressing the identity of an undercover operator or of a “friend to the law” who has ventured to assist the prosecution by disclosing information as to where crime has been, or is about to be committed is a benefit to *608 the State.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Willson v. Superior Court (2×)
Cal. · 1956 · confidence medium
(See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 253-254 [ 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 ]; United States v. One 1941 Oldsmobile Sedan, 158 F.2d 818, 820 ; Hill v. State, supra, 151 Miss. 518 [ 118 So. 539, 540 ]; Smith v. State, supra, 169 Tenn. 633 [ 90 S.W.2d 523, 524 ].)
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Martin (2×)
Cal. · 1956 · confidence medium
(Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 [ 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 , 39 A.L.R. 790 ]; Husty v. United States, supra, 282 U.S. 694, 700-701 ; Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 255 [ 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 ]; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 165-171 [ 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 ]; United States v. One 1946 Plymouth Sedan Automobile, 167 F.2d 3, 7 .) The judgment is affirmed, and the appeal from an alleged order denying a motion for new trial is dismissed.] Gibson, C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Blodgett (2×)
Cal. · 1956 · confidence medium
(Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 [ 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 , 39 A.L.R. 790 ]; Rusty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 701 [ 51 S.Ct. 240 , 75 L.Ed. 629 , 74 A.L.R. 1407 ]; Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 255 [ 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 ]; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 165-171 [ 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 ]; United States v. One 1946 Plymouth Sedan Automobile, 167 F.2d 3, 7 .) Defendant also contends that he did not have a fair trial because of misconduct of the prosecuting attorney in attempting to suggest to the jury that defendant had taken heroin the eveni…
discussed Cited "see" Walsh v. Top Notch Home Designs Corp.
E.D.N.Y · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Jimenez, 789 F.2d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he defendant has the heavy burden of showing that disclosure is ‘essential to the defense.’”) (quoting Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938).
examined Cited "see" Collins v. Commonwealth (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Va. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Scher , 305 U.S. at 253 , 59 S.Ct. 174 .
discussed Cited "see" Sturgess v. United States (2×)
D.C. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
The informant’s identity need not be disclosed unless the information would be “significant in determining guilt or innocence.” United States v. Russotti, 746 F.2d 945, 950 (2d Cir.1984); see Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 , 59 5.Ct. 174, 176, 83 L.Ed. 151 (1938) (identity need not be disclosed unless essential to the defense). 6 In Valenzuela-Bernal, supra, the Supreme Court considered the constitutional implications of a prosecutor permitting deportation of aliens who were eyewitnesses to an offense.
examined Cited "see" United States v. Jimenez (3×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
United States v. Saa, 859 F.2d 1067, 1073 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089 , 109 S.Ct. 1555 , 103 L.Ed.2d 858 (1988) (“[Djisclosure of the identity or address of a confidential informant is not required unless the informant’s testimony is shown to be material to the defense.”) (emphasis added); see United States v. Russotti, 746 F.2d 945, 949 (2d Cir.1984) (“essential to defense”) (quoting Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 , 59 S.Ct. 174, 176 , 83 L.Ed. 151 (1938)); United States v. Jimenez, 789 F.2d 167, 170 (2d Cir.1986) (same). 5 With regard to this showing, it is no…
examined Cited "see" United States v. John Edward Foster (3×)
8th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 , 59 S.Ct. 174, 176 , 83 L.Ed. 151 (1938); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 , 77 S.Ct. 623, 627 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957).
examined Cited "see" Jose R. Suarez, Jr., and Virginia Peters Suarez v. United States (3×)
5th Cir. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
“The purpose of the privilege is furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement.” Id.; see Scher v. United States, 1938, 305 U.S. 251, 254 , 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 .
cited Cited "see" McCray v. Illinois
SCOTUS · 1967 · signal: see · confidence high
See Scher v. United States, 305 U. S. 251 ; In re Quarles & Butler, 158 U. S. 532 ; Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U. S. 311 .
examined Cited "see" United States of America Ex Rel. Joseph Coffey, Relator-Appellee v. Hon. Edward M. Fay, as Warden, Green Haven Prison, Stormville, New York (3×)
2d Cir. · 1965 · signal: see · confidence high
See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 , 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 (1938); United States v. Santiago, 327 F.2d 573 (2 Cir. 1964).
examined Cited "see" Madre v. United States (3×)
D.C. · 1961 · signal: see · confidence high
See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 , 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 ; McQuaid v. United States, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 229 , 198 F.2d 987 , cer-tiorari denied, 344 U.S. 929 , 73 S.Ct. 499 , 97 L.Ed. 715 .
examined Cited "see" People v. Williams (6×)
Cal. · 1958 · signal: see · confidence high
(Roviaro v. United States, supra, 353 U.S. 53, 60-62 ; Portomene v. United States, 221 F.2d 582, 584 ; Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F. 2d 627, 628-629 ; Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390 , 391 et seq.; United States v. Blich, 45 F.2d 627, 629 ; United States v. Keown, 19 F.Supp. 639 ; People v. Alvarez, 154 Cal.App.2d 694 , 696 et seq. [ 316 P.2d 1006 ] ; People v. Castiel, 153 Cal. App.2d 653, 656-659 [ 315 P.2d 79 ] ; People v. Lawrence, 149 Cal.App.2d 435, 450-452 [ 308 P.2d 821 ] ; Crosvy v. Slate, 90 Ga.App. 63 [ 82 S.E.2d 38, 39-40 ] ; Hamilton v. State, 149 Miss. 251 [ 115 So. 42…
examined Cited "see" People v. Williams (3×)
Cal. · 1958 · signal: see · confidence high
(Roviaro v. United States, supra, 353 U.S. 53, 60-62 ; Portomene v. United States, 221 F.2d 582, 584 ; Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F.2d 627 , 628- 629; Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390 , 391 et seq.; United States v. Blich, 45 F.2d 627, 629 ; United States v. Keown, 19 F.Supp. 639 ; People v. Alvarez, 154 Cal.App.2d 694 , 696 et seq. [ 316 P.2d 1006 ]; People v. Castiel, 153 Cal.App.2d 653, 656-659 [ 315 P.2d 79 ]; People v. Lawrence, 149 Cal.App.2d 435, 450-452 [ 308 P.2d 821 ]; Crosby v. State, 90 Ga.App. 63 [ 82 S.E.2d 38, 39-40 ]; Hamilton v. State, 149 Miss. 251 [ 115 So. 427, 42…
examined Cited "see" United States v. Schneiderman (3×)
S.D. Cal. · 1952 · signal: see · confidence high
See Scher v. United States, 1938, 305 U.S. 251 , 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 ; Vogel v. Gruaz, 1884, 110 U.S. 311, 316 , 4 S.Ct. 12 , 28 L.Ed. 158 ; 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2374, 3d ed. 1940.
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Guerrero (3×)
S.D.N.Y. · 2009 · signal: see also · confidence low
Apr. 22, 2005) (citing United States v. Saa, 859 F.2d *428 1067, 1073 (2d Cir.1988)); see also United States v. Russotti, 746 F.2d 945, 949 (2d Cir.1984) (“[A]n informant’s identity need not be disclosed unless ‘essential to the defense.’ ”) (quoting Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 , 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 (1938)).
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Lenz (3×)
5th Cir. · 2006 · signal: see also · confidence low
See United States v. McLaughlin, 578 F.2d 1180, 1183-84 (5th Cir.1978); see also Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 255 , 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 (1938).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Alvarez
5th Cir. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See id.; see also Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 255 (1938).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Garcia (2×)
Ill. App. Ct. · 1982 · signal: see also · confidence low
Ed. 2d 639, 645 , 77 S. Ct. 623, 628 ; Portomene v. United States (5th Cir. 1955), 221 F.2d 582 ; United States v. Conforti (7th Cir. 1952), 200 F.2d 365 ; Sorrentino v. United States (9th Cir. 1947), 163 F.2d 627 ; see also Scher v. United States (1938), 305 U.S. 251, 254 , 83 L.
examined Cited "see, e.g." Ebarb v. State (6×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 1980 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 , 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 (1938).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Commonwealth v. Ortiz
Mass. · 1978 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Mills v. State (3×)
Ind. Ct. App. · 1978 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 , 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 (1938).
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Robert Charles Stevie, United States of America v. Raymond Lee Reynolds (6×)
8th Cir. · 1978 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 , 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 (1938) (warrantless search of automobile trunk for bootleg whiskey); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) (68 bottles of whiskey found behind upholstery of automobile seats); United States v. Collins, 532 F.2d 79 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 836 , 97 S.Ct. 104 , 50 L.Ed.2d 102 (1976) (bank robbery evidence found in trunk). 24 Relying upon these decisions, appellate courts have held that the exception to the warrant requirement extends to briefcases, suitcases, and other cont…
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Edward Lee Tucker (3×)
2d Cir. · 1967 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare, e. g., Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 , 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 (1938); United States v. Santiago, 327 F.2d 573 (2 Cir. 1964).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Malinsky
NY · 1965 · signal: see also · confidence low
(Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53, 61 , supra [emphasis supplied]; see, also, Scher v. United States, 305 U. S. 251 ; People v. Coffey , 12 N Y 2d 443, supra; United States v. Elgisser, 334 F. 2d 103, 110-111 ; United States v. Rosario, 327 F. 2d 561, 564 ; Costello v. United States, 298 F. 2d 99, 101-102 ; Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 817-818 ; Note, 76 ALR 2d 262 , 327-343; ALR 2d Supp.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Scher
v.
United States
49.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Dec 5, 1938.
305 U.S. 251
Mr. Gerald A. Doyle, with whom Mr. A. L. Greenspun was on the brief, for petitioner., Mr. Alexander Holtzoff, with whom Solicitor General Jackson, Assistant Attorney General McMahon, and Messrs. Mahlon D. Kiefer and Herbert A. Bergson were on the brief, for the United States.
McReynolds.
Cited by 369 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 88%
Citer courts: Ninth Circuit (6)
Me. Justice McRetnolds

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner Scher was found guilty under two counts of an indictment which charged violations of § 201, Title II, Liquor Taxing Act, January 11, 1934, [1] by possessing[*253] and transporting distilled • spirits in containers wanting requisite revenue stamps. He was sentenced for a year and a day, etc. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.

No objection to the judge’s charge is urged and the evidence submitted to the jury is adequate to support the verdict.

The material facts are not in serious dispute. A brief summation will suffice for the points to be considered.

Federal officers received confidential information thought to be reliable that about midnight, December 30, 1935, a Dodge automobile with specified license plate would transport “phony” whiskey from a specified dwelling in Cleveland, Ohio. About-nine-thirty, officers posted nearby saw the described automobile stop in front of the house and remain there for an hour. A man, with three women and a package, then entered the car and drove away. It returned shortly before midnight, stopped at the rear of the house and remained for half an hour. The headlights were extinguished; the officers heard what seemed to be heavy paper packages passing over wood. Doors slammed; petitioner drove the car away, apparently heavily loaded. The officers followed in another car. After going a few blocks petitioner stopped briefly at a filling station; then he drove towards his own residence two or three blocks further along. The officers followed. He turned into a garage a few feet back of his residence and within the curtilage. One of the pursuing officers left their car and followed. As petitioner was getting out of his car this officer approached, announced his official character, and stated he was informed that the car was hauling bootleg liquor. Petitioner replied, “just a little for a party.” Asked whether the liquor was tax paid, he replied that it was Canadian whiskey; also, he said it was in the trunk at the rear of the car. The officer opened the trunk and found eighty-eight bottles of distilled spirits in unstamped containers. He[*254] arrested petitioner and seized both car and liquor. The officer had no search warrant.

At the trial counsel undertook to question the arresting officers relative to the source of the information which led them to observe petitioner’s actions. Objections to these questions were sustained and this is now assigned as error.

Before trial petitioner’s counsel moved “to suppress all of the evidence obtained by the search made by the Revenue agents in the above entitled cause, together with all information obtained by reason of such search, and to grant an order requiring the agents to return all articles seized by reason of said search. . . .” In support of this he relied upon the facts above stated. Denial of this motion is said to be error.

The exception in respect of transporting liquor not intended for sale found in the statute affords matter for affirmative defense. Queen v. United States, 64 App. D. C. 301; 77 F. 2d 780.

In the circumstances the source of the information which caused him to be observed was unimportant to petitioner’s defense. The legality of the officers’ action does not depend upon the credibility of something told but upon what they saw and heard — what took place in their presence. Justification is not sought because of honest belief based upon credible information as in United States v. Blich, 45 F. 2d 627.

Moreover, as often pointed out, public policy forbids disclosure of an informer’s identity unless essential to the defense, as, for example, where this turns upon an officer’s good faith. Segurola v. United States, 16 F. 2d 563, 565; Shore v. United States, 60 App. D. C. 137; 49 F. 2d 519, 522; McInes v. United States, 62 F. 2d 180.

Considering the doctrine of Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (see Husty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694),[*255] and the application of this to the facts there disclosed, it seems plain enough that just before he entered the garage the following officers properly could have stopped petitioner’s car, made search and put him under arrest. So much was not seriously controverted at the argument.

Passage of the car into the open garage closely followed by the observing officer did not destroy this right. No search was made of the garage. Examination of the automobile accompanied an arrest, without objection and upon admission of probable guilt. The officers did nothing either unreasonable or oppressive. Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 30; Wisniewski v. United States, 47 F. 2d 825, 826.

The challenged judgment is

Affirmed.

1

Ch. 1, § 201, 48 Stat. 313, 316 (U. S. C., Title 26, § 1152a, 1152g)—

“No person, shall . . . transport, possess, buy, sell, or transfer any distilled spirits, unless the immediate container thereof has affixed thereto a stamp denoting the quantity of distilled spirits contained therein and evidencing payment of all internal-revenue taxes imposed on such spirits. The provisions of this title shall not apply to—
“(f) Distilled spirits not intended for sale or for use in the manufacture or production of any article intended for sale; . . .”

Sec. 207 — “Any person who violates any provision of this title, . . . shall on conviction be punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000, or by imprisonment at hard labor not exceeding five years, or by both.”